Outlook for Nuclear Power: Presentations at the Technical Session of the Annual Meeting--November 1, 1979, Washington, D.C. (1980)

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Nuclear Waste Management EARNEST F. GLOYNA* Problems involving the management of any type of waste frequently involves broad-scale public participation and occasionally encompasses a degree of technical complexity that does not lend itself to simple solutions. However, aggressive actions and intelligent choices in the available waste management options have consistently improved public health and have resulted in the betterment of man's total well-being. The current problems of radioactive waste management are akin to many of the historical public health issues.1 Every major public health issue concerning the treatment of water supplies, wastewaters, exhausted air, and solid waste have usually involved exhaustive debates. However, no previous set of technical solutions have met with such formidable resis- tance and have been attacked through the use of such pervasive uncer- tainties as that which surround commercial nuclear power and the associated radioactive waste. This paper addresses relevant issues concerning radioactive waste management as follows: (a) general background discussion of present and future waste generation rates, (b) radioactive waste management issues, (c) research requirements, (d) conclusions, and (e) policy recommendations for managing high-level radioactive waste. GENERAL BACKGROUND AND BASIS The radioactive wastes of concern are produced by the defense-oriented nuclear programs, the nuclear power utilities, research efforts, and medical activities. This discussion emphasizes high-level waste manage- ment. About 70 commercial nuclear power plants are generating electricity in the United States (99 under construction). Worldwide, there are about 2l0 commercial nuclear power plants in operation.2 In l977, l2% of all electricity in the United States was generated by nuclear power, and at times the Northeast and Midwest relied on *Earnest F. Gloyna is Dean of the College of Engineering, Joe J. King Professor of Engineering, The University of Texas at Austin, Austin, Texas 787l2. 5l

52 nuclear power for as much as 50% of their electric power needs. The existing nuclear power plants are reducing the electric utility industry's need for fuel oil by about l.5 million barrels per day. The present-day installed U.S. capacity is 50 gigawatts electric (GWe). It is generally assumed that 400 GWe could be available by the year 2000, after which it is anticipated that the capacity will level out or decline slowly depending on the availability of the necessary fuel. If no new reactors are placed into operation after 2000, the capacity would decline to zero by the year 2040. The waste derived from commercial nuclear power operations, whether low- or high-level, may be gaseous, liquid, or solid. Wastes that receive most attention today are those categorized as high-level, trans- uranic contaminated, and reactor spent fuel. Generally used definitions follow: l. High-Level Wastes (HLW) are the portion of wastes generated in the reprocessing of spent fuel that contain virtually all of the fission products and most of the actinides not separated out during reprocessing. If a final decision is made not to reprocess spent fuel, this would be categorized as HLW. The waste is characterized by high levels of pene- trating radiation, high heat-generation rates, and long radioactive half-life. Presently, about 270,000 m3 of high-level waste, mostly resulting from military operations, are stored in steel tanks and bins. To date, only about 2,300 m3 of high-level waste have been generated as a result of commercial reprocessing activities. Since April l977, no commercial reactor fuel has been reprocessed in the United States, but other coun- tries are reprocessing such fuel. 2. Transuranic (TRU) Wastes result predominantly from spent fuel reprocessing, the fabrication of plutonium to produce nuclear weapons, and plutonium fuel fabrication for recycle to nuclear reactors. TRU wastes are currently defined as material containing more than l0 nano- curies of transuranic activity per gram of material. Transuranic con- taminated waste is usually generated by plutonium fuel fabrication- reprocessing facilities and laboratories using transuranic elements. It is estimated that 370,000 m of these wastes have been buried or stored retrievable at five shallow-land-burial sites of the U.S. Depart- ment of Defense (DOE).5 There could be as much as 200,000 n\3 of commer- cial transuranic contaminated waste accumulated by the year 2000. Potential limits for shallow earth burial of transuranic elements have been fully examined by models of individual pathways to man.6 3. Low-Level Radioactive Wastes (LLRW) contain less than l0 nanocuries of transuranic activity per gram of material, or they may be free of transuranic contaminants, require little or no shielding, and have low but potentially hazardous concentration of quantities of radionuclides. Present production of solid, low-level radioactive wastes (LLRW), or that suspected of being radioactive, in the United States is about ll3,200 m3 or about 0.45 kg per person per year.7 This amount of solid waste is about the same as that produced by a city with a population of l00,000. The U.S. Department of Energy produces about 50% of the LLRW.8 4. Uranium Mine and Mill Tailings are the residues from uranium

53 mining and milling operations that contain low concentrations of natur- ally occurring radioactive materials. Uranium mill tailings, by volume, constitute the largest amount of all radioactive wastes. About l40 million tons of uranium mill tailings exist today.^ These wastes contain the natural radioactive decay pro- ducts of uranium in about the same concentration as the original ore. To control the movement of tailing particulates and gaseous radon-222, it is necessary to stabilize the tailing piles and localize the naturally occurring emissions. 5. Gaseous Radioactive Effluents are normally released to the atmos- phere and thereby become diluted and dispersed to a nonhazardous level. .These will not be discussed beyond this point. 6. Decommissioning Wastes are those wastes that occur as a result of dismantlement of reactor facilities. The volume and magnitude of this waste form is beyond the scope of this paper. One reference method of decommissioning is passive storage for 50 years before dismantlement. This time allows decay of most of the cobalt-60. Residual isotopes such as Ni-59 and Nb-94, 80,000-year and 20,000-year half-lives, respectively, require entombment consideration. RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT ISSUES The issues surrounding radioactive waste management embrace four basic considerations. These are: (a) U.S. policy as it relates to the spent fuel reprocessing question and fuel cycle evaluation, (b) waste manage- ment in terms of spent fuel handling and packaging and high-level waste solidification, (c) environmental impacts, and (d) sociopolitical con- siderations. Policy In the 25 years following the Atomic Energy Act of l947, nuclear sciences and technology flourished. In the l950's and l960's, industry carried forward many developments that were begun in the laboratories. By l975 federal policy was increasingly directed towards development of other energy resources. From l977 forward, this policy has shown a preference for nonnuclear energy sources. President Carter's nuclear policy statement of April 7, l977, empha- sized the nonnuclear policy. He announced indefinite deferral of commer- cial fuel reprocessing, redirected breeder R&D into alternative nonbreed- ing fuel cycles, proposed the cancellation of the breeder demonstration plant, and placed the breeder program on hold. In addition, the R&D program included two major studies—NASAP (Nonproliferation Alternative Systems Assessment Program) and INNFCE (International Nonproliferation Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation)—in which the principal conclusions will not be available until early l980. Today, there is general worldwide agreement with the President's policy of reducing the spread of nuclear weapons and bringing all nuclear power activities under international safeguards. However, there is wide

54 disagreement with the U.S. concept of self-denial of reprocessing of nuclear fuel and the timely development of the breeder. Obviously, waste management will be influenced by the nuclear fuel cycle that will be utilized. In the United States there exist three possible basic nuclear fuel cycle options: the once-through cycle, the uranium-only recycle case, and the uranium-plutonium recycle case. Figure l illus- trates possible waste sources and the general case for light water reactors. Two variations of the spent fuel cycle must be considered: deferred isolation of spent fuel in near-surface engineered facilities until dis- posal or reprocessing is permitted, and uranium reprocessing and recy- cling only with plutonium oxide stored at engineered surface facilities, or with plutonium remaining in solidified waste. It should be noted that about 40% less uranium ore is required and 30% less enrichment capability is needed if nuclear fuel is reprocessed. Also, the volume of reprocessed high-level solid waste, assuming no thermal constraints, could be as little as one-ninth that of the equivalent spent fuel. Current U.S. regulations stipulate that commercial high-level wastes must be solidified within 5 years of its formation.9 Waste Management Considerations Primary wastes from facilities generating fission products for both the once-through and plutonium-plus uranium recycle cases are presented in Table l. In the once-through cycle, irradiated fuel assemblies are isolated and considered to be a waste only if reprocessing is ultimately REACTOR FIGURE l Commercial nuclear fuel cycle and types of waste generated. •LEGEND HL-'MOH LEVEL* RAO WASTE I , •' iO« LEVEL* RAO WASTE T> MlLL TAJUNOS TRU- TRANSURANlUM-CONTAMlNATED RAO WASTE

55 TABLE l Primary Wastes from Facilities Generating TRU Wastes 10 Facility and Waste Type Fuel Cycle Volume, m3/MTHM Radionuclide Content, Ci/MTHM Fission Activation Products Actinides Products Nuclear power plant Once- Spent fuel through 0.4 FRP Recycle Fuel residue High-level liquid waste Gaseous wastes Combustible and compactable wastes Miscellaneous liquid and par- ticulate solid wastes Failed equipment and noncombus- tible wastes 0.32 0.6 l.8xl0C l.8 0.l5 0.65 3xl0 8xl0 lxl0C 8xl0" 2xl0] 2xl0 lxl0" lxl0 2xl0' 4xl0 lxl0: -2 2xl0 4xl0 2xl0 9xl0" 6xl0 -l disallowed. Assuming reprocessing does occur, then the radionuclide content, as shown in Table l, can be expected. The waste generated is shown as cubic meters per metric ton of heavy metal (m /MTHM) and the radionuclide content as curies per MTHM (Ci/MTHM). Table l is based on an assumed l,200 MWe nuclear power plant, an independent spent fuel storage basin, and a 2,000 MTHM/yr fuel-reprocessing plant (FRP).10 For each waste type, the waste management system involves: waste generation, waste modification/solidification, packaging, onsite interim storage, possible transport to a central site and interim storage, transport to isolation site, and final isolation/disposal. Advanced high-level radioactive waste management programs may involve a wide variety of alternatives. Presently, interim, near-surface retrievable storage and ultimate disposal in geologic formation presents a logical first generation solu- tion for safe containment and disposal. Seabed disposal is certainly a potential alternative. Transmutation or disposal through extraterres- trial means continues to be of research interest. Man-made structures in geological formations such as salt, granite, shale, and basalt are of major interest. Figure 2 illustrates the multiple barrier concept, which is foremost in the minds of many people involved in waste management. Herein solid- ified waste is contained in an environmentally acceptable mode through both engineered confinement and geological formations that serve as barriers. The fully engineered system would logically encompass con- sideration of the solid waste form, container, overpack, rock formation, and geographic isolation.

56 FIGURE 2 Multiple barriers. The multiple barrier concept involves immobilization, surveillance, and isolation. It may be depicted by a tri-component management system as shown in Figure 3. Immobilization is increased by appropriate solidi- fication. Emplacement of high-level solidified waste greatly increases the reliance on isolation and decreases the need for surveillance. The solid waste form may consist of a primary phase, which contains the radionuclides at the atomic and molecular level, and a secondary phase, which binds the primary phase particles in a matrix of a secondary material. Within the overall system, which utilizes fuel element repro- cessing, there exist a variety of options for producing solid waste forms: calcine, super sludge, ceramics, glass, metal matrix composites, and cement-concrete composites. One aspect of the system approach to waste processing comes into focus clearly in the selection of a specific geological site. Four levels of studies are required for selecting a geologic site: a data search, regional overlook, site specific study on a regional basis, and a local site specific investigation. Details are shown in Figure 4. Specific comments are warranted on the topics of spent fuel, spent fuel packages, high-level waste solidification, and the Swedish concept for high-level waste management. Spent Fuel Two major strategies (INFCE Working Group 7) have been con- sidered in development of environmental impact statements for spent fuel: strategy #l, LWR once-through fuel cycle; and strategy #2, LWR with full reutilization of plutonium as a fuel. The volume of wastes from strategy #2 is about twice that from strategy #l, but the aggregate fissile plutonium content in strategy #2 is reduced about 50-fold as compared to strategy #l. The heat generation rates per unit volume of heavy metal fed to the reactors differ substantially only after long times. This is of importance in regards to terminal storage or disposal.

57 HLtWta NCTMCVIMLE JSTOftACe ACCMfHT^ l MOCK u TION •/ ISOLATION •couKtc REPMITC Tom x-HH- 1LLW at REPROCEssma PLANT FIGURE 3 Tri-component management system. Spent Fuel Packages In the United States there is a program for experi- mentally packaging and storing spent fuel using facilities previously associated with the nuclear rocket program in Nevada. Several options are being investigated for encapsulating the spent fuel. Some options include: utilization of a metal matrix fill, sandfill, glassy or ceramic materials, and multiple-barrier encapsulation of the spent fuel and canister at the time it is declared a waste. To date, the most comprehensive study on packaging of spent fuel has been conducted by the Swedish Project Karn-Branse-Sakerhet (KBS).12 In this plan, the spent fuel would be stored on an interim basis in water for approximately 40 years. After this interim storage, groups of 500 fuel rods (l.5 MTHM) would be placed in a pure copper canister i L.TERATURE =DATA SEARCH ; -PROPRlETARY DATA TECTONlCS/SElSMlC TECTONlCS/SElSMlC -HlSTORY -MONlTORlNG -CLlMATlC RECORD - SUBSlDENCE RECORD -STRATIGRAPHY "> - STRATlGRAPHY » .REGlONAL A d _ SlTE SPEClFlC ^ 'OVERLOOK— vij -REGlONAL •'•s. la -HYDROLOGY ' -DEMOGRAPHY -j -GEOCHEMlSTRY -RESOURCE CONFLlCT -RESOURSE CONFLlCT - GEOMORPHOLOGY -PA LEO STUDlES -PETROLOGY -GEOMORPHOLOGY -TECTONlCS -STRATlGRAPHY -SlTE SPEClFlC LOCAL RESOURCE CONFLlCT - GEOPHYSICAL STUDlES - HYDROLOGY -MlNERALOGY FIGURE 4 Geological studies.

58 0.77 m in diameter with 20-cm-thick walls. After the canister has been filled with lead and a copper cover welded on the top, the entire canister would weigh about 20 metric tons. For final disposition, the canisters would be placed in granite at a depth of about 500 m. For emplacement the canisters would be placed in holes, some 7.7 m deep and l.5 m in diameter. Each hole would be lined with 40 cm of isostatically compressed bentonite. High-Level Waste Solidification U.S. policy has redirected high-level waste vitrification towards defense/military wastes and those associated with proliferation-resistant fuel cycles. One engineering unit, the Spray Calciner/In-Can Melter has operated at rates over 300 liters per hour (about 20 MTHM per day) for periods of 400 operating hours.11 This unit has been flexible with regard to waste composition and has successfully treated fuels with a very high sodium content by adding silicate to the feedstream. While the technol- ogy is well developed, the disadvantages involve capacity limitation to about 500 liters per hour, a requirement for vibrators to prevent scale buildup, and the need for additives if high-sodium wastes are calcined. Otherwise, the system is simple, releases low amounts of radionuclides, is capable of variable capacity, and has a long life. The In-Can Melter has been demonstrated through the laboratory, pilot-, and plant-scale systems. Over 40 engineering-scale canisters have been produced with nonradioactive glass. The Joule Heated Ceramic-Lined Melter is a new development in radio- active waste management and may replace the In-Can Melter system. This melter converts dry calcine and glass-forming frit to a molten glass. While the concept has been used by the glass industry for over 30 years, this system has not been operated in a remote hot cell. The United States, as well as other countries, has selected boro- silicate glasses as a contender for immobilization of high-level waste. Some question the stability of glass and containment, particularly in a salt environment. It is well known that time, temperature, and radiation affect the mechanical properties of the glasses. The rate of reaction increases with absolute temperature. The temperature or solidification matrix need not be the dominant factor in a waste disposal system design. The system design must always consider the interplay between solidification, immobilization, and iso- lation as it relates to the multibarrier concept. Yet, there are those who would contend that the containment unit must be capable of with- standing all environmental attacks for at least l,000 years. This solidification concept is difficult to justify. Environmental Considerations Environmental assessment generally follows the pathway of investigating potential effects associated with construction of waste management facilities, operation of the facilities, postulated accidents, transpor- tation of wastes, and decommissioning of facilities and equipment. A generic environmental impact statement might include: accident analysis,

59 atmospheric effect, resource requirements, radiological effects, health effects, ecological effects, and socioeconomic effects. Risk of radioactive release and effects of waste, as shown in Table 2, are related. Important mileposts may be divided into three time periods: (a) repository operation, (b) first l00 to 200 years follow- ing decommissioning, and (c) thereafter. Figures 5 and 6, respectively, show the relative ingestion toxicity of fission products from a light water reactor and common materials. ' After l,000 years several metals exhibit a higher toxicity index than the fission products and unrecovered plutonium. The toxicity index is related to the cubic meters of dilution water needed to produce permissible drinking water levels. Figure 7 shows a comparison of ingestion toxicity in western coal ash and nuclear reactor discharges. During the first 500 years, Sr-90 exerts a strong influence, thereafter the toxicity is less than that of ash from coal containing 24 ppm of uranium.15 The subject of criticality always seems to be of real concern to the layman. Criticality events have occurred in nature and the results of recent studies are providing an insight into the movement of radio- nuclides. At Oklo, Republic of Gabon, loss of fissiogenic isotopes during reactor operation (500,000 to 2,000,000 years) was restricted to noble gases. Later, some Cd, Mo, Rb, Sr, Cs, and I loss developed. The rare-earth elements were retained (roughly l00%) until the pre- sent.6'7 TABLE 2 Classification of Issues Risk of Radioactivity Release Effect of Radioactivity on the Biosphere Methods of Possible Radioactivity Escape Operational Period Flooding Vent to Air Waste/Rock Interaction Corrosion Brine Behavior Post-Operational Period Thermal Period Thermally Induced Fracturing Gas Generation Induced Fracturing Groundwater Transport Man-Caused Intrusion Container Movement in the Formation Water Intrusion Criticality Actinide Decay Period Climatic Changes Seismic Changes Groundwater Transport Man-Caused Intrusions Water Intrusion (Boreholes) Criticality Effects on the Geologic Formation Thermal Effects Waste/Rock Interaction Socioeconomic Impacts New Community Effects Psychological Aesthetic Civil Liberties Costs Distribution of Costs Impaction on Nuclear Proli- feration

60 10 K) icr 10° icr icr 10° STORAGE TIME, YEARS K)' 10° FIGURE 5 Ingestion toxicity of fision product from a light water reactor. ' Sociopolitical-Economic Considerations There is no question that radioactive waste management has become a worldwide problem. Yet, there exist disparate public concepts as to the basis of disagreement surrounding the nuclear question. For example, to one segment of the populace nuclear power is an important part of the energy system that is expected to spur economic growth and create jobs. ° To many, energy is the driving force for economic parity, and this significant fraction of the population is not ready to dump nuclear unless they are sure that the often-mentioned substitutes will keep this country going. Yet, in a country such as the United States, where public participation is only one essential element of a public accep- tance program, governmental efforts primarily designed to resolve con- flicts may in reality foster adversarial relationships. In the United States, in the system of widely disseminating alternative considera- tions,1* it is not uncommon for those committed to eliminating nuclear power for their own objectives to use the waste issue in initiating adversarial propaganda.

6l UNRECOVERED PLUTONlUM 10' MERCURY PITCHBLEND CHROMIUM SELENIUM LEAD CADMIUM SlLVER BARlUM iiiiiiiiU ARSEN ic URANlUM STRUCTURAL FlSSl0N MATERlAL—' I PRODUCT - ACTIVATION I PRODUCT ii l 10 l02 l03 l04 l05 l06 AGE OF WASTE-YR FIGURE 6 Toxicity index of spent fuel and high-level waste.14 The problem has become even more complex because there are those among us who choose to degrade the competence that exists in managing radioactive waste. The media calls it, "degrading the technical mys- tique." The erosion of confidence is brought about by a determined effort to retard the understanding of the social acceptance of commer- cial nuclear reactors and not permitting the development of waste management in a stepwise orderly manner. If each issue can be separated from speculative commentary such as "almost available clean energy," "sociopolitical consequences," and a host of other equally vague statements that lead to further decline of public confidence in technology's ability to deal with the problem, pro- gress may be reinstated. It is recognized that there need not be a "crash" program to place the first repository into operation. However, it is a fact that the lack of federal waste management to proceed expeditiously is seen by some people as a demonstrated lack of capability for managing these wastes and therefore the nuclear option is not viable. The placement of a moratorium or prohibition of deployment of the

62 (D to E o 'x o "in o> l0 13 1012 10" 10 9 10 8 l07 10 6 10 5 PWR Discharge Fuel U Mil Tailings 24 ppm U in Coal _Ash from Western _B[tu mj nou s_Coa I _ l ppm U in Cool 0.2 ppm U in Coal High-Level Wastes l I l l l 10 l02 l03 l04 l05 l06 l07 l08 Storage Time, years FIGURE 7 Comparison of ingestion toxicity in western coal ash, high- level wastes, discharge fuel, and mill tailings (uranium fuel 33.0 MWD/kg, cooled 0.4l yr before reprocessing.15 nuclear power option because of a perceived lack of technical competence for nuclear waste management is just not justified. According to the Atomic Industrial Forum, in l978 a nuclear kilowatt- hour of electricity cost about l.5 cents to produce, or the same as in l977. However, coal- and oil-generated kilowatt-hours cost, respec- tively, 2.3 and 4 cents in l978 as compared to 2 and 3.9 in l977. A National Economics Research Associates study estimates that the U.S. public will have to pay an extra $ll9 billion for electricity during the next 20 years if no nuclear power plants were allowed to start up. Further, the cost of waste management is not a significant deterrent for the decision to use nuclear-generated power. Estimates charged for having spent fuel, either on interim or ultimate disposal basis, have been about 0.l5 to l mill per kilowatt-hour. On the international scene, the United States has much to learn. Advanced programs exist in the United Kingdom, Belgium, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany. Similarly, the British incinerator design concept has been used in the United States. It appears that the trans- portation programs of Japan, the United Kingdom, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany are of interest to the United States because of the increasing technology for package design, testing, and risk accessment that is being developed by these countries.

63 The United States has four bilateral agreements relating to nuclear waste management. These are with Sweden, Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the United Kingdom. Agreements with Belgium and Japan are pending. RESEARCH REQUIREMENTS Although technology is available to initiate one or more demonstration schemes for either surface or subsurface deployment, there is always room for continuing research. Continuing research and ongoing field demonstration go hand in hand. Research in the "System Development" of nuclear waste management, i.e., storage, transportation, and disposal, must warrant high national priority. This research will assist in defining the longer-term (5-l0 year) nuclear waste management framework known as "System Deployment," i.e., development of strategic options, milestone definitions, and resolution of uncertainties. Candidate research areas are: (a) improved separation of transuranics and isotopes such as strontium and cesium from reprocessed wastes, (b) development of solidification alternatives, (c) measuring containment vessel interaction with solidified masses, and (d) evaluating inter- action of various engineered environments with alternative subsurface geologic media. All of this newfound information will be helpful in utilizing future site-specific data more efficiently. The national research and development program can become more effec- tive by: (a) eliminating proliferation of research into every conceivable "what if" question and proceeding with all available resources along pathways that have the potential of success as measured against an inte- grated and logical systematic assessment; (b) establishing realistic failure scenarios; (c) proceeding to obtain that basic data that contributes to the major source of gaps in geologic repository knowledge, i.e., site- specific data: encompassing geologic, hydrologic, geophysical, geo- chemical, and other information; (d) proceeding with in-situ tests to provide the information needed to develop systems designs that are conservative and workable; (e) differentiating between containment, i.e., protection of water supplies, and isolation, i.e., protection against intrusion; (f) delineating the first generation repository and waste forms so that engineered systems can be designed to mitigate risks, i.e., esta- blish guidelines so that thermal inputs can be controlled and thereby meet temperature related criteria; and (g) providing a workable and integrated assessment of "gaps and uncertainties" in scientific and technical knowledge related to geologic repository.

64 CONCLUSIONS While it has not been possible in this brief discussion to develop the full logic to support any extensive conclusions in this important area, the author has taken the liberty to state the following conclusions, which, in his judgment, can be supported and are fundamental in recom- mending a national policy on high-level radioactive waste management. These are: l. There is a well-developed technology that can be used to establish a geologic repository for pilot and demonstration purposes. There appears to be no technical obstacle to the selection of appropriate site and the design, construction, and operation of a subsurface repository. 2. There is a proven technology for the separation of radioactive waste from nuclear fuel; waste can be concentrated and solidified; residues can be incapsulated and transported; and these wastes can be stored either on the surface of the earth under interim-storage condi- tions or placed into a suitable geologic repository for demonstration, study, and ultimate disposal. Basically, these storage problems present no new difficulties, because throughout the history of the nuclear industry, it has been necessary to consider, evaluate, and utilitze the multiple barrier concept for radiation control. 3. The heat source term is subject to direct control by aging and/or dilution of the waste, waste package configuration, and repository emplaced spacing. Basic rock mechanics and heat transfer analysis are sufficiently advanced to enable conservative assessment and design of storage facilities. 4. There is an erosion of public confidence in technology to resolve the radioactive waste management problem. Much of this erosion has originated from those who use radioactive waste management, as almost any other waste management problem, to attack a primary target. It is time for the political leadership to recognize that nuclear power is a vital part of this country's well-being and that technology is available to safely store and demonstrate disposal. RECOMMENDED HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT POLICY There is an urgent need for a clear policy statement by the federal government to proceed with a comprehensive plan for the management of commerically generated high-level radioactive wastes. The following elements should be included in such a policy statement: l. The federal government must make it clear that it has sole res- ponsibility for the management and final disposal of all commercially generated high-level radioactive waste in a manner that is safe both for the present and future generations and with minimum impact on the environment. In support of this responsibility the federal government should establish the necessary regulations and procedures to cover: • processing of waste for acceptance by the government,

65 • designation of time of acceptance, • designation of place of delivery (including away from reactor [AFR] fuel storage, • acceptance of all future liability, • fixing compensation for residual value of spent fuel, • fixing cost of storage of disposal. 2. The federal government should proceed immediately to develop a waste disposal demonstration program based on the use of deep geologic repositories. The demonstration program shall provide continued research and development in both waste management technologies and the geophysical considerations of a geologic repository. Further consideration of other alternatives to geologic disposal, with the exception of deepsea bed disposal, shall not be required for NEPA, licensing, or program planning purposes. 3. Waste will be stored on an interim basis in engineered surface storage systems until such times when a final decision on waste repro- cessing has been made. The waste may continue in surface storage until they have cooled to a level that will minimize the potential uncertain- ties caused by the thermal behavior after disposal in a deep geological repository. REFERENCES l. Wolman, A. (ed. by G. F. White), Water Health and Society, p. 35, Ind. Univ. Press, Bloomington, Ind. (l969). 2. Anon., "World List of Nuclear Power Plants," Nuclear News, pp. 69- 87 (August l979). 3. Environmental Impact Statement, Management of Commercially Generated Radioactive Wastes, 1, p. l.7, U.S. DOE Report DOE/EIS-0046-D, Wash., D.C. (April l979). 4. Report to the President by the Interagency Review Group on Nuclear Waste Management, p.ll, TID-29442, Wash., D.C. (March l979). 5. Environmental Aspects of Commercial Radioactive Waste Management, p. l.4, U.S. DOE/ET-0029 UC-70, 1, Wash., D.C. (May l979). 6. Healy, J. W., and Rodgers, J. C., Limits for the Burial of the Department of Energy Transuranic Wastes, p. l-l2l, Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory Report LA-UR-79-l00, Los Alamos, N. Mex. (January l979). 7. Rust, J. H. et. al., The Shallow Land Burial of Low-Level Radio- actively Contaminated Solid Waste, p. 3, NRC, NAS, Wash., D.C. (l976). 8. "Nuclear Energy's Dilemma: Dispersing of Hazardous Waste Safely," p.iv, Report to Congress by the Comptroller General of the U.S. (September l977). 9. "Report of the Work Group on Radiation Exposure Reduction," Inter- agency Task Force on Ionizing Radiation, p. 34, Dept. HEW, PHS Center for Disease Control, Atlanta, Ga. (February l979). l0. 'Technology for Commercial Radioactive Waste Management, l, p. l.l3, U.S. DOE/ET-0028, Wash., D.C. (May l979).

66 ll. Platt, A. M., and McElroy, J. L., Management of High-Level Nuclear Wastes, Pacific Northwest Laboratory, Battelle Report PNL-SA-7072 (December l978). l2. Anon., Safe Handling and Storage of High-Level .Radioactive IVaste, Swedish KSrn-Branse-Sakerhet (KBS) Project Report, Stockholm, Sweden (l978). l3. Benedict, M., Pigford, T. H., and Levi, H. W. , Nuclear Chemical Engineering, Sec. Ed. (in prep.), McGraw-Hill, N.Y. (l979). l4. Heckman, R. A., Energy and Technology Review, Magnetic Fusion Research (October l977). Also, Ref. No. ll. l5. Pigford, T. H., "Radioactivity in Stored Cool Ash and in Nuclear Power Waste," Transactions American Nuclear Society, 29, pp. 293- 294 (November l978) . l6. Cowan, G. A., "Migration Paths for Oklo Reactor Products and Appli- cations to the Problem of Geological Storage of Nuclear Wastes," Natural Fission Reactor, Int. Atomic Energy Agency Technical Communication ll9, 620 p. (l978). l7. Brookins, D. G., Geochemical Constraints on Accumulation of Actinide Critical Masses from Stored Nuclear Waste in Natural Rock Reposi- tories, Office of Nuclear Waste Isolation, Battelle, Technical Report ONWI-l7, p. 9 (l978). l8. Wilson, M. B., "Articulating the Black Perspective," EPRI Journal, 4, 7, pp. 25-29 (September l979).