Evaluating Alternatives for Landside Transport of Ocean Containers (2015)

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133 Overview Advanced inland container transport technologies have been proposed as solutions to the capacity, congestion, and emissions issues facing marine container ports in dense urban envi- ronments. The proposals to apply advanced fixed-guideway technologies to inland container transport were generated by the desire and perceived need in Southern California to move con- tainers with zero local emissions and to take them off existing roads. These issues led Southern California ports and planners to search for a ZECMS that could supplement or replace conven- tional diesel truck drayage over public highways. The research team found that, as of early 2014, no zero-emissions container transport systems existed, nor were any planned in sufficient detail to be constructible. The proposed container movement technologies were, for the most part, drawn from passenger systems using Maglev, LIM, or LSM propulsion (e.g., rail transit and people-mover systems). As of early 2014, there have been no proposals for a complete system including the terminals, handling equipment, infrastructure network, and controls needed to replace truck drayage. Most technologies are conceptual; a few have been tested in prototype or model form. Terminal designs are conceptual at best. A definitive evaluation of ZECMS options is therefore not yet feasible. The capacity, cost, emis- sions, and congestion impacts of conventional diesel truck drayage are fairly well known; the equiva- lent factors for advanced transport technologies are not. There is, however, an ongoing interest in alternatives to truck drayage. Accordingly, this research project was sponsored to develop an evaluation method that could be used to evaluate future proposals. Proposed Evaluation Method The research team adapted conventional evaluation methods from related fields to derive a generic approach to evaluate both advanced container transport systems and the more conventional systems with which they would be compared. To do so, the research team • Identified the technical and operational elements required in a complete inland transport system for marine containers. • Identified the descriptions and metrics required for each element. • Prepared a spreadsheet model to link the required descriptors and metrics and quantify the system(s) as a whole. • Located representative values for each applicable descriptor and metric, using defaults from comparable experience elsewhere when system-specific values were unavailable. C H A P T E R 8 Findings and Conclusions

134 Evaluating Alternatives for Landside Transport of Ocean Containers • Developed corresponding spreadsheet model inputs for competing container transport systems (e.g., conventional electric railroads and low-emissions trucks). • Tested and calibrated the spreadsheet model in two case studies: the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach, and the Port of Baltimore. Figure 8-1 presents the basic evaluation steps. The research team found that this approach can yield useful system comparisons and suit- ability evaluations for both advanced fixed-guideway systems and truck drayage alternatives. The major near-term limiting factor on usefulness and precision is the availability of complete and accurate input data, not the method. If and when more concrete system proposals emerge, the method will likely be applicable. The other major limitation is the difficulty of quantifying and comparing very different non-technical factors such as congestion relief, neighborhood disruption, safety, security, and emissions reduction. The research team explored numerous approaches to quantifying and comparing these diverse costs and outcomes. In common with most such comparisons, however, there is no perfect method. Case Study Implications Overall Assessment The generic evaluation method developed in this study and followed in the two case studies appears to be valid, with the challenges coming in application rather than theory. DEFINE GOALS SELECT & WEIGHT CRITERIA DEFINE BASELINE LOCATE POTENTIAL CANDIDATES ASSEMBLE SCREENING DATA SCREEN IDENTIFY EVALUATION CANDIDATES ASSEMBLE EVALUATION DATA ANALYZE EVALUATE CHOOSE BEST CANDIDATE(S) Figure 8-1. Evaluation method structure.

Findings and Conclusions 135 Defining Goals Careful attention to goal definition and a rigorous analysis of the issues before considering the options was critical in the case studies, as anticipated. In both cases, the operative goals went well beyond the technical challenges and ruled out some major options even if they could have satisfied the technical criteria. Diverting port drayage trucks from existing streets and highways was an overriding concern in both cases. The ability of a proposed solution to divert trucks depends initially on capacity, and those options that did not provide new capacity (or use existing excess capacity) were screened out before technical or economic comparisons. In the absence of compulsion, new systems have to be cost-competitive and service-competitive with baseline truck drayage to divert trucks. Sys- tems with inherently high capital or operating costs, particularly intermodal systems that require additional transfers, cannot be expected to divert trucks. Minimum Screening Criteria Rigorous investigation of goals leads to equally rigorous specification of screening criteria, such as the need for new capacity. Essentially, minimum screening criteria should establish whether or not an option would, if successfully implemented, solve the problem or move stake- holders closer to their goals. If not, as in the case of options that would not increase capacity, cost and other factors are not relevant. Time Frames and Technological Readiness Decision and development timeframes are typically among the screening criteria, because stakeholders will not wait indefinitely for a solution. Advanced container transport systems are at low TRLs, and at even lower SRLs. The research team had to reformulate the case study questions to bypass the near-term focus, because otherwise all of the advanced technologies would have been screened out at the start of the analysis. The 2011 LA/LB Roadmap took a pragmatic approach and indeed screened out advanced fixed-guideway technologies on that basis (Figure 8-2). Figure 8-2. LA/LB Roadmap study summary matrix. Source: “Request for Concepts and Solutions for a Zero Emission Container Mover System—Findings and Recommendations,” memorandum from Eric C. Shen, August 2, 2010.

136 Evaluating Alternatives for Landside Transport of Ocean Containers Whether expressed as TRL, “constructability,” “implementation horizon,” or in other terms, the near-term availability of a given solution is a major concern. The uses of “constructability” and related concepts as screening criteria are directly related to the handling of technical risk. Constructability can encompass technology readiness, the certainty of an available right-of-way, engineering feasibility, and other factors that when compiled give decisionmakers insight into the likelihood of successful implementation in the chosen time frame. The evaluation method developed in this project proved applicable and useful in the Los Angeles-Long Beach and Baltimore case studies. The basic steps shown in Figure 8-1 were fol- lowed as far as possible in the case studies. In both cases, however, the research team had to re-define the evaluation goal to focus on potential long-term applications of advanced fixed- guideway technologies. These technologies cannot address the near-term problems of emissions, capacity, and congestion because they are not technologically ready for implementation. With a near-term implementation horizon, these technologies would have been screened out early in the evaluation process and the method itself would have remained largely untested. The 2010 RFCS and 2011 Roadmap analyses conducted for and by the Southern California ports reached the same basic conclusions: the proposed technologies were not ready. Implications for the evaluation method and how it is applied are summarized in the following sections. Time Horizon. The case studies highlighted the time horizon as a key factor in the evalu- ation process. The time horizon was explicit in the Baltimore case: the Port was seeking to add capacity in time for the opening of the new Panama Canal locks (then scheduled for 2015). The time horizon was less explicit in the LA/LB case, but the 2011 Roadmap analysis concluded that readiness of advanced fixed-guideway solutions was both distant and uncertain while the Ports faced near-term challenges that took priority. Performance Uncertainty. The LA/LB case study found that the capacity of advanced fixed- guideway technologies to relieve congestion at a competitive cost is in doubt. Under these cir- cumstances it is difficult to justify port or stakeholder investments in the technologies or in infrastructure to eventually accommodate them. The I-710 Alternatives Analysis reached this same conclusion, finding that other technologies (e.g., battery or electric trucks) were more likely to be ready within the planning horizon and to yield the expected capacity and performance. Until questions of potential performance and cost characteristics can be answered with rea- sonable confidence it will be difficult for proposed fixed-guideway technologies to either advance further or be permanently eliminated as container transport options. Goal Definition and Applicability. Goal definition, or its flip side—problem definition, emerged as a crucial step in the case studies. A wide range of goals, objectives, and purposes have been set forth for new container transport systems. Chief among these have been emissions reduction, congestion relief, and capacity enhancement. The research team found in the LA/LB case study that fixed-guideway technologies • Could offer only minimal emissions improvements because of parallel truck improvement. • Might not be able to reduce congestion because they would not be economically competitive. • Were not cost-effective in increasing capacity. The research team found in the Baltimore study that the key criterion for success of a new sys- tem would be reducing truck impacts in the Mount Clare community and that fixed-guideway technologies could not be effective in doing so. A focus on goal/problem definition revealed in both cases that advanced fixed-guideway tech- nologies could not attain the goal or solve the problem, even if they performed as proposed.

Findings and Conclusions 137 This finding suggests that a tight focus and careful specification of the goal to be pursued or the problem to be addressed is a vital first step in applying the proposed method. This finding also has implications for the inherent suitability of advanced fixed-guideway technologies for inland container transport, addressed in a following section. Such technologies may not offer effective solutions to the container transport problems facing U.S. ports. Implications for Advanced Fixed-Guideway Technologies Although the research team found that it was not yet possible to conduct a definitive evalua- tion of advanced container transport technologies, the information compiled during the project and the results of the LA/LB and Baltimore case studies have numerous implications for such technologies in general. Moving containers between two terminals is a conceptually simple objective, and some related fixed-guideway technologies have been proposed to meet that objective. For the most part, these proposed technologies draw on a few well-understood propulsion methods—Maglev, LIM, LSM, and conventional steel or rubber wheels on rail. There is, however, a large gap—perhaps a gulf—between conceptual transport between two terminals and a complete system of guide- way, vehicles, terminals, and control that can link multiple origins and destinations through the legacy infrastructure that surrounds most U.S. container ports. The broad implications for advanced fixed-guideway container transport systems are sum- marized in the following sections. Readiness and Completeness: Technologies vs. Systems A critical component of the evaluation process is the readiness of each option for implemen- tation. TRLs provide a relatively straightforward means to compare diverse technologies and approaches from a common baseline and would be useful in this application. The TRLs for integrated technology planning are summarized in Figure 8-3. • Many of the container transport proposals are in TRL 2, at the conceptual level but based on known principles. Source: “Request for Concepts and Solutions for a Zero Emission Container Mover System—Findings and Recommendations,” memorandum from Eric C. Shen, August 2, 2010. Figure 8-3. Technology readiness levels.

138 Evaluating Alternatives for Landside Transport of Ocean Containers • Some are at TRLs 3 and 4, corresponding to demonstrations of physical feasibility through laboratory experiments or testing. • A few of the line-haul technology proposals have attained TRLs 4 and 5 with the development and testing of models or prototypes. • None of the alternative technology proposals has reached TRLs 6 or 7 reflecting a shift from a laboratory or proving ground environment to first a “relevant environment” and then the “operational environment.” The technologies themselves are thus not yet ready for implementation, and the implemen- tation timeline for such systems is therefore both long and uncertain. Ports, regional planning agencies, and DOTs are generally in the business of implementing existing technologies, not supporting the development of new ones with uncertain payoff. A key point in the LA/LB 2011 Roadmap is that the Southern California ports needed to address existing problems and could not postpone action until advanced guideway systems were ready. In the Baltimore case study, the Port wanted a solution implemented in time for the opening of new Panama Canal locks in 2015. Although that target is likely to be missed by some margin of months or years, there was no guarantee that an advanced guideway system could ever be implemented at all, much less by 2015. In the Baltimore case, once the deadline could not be met, there was no need for such a system at all. The conceptual nature of the technologies and system elements also creates substantial technology risk in any public- or private-sector funding efforts. As became increasingly obvious in the early phases of this research, the biggest shortcoming of the advanced technologies is that they are not complete transport systems: • All of the proposals focus on point-to-point line-haul movement of containers. • Few of the proposals address the unloading/loading process needed at the terminals. • None of the proposals addresses the need to merge containers coming from multiple system origins or to distribute containers to multiple system destinations. For each TRL there would be a corresponding SRL as suggested in Table 8-1. Level TRL SRL 9 Line-haul technology proven by successful operation. Transport system proven by successful operation. 8 Line-haul technology qualified through test and demo. Transport system qualified through test and demo. 7 Prototype line-haul technology demonstrated in operational environment. Prototype transport system demonstrated in operational environment. 6 Model or prototype line-haul technology demo in relevant environment. Model or prototype transport system demo in relevant environment. 5 Line-haul technology component validation in real environment. Transport system component validation in real environment. 4 Line-haul technology component validation in lab environment. Transport system component validation in lab environment. 3 Analytical/experimental proof of line-haul technology concept. Analytical/experimental proof of transport system concept. 2 Line-haul technology concept and/or application formulated. Transport system concept formulated. 1 Basic line-haul technology principles observed and reported. Basic transport system principles observed and reported. Table 8-1. Technology readiness and system readiness.

Findings and Conclusions 139 Here too, none of the proposed systems have reached SRL 4 or above. Critical systems com- ponents, such as terminals and control systems, are still in the conceptual stage at best. Suitability of Advanced Fixed-Guideway Systems A fundamental conclusion from the LA/LB case study is that the advanced fixed-guideway con- tainer transport systems proposed to date are ill-suited for moving containers within 100 miles of port terminals. These systems lie in a no-man’s land between truck systems more suitable for short trips and conventional rail systems more suitable for long trips. Conventional rail systems create efficiencies by aggregating shipments into large trains. Research efforts have variously identified the minimum distance over which rail systems can compete with trucks at 500 to 750 miles. The shortest distances over which rail intermodal systems have had sustained success in competition with trucks are typically longer. There were some attempts to establish shorter rail intermodal services in the 1980s, but all were eventually abandoned. Ultimately, high capital costs must be spread over high volumes or long distances to be eco- nomically competitive. The advanced fixed-guideway technologies proposed to date have low capacities relative to highways or conventional railways and do not return sufficient economies of scale to be competitive over long distances. The technologies proposed for advanced fixed-guideway container transport systems are, as a rule, based on passenger transit systems. These technologies are generally well-suited to move- ment of light automated vehicles over short distances with passengers that load and unload themselves. The need to load and unload heavy containers with mechanical equipment on both ends of the trip dramatically increases the cost and complexity of the system. The cost and complexity of terminals and their operations cannot be economically spread over short trips. These findings suggest that the best use of advanced fixed-guideway systems is likely to be in new or rebuilt port complexes without legacy terminals or other infrastructure. The research team used the recently constructed container terminal complex at Shanghai as a possible example. In such cases • The cost of new fixed guideways can be compared with the cost of new highways. • The cost and space requirements of advanced fixed-guideway terminals can be compared with the same needs of on-dock rail intermodal terminals. • Marine container berths can be configured as multi-user facilities with a common fixed-guideway connection or, as in Oakland, grouped around a central core of fixed-guideway facilities. Although advanced-technology fixed-guideway systems would still face many challenges in those applications, several of the unique barriers in the LA/LB case would be absent. Suitability of Electric Trucks In contrast, the electric or hybrid electric truck systems using wayside power offer some intrinsic advantages in this application: • Relatively low incremental cost. The cost of adding catenary or other wayside power tech- nologies to existing highways or to new highways being planned (as in the I-710 case) is far lower than building new fixed-guideway. • Flexibility. Using the wayside power for part of the trip, battery-electric trucks can go any- where within battery range on each end. Battery-electric hybrids extend the range further, perhaps indefinitely. • Scalability. As the GNA study determined, a system of electrified highways begun as a port drayage corridor could eventually be extended to other freight corridors. • Terminal integration. Battery-electric trucks would integrate completely and costlessly with existing marine and rail terminals and also with importer/exporter and transloader locations.

140 Evaluating Alternatives for Landside Transport of Ocean Containers • Phased development potential. The highway infrastructure for electrified trucks provides addi- tional capacity, even before electrification is complete or electric truck technology is mature. As the I-710 analysis notes, this provides an opportunity to proceed with new, electrification- compatible highway infrastructure pending development of other system elements. • Shared vehicle cost. Battery-electric trucks would be owned by trucking companies that would thereby share the cost of the system. There is ample precedent for public-sector sub- sidy for “clean” drayage trucks. The development scenario analyzed here assumes a subsidy of $50,000 per truck—substantial, but far less than the total cost of a LIM or Maglev vehicle. Moreover, trucking companies will only invest in battery-electric trucks if they can reasonably expect to make a profit operating them. The private-sector role thus places a limit on the risk. • Technology readiness. Battery-electric or battery-electric hybrid technology is not yet off-the- shelf, but it is probably at TRL 5 or 6. Battery-electric drayage trucks have been demonstrated in real-world operation, and wayside electrical power is widely used by trolley buses and even by heavy-haul mining trucks. • Shared right-of-way. Battery-electric trucks do not need an exclusive right-of-way or a dedi- cated guideway. This feature increases constructability and allows for capacity utilization by other vehicles. Inherent Fixed-Guideway Limitations It became increasingly apparent in the compilation of technology descriptions that the devel- opers faced inherent limitations with fixed guideways in attempting to adapt technologies to container movement. The proposals to apply advanced fixed-guideway (e.g., rail) technologies to inland container transport typically adapt existing or conceptual passenger systems, rather than developing technologies specifically for the task. These passenger technologies, as it turns out, appear fundamentally unsuited for transporting containers in the present U.S. port context. Issues identified are discussed in the following sections. Throughput Capacity Passenger rail transit is typically viewed as a high-capacity alternative to highways. Transit trains of 10 cars with 150 passengers in each operating on 5-minute headways can move 18,000 passen- gers an hour over a single track. By comparison, a lane of highway with 1,200 vehicles per hour on 3-second headways with 1.7 occupants in each moves just 2,040 passengers per hour. The calculation, however, changes radically when the system is moving containers. Single- container vehicles moving at 60-second headways (the usual proposed interval) over a fixed-guideway can handle just 60 containers per hour. The highest proposed capacity for a fixed-guideway system is for 10-container vehicle consists at 90-second headways, or 400 containers per hour. It is not certain that such an operation is at all feasible, given the stopping distance required by an 800,000-pound consist of 10 fully loaded containers. Moreover, such an approach begins to resemble a conventional railroad rather than an advanced container mover technology. A lane of freeway can handle 1,200 containers per hour on trucks traveling at 3-second head- ways. This comparison leads to the ironic observation that if right-of-way is available for a new system, capacity would be maximized by paving it for trucks. The ability of fixed-guideway technologies to actually deliver those capacities in practice is ques- tionable and has yet to be demonstrated in a realistic port environment. ISO containers weigh a minimum of about 5,000 lb empty and a maximum of around 80,000 lb loaded, equivalent to 500 160-lb passengers. A single-container vehicle must therefore be capable of supporting, accelerating, and stopping a load equivalent to 3 to 5 loaded transit cars. It may not be possible to do so safely on 1-minute headways, particularly at the speeds often claimed for advanced technology systems. At a minimum, the container vehicles would need to be far more robust than transit vehicles, with

Findings and Conclusions 141 adverse implications for weight and cost. The tight headways might also be compromised by the need to allow for vehicle exit and entry in multi-terminal system configurations. The capacities of highways can be equaled by fixed-guideway systems when such systems resem- ble conventional railroads. A conventional train of 32 five-unit double-stack container cars can carry 320 40-foot containers. On 15-minute headways, such trains can move 1,280 containers per hour, equivalent to trucks on a freeway lane. However, it typically takes at least 4 hours to unload and reload a full double-stack train on each end of the trip, at a cost of $30 to $50 per container move. Such operations are therefore only practical and competitive over much longer distances than are considered here (e.g., a minimum of 500 to 750 miles in most instances) to allow the loading and unloading time and cost to be spread over a greater distance traveled. There is also an implied need for large terminals capable of handling hundreds of containers and multiple trains. Transit Time The guideway technologies proposed are all drawn from passenger applications in which short- haul transit time is very important and where the “cargo” is self-transferring. When applied to container transport, these technologies emphasize high speed and automation and, to date, largely ignore the need to load and unload the vehicles. High speed over short distances (under 100 miles) can be a priority when movement over the rail system constitutes the entire trip. A 100-mile trip at 30 to 35 mph over conventional roads can take 3 hours, whereas a 100 mph rail system can make the trip in an hour. The difference is likely to be of significant value to a passenger, especially one making a round trip. The 2-hour savings, however, is insignificant for a container making a 15-day, one-way trip between an Asian port and Chicago. The transit time issue recedes further in importance when the container is moving between an inbound vessel and a train scheduled for a fixed departure. As long as the container meets the railroad’s cut-off time for the train departure, reduced transit time is of no value. Terminal Design and Container Transfer A major limitation of fixed-guideway technologies in container transport is the loading/unload- ing function. The speed at which containers can be unloaded and reloaded on any transport vehicle is limited by the laws of physics. ISO containers weigh a maximum of around 80,000 lb loaded. Quick acceleration and braking of an 80,000 lb object would require massive force, with high likeli- hood of cargo damage and serious safety consequences. The largest quayside container cranes have a hoist speed of only about 4 feet per second (3 mph) with their rated container loads. Steady-state productivity for container cranes ranges from 20 to 30 moves/hour, or 2 to 3 minutes per move. Mobile lift equipment used in marine and rail intermodal terminals has a similar transfer rate. ISO containers can only be safely lifted from the top corner castings or supported on the bot- tom corner castings. They are not designed to be lifted, pushed, or pulled from other points. A complete lift-off/lift-on cycle consists of • Positioning the lifting device over the inbound container on the vehicle • Locking the lifting device into the top corner castings • Releasing any attachments to the vehicle (e.g., bottom corner castings from a rail car or twist locks on a road chassis) • Lifting the container clear of the vehicle • Transloading the container horizontally to the intended drop point or delivery vehicle • Lowering the container to the drop point or vehicle • Releasing the lift device from the top corner castings • Raising the lift device clear of the container • Positioning the lift device over the second (outbound) container • Lowering the lift device onto the top corner castings • Locking the lift device into the top corner castings • Lifting the container

142 Evaluating Alternatives for Landside Transport of Ocean Containers • Transloading the container horizontally over the outbound vehicle • Lowering the container onto the vehicle • Releasing the lift device • Raising the lift device clear of the container • Securing the outbound container to the vehicle Assuming that both containers are ready to be transferred and located within reach of the lift equipment and that the drop location is adjacent and clear, the unload/load cycle takes a minimum of 5 to 6 minutes. To this must be added the time to shift the lift equipment between vehicles. These times are incompatible with headways of 1 to 2 minutes or less and imply that the vehicle must be taken off the line-haul guideway for loading and unloading. This observation means, in turn, that vehicles must be spaced far enough apart on that line-haul guideway to allow for other vehicles to enter and exit the stream. The problem quickly increases in complexity if there are multiple terminals on each end of the trip, such as at LA/LB. The terminal operations also add capital and operating costs. Terminals are estimated to cost in the neighborhood of $250 million each. Comparable lift costs at rail intermodal terminals are typically $30 to $50 at high volumes, and $50 to $100 at lower volumes typical of the systems contemplated here. A lift-on at one end of a system and a lift-off at the other end would therefore cost $100 to $200 in addition to the one-way line-haul cost and any contribution to capital cost. By comparison, current (2014) round-trip truck drayage rates between the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach and the UP ICTF are $150 to $200. Some proposals envision direct transfer between vessel and the fixed-guideway system. Although perhaps physically possible, such transfers are not practical. Bringing the fixed- guideway system to the vessel side would be enormously disruptive to vessel operations. Efficient direct transfer assumes that vessel stowage has been arranged to suit, which is an untenable assumption given the realities of vessel stowage at foreign ports and multiple vessel calls. More- over, the need for the terminal to sort both inbound and outbound containers requires a buffer in the system, supplied by the terminal container yard. Utilization and Peaking All of the advanced fixed-guideway technologies proposed to date implicitly anticipate con- tinuous, automated operations of multiple vehicles on fixed headways. The throughput capac- ity of such systems is effectively a constant, i.e., 60 containers per hour for a single track with 1-minute headways between vehicles. Marine terminal container movements, however, display marked peaks and valleys in daily and weekly operations that appear poorly matched to the level capacity of proposed fixed-guideway systems. North American marine terminals typically operate a single day shift, e.g., 7AM–4PM or 8AM–5PM, with extended gate hours or additional shifts scheduled as required. Figure 8-4 shows a typical pattern of gate movements for a terminal that also closes at lunch time. The peaks and valleys during the day are evident. Some of this variability is because of the limited working hours—a 24-hour operation would show less peaking in the early morning and late afternoon. The late morning “valleys” reflect the time required for trucks to complete their first trip and return to the terminal for a second. Although these observations suggest that the most drastic peaks and valleys might be moderated, it is also apparent that a fixed-capacity transport system could be alternately over-taxed and idled during the working day. Day-of-the-week peaking is likewise pronounced, and being tied to vessel arrivals and depar- tures is intrinsic to containerized shipping. Figure 8-5 shows a typical weekly pattern, with ves- sel arrivals creating container movement peaks on Tuesday, Thursday, and Friday, and valleys between vessels on Monday, Wednesday, and weekends.

Findings and Conclusions 143 Figure 8-5. Example of weekly container terminal truck arrival peaking. Figure 8-4. Example of daily container truck arrival peaking.

144 Evaluating Alternatives for Landside Transport of Ocean Containers Finally, there are variations during the year, with agricultural movements and holiday goods creating seasonal peaks. This peak-and-valley variability creates difficulties for any fixed-capacity system: • A system capable of handling the peaks will be underutilized during the valleys. • A system sized to the valleys may be highly utilized at most times, but must be augmented with other systems during the peaks. • A system sized between the peaks and valleys will be alternately over-burdened and under-used. These observations suggest that a fixed-capacity system will operate significantly below its steady-state design capacity over time, unless it comprises such a small share of port container volume that it can always be fully utilized regardless of trade fluctuations. Flexibility and Scalability Fixed-guideway systems are inherently less flexible and less scalable than truck drayage using public highways. Although port terminals are rarely moved, their configurations and boundaries can change over time and new ones are added with some regularity. The pattern of container movement can also change with shifting international trade patterns, development of inland rail terminals, or emergence of new transloading and distribution facility clusters. Ideally, a fixed- guideway system (like a transit system) should act as a catalyst to such development, shaping the future rather than trying to react to it. Such a strategy is risky, however. Scalability is also an inherent problem with fixed infrastructure because it is “lumpy” in nature. That is, it must be built in complete and usable sections to be of any operational value. In addition, such systems are usually slow and costly to expand, reduce in size, or change in any meaningful way. Flexibility and scalability are especially salient issues in a changeable political environment, where new regulations, policy shifts, or other infrastructure projects can quickly change the economic and financial environments for better or worse. Closing Window of Opportunity for Emissions Solutions The passage of time and technological progress has shifted the relative environmental mer- its of advanced fixed-guideway technologies and highway drayage. When advanced Maglev and LIM technologies were first proposed in 2000 to 2005, the conventional alternative was diesel trucks with relatively high levels of criteria pollutant emissions. With EPA-mandated improvements in 2007 and 2010, current diesel trucks have far lower emissions and the advantages of fixed-guideway technologies have narrowed. The rapidly increasing supply and resulting lower cost of natural gas as a transportation fuel has made yet another solution to emissions and GHGs available. The emissions advantages of advanced fixed-guideway systems disappear completely in comparison with the most recent electric and hydrogen- hybrid truck technologies. All of these truck technologies are closer to implementation than the advanced fixed-guideway concepts. With clean or even zero-emissions trucks here or on the immediate horizon, advanced fixed-guideway solutions appear to be relatively distant, uncertain, and costly approaches to emissions reduction. Lack of Precedent for Operating Cost Subsidies The transit systems from which most of the proposed transport technologies are drawn are subsidized because they cannot recover their operating or capital costs from the farebox and the services provided are perceived as a public good. There is no precedent for such a subsidy for freight systems such as the advanced fixed-guideway proposals analyzed here. The lack of a clear subsidy mechanism puts the burden of diverting truck traffic on the commercial

Findings and Conclusions 145 characteristics of the technologies, where they compare unfavorably with even the cleanest and most expensive trucks. It is also typical for the transit applications from which these technologies are drawn to have relatively high capital costs because of complex engineering, automation, and other features. These capital costs are often supported by bonds or grants and paid back from tax revenue and other non-farebox sources such as advertising that are unavailable to container transport systems. Public-private partnerships (PPPs) are often mentioned as potential solutions to infrastructure funding dilemmas. To attract private capital, however, PPPs must offer a return on that capital. Making an advanced fixed-guideway system “profitable” would require a still larger public subsidy. System Costs and Regional Priorities The very high cost of new, elevated, high-technology infrastructure puts the initial system investment in the same realm as a passenger transit system. The cost estimates show that it would be impossible to recover the capital cost from revenues in a competitive environment—a circumstance shared by transit systems. The national shortfall in investment for conventional transportation infrastructure suggests that a large investment in landside container transport would not be a regional priority, even if funds were otherwise available. Most jurisdictions have substantial backlogs of unfunded highway and passenger transpor- tation projects that would likely take precedence over a container transport system. The 2012 Southern California Association of Governments Regional Transportation Plan, for example, calls for a total of $524.7 billion in transportation investments for the next 25 years, including $262.8 billion in capital projects. The plan includes $55 billion for passenger transit, $51.8 billion for passenger and high-speed rail, and $86.3 billion for highways and arterials. Existing revenue sources cover only $305.3 billion, leaving $219.4 billion dependent on new funding sources that may not materialize. The research team estimated that a fixed-guideway container transport system would add $10 billion to that unfunded burden. Scale Economies The need for advanced fixed-guideway systems and the scale economies required to support them may simply not exist at most U.S. ports. The high initial cost of advanced fixed-guideway systems can only be justified by very high throughputs, which may not be achievable. The relatively low expected volume of container trips in the Baltimore case would leave such a system seriously underutilized. The Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach will together handle about 15 million TEU in 2014, or roughly 8.5 million containers. Over half of that volume moves between the Ports and rail facilities or customer locations within the 100-mile range considered in this project. The advanced fixed-guideway proposals originated in this context. Other ports do not have nearly the potential scale of the Southern California ports. The next largest port complex, the Port of New York-New Jersey, will handle about 5.5 million TEU in 2014, or about one-third of the Southern California volume. The Port of Baltimore will likely handle around 700,000 TEU in 2014, or 5% of the Southern California volume. Legacy Infrastructure Barriers A final major shortcoming of advanced fixed-guideway is the difficulty of integrating such systems with existing infrastructure. Major container ports and the surrounding urban areas are typically heavily developed, with a profusion of structures, roads, rail lines, and water- ways over which a separate guideway system would be very difficult to superimpose. Marine container terminals have limited footprints and internal infrastructure planned for efficient

146 Evaluating Alternatives for Landside Transport of Ocean Containers ship-to-shore and shore-to-rail container transfer that would be disrupted by a new guideway operation. At legacy ports, particularly those set in developed urban areas, the feasibility of locating and developing right-of-way for a new guideway is often questionable. In the Baltimore case, a new guideway would require bridges, tunnels, or building through densely developed urban areas requiring years of permitting and approvals, congestion, noise, and other construction disrup- tions to the community. As the following figures illustrate, many U.S. ports have water on one side and urban develop- ment on the other. The Port of New York-New Jersey is a vivid example: the container terminals shown (Figure 8-6) are backed by a major freeway and the Newark International Airport. The Port of Seattle (Figure 8-7) is at the foot of the downtown business district. The Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach (Figure 8-8) are surrounded by development in every direction, including multiple freeways, refineries, rail yards, and residential neighborhoods. Although it may be possible to locate a technically feasible fixed-guideway path through urban development of such extent, the capital cost, political cost, and disruption would be enormous. Moreover, the magnitude of such a challenge raises doubt regarding feasibility, development time, and cost estimates that would be detrimental to a proposed system. Fundamentally, identified advanced technologies are unsuited for moving a low volume of containers through a developed area with inherently high infrastructure costs. The Baltimore case study suggests a more promising role for technologies, such as in-track LSM or wayside electrification (for trucks or trains) that could be retrofit to existing rail or highway infrastruc- ture. Where the primary goal is to reduce emissions, GHGs, and noise, rather than to increase capacity, electrification of existing infrastructure could become a competitive option. Of these Figure 8-6. Legacy infrastructure surrounding NYNJ container terminals.

Findings and Conclusions 147 Figure 8-7. Legacy infrastructure surrounding Seattle container terminals. Figure 8-8. Legacy infrastructure surrounding LA/LB container terminals.

148 Evaluating Alternatives for Landside Transport of Ocean Containers options only conventional rail electrification (via catenary or third rail) is a mature technology, with truck electrification at a lower level of technological readiness and LSM retrofits lower still. These technologies would face some specific implementation issues related to safety and clear- ances as exemplified by the Howard Street Tunnel in Baltimore. Zero-Emissions Are Not Enough: Mount Clare and SCIG Community concerns over truck movements include the mere presence of more trucks on local streets and highways in addition to emissions, noise, and safety. Eliminating emissions and reducing noise through alternative fuels or electrification may not be enough to gain community acceptance; the trucks must be diverted from local streets and highways. Although the two case studies exhibit distinct similarities and differences, community accep- tance is critical in both cases and will have strong implications for transport technologies. In Baltimore, the ability of CSX to develop a new terminal at Mount Clare will be largely deter- mined by how well the proponents can address community concerns such as • The presence of the terminal infrastructure itself • Terminal operations • Truck movements to and from the terminal In Southern California, the proposed BNSF SCIG terminal faces the same issues. In that case, BNSF has already committed to requiring the cleanest possible technology for trucks serving the terminal, including whatever zero-emissions technologies are available. Yet SCIG’s development is still encumbered with community objections to the presence of trucks and the presence of the facility itself. Just meeting a goal of zero-emissions is not enough in these circumstances and is unlikely to be enough in similar circumstances elsewhere. As the Baltimore case study notes, there is widespread community dislike of elevated guideways and a history of opposition to them. The Mount Clare and SCIG terminals are unlikely to be any more acceptable to the communities if elevated fixed-guideway connections are provided. These observations imply that the high capital cost of new zero-emissions systems, includ- ing electrified truck systems, may not result in community acceptance unless those systems can also take trucks off local streets and highways. Unfortunately, to do so, the new systems would have to extend their own infrastructure into the rail or marine terminals. Doing so increases the costs, complicates terminal design, reduces flexibility, and—most critically—adds more freight transportation infrastructure to the community. Favorable Conditions for Advanced Fixed-Guideway Technologies The research and case studies also yielded insights into the circumstances under which fixed- guideway systems are likely to be most competitive with conventional drayage. The applica- bility of advanced transport systems varies widely with port circumstances. This observation becomes apparent in both generic analysis and case studies, and is most relevant to the compari- son between fixed-guideway systems and flexible highway systems. The capital cost, operational complexity, and implementation difficulty of fixed-guideway systems escalates dramatically from single point-to-point systems to multi-terminal networks. In particular, the dramatic cost and implementation challenges inherent in building fixed-guideway systems in complex, developed urban settings suggest that such systems are more likely to be feasible in simpler “greenfield” applications.

Findings and Conclusions 149 The above considerations imply that advanced guideway technologies are poorly suited to replace truck and rail systems at existing ports, but might be more competitive as part of new port designs and developments. Unfavorable and favorable conditions for advanced fixed- guideway systems are outlined in Table 8-2 and discussed in further detail below. Los Angeles and Long Beach together have 13 active container terminals dispersed along 5 miles of waterfront, greatly increasing the cost and complexity of any fixed-guideway system (Figure 8-8). Ports such as Seattle and Virginia (Norfolk) also have multiple terminals separated by land or water. System complexity and cost would be materially reduced if the marine termi- nals could be served by a single-container transport system terminal. At Oakland, for example, the container terminals surround the BNSF and UP railyards (Figure 8-9). As with marine ter- minals, having multiple inland points on the system adds to cost and complexity. At Savannah (Figure 8-10), the container terminals are more or less contiguous and could conceivably be served by a single connection to a fixed-guideway system (given that they have common access to a rail intermodal terminal at present). The Houston Barbours Cut terminal (Figure 8-11) has no internal divisions except for the western portion operated by APM (where the divide is just moveable concrete barricades). Barbours Cut is served by a single rail terminal and could likely be served by a single terminal if a different fixed-guideway system were introduced. Large, multi-user terminals are the norm in international container ports. Figure 8-12, for example, shows the terminal complex in Amsterdam, with a core of rail facilities in the middle. Multi-user terminals of this kind would likely be more conducive to advanced fixed-guideway development in addition to simplifying terminal requirements. Unfavorable Condions Favorable Condions Multiple separate terminals Single mul user or clustered terminals sharing a system connecon Legacy marine terminals New, purpose designed marine terminals Exisng on dock rail No on dock rail or opportunity to integrate system Wheeled container terminals Stacked container terminals Wheeled inland terminals Stacked inland terminals Low terminal automaon High terminal automaon Multiple inland points Single inland point Legacy ROW challenges New or clear ROW context Elevated (sunken, tunneled) ROW Surface ROW One weekday terminal shi (8/5) Mulple terminal shis (24/7) Exisng truck drayage No truck drayage, or exclusive system use More demand peaking Less demand peaking Very short distance Medium distance Very long distance Medium distance Exisng/planned emissions reducons in competing modes Unaddressed emissions problem No precedent for operaons subsidy Precedent/willingness to subsidize operaons Table 8-2. Unfavorable and favorable conditions for advanced fixed-guideway systems.

150 Evaluating Alternatives for Landside Transport of Ocean Containers Figure 8-9. Port of Oakland configuration. Figure 8-10. Port of Savannah configuration.

Findings and Conclusions 151 Figure 8-11. Port of Houston Barbours Cut configuration. Figure 8-12. Port of Amsterdam configuration.

152 Evaluating Alternatives for Landside Transport of Ocean Containers Few legacy container terminals could easily add a fixed-guideway transfer point within their existing footprint. At a minimum, the terminal would have to surrender a significant portion of its long-term throughput capacity to convert existing container yard space to a new use. Many terminals would require extensive and costly rebuilding to add a fixed-guideway terminal within their perimeters. On-dock rail intermodal terminals are, in fact, fixed-guideway transfer points and give some idea of the scale. The on-dock intermodal yard at the Hyundai terminal in Tacoma, for example (Figure 8-13) occupies 28 of the 137 terminal acres, or 20% of the total footprint. Moreover, an existing on-dock rail terminal may form an obstacle to entry of a second fixed-guideway system. The research team did not find that any efforts had been made to develop shared terminals that could accommodate both conventional and advanced fixed- guideway technologies. “Wheeled” marine and rail terminals in which containers are parked on road-going chassis (Figure 8-14) favor truck drayage over fixed-rail systems. Drivers can pick up or drop off a container on chassis without the assistance of longshore labor or a lift machine, at a sig- nificant savings in time and cost. Fixed-guideway systems that require lifts and labor would be at a disadvantage. In stacked terminals (Figure 8-15), transfers to and from trucks should require the same basic lift functions as fixed-guideway (or conventional rail) systems would, at least in principle, placing the modes on a more equal footing. Marine or rail terminal automation should also favor a fixed-guideway system that is itself automated. As U.S. container terminals increase throughput and transition from steamship line supply of chassis, they will likely also tend to shift from wheeled to stacked operation. Many are already stacked. In the long run, then, wheeled operations may cease to be barriers to fixed-guideway technologies. Figure 8-13. Port of Tacoma Hyundai terminal.

Findings and Conclusions 153 Figure 8-14. Wheeled marine container terminal. Figure 8-15. Stacked marine container terminal.

154 Evaluating Alternatives for Landside Transport of Ocean Containers A previous section discussed the difficulties faced by system planners in finding routes through the legacy infrastructure surrounding most U.S. ports. Marine terminals developed away from most existing infrastructure may be more suited to advanced fixed-guideway technologies. Examples include the Bayport terminal at Houston (Figure 8-16), the APM terminal at Ports- mouth (Figure 8-17), and Deltaport at Vancouver, BC (Figure 8-18). The Deltaport terminal is a particularly good illustration, because its development involved creation of a causeway to carry rail and highway traffic. A new right-of-way such as at Deltaport presents system planners with a clean slate. Most U.S. container terminals work a single weekday shift. This practice would effectively constrain a fixed-guideway system to about one-third of its potential capacity, leaving it chronically underutilized (as marine terminals often are at present). If the fixed-guideway system is automated, the marginal cost of operating it 24 hours daily may be very low. This potential capacity would be wasted if it can only operate in conjunction with an 8-hour week- day terminal shift. Longer terminal operating hours are more common in other countries. Fixed-guideway systems would likewise benefit from an even workload, rather than daily and weekly peaking. The need to elevate, depress, or even tunnel the fixed-guideway is another factor in high capital costs and difficult implementation. Research team estimates suggest that elevation adds around $20 million per mile to capital costs. The nature of electrically powered, unmanned systems, however, often leads to elevation to maximize safety. Basically, a decision to auto- mate and electrify a system is a decision to grade-separate it through developed areas. Although some systems have been illustrated with drawings of vehicles operating in the center of freeways (Figure 8-19, for example), having such medians and accessing such medians requires advance planning. The freeways serving Los Angeles and Long Beach, for example (I-710, I-110, SR103) Figure 8-16. Port of Houston Bayport terminal.

Findings and Conclusions 155 Figure 8-17. Port of Virginia APM terminal. Figure 8-18. Port of Vancouver Deltaport terminal.

156 Evaluating Alternatives for Landside Transport of Ocean Containers have only concrete barriers for medians. The main arterials serving Seagirt at Baltimore have no medians at all. Distance poses a problem for fixed-guideway technologies. It is not clear from the informa- tion that the research team was able to compile that there is a distance range in which advanced fixed-guideway technologies could have a competitive advantage. At very short distances, e.g., less than 100 miles, their terminal costs and time requirements handicap them in competing with trucks. Over longer distances, e.g., 500 to 750 miles, conventional rail becomes a more cost-effective and productive mode. These technologies are competitive in the passenger realm for short trips between airport terminals or, in the case of BC Skytrain, within a confined metro- politan area. In the airport application there is often no alternative, and thus no need to com- pete. The original BC Skytrain LIM system extends about 17 miles from downtown Vancouver to King George Station and takes about 40 minutes to make the trip. A fixed-guideway option would be guaranteed success if there were no truck drayage alter- native, either because of infrastructure constraints or by regulation (e.g., a port truck ban). Although this observation may be irrelevant at existing ports, future terminals could be accessed via exclusive-use causeways or rights-of-way rather than public highways. Electrically powered fixed-guideway technologies (or any electric options) would be more attractive where trucks had unaddressed emissions problems. As U.S. EPA diesel emissions stan- dards tighten and drayage fleets gradually turn over, this will no longer be the case at U.S. ports. The issue may have greater impact in developing nations that do not yet have effective diesel emissions standards. Finally, the likely need for substantial capital funding and ongoing operating subsidies implies a greater chance for success where there are precedents for such public support. The United States has few, if any precedents for permanent operating subsidies for cargo movement. Nations with a nationalized port system, steamship line, railroad, or airline may have such precedents or be willing to establish a subsidy without an obvious precedent. These findings suggest that the best use of advanced fixed-guideway systems is likely to be in new or rebuilt port complexes without legacy terminals or other infrastructure. Earlier, the research team used the recently constructed container terminal complex at Shanghai as a possible example. Figure 8-17, as a North American example, shows the recently constructed Figure 8-19. I-710 in Southern California.

Findings and Conclusions 157 APM terminal at Portsmouth, which is connected to the highway system via a dedicated road. This highly automated terminal also has a rail intermodal transfer facility on its north perimeter. Unconstrained by surrounding infrastructure, a new terminal of this type could present an opportunity to integrate, rather than retrofit, a new technology. Figure 8-16 shows the Bayport terminal at Houston, again with little legacy infrastructure to constrain access. In such cases • The cost of new fixed guideways can be compared with the cost of new highways. • The cost and space requirements of advanced fixed-guideway terminals can be compared with the same needs of on-dock rail intermodal terminals. • Marine container berths can be configured as multi-user facilities with a common fixed- guideway connection or, as in Oakland, grouped around a central core of fixed-guideway facilities. Although advanced-technology fixed-guideway systems would still face many challenges in those applications, several of the unique barriers present in the LA/LB case would be absent. Point-to-Point “Greenfield” Applications Point-to-point movement of containers between a single marine terminal and a single inland point is conceptually and pragmatically the simplest case for applying alternative container transport systems. The application is further simplified in so-called “greenfield” developments where there is no legacy infrastructure or background pollution. These ideal circumstances are most likely to occur in new port developments or stand-alone expansions at existing ports. In these cases a “single marine terminal” is likely to be a large multi- berth, multi-user facility typical of European and Asian ports. These terminal configurations offer the opportunity to link with a container transport system at a single common point, or along a loop. The inland terminal configuration would likely be similar. By no coincidence, this system geometry closely matches typical people-mover configu- rations at airports. These systems commonly operate in loop or semi-loop patterns, with vehicles operating at fixed headways in either or both directions. These single configurations also favor automated operations, because no switching or merging is required in routine operations. Unlike people movers at airports, however, introducing additional “stops” into container transport systems greatly increases the operational complexity. For people-mover systems (or rapid transit systems), adding an intermediate stop requires adding a fixed time for passengers to get on and off. A typical stopping time for an airport people mover is 25 to 45 seconds, with train headways of 2 to 4 minutes. In contrast, the unload/load cycle for a marine container is 5 to 6 minutes, although the proposed systems have headways of around 1 minute. It is thus infeasible to unload and reload container vehicles on the through track. Splitting the configura- tion into separate unload and load tracks reduces the time to about 3 minutes, but this is still too long for on-track transfer. Greenfield applications also offer the substantial advantage of design freedom, as opposed to the far more costly and disruptive alternative of building a new system through a network of legacy infrastructure. Agile Port Applications The “agile port” concept has multiple meanings depending on the context in which it is used. The relevant “agile port” concept for advanced container transport systems is a system

158 Evaluating Alternatives for Landside Transport of Ocean Containers that (1) moves import containers from the marine terminal to an inland satellite terminal for sorting and onward movement and (2) moves export containers from the inland satellite terminal to the marine container terminal itself. Within the agile port concept, a container transport system would shuttle the unsorted import containers and sorted export containers between marine and inland terminals. In concept, the unsorted movement of import containers would free space at the marine terminal and increase throughput capacity within a limited footprint. By delivering sorted export containers to the marine terminal in a timely fashion, such a system would likewise increase outbound terminal capacity. The closest U.S. example is the Virginia Inland Port, which operates as a satellite to the Port of Virginia (Norfolk/ Portsmouth). In that case, however, the shuttle services are provided by a conventional rail- road in discrete trainloads, rather than by advanced transport technologies moving indi- vidual containers. Implications for Truck Drayage Systems Truck drayage systems range from existing diesel trucks moving over public highways to electric trucks moving over exclusive right-of-way. The LA/LB case study demonstrated that the proposed evaluation method was valid for truck drayage options. Most free-running truck drayage options consist of privately owned and operated trucks with clean and efficient propulsion systems. The EPA 2007 and 2010 standards for diesel engine emissions serve as a baseline, because the drayage fleet is constantly transitioning to newer vehicles. Options include natural gas, conventional electric hybrids, hydrogen fuel cell hybrids, and battery-powered units. Most options are relatively well-understood and well-documented compared to fixed-guideway technologies, with both prototype and com- mercial units operating in the port environment as of 2014. Because their transportation performance is basically identical to existing trucks and their emissions performance has been measured, the remaining uncertainty is over their long-run cost characteristics. In each case, new units mix interchangeably with older units on highways and in terminals. Neither the highway nor the terminals require modifications, simplifying the evaluation process as well as reducing the cost. True electric or battery-electric truck systems draw power from the highway, typically from overhead wire (catenary). In the most commonly discussed configuration, the powered highway would be used for the “line-haul” trip, with battery operation between the “end of wire” and the terminals or other locations at either end. A battery-electric truck could therefore serve distribu- tion centers and other shipping/receiving locations within battery range, as well as marine and rail terminals. Terminals would not need modifications, and roadways would need the addition of catenary and power supply systems. Here too, the technical performance of the separate technolo- gies is well understood, with uncertainty focused on the performance of the combined system and costs of vehicles and infrastructure. Complications arise in the evaluation method when long-term roadway capacity is an issue. In the Baltimore case, the truck volume between the Port and Mount Clare was rel- atively small, and a small part of the overall highway traffic. Moreover, CSX committed to moving the containers by rail if volume passed a stated threshold. The cost of highway capacity, therefore, was not a practical consideration in the truck drayage alternative. In the LA/LB case, however, traffic congestion on I-710 was a major issue, and plans were being formulated to add truck lanes. The question facing the I-710 planners was whether to allow for the incremental cost of fixed-guideway system or electric truck power over the lanes they were already planning to add. If the cost of the new lanes themselves were not considered in the truck drayage alternative, comparisons with a fixed-guideway on a separate route with

Findings and Conclusions 159 its own infrastructure costs would be heavily skewed toward the trucks. This observation is crucial because one of the major reasons for considering fixed-guideway alternatives was to divert trucks from public roads. The capacity comparison is further complicated by the observation that fixed-guideway sys- tems can only be used for trips within a closed system, but new freeway lanes can be used by any eligible vehicle. Adding lanes to I-710 will facilitate truck movements of all kinds, port drayage trips among them. The benefits of added highway capacity therefore accrue to non-port trucking customers as well as to port drayage. These considerations imply that great care must be taken in applying the proposed evaluation method to truck drayage to ensure that capacity additions or the need for capac- ity are correctly analyzed and that the treatment of truck and fixed-guideway options is equitable. Policy Questions The analyses presented suggest that advanced fixed-guideway systems will not be able to compete commercially with truck drayage systems. This observation implies in turn that customers—ocean carriers, 3PLs, brokers, importers, exporters, and others that control cargo and pay the bills—will not use such systems voluntarily. Some fundamental policy questions have not yet been addressed and are unlikely to be resolved in the near future: • Can the public sector require the private sector to use a more costly transport option to achieve public goals? To some extent, the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach (and other ports) have done so by implementing clean truck plans, which require customers to use motor carriers with “clean” trucks and thus pay higher prices. The emerging requirement for electric “shore power” to avoid idling vessels in port is another example. In both these cases, the regu- lations increased the cost of an existing mode without requiring customers to switch mode, and the regulations were based on public air quality and health objectives. Proposals to require drayage operators to use employee drivers and meet other conditions as part of the CAAP were struck down, however, after legal challenges, which suggests limits to the power of ports to intervene in the business decisions of other stakeholders. • Could ports or regional transportation agencies ban truck drayage entirely for some category of container moves and require customers to use fixed-guideway transport instead? There are myriad examples of truck bans on specific routes or in specific parts of cities, but not in industrial areas where truck transportation is integral to commerce. There are also weight limits for trucks, and restrictions on the movement of tank trucks and hazardous materials. These restrictions, however, are almost entirely safety based and do not lead to mode shift. • Can the public sector induce port customers to use more costly transport options to promote public goals? All U.S. passenger transit systems are subsidized and charge fares that are less than their full economic cost. Transit systems are subsidized in two ways: by reducing or eliminating the cost of capital and by subsidizing operations. Although there are many variations on these strategies, both are applicable to advanced fixed-guideway con- tainer transport systems or, indeed, any transport system. The cost estimates for advanced fixed-guideway systems indicate that capital costs will be very high. Given that fixed-guide- way operating costs alone are expected to be higher than truck drayage costs, attempting to pay for those capital investments through transport charges would raise those charges far beyond a competitive ceiling. Any financial inducement to divert truck drayage trips to a fixed-guideway system, therefore, would have to be substantial. To date, there has been little or no public-sector interest in massive freight subsidies.

160 Evaluating Alternatives for Landside Transport of Ocean Containers For the most part, these broad policy issues remain unaddressed in the goods movement field. Multiple policy tools are in use to influence the mode choice of passengers, including transit subsidies, tax incentives, HOV lanes, and selective auto bans. Outside of emissions regulations and funding for inland waterways, few, if any, policy tools are being used to influence mode choice among freight customers. In the United States, the public sector supported the development of waterway, rail, and highway networks for freight to various degrees. Various agencies have likewise offered limited support (e.g., research grants) for the development of new freight technologies and for a limited number of freight infrastructure projects. The advanced fixed-guideway container transport technologies proposed to date do not appear to be effective solutions to emissions, capacity, and congestion problems at U.S. ports. The question remains, however, whether a genuinely promising new technology could be supported if it were not commercially viable.

Abbreviations and acronyms used without definitions in TRB publications: A4A Airlines for America AAAE American Association of Airport Executives AASHO American Association of State Highway Officials AASHTO American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials ACI–NA Airports Council International–North America ACRP Airport Cooperative Research Program ADA Americans with Disabilities Act APTA American Public Transportation Association ASCE American Society of Civil Engineers ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers ASTM American Society for Testing and Materials ATA American Trucking Associations CTAA Community Transportation Association of America CTBSSP Commercial Truck and Bus Safety Synthesis Program DHS Department of Homeland Security DOE Department of Energy EPA Environmental Protection Agency FAA Federal Aviation Administration FHWA Federal Highway Administration FMCSA Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration FRA Federal Railroad Administration FTA Federal Transit Administration HMCRP Hazardous Materials Cooperative Research Program IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers ISTEA Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 ITE Institute of Transportation Engineers MAP-21 Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act (2012) NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration NASAO National Association of State Aviation Officials NCFRP National Cooperative Freight Research Program NCHRP National Cooperative Highway Research Program NHTSA National Highway Traffic Safety Administration NTSB National Transportation Safety Board PHMSA Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration RITA Research and Innovative Technology Administration SAE Society of Automotive Engineers SAFETEA-LU Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (2005) TCRP Transit Cooperative Research Program TEA-21 Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (1998) TRB Transportation Research Board TSA Transportation Security Administration U.S.DOT United States Department of Transportation

TRA N SPO RTATIO N RESEA RCH BO A RD 500 Fifth Street, N W W ashington, D C 20001 A D D RESS SERV ICE REQ U ESTED ISBN 978-0-309-30848-9 9 7 8 0 3 0 9 3 0 8 4 8 9 9 0 0 0 0 N O N -PR O FIT O R G . U .S. PO STA G E PA ID C O LU M B IA , M D PER M IT N O . 88 Evaluating A lternatives for Landside Transport of O cean Containers N CFRP Report 34 TRB