Evaluating Alternatives for Landside Transport of Ocean Containers (2015)

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74 Background For the LA/LB case study, the research team used the proposed method and cost model to determine whether advanced container transport technologies have a place in long-term solutions to the challenges facing Southern California ports and communities. In so doing, the research team effectively re-examined the issues addressed in the previous studies. The research team’s objective was twofold—to test the method and to develop insights regarding the long-term prospects for advanced container transport technologies themselves. The available information on advanced technologies and systems incorporating those tech- nologies is far too sparse to support definitive cost estimates or performance metrics. This case study therefore combines available estimates and information with additional estimates devel- oped by the research team to fill the gaps. A case study involving the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach is appropriate for several reasons: • Together, the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach (LA/LB) form the largest, busiest, and most complex container port in North America. • The advanced container transport and advanced drayage concepts considered in this project first emerged in response to emissions and congestion problems in Southern California. • The two port authorities have considered alternative container transport systems in three successive initiatives. • Development of the EIS for expansion of Interstate 710 serving the ports considered advanced container transport systems as well as advanced drayage systems. • Southern California experience with low-emissions, LNG, and hydrogen-hybrid drayage tractors provides more complete real-world comparisons. The multi-stage LA/LB consideration of container transport options has been driven by more than just the desire to move containers efficiently and with minimal emissions. Communities, interest groups, and regulatory agencies are deeply concerned over the regional impacts of current and projected container movements. Every port expansion or improvement project is closely scrutinized. To obtain the cooperation and acquiescence of these organizations, the ports must demonstrate a pro-active approach to reducing emissions, congestion, and other impacts. The ports are therefore effectively compelled to investigate and, where justified, support the development of low-emission and zero-emission technologies. The LA/LB situation is the most prominent example of a broader national and international trend. Recognition and documentation of container port externalities is leading regional planning, political, and regulatory bodies to require stringent mitigation and remediation efforts. Ports are facing increased opposition to expansion plans unless regional stakeholders see earnest efforts C H A P T E R 6 Los Angeles/Long Beach Case Study

Los Angeles/Long Beach Case Study 75 to reduce both current and future impacts. Given this increasingly adversarial context, ports everywhere will need to make good-faith efforts to locate and implement the most community- friendly transport technologies. The evaluation method must therefore satisfy the demands of regional stakeholders for due diligence as well as the port’s own financial and development requirements. Context Terminals The pieces of the Southern California port “puzzle” include numerous terminals and connectors. There are about 13 active Port marine container terminals (Figures 6-1 and 6-2). There are two major off-dock rail intermodal terminals (BNSF’s Hobart and UP’s Los Angeles yards, both about 20 miles from port terminals, Figure 6-3). UP has three regional facilities, but the Los Angeles facility on Washington Blvd. (technically in City of Commerce) handles almost all of the international containers. The “Inland Empire” includes a cluster of distribution centers and other import/export customers straddling Riverside and San Bernardino counties roughly 70 miles inland from the ports (Figure 6-4). With 13 active or developing container terminals, 9 port intermodal yards, 2 near-dock rail intermodal yards, 2 more distant (20 miles) rail intermodal yards, and the possibility of service to inland ports or satellite terminals within the 100-mile study radius, many different system configurations are possible. There have been no concrete proposals for advanced-technology systems linking these points in any combination. Studies to date have implicitly or explicitly assumed different configurations. The I-710 Alternatives Study, for example, examined a system linking the port terminals to the off-dock terminals 20 miles inland, but not to the near-dock terminals because it was examining alternatives to expanding I-710 which trucks use to reach the off-dock terminals. The 2010 RFCS, in contrast, focused on service to the near-dock rail terminals. Source: http://www.polb.com/facilities/maps/cargo/asp Figure 6-1. Port of Long Beach container terminals.

76 Evaluating Alternatives for Landside Transport of Ocean Containers Connectors At present, container movements to and from the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach are spread over highways and conventional rail lines. The major highways connecting port terminals with local, regional, and national origins and destinations are Interstates 110 and 710, with I-710 taking the greater truck traffic burden, as shown in Figure 6-5. About 50 to 60% of all container drayage trips are contained in the 20 miles between the ports and downtown Los Angeles. Source: Port of Los Angeles website Figure 6-2. Port of Los Angeles container terminals. BNSF Hobart UP Los Angeles UP ICTF BNSF SCIG Courtesy of The Port of Long Beach Figure 6-3. Near-dock and off-dock rail intermodal terminals.

Figure 6-4. Inland Empire—representative terminal site. Figure 6-5. Highway network for ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach.

78 Evaluating Alternatives for Landside Transport of Ocean Containers Efforts to increase the capacity of I-710 have been going on for more than a decade, with the current EIR/EIS preparation now in its 7th year (as of early 2014). I-710 is the subject of a major expansion project covering the 18 miles north of the ports. Estimated right-of-way and construc- tion costs for the preferred expansion alternative in 2010 dollars are about $5.3 billion. Approximately 26% of container movements to and from the ports are handled at the nine on-dock rail intermodal terminals. Rail operations in the port area are handled by Pacific Harbor Line (PHL). PHL connects marine terminals with UP and BNSF, operating over the Alameda Corridor (Figure 6-6). Operations beyond the Alameda Corridor are handled by UP and BNSF on their own networks. About 14% of port container movements are drayed to and from near-dock and off-dock rail yards (Figure 6-3). UP operates the Intermodal Container Transfer Facility (ICTF) about 4 to 6 miles from the marine terminals. Containers are drayed over local streets and highways between the marine terminals and the ICTF. BNSF has proposed development of the SCIG on a site just south of the ICTF (Figure 6-3). SCIG would be served by “clean” trucks exclusively under commitments made by BNSF. BNSF and UP also have “off-dock” rail intermodal terminals about 20 miles inland from the ports (Figure 6-3). These terminals are accessed primarily from I-710. There are no regular Figure 6-6. Pacific Harbor Line map.

Los Angeles/Long Beach Case Study 79 container movements by rail between the ports and the near-dock or off-dock rail intermodal terminals. Container Flows Several Southern California container flows might be served by a new inland transport system (Figure 6-7). The current proportions of these flows are given in Figure 6-8. Local Customer Imports and Exports Containers with customer origins or destinations in the immediate vicinity of the port terminals (e.g., within a 20-mile radius) are moved directly to and from the marine terminals via truck drayage. These dispersed flows would not be candidates for technologies that required additional transfers or movement to and from an inland system terminal. Figure 6-7. Container flows to/from port terminals. On-dock Rail Marine Container Terminal Near-dock Rail Off-dock Rail National O-Ds Local O-Ds Regional O-Ds Local Transloaders Local Depots Candidate Flows for New System Poor Candidates for New System Figure 6-8. Shares of major container flows.

80 Evaluating Alternatives for Landside Transport of Ocean Containers Local Transloads The transloaders near the port terminals concentrate substantial volumes in each location. Southern California transloading is dominated by imports, with empties returned to port ter- minals. Once transloaded to domestic containers and trailers, the imports are either drayed to rail terminals or trucked to destinations. These flows are also likely to be poor candidates for a fixed or exclusive guideway system. Near-Dock Rail Intermodal UP’s ICTF is roughly 4 to 6 miles from the marine terminals, as is the site of the proposed BNSF SCIG terminal. These terminals receive import containers from most of the marine terminals and dispatch export and empty containers in return. The volumes concentrated at these terminals makes the near-dock flows candidates for application of advanced technologies, although the short distances involved may constrain the competi- tive advantages. Off-Dock Rail Intermodal The BNSF Hobart and UP East Los Angeles rail intermodal terminals are close together about 20 miles from the ports (Figure 6-3). The large volumes involved and greater distance traveled makes container flows to and from these terminals prime candidates for advanced technologies. On-Dock Rail Intermodal Containers transferred to and from rail cars at on-dock rail terminals (Figure 6-6) would not ordinarily be candidates for advanced transport technologies. Intraregional Imports and Exports Containers trucked to and from points in the 20- to 100-mile range could be candidates for advanced transport technologies if the flows were sufficiently concentrated. The obvious candidates would be flows to and from the Inland Empire, roughly 85 miles from the Ports. The feasibility of an inland port serving these flows was extensively analyzed in a report for SCAG in 2008. There have been tentative proposals for inland ports at other locations in Southern California, but, as yet, none have a significant concentration of import/export container flows. Interregional Imports and Exports Containers trucked to and from dispersed points outside the port region would not be good candidates for advanced-technology systems. The best candidates for an advanced- technology system would therefore be near-dock rail intermodal, off-dock rail intermodal, and Inland Empire flows, with Inland Empire flows being concentrated at a single terminal in that market area. Project History There have been four major studies of alternative container transport systems in Southern California: • The 2006–2008 ACTTEC by Cambridge Systematics/URS (2008 ACTTEC) • The 2007–2009 Alternative Goods Movement Technology Analysis Initial Feasibility Study Report prepared by URS for the Metro I-710 Expansion EIR (2009 AGMTA) • The 2009–2010 Request for Concepts and Solutions for a Zero-Emissions Container Movement System (2010 RFCS)

Los Angeles/Long Beach Case Study 81 • The 2011 Roadmap for Moving Forward with Zero-Emissions Technologies at the Ports of Long Beach and Los Angeles (2011 Roadmap) The purpose of the 2008 ACTTEC project was “to conduct a systems analysis of advanced transportation technologies for moving containers from the ports to the Intermodal Con- tainer Transfer Facility (ICTF) and the proposed Southern California International Gateway (SCIG).” The preliminary assessment was essentially a screening process. Proponent responses to questions were taken at face value and not, at this stage, analyzed or evaluated. The second stage, the “Technical Inquiry,” asked proponents to respond to a list of questions based on two hypothetical service scenarios. Third, proponents were asked for cost estimates. The final step combined the commercial and technical scoring. The ACTTEC study was essentially an early- stage survey and readiness assessment. The state-of-the-art had not progressed far enough to support quantified analysis against absolute selection criteria. For the 2009 I-710 EIR Feasibility Study, that project team evaluated various container trans- port system proposals as alternatives to freeway expansion. This effort involved a feasibility study to determine if any of the proposed systems could be substituted for additional freeway capacity. This was a very different research question than that posed in the 2008 ACTTEC study. The 2010 LA/LB RFCS solicited proposals to achieve the general goal of “Moving containers between marine terminals and near-dock intermodal facilities by an alternative mode of transport that generates zero-emissions at no cost to the Ports and ACTA (Alameda Corridor Transporta- tion Authority).” As it turned out, none of the proposals could demonstrate capabilities of these kinds; the technologies were not sufficiently mature nor were the financial assumptions sufficient to generate market-based solutions. The evaluation process effectively defaulted to a screening exercise in which none of the candidates passed initial screening. In September 2011, the Ports completed the “Roadmap for Moving Forward with Zero-Emissions Technologies at the Port of Long Beach and Port of Los Angeles” (2011 Roadmap). This effort corresponds to the next step in overall progress toward a working system and resulted in com- mitments to demonstration projects, research and development support, and help with securing other funding. No commitments were made to build or implement any of the proposals. Decisionmakers The two port authorities and the regional planning agencies (chiefly the Southern California Association of Governments—SCAG, and the South Coast Air Quality Management District— SCAQMD) would be the key decisionmakers in the LA/LB case study. Although the port authorities are not technically responsible for transportation beyond their terminal boundaries, they have effectively been given that responsibility and accepted it. The two port authorities sponsored three previous studies. Any container transport system would connect at port-owned marine terminals. Fixed-guideway systems would require new infrastructure at those terminals, presumably built with port funds. Truck systems would use existing or expanded entrance/exit gates, again built with port funds. The ports need completed, approved EIRs to proceed with infrastructure projects to accommodate growth. To obtain local and regional concurrence on those plans, the ports needed to reduce port-related congestion and emissions or at least make good-faith efforts to do so. Local agencies (e.g., SCAQMD), communities, and interest groups have opposed and delayed port plans that do not remediate existing conditions. Project plans must therefore include measures that not only mitigate project impacts, but reduce the impacts already occurring. In effect, the ports have accepted a measure of responsibility for inland transport congestion and emissions in return for cooperation with expansion plans. This is a clear example of the “social license” and “TBL” concepts discussed below in the context of evaluation criteria.

82 Evaluating Alternatives for Landside Transport of Ocean Containers The ports cannot fund or implement an inland container transport system on their own. Although they have accepted some responsibility for transport activity beyond their terminals, they lack authority over inland infrastructure and operations or the financial capability to build an inland system. Inland infrastructure would require regional, state, and possibly federal funds. To obtain those funds, a new inland container transport system will need the support of the metropolitan planning organization (SCAG), the regional air quality authority (SCAQMD), and the State of California. State and federal transportation infrastructure funding decisions are increasingly based on regional and state plans that aggregate local and regional proposals into long-range programs. Local projects are aggregated into Metropolitan Transportation Improvement Plans (MTIPs) and Regional Transportation Improvement Plans (RTIPs), which are in turn aggregated into State Transportation Improvement Plans (STIPs). To progress upward through this funding process, an inland container transport system will need to start with regional approval by SCAG and SCAQMD. The users of the proposed evaluation method, therefore, would be the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach, SCAG, and SCAQMD. Approval by these organizations would likely be contingent on acceptance by communities and interest groups, but those stakeholders are more likely to react to proposals and proposed approvals than to conduct a completely independent evaluation. The customer is not represented in the formal approval process. Private industry stakeholders— importers, exporters, ocean carriers, truckers, and railroads—typically have opportunities for input, but no role in the evaluation or approval process. Their cooperation is essential for project success, but they may not be given a choice. There is an emerging exception to the absence of customer participation. Increased concerns with both the image and the reality of being environmentally responsible and “green” have led some major importers to focus on the criteria pollutants, fuel use, and GHG emissions in their supply chain. This concern has become manifest in requirements for drayage contractors to be “green,” specifically by using “clean” or alternative fuel drayage tractors. Concerned importers have been willing to pay higher drayage prices for “greener” trucking services. The primary focus of these concerns, however, has been local Southern California drayage, rather than rail intermodal trips, and may not be relevant to this case study. Evaluation Objective The research team devoted considerable attention to the match between evaluation method and evaluation purpose. Deciding whether or not to build a multi-billion dollar system, for example, requires a very different and more extensive evaluation than deciding whether or not to award technology developers a $100,000 research grant. For this case study, the research team defined the decision question as Which inland transport systems would be cost-effective approaches to reducing port-related criteria pollutants, traffic congestion, greenhouse gas emissions, and capacity constraints within the current port planning horizon (2035)? This question was intentionally quite specific. It had been established through multiple previous studies that advanced fixed-guideway proposals are not sufficiently advanced or complete to be implemented in the near future (roughly defined as the next 5 to10 years). When, if ever, will such technologies become cost-effective options? Attempting to lay out a timeline for system

Los Angeles/Long Beach Case Study 83 development is unlikely to be fruitful or accurate. A more useful approach would be to define the circumstances under which such technologies would become cost-effective options. With that information in hand, the ports and regional planning agencies can decide when and if to investigate such technologies further. The question also requires a match between systems and circumstances. There may be circumstances under which no system can succeed and systems that cannot succeed under any realistic circumstances. The question is also specific about what advanced transport technologies are expected to do: reduce criteria pollutants, reduce traffic congestion, reduce GHG emissions, and increase transport capacity. To be of value to ports and the public sector with limited resources, the systems should be a cost-effective means of achieving those ends compared to a well-defined baseline. This decision question does not require the chosen system to be an exclusive approach to these goals. A significant part of defining the circumstances under which such systems can be cost-effective will be defining the container movements for which they are most advantageous. The sheer volume and complexity of marine container flows at LA/LB virtually guarantees that no single approach will suffice. The question being asked in this case study, then, is not whether or not a specific technology should be implemented in Southern California, but which generic options would make sense in the future. If there are no circumstances in which these technologies would be cost-effective compared to the baseline, then they have no future role. If there are circumstances where they would be advantageously deployed, that finding will be of value to all concerned. Defining Goals Goal definition is a critical first step in both designing and evaluating a container transport system. The complexity of the Southern California port context makes the goal discussion multi-dimensional. Over the past decade, the two ports have struggled to accommodate growing trade while responding to escalating community concerns over emissions and traffic congestion. The 2008–2010 recession reduced trade through Los Angeles and Long Beach and temporarily eased criticism from the community, but the two ports remain under pressure to reduce emissions and traffic impacts. The major response to community concerns has been the development and implementation of the joint LA/LB CAAP. This plan provided for the progressive retirement of older drayage tractors and replacement with tractors meeting 2007 engine emissions standards. Implementation of this plan, together with recession-induced cargo reductions and other measures, reduced truck- related port emissions by roughly 90% between 2005 and 2010 (1Q12 CAAP Implementation Report). Besides reducing emissions in surrounding communities, these improvements have reduced the marginal environmental benefits of other technologies, notably electric power. In parallel with implementation of the CAAP, however, the perceived need to both reduce emissions and reduce congestion on existing roadways stimulated interest in electrically powered systems that would run on fixed, exclusive guideways. Social Goals The major social goals for an alternative technology system are emissions reduction, conges- tion relief, and community impact reduction (including issues such as noise and land use). Outwardly, it would appear that those goals are best served by a system with no local (“tailpipe”) emissions that diverted truck drayage trips from shared roads and freeways onto an exclusive

84 Evaluating Alternatives for Landside Transport of Ocean Containers right-of-way outside sensitive communities (especially residential areas, schools, and so forth). The ZECMS proposals were direct responses to those goals. Transportation Goals The transportation goals include efficiency, capacity, stability, flexibility, and compat- ibility with existing and planned operations and infrastructure. Outwardly, those goals would best be met by low-cost, high-capacity solutions based on available technology and infrastructure. The social and transportation goal sets have some points in common: • The solution must be environmentally acceptable, at least meeting current regulatory standards. • Operating efficiency ordinarily also minimizes energy consumption, pollutant emissions, and greenhouse gas emissions. • Higher capacity increases the system’s ability to divert trucks from roads and freeways. Economic Goals Where these goals may diverge is in system cost. The analyses conducted by and for the ports indicate that a ZECMS on exclusive fixed-guideway will be costly to build and costly to operate even under favorable assumptions. It appears highly unlikely that such a system could recover its capital and operating costs in competition with conventional truck drayage. There is a major potential divergence between goals that can only be achieved through large-scale subsidies and goals that can be achieved either without subsidy or with a more modest initial investment. The problem definition is the “flip side” of the project goal, but alignment between problem and goal cannot be taken for granted. In the LA/LB case, the overall problem is larger than the proposed project scope or goals, and the difference is instructive. Ports in Southern California and elsewhere are increasingly being held accountable for and judged by the TBL. This trend is linked to the effective assumption by port authorities for port-related community and environmental impacts beyond port boundaries, as discussed above. The “triple bottom line” has been variously defined. For this analysis, the TBL is interpreted as encompassing social/community and environmental issues as well as traditional economic or financial measures. The TBL concept is closely related to the “social license” concept used in Canada. From this perspective, a port is granted an implicit license to operate, so long as its operations remain reasonably congruent with overall social goals. To the extent that such social goals are reflected in the economic, environmental, and social/community elements of the TBL, the concepts are equivalent. Social/Community Issues The Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach face social and community issues, as well as technical challenges. The social challenges include establishing and maintaining a cooperative working relationship with regulatory agencies, communities, and interest groups. This relationship is sustained by demonstrations of port responsiveness as well as by actual emissions and conges- tion reduction progress. In this connection, it is particularly important for the Ports to be seen as making a good-faith effort to find and implement solutions. Much of the attention paid to advanced technologies can be attributed to this need to sustain community relationships. Advanced container transport technologies were proposed to address community concerns with

Los Angeles/Long Beach Case Study 85 emissions and congestion, and the ports would be seen as unresponsive and unconcerned if they did not follow up on these technology proposals. The 2009 request for solutions can be seen as a direct expression of this concern by the Ports. The 2012 Roadmap carefully documents the Ports’ reasons for not pursuing the fixed-guideway technologies. Environmental Issues The environmental issues relevant to this case study include Emissions from Truck Drayage. The key criteria pollutants of concern are HC, NOx, CO, and PM2.5. Significant clusters of asthma, lung cancer, and other environmentally related health threats have been identified in communities adjacent to I-710, with emissions from diesel trucks popularly considered the main culprits. Some community stakeholders have referred to the affected area as the “diesel death zone.” The interest in zero-emissions technolo- gies is directly attributable to the public and regulatory concern over criteria pollutants from diesel drayage trucks. GHGs. GHGs are a significant environmental concern in this case. GHG emissions are generated by burning fossil fuel, releasing carbon dioxide, and adding to the carbon footprint of the supply chain. Conversion to natural gas fuel would reduce, but not eliminate, GHG emissions. Zero-emissions systems that eliminate local tailpipe emissions also eliminate local GHG emissions. Although electric power still has a carbon footprint, it is not a local concern. Noise. The proximity of communities to the I-710 makes noise from truck drayage part of the problem. Congestion. I-710 is regularly congested, with port drayage trucks being conspicuous con- tributors to that congestion. Congestion can extend to surface streets and arterials in the general area of the ports and is a major factor in the broader category of environmental concerns. Safety is a corollary concern. To alleviate congestion, a solution must divert the trucks themselves from existing routes. Economic Issues The third aspect of the greater problem facing the ports and the region is economic. California in general and Southern California in specific have been in fiscal crisis for several years, with tax revenue falling far short of escalating infrastructure needs. The 2012–2035 SCAG Regional Transportation Plan anticipates expenditures of $524.7 billion in FY 2011–2035. The financing plan anticipates covering $305.2 billion from core (i.e., existing) local, state, and federal sources. The $219.5 billion shortfall is to be made up from “new revenue sources and innovative funding strategies” such as mileage fees, a federal freight fee, and e-commerce taxes, that may or may not materialize. These observations suggest that the region cannot reliably finance the transportation infrastructure it views as vital, leaving little likelihood that it could finance a multi-billion dollar container transport infrastructure project. The Southern California ports are reluctant to support initiatives that would raise the cost of shipping through the LA/LB gateway. Competition between West Coast container ports is intense. Both the Southern California ports and their competitors are very sensitive to any cost difference that can be turned to competitive advantage. The level of competition is being raised by the construction of the new, larger Panama Canal locks. The Southern California ports are seeing widespread predictions of substantial cargo diversions because of predicted Panama Canal cost advantages. From an investment perspective, the two ports have limited capital and

86 Evaluating Alternatives for Landside Transport of Ocean Containers limited bonding capacity. They would prefer to devote the available capital and borrowing capa- bility to marine terminal infrastructure. As reflected in the 2009 request for solutions, the ports are interested in proposals that do not involve port investment or subsidy. Critically, there is no precedent for ongoing public-sector subsidy of freight operations, particularly in California. There have been instances where California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) funds or other sources have been used to purchase freight transportation equipment or for demonstration projects, but not to subsidize ongoing operations. The Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach are not subsidized themselves, but are expected to generate net revenue for their cities. These considerations lead directly to the Ports’ preference for a private-sector DBFOM (design, build, finance, operate, and maintain) approach to a ZECMS. Neither the ports nor the regional agencies are ever likely to have the capital or subsidies to do otherwise. Technical Challenges Reducing port-related criteria pollutants, GHGs, and traffic congestion while adding capacity is not a simple undertaking, and entails multiple technical challenges. Criteria pollutants (SOx, NOx, HC, and PM2.5) can be reduced through the use of cleaner engines, through electrification, through operational efficiencies, or through some combination of strategies. With 2007-compliant or 2010-compliant diesel engines as a baseline, there is relatively little scope for improvement within diesel technology. In this context, cleaner engines would need to be alternative fuel engines (LNG or hydrogen), hybrids (which achieve lower emissions through increased efficiency), or both. Electrification is usually seen as a “zero-emission” option for local purposes. The emissions from electric power, if any, are typically at the point of genera- tion, rather than the point of use. From the perspective of the decisionmakers and the affected communities, however, only the local emissions are at issue. Operational improvements that reduce the idling, creeping, and VMT necessary to move international containers can have substantial benefits, but by themselves are unlikely to attract much local support. In a practical sense, a new system must use alternative fuels, hybridization, or electric power to reduce criteria pollutants. GHGs are a similar story, as they are a function of the type and quantity of fuel used. Moving from diesel to alternative fuels to electricity reduces GHGs. GHG emissions associated with electric power are, again, determined by how the power is generated. Operational efficiency helps, but here too would be unlikely to make a sufficient difference to generate support for an operational rather than a technological solution. Increased capacity and reduced traffic congestion go hand-in-hand. With congestion on I-710 as the focal point, there are basically three ways to increase net capacity embodied in the system scenarios: • Increasing capacity on I-710 by adding lanes, adding truck-only lanes, and so forth (embodied in free-running truck drayage scenarios). • Shifting truck traffic from I-710 to existing rail lines with excess capacity (embodied in railroad scenarios). • Shifting truck traffic from I-710 to a new truck or rail right-of-way (embodied in advanced- technology and electric truck scenarios). These three approaches assume that new rights-of-way, expanded right-of-way, or excess rail capacity is available. Threading new right-of-way through legacy infrastructure and land use is an economic, technical, and social/political challenge within the overall project scope. Studies

Los Angeles/Long Beach Case Study 87 to date have identified conceptual rights-of-way, but have not undertaken the detailed analysis that would be required. Evaluation Criteria At their highest level, the selection criteria for a new container transport system reflect the port and regional goals: • Reduce criteria pollutant and GHG emissions compared to the baseline option. • Reduce drayage truck traffic on public roads and highways. • Add container transport capacity to accommodate cargo growth. • Remain economically feasible. However, these high-level goals are actually composites of more basic goals that translate better into selection criteria. Moreover, these goals are interdependent in ways that must be recognized and reflected in both selection criteria and weighting. As expressed in the 2009 RFCS, the ports are interested in a DBFOM solution to inland transport. In addition to the criteria above, the ports are also looking for a near-term solu- tion, implying a need for a high TRL. Although the ports have offered some limited fund- ing for promising demonstrations of new technologies, they could not or would not finance extensive technology development. The ports also have limits on the land available for marine terminal development. Solutions that impinge on that land supply by requiring new port-area terminals or substantial transfer facilities within marine terminal boundaries would reduce long-term port cargo capacity. Reducing Criteria Pollutants To reduce net criteria pollutants, a new system has to have lower criteria pollutant emissions per unit (e.g., container or container-mile) and attract a significant volume of container business away from the baseline alternative of free-running clean trucks. Most of the candidate systems are electrically powered, which eliminates local criteria pollutant emissions. Given that all would be powered from the same electrical grid (Southern California Edison), any criteria pollutants resulting from electric power generation would be the same for all candidates. The drastic reductions in criteria pollutants implicit in diesel fleet replacement with 2010-compliant units, however, leave relatively little to be achieved by conversion to electric power on a unit-for-unit basis. This finding in turn implies that a large-scale diversion would be needed to achieve any significant net regional reduction. The potential for criteria pollutant reduction is, therefore, more an issue of diversion potential than of technology. GHG Emissions GHG emissions translate to carbon footprint when the analysis encompasses the power generation as well as the power consumption. The GHG advantages of advanced fixed-guideway systems are based on the presumed smaller carbon footprint of electric power generation. Electric trucks and electric railroad systems have the same advantage. Here again, all the electrically powered options would have the same GHG emissions and carbon footprint for each unit of electricity consumed. From this perspective, fixed-guideway technologies may have a slight edge, because their lower line-haul friction should enable them to use less electric power for each diverted truck trip than electric truck options, and therefore maintain a smaller carbon foot- print. These differences are likely to be small, however, and offset by the additional lift-on/lift-off operations required by fixed-guideway systems. Beyond these fine distinctions, the potential for GHG carbon footprint reductions will depend more on the number of trucks diverted than on the line-haul technology chosen.

88 Evaluating Alternatives for Landside Transport of Ocean Containers Congestion Relief The ability of an alternative container transport option to reduce port drayage truck traffic on public streets and highways is a direct function of the system’s ability to divert those movements to a new right-of-way. There may be a large difference in the net VMT diversion depending on network configuration. A new system that required truck drayage between marine terminals and a central departure point would have a smaller net VMT diversion than a system connecting marine terminals directly to inland points. In the absence of a legal imperative, the ability of a new system to attract container trips from the baseline drayage alternative will depend on the competitiveness of the cost/service/reliability combination it can offer to customers and its throughput capacity. Capacity System capacity would seem to be a straightforward metric. The complex nature of the facili- ties, routes, and movements involved, however, adds corresponding complexity to the metric. The baseline scenario of free-running diesel truck drayage does not include new capacity, but new highway capacity is being planned (the I-710 expansion). Because neither the ports nor the inland destinations are single points, the location and flex- ibility of any added capacity are issues. The two ports have 12 marine terminals in current operation and one under development, served by eight on-dock rail facilities with a ninth under development. The configuration of these terminals has changed over time and will continue to change, making flexibility and adapt- ability desirable system attributes. A given unit of new capacity is more valuable if the ports can be sure it will be in the right place when needed. There are fewer inland rail terminals than marine terminals, but there are still uncertain- ties. As the discussion of the baseline drayage system notes, the ports are supporting develop- ment of the near-dock BNSF SCIG, expansion of the near-dock UP ICTF, and development of additional on-dock rail capabilities. These developments would sharply reduce the need to move international containers between the off-dock Hobart and East Los Angeles rail yards and the marine terminals and likewise reduce the value of any corresponding container transport infrastructure capacity. Timing and scalability of capacity additions are also sub-criteria. Other things being equal, incremental capacity additions that allow the ports to keep pace with cargo growth and main- tain high utilization would encourage efficiency. Systems that require large, step-wise capac- ity additions tend to alternate low and high utilization over time. The timing issue was most dramatically illustrated by the container trade declines during the 2008–2010 recession. In that period, utilization of formerly crowded marine terminals plummeted, recently built capacity was wasted, and pending projects were put on hold. Flexibility and Scalability Flexibility and scalability are issues for any port complex, but are especially vital in Southern California with the complexity and growth potential of its ports. The location of existing Southern California inland rail terminals is fixed for the near future. The potential development of SCIG and expansion of the ICTF would dramatically change the volume and pattern of inland container movements, however. There is also value in flexibility on the marine terminal end of the trip. Over the past decade, new Southern California terminals have been completed and more are under construction or in plan- ning. In most cases, these terminals have new on-dock rail terminals and would need new terminals

Los Angeles/Long Beach Case Study 89 for fixed-guideway systems. System configuration changes are inherently difficult and costly for fixed-guideway systems of all types. Changes are complicated by elevated fixed guideways. The scalability issue is more related to system capacity functions. Conventional truck drayage system capacity is easily varied to accommodate day-to-day volume fluctuations, shifts of volume between terminals, and long-term growth (or, in 2008–2009, short-term decline). Drayage tractors are used in other business segments during periods of low demand and can (within limits) take other routes when freeways are congested. It is far more difficult to adjust the capacity of fixed- guideway systems. The use of alternative fuels and electric power would reduce the flexibility and scalability of truck drayage systems somewhat. At present, the lack of an extensive fueling network constrains the operating range of alternative fuel tractors. Such tractors can still, however, be used in other local and regional trips: • Battery-electric tractors would be useful only for local trips when not in port drayage service. • Tractors using wayside electric power for the “line haul” and battery power off the powered guideways would have a restricted range in other uses. Economic Feasibility Ideally, any new container transport systems would be self-financing in development and self- supporting once built. In practice, however, the distinction between development and operating costs and who pays those costs can be blurred. Although the ports have maintained that they are not expecting to contribute significant capital or support operations, the possibility of some port contribution in the development stage should not be ruled out. Regional, state, and federal support for capital may also be feasible. Both the ports and other public sources contributed to the capital cost of the Alameda Cor- ridor. In recent years, California voters approved a multi-billion dollar series of “infrastructure bonds.” This financing was used for multiple freight-related projects. Economic feasibility, therefore, might better be phrased as “supportable” rather than strictly “self-supporting.” From the ports’ point of view, economic sustainability without Port contributions is a minimum performance criterion (and that criterion was indeed part of the 2012 request for solutions). The ports have, on the other hand, paid for comparable infrastructure, such as on-dock rail intermodal terminals, so there is a precedent for financial participation. The ports also previously helped finance the Alameda Corridor, with seed money to get the project started in 1981–1989 and $394 million for right-of-way purchase in 1994. The ports have not, however, subsidized ongoing transport operations. From the port and regional planning perspective, it is critical to know how much of the prob- lem a given solution can address. A system that can cost-effectively address 10% of the problem may be less desirable than a less cost-effective system that can address 50% of the problem. In principle, this issue concerns the marginal cost-effectiveness of the proposed solution. The ports and the regional planning and air quality agencies must address the whole problem and all the flows. Although a single, global solution is probably unattainable, a costly solution that only addresses a small part of the problem is unlikely to attract the broad support needed for approval, funding, and implementation. Implicit User Choice Criteria In the absence of legal authority to require use of new transport options, the effectiveness of new options in achieving port and social goals depends on the willingness of users to divert their

90 Evaluating Alternatives for Landside Transport of Ocean Containers business from the baseline clean truck drayage option. There are multiple levels of customer choice involved, with implications for port and regional system evaluation criteria. If customers are committed to moving containers between points served by the proposed systems, their choice is between using the system and some alternative, usually the baseline truck drayage system. This choice would presumably be made on the common transportation criteria of capacity, transit time, reliability, cost, security, service frequency, and environmental impact. These are the same criteria being used in this evaluation on behalf of ports and regional planning agencies, with the comparison being made between the baseline and the proposed new systems. The basis of comparison can change when the array of user choices is expanded. The primary market segment being targeted by new system proposals consists of containers moving between marine terminals and off-dock or near-dock rail intermodal terminals. On-dock rail transfer is an alternative to drayage between marine terminals and near-dock/off-dock rail terminals, as recognized in the I-710 alternatives evaluation. Ordinarily, the most concentrated origin- destination flows of intermodal containers move via on-dock transfer. For example, inbound containers from a large vessel bound for Chicago under a contract between ocean carrier and railroad will be loaded onto rail cars at an on-dock terminal and depart as a solid train to Chicago via the Alameda Corridor. A call by a large vessel may result in multiple trains at on-dock transfers. Some may move intact to single inland destinations while others may be “blocked” for later sorting at designated “block swap” points inland. None of these containers need to use the transport systems being evaluated in this project. The containers being drayed to and from the off-dock and near-dock terminals and thus targeted by new options are likely to include • Import and export containers moving under ocean carrier control that are excess to on-dock train capacity, too late for on-dock service, or headed to/from inland points with too little volume for direct or “block swap” service. • Import and export containers traveling under importer, exporter, or third-party control for which the railroads do not provide on-dock service. • Import and export containers tendered by ocean carriers that do not have on-dock service. Ocean carriers and their customers ordinarily prefer on-dock service for its simplicity, lower cost, and reliability. On-dock service is not invariably faster or less expensive, as the on-dock transfer fees charged by marine container terminal operators are substantial. It is also sometimes possible for customers with urgent needs to have a container drayed off-dock for an earlier train departure. Regardless of the exceptions, on-dock transfer can be regarded as the first choice for most rail intermodal movements. On-dock rail is also a strong preference of community groups, interest groups, and regional planners. The environmental advantages of on-dock rail are generally accepted (although the actual advantages depend on many circumstances), and on-dock rail eliminates truck traffic on roads and freeways. These observations raise the possibility of customers increasing their use of on-dock rail as an alternative to a new system serving off-dock and near-dock terminals. The availability of this option is constrained by on-dock capacity, capacity of the port-rail network, and on-dock economics and logistics. A second level of alternative is for customers to divert their inland rail movements to other ports. Customers have diverted inland rail movements to take advantage of new opportunities at other ports or to avoid cost, congestion, or delay at LA/LB. Cost elasticity analyses on behalf of SCAG have estimated the cost threshold for diversion: In particular, in the case of no reduction in flow times, a fee of $60 per FEU (forty-foot equivalent unit) was predicted to cause a 6% reduction in total import volumes handled through the San Pedro Bay ports.

Los Angeles/Long Beach Case Study 91 On the other hand, if major improvements in infrastructure were made that enabled significant reductions in container flow times, the analysis showed that there would be no drop in total import volumes if fees of up to $200 per FEU were applied subsequent to the availability of the new infrastructure, although the mix of importers using the ports would evolve considerably. (SCAG Elasticity Report, Phase II.) The possibility of diversion to other ports increases the Ports’ sensitivity to the cost of new transport systems. If those systems are expensive to use, carriers and their customers can bypass both the new systems and the ports themselves. This action could adversely affect the near-dock and off-dock trips, leaving the on-dock volumes unaffected. It is also possible that carriers would divert some of the on-dock rail volume to avoid splitting services between ports. A critical question related to the minimum performance requirements is the amount of additional capacity required. To generate local political support and to be judged a success by the decisionmakers, a new system would need to have some noticeable impact on I-710 congestion. The most limited practical scope for an advanced container transport system at LA/LB is given in the 2009 ZECMS RFCS: moving containers between marine terminals and near-dock rail ter- minals (the ICTF and the SCIG site). As Table 6-3 indicates, about 3.1 million annual container trips are involved, requiring a capacity of 794 containers per hour (both directions combined). Accordingly, for this case study, a minimum performance requirement is an hourly through- put of 800 containers. The equivalent minimum performance requirement for a truck-based system would be 800 containers per hour on a four-lane road or equivalent right-of-way. Feasibility The right-of-way study prepared for the ZECMS RFCS (Attachment 4, Preliminary Align- ment Analysis) located two potential alignments between Port of Long Beach Pier A and the ICTF. The I-710 Alternatives Analysis provides a range of potential track configurations, head- ways, and cars per consist with equivalent nominal hourly capacities. The report also notes the inherent reliability disadvantages of a two-track system (one track in each direction) versus a four-track system. A four-track system requires a right-of-way roughly 60-feet wide, apparently feasible on the alignments identified. Although most environmental criteria in previous studies call for emissions reductions, pragmatically a successful solution will need to achieve zero tailpipe emissions. SCAG planning documents focus on achieving zero emissions in as many transportation sectors as possible. SCAQMD analyses and inventories likewise indicate that the region can only approach its air quality goals if, again, major transport sectors move toward zero emissions. Moreover, zero emission has been established as a concept and expectation in the region with specific application to port movements. Weighting For this case study, the research team did not attempt to weight the criteria. The key purpose of weighting is to facilitate tradeoffs—as the case study proceeded, it became apparent that there were no significant tradeoffs to be considered. In effect, the analysis proceeded with equal weighting on the three overriding requirements: zero tailpipe emissions, GHG reductions, and congestion relief. Defining the Baseline The relevant baseline definition for 2035 includes both the context in which future systems will operate and the default system that will operate unless replaced by some alternative. There have been major changes in the Southern California context since consideration of alternative transport

92 Evaluating Alternatives for Landside Transport of Ocean Containers systems began. The net effect has been to reduce the potential benefit of alternative systems over a dramatically improved baseline and outlook. Truck Drayage Emissions from diesel trucks engaged in port drayage was one of the two major motivations for considering alternative technologies (the other being congestion). The Clean Truck Plan, adopted by the ports in 2006, was the subject of controversy and legal challenges. Although some provisions were eventually voided, the essential emissions restrictions remained in place. Combined with the cargo declines attributable to the 2008–2010 recession, these restrictions enabled the ports to reduce emissions from truck drayage over 80% by 2012. Even stricter California Air Resources Board (CARB) restrictions took effect on January 1, 2014, requiring all trucks engaged in port and intermodal drayage to have engines meeting 2007 standards. Although truck emissions have not disappeared, they have been reduced to where air quality concerns are more focused on vessel operations. The movement of containers between port terminals and off-dock rail intermodal terminals (BNSF Hobart and UP Los Angeles) 20 miles away has been the focal point of many alternative technology proposals. This flow may be the best target for alternative technologies because of its rise and concentration (at least at the inland end). BNSF, however, is endeavoring to drastically reduce this flow by building the SCIG, a near-dock terminal roughly 4 miles from the port terminals. SCIG would replace Hobart as the primary BNSF transfer point for international containers. In parallel, UP is endeavoring to expand its existing ICTF near-dock terminal to reduce the international container flows to City of Commerce. Together, these two developments would reduce the port-rail intermodal drayage to more distant off-dock terminals. The status of the I-710 Corridor Project is a critical question in defining a baseline for 2035. The I-710 Freeway Major Corridor Study was completed in 2005. The project sponsor (Metro, the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority) along with partner agencies is engaged in completing the EIR/EIS. A draft EIR/EIS was issued in June 2012 and is in the comment and revision process. There is no guarantee that the EIR/EIS will be approved— there are still significant technical, environmental, and community concerns. Funding must also be secured for a $5–6 billion construction cost. Given the regional priorities placed on the project, however, the research team assumed that it would be completed by the 2035 planning horizon. One critical point is that free-running drayage using the legacy mix of pre-2007 diesel tractors is not an option. Many of the fixed-guideway high-technology systems were proposed before the CAAP required replacement with 2007-compliant tractors. The replacement was complete by the end of 2013. The particulate and criteria pollutant characteristics of the legacy fleet are, therefore, no longer relevant to the evaluation. As of early 2014, free-running drayage with 2007-compliant tractors is the status quo for the Southern California ports. CARB’s Truck and Bus Regulation requires that all port drayage trucks will meet 2010 US EPA engine standards by 2023, which is within the time horizon for this study. These standards limit emissions to (in grams per brake horsepower-hour) 0.20 for NOx, 0.14 for NMHC, and 0.01 for PM. Compared to the 2004 standards, these regulations will reduce PM by 90% and NOx + NMHC by 86%. Version 2.0 of EPA’s Smart Way DrayFLEET model was used to estimate baseline drayage costs, as shown in Table 6-1. Regression analysis from a confidential sample of actual 2013 Southern California drayage rates was used to generate comparable rate estimates in Table 6-2.

Los Angeles/Long Beach Case Study 93 These rate estimates establish rough competitive boundaries for the rates that alternative transport systems could charge. Terminals There is an important distinction to be made regarding the 2035 status quo at the marine ter- minals. Until recently, LA/LB marine terminals have relied on “wheeled” operations (contain- ers parked on chassis) to minimize container handling and operating cost. Wheeled operations do not require a transfer for truck service; drivers simply pick up or drop the container on the chassis. In recent years, most ocean carriers have stopped providing chassis, which is leading Southern California terminals to shift from wheeled to “grounded” or “stacked” operations. In grounded or stacked operations, the container needs to be mechanically transferred to and from a trucker-supplied chassis. Grounded or stacked operations also achieve higher container storage densities and are more easily automated. For all these reasons, the evaluation assumes grounded or stacked marine terminal operations by 2035. Integration of a fixed-guideway transfer point into a marine terminal is comparable to integrat- ing a conventional on-dock rail terminal. Current practice at most marine terminals with on-dock rail facilities is to use yard chassis for internal drayage between shipside cranes or container stacks on the one hand and the rail transfer point on the other. No North American marine termi- nals transfer containers directly between rail and vessel without intermediate handling. The most advanced marine terminal designs provide for truck drayage access to the storage stacks, but add an additional handling step between storage stacks and rail cars. Substituting an advanced-technology fixed-guideway system for the rail terminal would not obviate the need for the additional transfer, which will cost $50–100 per container trip. Candidate Technologies The method developed for this study is intended to be flexible in its application, so the research team has identified multiple case study scenarios. The complexity of Southern California con- tainer port operations is paralleled by the complexity of the transport options. Conceptually, the options include • Conventional truck tractor drayage using 2010-compliant diesel engines (baseline), with expanded I-710 capacity. • Conventional truck tractor drayage using LPG engines or hydrogen-hybrid tractors, with expanded I-710 capacity. Miles MPH Travel Time MT Time RT Time One-Way Cost Near-Dock 5 20 15 65 20 70.52$ Off-Dock 20 30 40 65 20 93.20$ Intra-Terminal 2 20 6 65 20 64.33$ Table 6-1. Baseline drayage cost estimates from port terminals. Miles Constant Mileage One-Way Rate Near-Dock 74.25$ 6.59$ 80.84$ Off-Dock 74.25$ 26.37$ 100.62$ Intra-Terminal 5 20 2 74.25$ 2.64$ 76.89$ Table 6-2. Estimated rates from regression analysis.

94 Evaluating Alternatives for Landside Transport of Ocean Containers • Electrically powered truck tractor drayage using wayside power and battery power in combi- nation, with expanded I-710 capacity. • Conventional rail intermodal service using Tier IV diesel locomotives or LPG locomotives. • Electric rail intermodal service (zero tailpipe emissions) using conventional technology or in-track LSM motive power. • Advanced fixed-guideway container transport systems (e.g., LIM, LSM, or Maglev propulsion). The three truck drayage scenarios, including the baseline, include the proposed capacity addition to I-710. Additional capacity is a critical criterion for both diverting truck drayage traffic from the existing I-710 lanes and to accommodate expected port trade growth. The two railroad options do not anticipate new capacity; both would operate over existing lines. The advanced fixed-guideway option requires new guideway and, therefore, new capacity. Truck Drayage Scenarios There are three truck drayage scenarios to be evaluated: • Free-running truck drayage using 2010-compliant trucks. • Free-running truck drayage using “green” alternative fuel or hybrid trucks. • Mixed free-running/guideway trucks using wayside electric power and batteries. The free-running truck drayage scenarios do not require a “system” beyond adequate capacity on the surface road and freeway network. They will, however, require selective expansion of that capacity, focusing on I-710, to maintain throughput capability, reduce vehicular congestion, improve safety, and reduce criteria pollutants and GHGs from idling and inefficient operation. The I-710 improvement project is intended to provide the required capacity and other benefits, so this analysis draws on the results of that project. As with the fixed-guideway alternatives, the drayage scenarios are more or less applicable to the different container flows identified above: • Free-running drayage using 2010-compliant diesel tractors is the baseline for all the flows shown. • Free-running drayage using alternative fuel or hybrid tractors can likewise be used for all the flows shown. The restriction, if any, would be on hydrogen-fueled tractors with limited range and refueling opportunities, but those tractors will still have the capability for round trips to the Inland Empire. • Electric or hybrid truck drayage using a combination of battery power and wayside electric power could apply to all the flows shown. For free-running truck tractor drayage using diesel, LNG, or hydrogen for power, the de facto “system configuration” is the public highway system. Although this legacy system is in place, it is neither free nor adequate for the long run. Indeed, the growing congestion of port-area freeways and arterials has been a major motivation for investigating fixed-guideway systems that would add capacity and relieve congestion. The I-710 expansion project is demonstrating the inherent difficulty of increasing highway capacity in the area. It is clear that any highway capacity additions will be time-consuming and costly. For an apples-to-apples comparison, therefore, the research team needed to include the cost of incremental highway capacity in free-running truck tractor drayage alternatives. If that capacity is delivered as either ordinary public highway capacity or un-tolled truck lanes, the incremental cost of the capacity will not be passed on to the customer. The drayage trucks that use that incremental capacity will pay the same highway, fuel, and registrations fees as other trucks, and the cost of the incremental capacity will be spread over all taxpayers and highway users. If incremental highway

Los Angeles/Long Beach Case Study 95 capacity is delivered in the form of truck-only lanes or routes with tolls, some or all of the incremen- tal infrastructure cost may be passed on and reflected in prices paid by customers. Electric Railroad Scenarios There are two scenarios for use of electric propulsion on existing railroad rights-of-way: • Conventional electric shuttle trains would use existing facilities equipped with overhead electric power (catenary). • LSM electric railroad operations would derive propulsion from LSM elements added to existing railroad tracks (Figure 6-9). This technology is in operation in five transit systems,18 but has not been used in a freight application. Linear synchronous motors (LSMs) are used in some passenger transit systems and have been pro- posed as a retrofit propulsion system for conventional railroad tracks. The SCAG freight rail electri- fication report included an investigation of LSM technology. Proponents have envisioned equipping locomotives or helper cars to propel container cars using in-track LSM. The LSM system itself would consist of electromagnets installed between the rails and reactive magnet arrays mounted under railroad equipment. The SCAG report noted some key issues with use of LSMs for freight. • Proposed LSM designs would require the reactive arrays to be within 2 inches of the in-track magnets. Railroads maintain that a clearance of at least 4 inches is necessary to accommodate track tolerances, heavy loads, and grade changes. Current FRA regula- tions require a clearance of at least 2.5 inches between cars or locomotives and rails. As Figure 6-10 shows, common railroad trackwork would prevent any equipment from extending below the rails. In addition, railroad container cars commonly have 3 to 4 inches of spring travel to accommo- date both loaded and empty operations. An air gap of less than 2 inches would leave the system Figure 6-9. Proposed LIm-rail design.19 18 http://www.Maglev.ir/eng/documents/papers/conferences/maglev2002/topic7/IMT_CP_M2002_T7_S2_1.pdf 19 http://www.magnetictransportsystems.com/documents/MAGRAILANDLIMRAILlTECHNOLOGY_DEVELOPMENT_ REPORT_10-22-07cl_000.pdf

96 Evaluating Alternatives for Landside Transport of Ocean Containers vulnerable to disruption from relatively small debris (e.g., a baseball-sized rock). The ability of LSM systems to move heavy freight loads is uncertain and undemonstrated. Accordingly, the SCAG report assigned LSM technology TRL range 5-6, the development/ demonstration range. Advanced-Technology Fixed-Guideway Scenarios There is no definitive scenario for a Southern California fixed-guideway advanced-technol- ogy container transport system. While complicating the case study, this ambiguity can be used to verify the applicability of the evaluation method to complex cases. Table 6-3 shows seven Table 6-3. Fixed-guideway scenarios. Figure 6-10. Common railroad trackwork. Source: Daniel Smith, The Tioga Group

Los Angeles/Long Beach Case Study 97 fixed-guideway scenarios; three from the I-710 EIR/EIS alternatives evaluation and four con- structed for this study. The table also shows estimates for the size of the corresponding 2035 container volume and the required hourly throughput capacity. • Port No Build. This “base case” scenario from the I-710 analysis assumes that the Ports do not add on-dock capacity, that BNSF’s SCIG is not built, and that UP’s ICTF is not expanded beyond the need to accommodate proportionate growth. This assumption leaves future rail intermodal volumes distributed between on-dock, near-dock, and off-dock rail intermodal terminals as of present. The I-710 report estimated the maximum annual system volume at 3.1 million containers. • Port Build without SCIG/ICTF Expansion. This scenario assumes that the Ports add on- dock capacity to take a larger share of the rail intermodal volume, leaving a maximum of 2.3 million annual containers split between existing near-dock (ICTF only) and off-dock facilities. • Port Build with SCIG/ICTF Expansion. The third I-710 scenario assumes that added on-dock capacity reduces the volume of rail intermodal containers drayed and that con- struction of SCIG and expansion of ICTF allow the entire volume to be handled at the near-dock facilities. • Port No Build with SCIG/ICTF Expansion. This additional scenario assumes that SCIG is built and ICTF is expanded, but that the on-dock share does not increase. This scenario would put all 3.1 million containers through the two near-dock facilities. • Port No Build Off-Dock System. This scenario assumes that the Ports do not add on-dock capacity and that the new fixed-guideway system is built to serve the off-dock rail terminals approximately 20 miles from the Ports. • Port No Build Inland Empire System. This scenario assumes that the Ports do not add on-dock capacity and that the new fixed-guideway system is built to serve a satellite ter- minal or “inland port” facility in the Inland Empire, approximately 60 to 70 miles from the Ports. • Port No Build Complete System. This scenario assumes that the Ports do not add on-dock capacity and maximize both scope and volume by serving near-dock rail terminals, off-dock rail terminals, and an Inland Empire terminal. As the table indicates, each scenario has a different physical scope and a different potential market volume. Within each potential market, the share captured by the system is also a variable, increasing the complexity of the method test. The market and market share estimate is related to the earlier discussion of goals. If the goal is to maximize diversion of trucks from roads and freeways onto an exclusive right-of-way, then the maximum scope and market share would be an appropriate match. If cost-effectiveness criteria are added, then there will likely be a point at which the cost of diverting an incremen- tal truck becomes prohibitive. If efficiency and cost-effectiveness are primary criteria, then the appropriate scope would be dictated by the comparative advantages of the proposed system in variables configurations. Screening Candidates The emphasis on emissions reduction and congestion relief allowed the research team to conduct initial screening with relatively little detailed data. In this case study, it was possible to screen potential candidates based on fundamental attributes. The research team required only enough information to determine whether, if operated as envisioned, proposed systems

98 Evaluating Alternatives for Landside Transport of Ocean Containers had zero tailpipe emissions, reduced GHG, and added net capacity to (potentially) reduce congestion. The minimum performance criteria developed above can be used for the initial screening in advance of detailed scenario-by-scenario analysis. The screening process should eliminate options that would not achieve zero-emissions, reduce congestion (by increasing capacity), and accommodate growth (also by increasing capacity). Zero Tailpipe Emissions. All of the transport options would likely reduce emissions of cri- teria pollutants (SOx, NOx, CO, HC, and PM2.5) compared to the baseline diesel drayage system. The reduction is unambiguous for the electric and alternative fueled alternatives, although the improvement over 2010-compliant diesel trucks may be small. Conventional rail operations using Tier IV diesel locomotives and hybrid or alternative fuel switching locomotives may not have an emissions advantage for the very short movements to the rail intermodal terminals or even to the Inland Empire. Moreover, to promote acceptance from community stakeholders and planning-sector decisionmakers (e.g., SCAG and SCAQMD), the solution must achieve zero-emissions at the tailpipe. This stricter criterion screens out all options, except electric powered trucks, rail or advanced fixed-guideway systems, and hydrogen-hybrid trucks. Technically, fixed-guideway systems may also have truck drayage components which are assumed to use zero-emissions technology (e.g., battery power). All the options, with the possible exception of conventional rail shuttles using Tier IV diesel locomotives, would reduce emissions compared to baseline drayage using 2010-compliant trucks. Only electric and hydrogen-hybrid technologies, however, reach zero-emissions. GHG Reduction. Achieving substantial GHG reductions requires conversion to a lower carbon fuel or electric power (under the assumption that the electric power used has a smaller carbon footprint than the diesel alternative). Natural gas (LNG) can reduce GHG emissions by up to 20% versus diesel, and hydrogen and electric power have zero local GHG emissions. All of the non-diesel options would therefore materially reduce GHG emissions versus the baseline diesel truck scenario. Congestion Relief. To reduce congestion, a new system must increase net capacity and divert business from highways. To increase net container transport capacity significantly, a transport option must either increase the effective capacity of existing and planned infrastructure, or include new infrastructure capacity (e.g., additional right-of-way, lanes, or guideway as part of the option): • Advanced fixed-guideway technologies would, by definition, add net capacity. • Electric or alternative fuel trucks operating on new exclusive guideway or on new shared guideway would also provide additional capacity. Conventional railroad shuttles using existing tracks do not provide new capacity, unless those tracks would otherwise remain underutilized. The 2008 Inland Port Feasibility Study found that the port-area rail operator, Pacific Harbor Line, considered the existing and planned port-area rail network inadequate to assemble shuttle trains (in that case for an Inland Empire terminal). The capacity criterion, therefore, screens out conventional rail shuttles on the exist- ing network. Assumptions regarding (1) additional port on-dock rail capacity and (2) expansion of the ICTF and development of SCIG are critical to the screening process. Development of more on-dock rail capacity would reduce the forecast 2035 volume for the rail terminals from 2.5 to 1.8 million annual containers. Expansion of the ICTF and development of SCIG in conjunction

Los Angeles/Long Beach Case Study 99 with additional on-dock capacity would both reduce the volume and the distance the system would cover. Shorter distances favor systems with fewer transfers. Significant congestion relief also requires that the new transport option attract significant truck drayage traffic from existing highways. The cost, service, and reliability combination offered by the new option must be superior to the baseline free-running drayage option to attract traffic. The need for increased capacity to both divert trucks from I-710 and accommodate trade growth eliminates the conventional rail options. Tier IV locomotives, electric locomotives, and in-track LSM reduce or eliminate emissions, but do not increase capacity over the existing network. The need to increase capacity also means that truck drayage options must include either additional capacity in the I-710 Corridor or on some effectively parallel right-of-way. The I-710 EIR/EIS effort developed cost estimates for both conventional and electrified truck lanes in the I-710 Corridor that can be used in this study. The options that passed the initial screening step include • Battery-electric trucks on new electrified lanes in or parallel to the I-710 Corridor and free- running elsewhere (to the limit of their battery capacity). • Advanced-technology propulsion over an exclusive fixed-guideway in or parallel to the I-710 Corridor with scenarios as defined in Table 6-3. These are the same alternative technologies analyzed in the I-710 EIR/EIS process. Analyzing Candidates Technical, performance, and cost data on advanced-technology proposals are scarce at best. To develop usable or representative evaluation data for the LA/LB case study, the research team assembled data from multiple sources: • Whenever possible, specific values for key variables were obtained from technology proposals, presentations, and websites. • Where proposal-specific data were not available—which was most cases—generic or repre- sentative values from one technology (e.g., LIM Maglev) were applied to similar technologies (e.g., other LIM or LSM Maglev proposals). • The research team also conducted a broad search for applicable or representative technical, performance, and cost data from transit systems, rail systems, academic research, and so forth. These data were compiled in an Excel workbook which then formed the basis for the estimates and comparisons in the analysis that follows. Fixed Rail Advanced-Technology To evaluate the potential performance of a representative advanced-technology fixed-guideway system in Southern California, the research team had to develop • A conceptual network of lines and terminals. • A conceptual terminal design, with capacity, capital cost, and operating cost estimates. • Throughput capacity and cost estimates. A representative fixed-rail advanced-technology system linking the LA/LB container terminals with the major existing and proposed rail intermodal terminals is shown in Figure 6-11.

100 Evaluating Alternatives for Landside Transport of Ocean Containers On the port end, 9 rail intermodal terminals serve 13 active marine container terminals (Figure 6-11). The case study assumes that an advanced-technology fixed-rail system would serve the same nine locations to access the marine terminals. These facilities are dispersed over the port areas, as are the terminals they serve. The dispersion of the port intermodal rail terminals implies the need for a series of branches, as shown in Figure 6-11. Division of the terminal area by navigable waterways creates formidable barriers to a loop network. As indicated in Figure 6-11, the route would have to cross a navigable waterway, requiring either a drawbridge or a high-level bridge. The fixed-rail system would also have to be “threaded” through one or more complex highway interchanges. Inland, the major concentrated origin/destination points are the four major rail terminals: • The UP Intermodal Container Transfer Facility (ICTF), roughly 4 miles from the ports. • The proposed BNSF Southern California International Gateway (SCIG), to be located south of the ICTF. • The BNSF Hobart yard, located roughly 20 miles inland. • The UP Los Angeles yard, located just north of Hobart. The adjacency of the ICTF and the SCIG site, and of the BNSF Hobart and UP Los Angeles yards, suggests that it would be advantageous to serve each pair with a single joint terminal on the advanced-technology system. Figure 6-11 shows the port and inland rail intermodal terminals connected by a network of hypothetical lines roughly following existing rail routes (including the Alameda Corridor south of Hobart/UP Los Angeles). The field and engineering work required to confirm that Figure 6-11. Representative fixed-guideway system.

Los Angeles/Long Beach Case Study 101 an advanced-technology fixed-guideway system could be constructed on those routes is far beyond the study scope and would almost certainly reveal serious technical, political, and environmental challenges. The hypothetical network shown in Figure 6-11 was developed solely for this case study. The network envisioned in Figure 6-11 includes approximately 35 line miles of track, not including trackage in the terminals. The configuration shown in Figure 6-11 immediately raises line capacity issues. If the nominal minimum headway on the main north-south line is 1 minute (60 vehicles per hour), the port-area branch lines cannot also operate at that headway, unless there are multiple tracks in each direction on the line to the inland terminals. Multiple lines would also be required by both ICTF/SCIG and Hobart/Los Angeles to dispatch and receive containers at that rate. The scope of the investigation included trips of up to 100 miles inland. For Southern California, the major market in that range is the Inland Empire, roughly equivalent to the urban portions of Riverside and San Bernardino counties (Figure 6-12). The center of this market is generally considered to be the unincorporated “Mira Loma” area of Riverside County east of the Ontario Airport. This area has a large concentration of major industries and distribution centers. For this case study, the research team used the site shown in Figure 6-13 as a hypothetical Inland Empire terminal site. The site in question is a former landfill adjacent to rail lines and with good freeway access. Although this site will likely be developed for some other purpose, it was identified in the SCAG Inland Port Feasibility study as a candidate location for a rail intermodal terminal connected to the ports via rail shuttles. Figure 6-12. Fixed-guideway extension to Inland Empire.

102 Evaluating Alternatives for Landside Transport of Ocean Containers The Inland Empire terminal shown in Figure 6-13 adds 39 route miles to the 35-mile port-area system shown in Figure 6-11. The 2008 SCAG study estimated 3,500 daily container trips between the port terminals and the two-county Inland Empire market shown in Figure 6-12. Based on the most recent forecast, this estimate would be equivalent to about 9,600 daily trips in 2030. An 80% market share for the advanced transport system would be 7,600 daily trips, or 240 per hour in each direction for a 16-hour day. Volume and Capacity The volume requirements for a fixed-guideway system depend on some assumptions regarding operating hours, throughput capability, and routine versus maximum capacities. Port terminals in Southern California are open to railroad truck transfers about 80 hours per week, including extended hours under the Off-Peak program. The operations at most ter- minals are 16 hours per day Monday through Thursday (accounting for scheduled breaks), 8 hours on Friday, and 8 hours on Saturday. This schedule is equivalent to 16 hours per day on weekdays (5 days per week). Of the nominal 260 weekdays in a year, the ILWU contract provides for 16 paid holidays, leaving 244 annual workdays. At 16 hours per day for 244 days, the annual capacity of the system declines to 3.3 million. Although marine container termi- nals are “open” 24 hours for vessel operations as needed (at high cost for overtime), other terminal functions have more limited hours. Common transportation engineering practice is to estimate routine throughput capability at 80% of maximum capacity. This conservative practice reflects multiple realities: Figure 6-13. Representative Inland Empire terminal site.

Los Angeles/Long Beach Case Study 103 • Systems operating at full capacity have no room for error or variation and are thus highly susceptible to disruption. • Indefinite operation at full capacity requires perfection of the human element, which cannot be assumed. • Operation at full capacity requires that connecting systems either operate at the same capacity or have large buffers. As Table 6-4 shows, depending on the system configuration and markets served, the system could require capacities of 512 to 1306 containers per hour, or 256 to 653 per hour in each direction. As typically envisioned, most advanced-technology systems would operate with individual vehicles carrying one container each on 1-minute headways, yielding a nominal capacity of 60 containers per hour in each single-track guideway. Under these circumstances, such a system would need 5 to 11 tracks in each direction, 10 to 22 tracks in total, to sustain the volumes envisioned above. The alternative is to drastically reduce the headway or carry multiple containers per vehicle. These solutions are, unfortunately, mutually incompatible. Loaded containers can weigh up to 80,000 lb each, the equivalent of 500 160-lb people. Even at average loads of 20,000–40,000 lb, carrying multiple containers on a single vehicle or on a set of linked vehicles would require longer headways to allow for safe braking and acceleration rates. The optimal capacity solution would entail tradeoffs between load, head- way, speed, braking force, and adhesion. For example, the hypothetical system analyzed for the I-710 EIR/EIS has vehicle consists of 10 containers operating at 90-second headways. Such a system would have a maximum capacity of 800 containers per hour on a single line. That system would have an estimated sustainable throughput of 640 containers per hour. At 244 days per year, 16 hours per day, such a system could be expected to move 2.5 million containers annually. Capital Costs Capital costs were estimated for a representative ECCO fixed-guideway system in three configurations. System Scope Port No Build Port Build w/o SCIG/ICTF Expansion Port Build with SCIG/ICTF Expansion Port No Build with SCIG/ICTF Expansion Port No Build Off-Dock System Port No Build Inland Empire System Port No Build Complete System 2035 Volumes Annual Max (million containers ) 3.1 2.3 2.3 3.1 2.4 2.0 5.1 80% Share (million containers ) 2.5 1.8 1.8 2.5 1.9 1.6 4.1 Daily Avg. Volume (244 weekdays) 10,164 7,541 7,541 10,164 7,869 6,557 16,721 Hourly Avg. Volume (16 hours) 635 471 471 635 492 410 1,045 Required Hourly Capacity (80% rule) 794 589 589 794 615 512 1,306 I-710 EIR/EIS Scenarios Addi•onal Scenarios Table 6-4. Fixed-guideway scenario capacity requirements.

104 Evaluating Alternatives for Landside Transport of Ocean Containers The near-dock cost model (Table 6-5) represents a 20-mile network linking the port marine terminals with the existing ICTF and the SCIG site, served for this purpose by a single ECCO terminal. The estimates in this and following tables strive for completeness and include estimates of right-of-way acquisition costs, control and maintenance facilities, environmental mitigation, design, contingencies, and so forth. These categories substantially increase the cost relative to “bare bones” estimates that simply apply an average per-mile cost to the distance covered. The estimated capital cost is $7.3 billion. The estimate in Table 6-6 is for an off-dock system linking marine terminals to the BNSF Hobart and UP Los Angeles terminals served jointly by a single ECCO terminal about 20 miles inland. The additional distance raises the capital cost estimate to $9.6 billion. Capital Costs - ECCO Near-Dock Single Vehicle System, 60 vehicles/hr Category Metric Unit Cost Units Cost Trackage Elevated Double-track miles 33,000,000$ 20 660,000,000$ Incremental Bridge Double-track miles 60,047,382$ 0.2 12,009,476$ Incremental Tracks (Pair) Double-track miles 10,000,000$ 120 1,200,000,000$ ROW Acquisi†on % of non-ROW costs 14.80% 277,057,402$ Trackage Subtotal 2,149,066,879$ Power Substa†ons Line Miles 479,911$ 1 479,911$ Distribution System Line Miles 849,552$ 20 16,991,045$ Power Subtotal 17,470,956$ Control, Signalling, & Communicaˆons System 2,144,200$ 1 2,144,200$ Control Facility Number 10,000,000$ 1 10,000,000$ Maintenance Facility Number 50,000,000$ 1 50,000,000$ Land Acquisi†on % of non-land costs 14.80% 7,400,000$ Maintenance Facility Subtotal 57,400,000$ Terminals Port Terminals Number 250,000,000$ 9 2,250,000,000$ Inland Terminals Number 250,000,000$ 1 250,000,000$ Land Acquisi†on % of non-land costs 14.80% 333,000,000$ Terminals Subtotal 2,833,000,000$ Infrastructure Total 5,069,082,035$ Environmental Mi†ga†on % of non-land costs 7.50% 333,871,847$ Vehicles Number 720,000$ 152 109,136,842$ Subtotal Capital Cost Esˆmate 5,512,090,725$ Design Unit 10% 551,209,072$ Contingencies Percent 20% 1,212,659,959$ Total Esˆmated Capital Cost 7,275,959,756$ Table 6-5. Fixed-guideway near-dock cost model.

Los Angeles/Long Beach Case Study 105 The third estimate (Table 6-7) connects both the near-dock and off-dock rail facilities to the marine terminals at an estimated capital cost of $9.9 billion. The difference in cost between Tables 6-6 and 6-7 is the additional terminal at ICTF/SCIG. For comparison purposes, Table 6-8 presents the capital cost estimates prepared for the con- ceptual near/off-dock system developed for the I-710 Alternatives Analysis (Figure 6-11). The range of $8.2 to $11.3 billion almost precisely brackets the $9.9 billion estimate in Table 6-7, adding to the level of confidence. Table 6-9 presents the I-710 Alternative Analysis estimates of annual operating costs for the system in Table 6-8. The mean is $315 million annually. Capital Costs - ECCO Single Vehicle System, 60 vehicles/hr Category Metric Unit Cost Units Cost Trackage Elevated Double-track miles 33,000,000$ 35 1,155,000,000$ Incremental Bridge Double-track miles 60,047,382$ 0.2 12,009,476$ Incremental Tracks (Pair) Double-track miles 10,000,000$ 210 2,100,000,000$ ROW Acquisi‡on % of non-ROW costs 14.80% 483,517,402$ Trackage Subtotal 3,750,526,879$ Power Substa‡ons Line Miles 479,911$ 1 479,911$ Distribution System Line Miles 1,870,469$ 35 65,466,416$ Power Subtotal 65,946,327$ Control, Signalling, & Communica†ons System 2,144,200$ 1 2,144,200$ Control Facility Number 10,000,000$ 1 10,000,000$ Maintenance Facility Number 50,000,000$ 1 50,000,000$ Land Acquisi‡on % of non-land costs 14.80% 7,400,000$ Maintenance Facility Subtotal 57,400,000$ Terminals Port Terminals Number 250,000,000$ 9 2,250,000,000$ Inland Terminals Number 250,000,000$ 1 250,000,000$ Land Acquisi‡on % of non-land costs 14.80% 333,000,000$ Terminals Subtotal 2,833,000,000$ Infrastructure Total 6,719,017,406$ Environmental Mi‡ga‡on % of non-land costs 7.50% 442,132,500$ Vehicles Number 720,000$ 211 151,578,947$ Subtotal Capital Cost Es†mate 7,312,728,854$ Design Unit 10% 731,272,885$ Contingencies Percent 20% 1,608,800,348$ Total Es†mated Capital Cost 9,652,802,087$ Table 6-6. Fixed-guideway off-dock cost model.

106 Evaluating Alternatives for Landside Transport of Ocean Containers Capital Costs - ECCO Single Vehicle System, 60 vehicles/hr Category Metric Unit Cost Units Cost Trackage Elevated Double-track miles 33,000,000$ 35 1,155,000,000$ Incremental Bridge Double-track miles 60,047,382$ 0.2 12,009,476$ Incremental Tracks (Pair) Double-track miles 10,000,000$ 210 2,100,000,000$ ROW Acquisi‡on % of non-ROW costs 14.80% 483,517,402$ Trackage Subtotal 3,750,526,879$ Power Substa‡ons Line Miles 479,911$ 1 479,911$ Distribution System Line Miles 849,552$ 35 29,734,329$ Power Subtotal 30,214,240$ Control, Signalling, & Communica‡ons System 2,144,200$ 1 2,144,200$ Control Facility Number 10,000,000$ 1 10,000,000$ Maintenance Facility Number 50,000,000$ 1 50,000,000$ Land Acquisi‡on % of non-land costs 14.80% 7,400,000$ Maintenance Facility Subtotal 57,400,000$ Terminals Port Terminals Number 250,000,000$ 9 2,250,000,000$ Inland Terminals Number 250,000,000$ 2 500,000,000$ Land Acquisi‡on % of non-land costs 14.80% 333,000,000$ Terminals Subtotal 3,083,000,000$ Infrastructure Total 6,933,285,319$ Environmental Mi‡ga‡on % of non-land costs 7.50% 458,202,594$ Vehicles Number 720,000$ 166 119,747,368$ Subtotal Capital Cost Es‡mate 7,511,235,281$ Design Unit 10% 751,123,528$ Contingencies Percent 20% 1,652,471,762$ Total Es‡mated Capital Cost 9,914,830,571$ Table 6-7. Fixed-guideway near/off-dock cost model. Capital Costs I 710 Near/Off Dock System, 10 vehicle consists, 90 second headways Category Low Unit Cost High Unit Cost Units Low Cost High Cost Mean System Miles Line Haul 300,000,000$ 394,000,000$ 16 4,800,000,000$ 6,304,000,000$ 5,552,000,000$ Rail Terminals 180,000,000$ 264,000,000$ 4 720,000,000$ 1,056,000,000$ 888,000,000$ Port Terminals 180,000,000$ 264,000,000$ 15 2,700,000,000$ 3,960,000,000$ 3,330,000,000$ System Total 35 8,220,000,000$ 11,320,000,000$ 9,770,000,000$ Table 6-8. I-710 Fixed-guideway capital cost estimate. Operating & Maintenence Costs I 710 Near/Off Dock System, 10 vehicle consists, 90 second headways Category Low Unit Cost High Unit Cost Units Low Cost High Cost Mean System Miles Line Haul 7,500,000$ 10,500,000$ 16 120,000,000$ 168,000,000$ 144,000,000$ Rail Terminals 7,500,000$ 10,500,000$ 4 30,000,000$ 42,000,000$ 36,000,000$ Port Terminals 7,500,000$ 10,500,000$ 15 112,500,000$ 157,500,000$ 135,000,000$ System Total 35 262,500,000$ 367,500,000$ 315,000,000$ Table 6-9. I-710 Fixed-guideway operating and maintenance cost estimate.

Los Angeles/Long Beach Case Study 107 Category Low Volume & Cost High Volume & Cost Annual O&M Cost 262,500,000$ 367,500,000$ Annual Max Volume @ 80% Share 1,840,000 2,480,000 Operating cost per container move 143$ 148$ Annual Debt Service at 3% 246,600,000$ 339,600,000$ Annual Debt Service per container move 134$ 137$ Total Annual Cost 509,100,000$ 707,100,000$ Total Annual Cost per Container 277$ 285$ Table 6-10. Fixed-guideway unit cost estimates. Table 6-10 estimates average annual operating, debt service, and total cost per container moves. Two combinations are shown: • The low operating and capital cost estimates with the lower value (Port Build w/o SCIG/ICTF) from Table 6-3. • The high operating and capital cost estimates with the higher volume (Port No Build) from Table 6-3. The operating cost per container move ranges from $143–148, compared to a competitive estimate of $81–101 from Table 6-2. Attempting to cover the debt service on bond or loan financing would raise the rates much higher. Moreover, the rate/cost estimates in Table 6-10 correspond to the fixed-guideway system operating at its full capability (80% of maximum capacity). Because so many of the system costs would be fixed, the average cost would climb still higher at lower volumes. Electric Truck System Option A battery-electric or battery-electric hybrid truck system would use four lanes of right-of-way constructed as part of the I-710 Corridor Project. Development of wayside power for electric trucks is covered under Alternative 6B of the I-710 Corridor Project, which also includes automated guidance to enable truck “platooning” to increase capacity. GNA developed estimates of incremental infrastructure capital cost and annual operating and maintenance costs for three variations of zero (or near-zero) emissions trucks: • Natural gas/electric hybrids • Hydrogen fuel cell/electric hybrids • Battery-electric The estimates are shown in Table 6-11 for a vehicle fleet of 1,000 trucks. Running between port terminals and Hobart or UP Los Angeles, a single truck can typically make six or more one-way trips in a working day, giving the system shown an annual capacity of approximately 1.5 million annual container trips. As the table shows, the operating costs of the system and the vehicle (exclusive of labor) are estimated to be $15–24 per trip.

108 Evaluating Alternatives for Landside Transport of Ocean Containers Table 6-12 presents a separate capital cost estimate for a four-lane electric truck system. The estimate is $5.4 billion, almost precisely the estimate developed in the I-710 Alternatives Analysis. The infrastructure costs shown are the incremental additions to the basic highway infrastruc- ture and range from $248 million to $305 million. The I-710 EIR/EIS estimates the capital cost of Alternative 6B of the I-710 Corridor Project, including infrastructure, but not vehicles, at about $5.3 billion. To be comparable to the higher capacity (2.5 million annual trips) shown in Table 6-3, the estimate in Table 6-12 should be raised to reflect 1,670 vehicles at a cost of $414–470 million, bringing total capital cost to about $5.7 billion. The vehicle cost is zero because the vehicles themselves would be provided by the trucking companies, rather than by a public-sector sponsor. Labor and overhead costs must be added Category Infrastructure Required Infrastructure Cost Vehicle Costs (fleet of 1,000 trucks) Total Infrastructure Cost Non vehicle Infrastructure O&M Costs Annual Vehicle O&M Costs Total Annual O&M Cost Cost per trip at 1.5 million annually 20 year Total Cost Catenary lines and associated electrical infrastructure Hydrogen fueling staons Charging equipment Baery Electric Truck Fuel Cell Hybrid Truck $248 million $300 $305 million $5 $24 million $17 million $35 $40 million $282 million $231 million $265 million $0.8 billion $1.0 billion $1.0 billion Notes Infrastructure cost based on esmates of $1.3 $6 mill ion per mile. Higher costs include various security and control systems. *Infrastructure maintenance costs esmated at 1% of system cost annually14. Costs based on NREL pipeline delivery model15. Esmated $7.75/ annual kg dispensed. No pipeline infrastructure costs included. Infrastructure costs based on charging and electrical infrastructure costs to support 1,000 trucks16. **Infrastructure maintenance costs unknown, but esmated based on a ten year replacement rate for vehicle chargers. $36 million $15 $24 $24 NG Catenary Hybrid Truck Capital Costs Annual Costs Included in infrastructure costs $0.05 $0.2 million* $2 million** $23 million $36 million $34 million $23 million $36 million $287 $306 million Table 6-11. GNA electric truck cost estimates.

Los Angeles/Long Beach Case Study 109 to the average operations and maintenance costs per trip shown in Table 6-11 to estimate the full per-trip cost. Labor at $15 per hour and overhead at $25 per trip would add about $46 per trip to the figures shown, yielding total per-trip operating and maintenance costs of $60–70. These costs are comparable to the estimates in Table 6-2. This agreement is not surprising because labor and overhead account for most of the drayage cost and are the same in both cases. Evaluating Candidates Evaluation of the two basic short list candidates—advanced fixed-guideway and electric truck with wayside power—and their variations is relatively straightforward because of the large differ- ences between them. It was not necessary to weight the criteria or use formal ranking or ratings. Emissions. Both candidates achieve zero or near-zero-emissions, and in this respect there is nothing to distinguish one over the other. Although there may be small differences, both alter- natives are still somewhat conceptual and there are no actual emissions data on either option. GHG. Because both systems rely primarily on electric power, any difference in GHG would depend on their relative energy efficiency. As with emissions, any estimates are conceptual and there is no basis for reliably distinguishing between them. Both systems may use free-running clean or zero-emissions drayage for short connector trips at the ends of the systems. Capital Costs On/Off Dock Electric Truck, 1130 Vehicles /lane hr Category Metric Unit Cost Units Cost Highway Two lane Freeway Miles 17,600,000$ 50 880,000,000$ Elevation Miles 45,364,773$ 50 2,268,238,628$ Incremental Bridge Miles 108,740,721$ 0.4 108,740,721$ ROW Acquision % of non ROW costs 14.80% 465,939,317$ Highway Subtotal 3,722,918,666$ Power Substaons Line Miles 479,911$ 25 11,997,775$ Distribution System Line Miles 440,968$ 100 44,096,845$ Power Subtotal 56,094,619$ Control, Signalling, & Communicaons System $ Control Facility Number $ Maintenance Facility Number $ Land Acquision % of non land costs 14.80% $ Maintenance Facility Subtotal $ Terminals Port Terminals Number $ Inland Terminals Number $ Land Acquision % of non land costs 14.80% $ Terminals Subtotal $ Infrastructure Total 3,779,013,285$ Environmental Migaon % of non land costs 7.50% 248,480,548$ Vehicles Number $ Subtotal Capital Cost Esmate 4,027,493,833$ Design Unit 10% 402,749,383$ Contingencies Percent 20% 886,048,643$ Total Esmated Capital Cost 5,316,291,859$ Table 6-12. Capital cost estimate four-lane electric truck system.

110 Evaluating Alternatives for Landside Transport of Ocean Containers Noise. With electric power for propulsion, much of the noise will come from wheel-to-rail contact on the fixed-guideway and tire-to-pavement contact for electric trucks. Here too there is no reliable basis for favoring one system over another. Capacity. The fixed-guideway system envisioned in the I-710 Alternatives Analysis has a maxi- mum capacity of about 800 containers per hour in each direction (Table 6-3), or 1,600 total. The four-lane electrified truck roadway in Table 6-12 has a capacity of 1,130 vehicles/containers per lane- hour or 4,520 total. The four-lane freight corridor envisioned in the I-710 Alternatives Analysis would also have a capacity of 4,520 vehicles or containers per hour, but that capacity would be shared with other types of truck traffic. Both systems, however, have adequate capacity to accommodate port trade growth to the 2035 planning horizon and to divert trucks from existing highways, specifically I-710. Capital Costs. Advanced fixed-guideway systems are more expensive to build than electrified roadways. The estimated cost of a near/off-dock fixed-guideway system is roughly $10 billion, while the estimated cost of a four-lane electrified highway system with greater capacity is about $6 billion. A major reason for the difference is the need for multiple terminals in the fixed- guideway system versus the ability of battery-electric trucks to use existing terminals. By com- parison, SCAG’s proposed investment in bus transit for 2012–2035 is $4.6 billion (RTP), and the Gerald Desmond Bridge replacement will cost about $1 billion. Operating Cost. The substantial disparity in operating costs between advanced-technology fixed-guideway systems is heavily influenced by the additional container lifts required. The esti- mates in Table 6-10 significantly exceed the baseline drayage costs in Table 6-2 and the electric truck estimates in Table 6-11. Congestion Relief. Issues of efficiency aside, the substantially higher operating costs of an advanced-technology fixed-guideway system imply failure under a critical criterion: the potential to divert truck trips from the baseline drayage option in a competitive market. Alternatively, an advanced fixed-guideway system would have to be heavily subsidized to compete. There are no funding sources for such subsidy, no freight sector precedents, and no willingness on the part of stakeholders to provide subsidies. User Choice Criteria. Given the higher operating cost, the fixed-guideway system is likely to fare poorly in choices made by users. Over the short distances, any advantage in line-haul speed from Maglev, LIM, or LSM technology would have little, if any, value. Technological Readiness. The I-710 Alternatives Analysis and the terminal design have actually added to the fixed-guideway concept, which formerly lacked any realistic terminal designs. Nonetheless, advanced-technology systems remain essentially conceptual, at TRLs 3–4. In contrast, electric truck systems building on technologies already operating in the freight sphere are at TRLs 5–6. The difference may represent a decade or more of development time. Most critically, there is no way to predict when advanced-technology fixed-guideway systems would be ready to implement. Although the electric wayside power and battery-electric truck technologies have been suc- cessfully implemented separately, it cannot be assumed that they would necessarily function together as a system in the port environment. It is envisioned that trucks would also recharge their batteries while receiving propulsive power from overhead catenary. The distances to the near-dock rail terminals, however, range from 4 to 6 miles from the marine terminals. At 30 mph, the time under catenary would be just 8 to 12 minutes, which is far less than required to charge or even “top off” truck batteries. Significant additional technology development would be required to determine how far or how long a truck would need to travel with wayside power to accumulate enough battery charge for significant “off-wire” travel.

Los Angeles/Long Beach Case Study 111 Findings Based on the available information supplemented by the research team’s analysis estimation and conceptual design efforts, advanced-technology fixed-guideway systems (e.g., Maglev, LIM, and LSM) will not have an effective role in solving the ports’ inland container transport problems for the foreseeable future. Such systems do not appear to be cost-effective relative to either free-running truck drayage or battery-electric trucks with wayside power. The capital costs are substantially higher than the alternatives. The operating costs are likely to be prohibitive, eliminating any potential for substantial diversion of trucks from existing streets or highways. Battery-electric or battery-electric hybrid trucks appear to be a potentially cost-effective option in terms of both capital investment and competitive operating costs. Conclusions The proposed evaluation method yields the same end result as the Roadmap analysis and the I-710 Alternatives Analysis: advanced fixed-guideway systems are too costly, too narrow in their application, too inflexible, and insufficiently scalable to be cost-effective solutions to the emissions, congestion, and capacity problems facing the Ports and the region. Moreover, the very long and uncertain lead time for their development and implementation would leave pressing problems unaddressed for an unacceptably long time and entail considerable risk. The proposed method also identified advanced truck drayage concepts as more feasible in the near term, again consistent with the Roadmap and the I-710 Alternatives Analysis. The results are driven by a few inherent characteristics of advanced fixed-guideway technologies and the container transport needs of the Southern California ports: • Automated small-vehicle fixed-guideway technologies are inherently unsuited to moving large volumes of marine containers in complex or multi-destination networks. These technologies excel at handling passengers in relatively short, simple loops or systems. • Advanced fixed-guideway systems are inherently capital-intensive, especially where they must be elevated and retrofit to legacy facilities. • Advanced fixed-guideway systems are inherently inflexible and non-scalable compared to truck drayage systems. The opportunity window for advanced fixed-guideway systems may be closing. Foreseeable developments at LA/LB, particularly expansion of UP’s ICTF, development of BNSF’s SCIG, and additional on-dock rail capacity, would drastically reduce the volume of traffic and potential advantages of advanced fixed-guideway technologies. The LA/LB case study suggests that the proposed evaluation method is fundamentally useful and sound, but must be flexible in its application. The current social, environmental, and economic context of North American ports requires that a transport system do more than move containers efficiently. The TBL is the new reality for ports. The precision of the proposed method remains limited by the information available on advanced technologies and on the complete systems that must eventually be built around them. The advanced propulsion systems remain largely conceptual in their application to container transport, despite some successful demonstrations under “laboratory” conditions. There is no obvious source for ongoing research and development beyond the private capital of the proponent firms, so the outlook for eventual technological and system readiness is unclear.