Transportation Research Implementation: Application of Research Outcomes (2015)

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SESSION 1 Setting the Scene John F. Munro, University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland, USA Ángel Aparicio, Universidad Politécnica de Madrid, Spain Joris Al, Forum of European National Highway Research Laboratories (FEHRL), Brussels, Belgium Mark Vandehey, Kittelson and Associates, Portland, Oregon, USA Terry Hill, Arup Group Trusts, London, United Kingdom, and International Organization for Standardization, Geneva, Switzerland TransporTaTion research implemenTaTion in The european union and The uniTed sTaTes: observaTions and Working hypoTheses John F. Munro and Ángel Aparicio John Munro began by saying that his goal was to provide a few points that would stimulate discussion and offer a contrast to the second white paper. The bottom line of his and his coauthor’s white papers is that the research implementation processes in both the United States and Europe are unsatisfactory and in need of vast improve- ment. For the past 40 years, most conventional studies of transportation research transfer have focused on a reduc- tionist view of symptoms rather than on an exploration of the underlying core causes, he said. For example, the studies have looked at details such as the existence of champions within a project but have not risen to con- sider the systems level. The reductionist approach looks at little things rather than examining the systemic condi- tions that impede implementation. Munro urged that, ultimately, there is a need to move from incremental to paradigmatic change on both sides of the Atlantic. As pointed out in his white paper, there are critical areas of overlap between the United States and the Euro- pean Union in terms of outcomes that are affecting the research dissemination process. The factors causing the problems differ, but the outcomes are similar. For exam- ple, in both the European Union and the United States, the research implementation process lacks sufficient government involvement in commercialization. Munro referred to this as the “valley of death.” There are two valleys of death: one technological and one financial (commercialization) (Figure 1). Systems-Level Factors Promoting Research Implementation There are four key systems-level factors that would allow a better research implementation process that are not present in the United States or in the European Union, Munro said. These factors, which are summarized in Fig- ure 2, are 1. Sufficient funding for research implementation, 2. Organizational centralization and coordination, 3. Comprehensive data collection and analysis, and 4. Effective use of intellectual property (IP) tools. The lack of funding is a serious problem in the United States, where commitment to improving infrastructure has declined and the U.S. government has historically been reluctant to put money into commercialization. That reluctance is changing somewhat with the U.S. Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), but little has been done to fund commercialization. The organizational structures are complex and overlapping, and it is difficult for one hand to see what the other is doing. Similarly, although some good metrics are present in the European Union at the national level, such as in France, EU-wide metrics are poor in terms of information collection on outcomes, levels of commercialization, and revenues versus costs. 3

4 t r a n s p o r t r e s e a r c h i m p l e m e n t a t i o n Munro asked his coauthor to elaborate, and Ángel Aparicio emphasized that the lack of funding has been evident over the past decade. He noted that in the European Union, individual countries do research and implementation, but not at the EU level. The European Commission encourages young researchers to enter the field, but there are few professional career opportunities to allow them to do so. Second, in the 2 to 4 years after a research project ends, there is a lack of comprehensive monitoring that would show whether the project had been commercialized. In that regard, the attention to the research ends too soon. On the issue of revenue, Munro added that many U.S. states are backing out of research programs because of budget uncertainties. Even for small research projects of $1 to $2 million, a state governor may decide not to pursue the project in favor of immediate needs such as filling potholes. Federal officials are more receptive to operational stakeholders or to infrastructure issues than to research, because research delivers intangible benefits that are not real time. Myths That Impede Effective Research Next, Munro discussed myths that impede effective research implementation. One of these strongly held myths is that funding should decrease as research approaches commercialization. Although American institutions such as the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the National Cancer Institute, and the U.S. Department of Agriculture are heavily involved in the transfer of research, in transportation the situation across states is so complicated and overlapping that control of the process is not good. Part of the solution to metric issues rests in the development of a more robust IP system in Europe and the United States, Munro continued. Some agencies, such as NASA and the National Cancer Institute, develop IP well, but others, such as the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), do not. Munro speculated that the lack of IP development could be due to a fundamental belief that it was inappropriate for public money to be translated into IP that could be licensed. The belief structure that IP is contrary to the proper role of government is typical of both the United States and the European Union. Áparicio expanded on the final myth, which holds that transport research problems are modal and that research implementation should therefore be left to the modes. This myth leads to incremental rather than dis- ruptive innovation, he said. Munro concluded with a list of 12 hypotheses, such as that a lack of integrated IP systems is impeding innovation FIguRE 1 Two valleys of death: technological and financial (commercialization). (Source: Adapted from Jenkins and Mansur 2011, Figure 1, p. 5.) Venture Capital Public Financing Private Equity Debt Financing Potential Contracts with Agencies Little or no direct public financing Technological Valley of Death Commercialization Valley of Death Stage 1: R&D Stage 2: Prototype/Proof of Concept Stage 4: Demonstration Pilot Stage 6: Commercialization

5s e t t i n g t h e s c e n e on both sides of the Atlantic. He noted that the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Research and Technology (for- merly the Research and Innovative Technology Adminis- tration) had been innovative in getting an IP attorney and beginning to think about IP in a new way, but that most authority was in the modal administrations and, there- fore, implementation of IP changes was difficult. Munro stressed the importance of taking a systems approach to achieve paradigm change. Transportation could not sim- ply identify individual elements at a reductionist level if it hoped to move forward dramatically. lessons learned from case sTudies of successful research implemenTaTion in europe and The uniTed sTaTes Joris Al and Mark Vandehey Joris Al conducted the first half of the presentation, explaining that the main body of his and Vandehey’s white paper consisted of 13 cases: six from the United States and seven from EU countries. The cases studied research implementation projects across diverse modes, with an emphasis on rail and roads but also covering infrastructure (construction and maintenance), transpor- tation (urban and highway), traffic management (includ- ing intelligent transportation systems), and management issues such as life-cycle costing systems. The paper pro- vided specific lessons learned from each case as well as general findings that corroborated those of the first white paper. Al directed participants to the executive summary of the white paper, which relates each of the cases to the main lessons learned. Method Next, Al explained the method used in the paper and remarked on some of its limitations. The paper cen- ters on successful cases, and the coauthors began with no predetermined theory. Instead, they took a neutral FIguRE 2 Conditions necessary for implementation of research: Europen union versus united States. European Union United States Cause Comment Sufficient Funding for Research Implementation Insufficient Insufficient Austerity budgets and a lack of legislative and policy emphasis on commercialization. In the European Union and the United States, not only is overall funding insufficient, but the funding targeted toward research dissemination is insufficient or nonexistent. Organizational Centralization and Coordination Some coordination through EU research framework programs Insufficient In the United States, the historical evolution of modal administrations has contributed to a lack of coordination. Also, the complexity within specific modes such as FHWA limits coordination. The United States lacks an integrated national plan for transportation, although Secretary Foxx has committed to developing such a plan. Comprehensive Data Collection and Analysis Effective Use of Intellectual Property Tools Ex-post evaluation, unable to identify actual implementation of results Insufficient Both the European Union and the United States lack mechanisms to monitor programs and evaluate outcomes effectively. In the United States, until the passage of MAP 21 and the diminishment in available funds, there has not been the political will to develop an effective data collection and analysis process that crosses modes. Insufficient Insufficient Neither the European Union nor the United States has fully exploited intellectual property tools. U.S. transportation modes vary in their willingness to use intellectual tools. Some of the differences relate to organizational culture. Partially Meeting Not Meeting

6 t r a n s p o r t r e s e a r c h i m p l e m e n t a t i o n approach by examining the existing literature and con- ducting interviews with experts about the implemen- tation of each case. Each case yielded several lessons, which were then consolidated into a list of eight main lessons. Each case was interesting in its own right, Al said, and at the end the coauthors compared the find- ings from their 13 cases with evaluations by the Euro- pean Rail Research Advisory Council (ERRAC) and the Transportation Research Board’s second Strategic Highway Research Program (SHRP 2) on the uptake of research. Their findings were consistent with the conclusions of the ERRAC and SHRP 2 evaluations. Al noted the time constraints that the coauthors faced, in that they had only 2 months in which to write the white paper. That time frame would not have been a problem had there been consistent or consolidated information on implementation, but no such sources were available. Rather, the information on implementation was limited and fragmented and therefore took time to gather. In addition, there were no standard terms or definitions. Another limitation Al noted was that the white paper looked only at successful cases, but there are lessons to learn from failures, too. Despite the time constraints that necessitated a somewhat superficial and broad treatment, he said, the findings were consistent among the cases and with the three other evaluations and thus were representative. Implementation Issues Al continued his portion of the presentation with a discussion of issues related to implementation. He noted that definitions of research and implementation were not exact. The research in the cases that were reviewed ranged from fundamental or basic research to applied or practical research. Most of the cases fell into the category of practical research, although a few were fundamental research. Similarly, the cases focused on successful implementation, but what defines “successful implementation?” Is it when a piece of legislation is proposed? when a law is put into practice? when a practice is evaluated and deemed a success? Similarly, there are differences between innovation and research. Innovation is a very different process from research. Innovation usually starts with a solution, which research then validates; research starts with a problem and ends in an innovative solution. Finally, there was a lot of literature on research but not on implementation, Al said. It is harder to trace an implementation back to the research that created it because there is no clear one-on-one relationship. Therein arises the question of whether the innovation would have been implemented anyway, without the research. Much of the research did end in implementation because it was practical research, but whether the research was efficient is hard to say. Al concluded his part of the presentation by saying that successful implementation has three constants: 1. Consistent communication, 2. Smooth governance, and 3. Finance and capacity assured throughout the process. He ended with a chart of implementation strategies that provides researchers with clues as to how to shape their research to improve implementation (Figure 3). Main Lessons from Case Studies Mark Vandehey then continued with the second half of the presentation by identifying eight main lessons learned from the case studies. These lessons are not revolution- ary concepts, Vandehey said, but it is possible to see their power and impact when several of the lessons are used in one project. When more of these lessons can be inte- grated into a research project, the project is more likely to end with successful implementation. The lessons are as follows: 1. Stakeholder involvement. Key stakeholders should be involved early and continuously in the process of implementation planning. Stakeholders play a role in communication and are often early adopters, so plan- ning for stakeholder involvement at the outset helps get implementation. 2. Resources for implementation. Resources for implementation should be secured. Researchers tend to focus on the up-front costs of research and not to think about the implementation side, Vandehey noted. SHRP 2 had it right, he said, when it devoted funding and resources to implementation from the outset. The funding should be for activities such as training, pilot studies, and outreach, as well as for staffing resources. 3. Development. Postresearch development is critical. Specifically, technology is often not “market ready.” Technology needs pilot testing, but if there is no funding for pilots, the research stalls. In an interview with Neil Pedersen of SHRP 2, Vandehey was told that funding for development should be two to three times the level of research funding to get the research market ready. 4. Early adopters and champions. Early adopters are valuable in getting the word out early and showing the early successes of the research. Early adopters help cata- lyze more adoption. 5. Overcoming institutional barriers. Researchers should plan to address institutional barriers. Multiple

7s e t t i n g t h e s c e n e layers of approval—policies, approval procedures, standards—as well as procurement rules and regulations come into play. Implementers of successful projects think early on about how to overcome those institutional barriers, and stakeholders can be helpful in overcoming some of the barriers. 6. Government leadership. Government leadership can be valuable as a catalyst for change, to accelerate innovation. For example, FHWA’s Every Day Counts program shows the benefits of having the federal gov- ernment play the lead role in getting innovation adopted. 7. Communication. Communication, both internal and external, should start at the research phase to get the word out and create a pull factor that generates demand and plants the seeds of implementation. Al and Vande- hey found many examples of how continuous communi- cation educates the users and the public. 8. Market readiness. Market readiness tills the soil in advance to make it ready for the seeds of research to grow. It is important to get the market ready to implement the research. Table 1 can be used to delve into the 13 cases in greater detail on the basis of their themes. Because it was found that the more themes a case had, the more likely it was to be successfully implemented, a key lesson for the future is that if researchers want to maximize the chances of successful implementation of research, they should try to incorporate as many of the eight lessons as possible into each research project. Vandehey ended with some general suggestions for maximizing the impact of the findings. First, all the les- sons should be translated into specific courses of action. Second, continuing to develop case studies of success stories can be beneficial because it is hard to find these cases in the literature and because few studies docu- ment a project from the start of the research through to implementation. Therefore, developing cases such as the ones in this white paper would be useful. Third, Vande- hey suggested developing a primer on best practices for facilitating the research process so that future researchers could have more of a road map to follow and planners could set up their research in a way that would position it for implementation. Al closed the presentation by saying that the system was a series of components and that it was important to think about how the components fit together. It was also important to note that more funding must be allocated to the development side of R&D. Research is just the start, he said. FIguRE 3 Implementation strategies. PASSIVE standards available information available benchmark solutions promote knowledge funding available innovative procurement prescribe solutions specifications targeted subsidy provide database ACTIVE VOLUNTARY MANDATORY funding conditions standards required education/ training

8 t r a n s p o r t r e s e a r c h i m p l e m e n t a t i o n keynoTe speech TransporT research implemenTaTion: WhaT socieTy really needs Terry Hill Terry Hill began by saying that he and the symposium’s participants share a common ambition for innovation to be an enabler that improves society. He said that during his presentation, he would be direct about the challenges being faced and that he would be thought provoking and a bit radical. Hill is with Arup, a firm with a staff of 11,000 and annual sales of £1 billion. Thirty percent of the com- pany’s revenues are derived within the United Kingdom, and the other 70% is derived equally from the United States, Europe, and China. The company chooses to invest in research on the built environment. The company has to make the research count because it is a commercial enterprise. Arup is researching low-emission autonomous vehicles, rapid transit, and transportation infrastructure. Hill reflected on the aforementioned valley of death and commented that valleys often contain the most fertile ground. Infrastructure Projects Hill noted the massive scale of infrastructure projects. Big infrastructure projects in Europe include the UK’s €8.1 billion Channel Tunnel, London’s €18 billion Crossrail project, Sweden’s €4 billion Öresund crossing, and, in the United States, New York City’s $17 billion Second Avenue subway and Los Angeles, California’s, $1.2 billion Gerald Desmond Bridge replacement. Infrastructure changes lives and induces transformational change, Hill said. Consider how public health improved after the advent of city sewers, how the U.S. West was opened up by the railroad, or how the city of Malmö in southern Sweden was transformed after the construction of the Öresund bridge. London would not have hosted the Olympics were it not for the High Speed 1 railway that connected the United Kingdom to the rest of Europe by providing high-speed rail service from London to the Channel Tunnel. TABLE 1 Themes Exemplified in Each Case Study Case Study St ak eh ol de r In vo lv em en t R es ou rc es f or I m pl em en ta ti on D ev el op m en t E ar ly A do pt er s an d C ha m pi on s O ve rc om in g In st it ut io na l B ar ri er s G ov er nm en ta l L ea de rs hi p C om m un ic at io n M ar ke t R ea di ne ss European Union Asset Management (the Netherlands) X X X ALJOIN X X INNOTRACK X X X X River Information Services X X X X SAMARIS, ARCHES, and CERTAIN X X X Silent and Durable Road Expansion Joints (IPW, the Netherlands) X X X X Climate Change X X X United States Highway Safety Manual X X X X X Flashing Yellow Arrow Left-Turn Display X X Modern Roundabouts X X X Warm-Mix Asphalt Pavements X X Heavy Rail Acoustic Bearing Detector X X Bus Rapid Transit X X X Note: ALJOIN = Crashworthiness of Joints in Aluminum Rail Vehicles; SAMARIS = Sustainable and Advanced Materials for Road Infrastructures; ARCHES = Assessment and Rehabilitation of Central European Highway Structures; CERTAIN = Central European Research in Road Infrastructure; IPW = Netherlands’ Innovative Road Maintenance program.

9s e t t i n g t h e s c e n e International Standards Hill heads the International Organization for Standard- ization (ISO), which has 19,000 standards designed to enhance society through the supply of safer and more efficient goods and services. Standards are an enabler of innovation because they develop a common understand- ing, Hill said. This is particularly important for emerging technology that could otherwise face barriers. That is why standards can make such a difference in creating a com- mon framework for innovation and in setting the rules of the game. Standards create a common vocabulary and identify essential characteristics and best practices. Construction Industry Hill said he began his presentation by listing how much large infrastructure projects cost because he wanted to underscore the point that it is costly to make these transformations. It takes billions of dollars to do so. Why do such projects cost so much? Is it a fundamental truth that big infrastructure must be costly, or should society challenge that assumption? The majority of the cost of big infrastructure is in the construction—80% of the costs are construction costs, and the remaining 20% are the system costs. Is it reasonable for construction to cost so much? Worse, construction costs show no downward trend, which is remarkable, given how costs come down in other sectors, such as technology. Construction is an unfortunate necessity. It is not sophisticated, and it is very expensive. In 2010, Hill was asked by the UK government to investigate the construction element of infrastructure. The United Kingdom has one of the safest construction industries in the world, but it has not achieved cost reductions. One of the UK government’s goals in 2010 was to achieve a 15% reduction in construction costs. To do so will require five actions: • Publication of a pipeline of projects among which to invest; • Identification of funders and delivery agents by governance, to ensure that there is a single controlling mind; • Discipline; • Appropriate standards; and • Performance criteria. One way to ensure that standards are appropriate is to encourage derogations and to use a red–amber–green approach to rating which standards are required. That is, if a standard is red, it is mandatory; if it is amber, it is advisory; and if it is green, it is simply illustrative of how something could be done. Finally, it is important to ensure that construction projects are fully designed before they are built. Hill also stressed that procurement needs a more risk-based approach that looks at the total supply chain to reduce costs. If those actions were taken, then the construction industry would have confidence to invest in training, research, and innovation. Will this fivefold program result in a sea change in construction research? The consequences of overly expensive transport infrastructure projects are serious. Infrastructure is political, and funders are forced to be risk averse. We have to figure out why politicians, funders, and bankers are all nervous about the costs of infrastructure, Hill said. All stakeholders have to control the risks, because the consequences of risk aversion are serious, primarily because the first response to uncontrolled risks is simply not to invest in infrastructure at all because of the risks and high cost. However, avoiding investment in infrastructure means that all of society suffers. The second consequence of risk aversion is that much- needed projects are delayed for decades. The Crossrail project was first identified 50 years ago, but the €18 billion cost delayed it. “Perhaps the only way you get to invest in infrastructure is if your city hosts the Olympics,” Hill joked. Third, risk aversion means that when the investment finally takes place, it is too little too late. The investment is undertaken because there are no alternatives and citizens finally call for action, but the solution is suboptimal. Finally, investment is undertaken, and jurisdictions try to squeeze greater performance out of existing infrastructure that is already overloaded. The construction industry has not yet had its revolu- tion, as has the aerospace industry with its jet propul- sion and fly-by-wire, the pharmaceutical industry with its stem cell research, or the automotive industry with its onboard computer management and fuel and emissions efficacy. The oil and gas industry has had revolutions in offshore extraction and hydraulic fracturing. Even the food industry has had a revolution with genetically modified organisms, or GMOs. True, there have been some construction industry advances, such as low- or no-energy buildings, better tunneling, and higher sky- scrapers, but these advancements are incremental rather than game changing, which forces private companies and the public to make do or to make patch solutions. Compared with other industries, the construction industry is the biggest of all in terms of revenue or employment, but it is the least affected by the techno- logical revolution. The construction industry is still stuck in the industrial revolution, mid–twentieth century era of internal combustion engines. The digital revolution has hardly affected it. Why? The root cause is the fragmented nature of the industry.

10 t r a n s p o r t r e s e a r c h i m p l e m e n t a t i o n Consider other industries, which have large, domi- nant players, Hill said. If the European Commission wants to speak to the automotive, airplane manufac- turing, or drug industries, there are a few key players to contact. The major work of building an airliner or a new car or drug is undertaken by the private sector. The scale of building an offshore oil platform is the same as building a big bridge, but the oil industry is able to handle it privately through megacorporations that assess the risk and manage the project. The problem with the construction industry is that the bulk of the work is carried out by small and medium-sized enter- prises (SMEs). For example, in the United Kingdom, there are 300,000 construction firms with an average employee headcount of only seven, Hill said. The construction industry should be dynamic and light on its feet, because SMEs are at the heart of innovation, but SMEs are not designed to take on large construction projects. No existing construction company could take on the risk of a large infrastructure project. There is high project cost but a low capital asset base and risk-averse funders. There are huge upside innovation benefits but only small players to deliver them. The solution, Hill said, is that we have the risk allo- cation wrong. Construction needs help and cannot just pass the risk down the supply chain. Commissioners of projects must share this risk. There is a need for smarter procurement by highly trained experts who incentiv- ize innovation, and a need for large companies rather than small companies that are only hired for one local construction job. Construction companies do not have the stable structure that the automobile industry has, for example, with its original equipment manufacturers and Tier 1 (direct) suppliers to manage it. Research and Innovation Research and innovation should be allowed its serendipity and some failure, Hill said. A recent article in the Economist magazine [“Rise of the Robots,” March 29, 2014] shows the three positive factors for advancement: easier R&D, imagination, and investment. José Viegas, who recently spoke at a European Commission meeting, described condition-aware infrastructure based on sensors, such as are common in the aerospace industry. When a jet engine needs attention, it sends a signal back to the manufacturer that it needs repair. The same can be done with remote monitoring of infrastructure. Harvard’s Justin Werfel is developing distributed autonomous control rules for self-building infrastructure. What is the revolution that may happen? The advancements could make infrastructure safer, green, and smart. Then politicians would champion it and not be wary of it, Hill said. In 2010, the United Kingdom targeted a 15% cost reduction through governance and smart procurement. With Construction 2025, a joint strategy of government and industry for the UK construction sector, the United Kingdom is targeting 50% greener, 50% faster, and 33% cheaper construction projects. Achieving the Construction 2025 targets cannot be done by doing the same things we do now—we need to do new things, Hill said. Without research and development, infrastructure will have to be built the old way: high carbon, low innovation, and high cost. Big construction is risky. Innovation in construction is constrained by the risk aversion of governors who want the tried and tested old techniques because of a failure to invest in research. When one looks at the percentage of an industry’s total revenue that is invested in R&D, construction is not even listed in the table. It is the biggest of all industries but does not invest in research. Infrastructure construction does not have private financing. Coordinated and directed research is needed to avoid overlap, Hill urged. Big innovation projects are too daunting for individual companies, so innovation is inhibited and there is a fear of legal challenges. The market needs unlocking, transparency, and innovation, Hill concluded. discussion John Mason opened the audience discussion of the three talks by saying that the goal of the dialogue was to enhance the implementation of the research and that regardless of one’s position as a researcher, funder, or implementer, enhancing the return on research funding and improving the infrastructure was of interest to all. Bill Millar asked Joris Al to say more about Table 1 and Al’s comment that the way to increase the opportunity for success was to fill in more of those spaces. Joris Al replied that through the white paper research, it became evident that the more of these key elements were in the research project, the more likely the project was to be implemented. The elements serve as accelerators, so when more of the elements can be strung together—for example, putting resources toward implementation early on, getting adopters involved early on, and starting communication early— implementation is more likely to take place. He added that he was looking forward to the upcoming pre- sentation about SHRP 2 the next day because he had attended one of SHRP 2’s implementation workshops and seen that they were thinking about the majority of these elements, and so he was interested to see how successful they had been.

11s e t t i n g t h e s c e n e Patrick Malléjacq added that research results must be disseminated but that it was not easy to promote what you had just achieved. Transnational projects on road research need reports and conferences to push the results to the end users and to gain peer pressure for implementation. Risk aversion is certainly present in France with regard to funding the road sector, he continued, because if the innovation does not work, the implementer will be fired. He wondered how to mitigate risk. The insurance industry may offer a model for how to handle the risk, he suggested. To Malléjacq’s first point, Al answered that much of the dissemination of results comes from the research side and not from the implementation side. However, researchers need to disseminate what the implementer needs, not what the researcher needs. The Innotrack example described in Al and Vandehey’s white paper made that clear. All 50 products were directed at dissemination. Francesca La Torre, a professor at the University of Flor- ence, Italy, explained that she is a researcher and also a designer. As a designer, she wants innovation, but she has to convince road administrators to implement the innovation. She wondered how to improve this develop- ment chain, so that when a research team produces a good innovation, there is opportunity to push it forward to a larger scale. Terry Hill answered that the researcher has to be tough and loud, but there are obstacles. For example, in London, the biggest highway project will focus on improving the existing infrastructure, namely, widen- ing and upgrading the M25 motorway around London. The standards were set, but then an innovation arose in the form of composite materials. The innovation was stopped, however, because it did not comply with the specifications. For each administrator, it was “above my pay grade,” even though the benefits of the new mate- rial were huge. The innovators had to push higher and higher in the hierarchy, finally up to the minister, who gave the go-ahead for the new material, which ultimately saved £200 million. Hill then had a question for Munro, who had won- dered why the public sector was not taking out pat- ents. It is assumed that if a company gets government money, it is not allowed to have IP rights. Hill pointed to what happens in other sectors, such as finance and retail, which do massive amounts of research but do not publish the results or even get patents, because doing so would require disclosing the innovation. They do the research themselves for their own benefit. Hill agreed that IP rights were a constraint. He was in favor of pub- lic and joint funding to generate IP, and he saw a need to work out how to protect IP so that researchers and implementers could benefit while allowing the public to benefit from the investment of public funds. John Munro added that if a project is developed with public money, it has to stay in the public sector, so there is a hesitancy to issue exclusive licenses and a reluctance to change the IP regime. In the historical development of the federal highway program in the United States, the U.S. DOT has been a distributive agency that distributes funding to states as the primary customers. The U.S. DOT has not embraced the marketplace. It continues to be a fundamental obstacle for market mechanisms to promote innovation. The IP issue is also a constraint on measuring research outcomes, because IP and revenues from IP licensing would be an easy way to measure and monitor research outputs. Outcomes would be easy to track if there was a payoff from the research. At best, there are discrete case studies that evaluate and monitor an implementation, but there is no broad vision of how to incorporate the market into the process. The United States is a capitalist nation, and some citizens complain about the encroachment of government, but in this case the government does nothing to utilize the market in an effective way. Beverly Scott said that too often in research, “we have a conversation with ourselves.” She urged researchers to think broadly in order to get public support. Liam Breslin of the European Commission appreciated the comparison of the construction industry with the aerospace industry. The aerospace industry uses composite materials and structures with sensors built in to detect minor cracking; if cracking is detected, a signal is sent back to the manufacturer to alert them to do maintenance. He also praised Munro and Aparicio’s paper, elaborating that he works with Damiani in the European Commission on formulating research programs. One of the problems the European Commission faces is being so busy with running a new program that it lacks the time to revisit the implementation of previous programs. He detailed that within Horizon 2020, there will be 600 new research proposals that have to be evaluated in 3 weeks, and then the follow-on projects will be negotiated. He noted with regret that he funded very good projects 8 or 9 years ago that are delivering results, but that he lacks the staff to see what needs to be done for the projects’ implementation, so it falls on the consortia to follow up on implementation. In the automobile industry, he pointed out, companies know what they need, and when the research is done, companies are ready to pick it up; in transportation, however, there is no industry to pick up the project. Munro agreed but said it went back to setting up a system of IP in the United States and European Union that would provide incentives for the private sector to implement the research in exchange for an exclusive license. The current belief is that if one does not keep the research open, one is not upholding the public trust; how-

12 T R A N S P O R T R E S E A R C H I M P L E M E N T A T I O N ever, if the government got the IP, licensed it, and gath- ered revenue from it, then it could reinvest the revenue in further research. Such an approach would be especially beneficial as budgets decrease. The salient licenses could be auctioned off, as NASA does, as a way to generate revenue for research. Doing this would provide oppor- tunities, Munro said, if the transportation industry were willing to do a paradigmatic shift. IP is a core condition, in that a systematic way to manage IP across modes and within modes should be developed. American universi- ties and NASA have centralized IP management, and the transportation sector should consider doing so as well. Phillippe Citroën of the Association of the European Rail Industry (UNIFE) said he sees reasons to be optimistic. The European Commission has, in 3 years, built the Shift²Rail initiative and discovered that public–private partnerships can be a useful tool. Industry is ready to match the €450 million funding put in by the public sec- tor, which will bring the total funding for the initiative to €920 million for 2014–2020. Operators, infrastructure managers, and universities have been able to do coop- erative projects together and be as close to the market as possible. The rail industry has to be more competitive, especially to face Asia, he said.