Legal Issues in Public Transit Emergency Planning and Operation (2013)

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54 • Means should be taken to ensure adequate communications plans during an emergency. APTA’s suggested template for the devel- opment of an MOU covers key areas for opera- tional and legal review, including:349 • Assistance commencement and termina- tion. • Mandated rest time. • Anticipated length of activations. • Responsibility for meals, lodgings, materi- als, and transport. • Safety rules. • Timekeeping. • Resource specifications. • Wages, benefits, payroll taxes, liability in- surance, workmen’s compensation, and other contingencies. • Administrative costs. • Indemnification. See the full sample of APTA’s MOU tem- plate in Appendix B. IV. CONCLUSION After September 11, 2001, the transit indus- try became an integral actor within a new and quickly-evolving homeland security industry. While striving to fulfill its mandate to provide efficient and safe public transport, the transit industry had a steep learning curve to building security and emergency management pro- grams. However, deficiencies in cross-sector coordination and the development of sweeping homeland security programs left transit man- agers unsure of what was expected of them. For example, transit managers understood they had roles in regional emergency response, but many did not understand their planning roles and how they fit exactly into a regional structure. Moreover, while managers generally understood the benefits of a NIMS, how such systems could be applied in practical fashion to their operations was left unclear. Transit was already struggling with challenges from its own industry, including requirements for rail transit SSO and the process of adapting to such regulatory structures. In general, existing emergency planning re- quirements are high-level, systems, risk- management-oriented mandates. The SSPP, SEPP, and the incorporation of ICS into plans are overarching, management-level planning requirements. More prescriptive, operationally 349 Id. at 4–5. oriented requirements are rare. However, sift- ing through the volumes of guidance docu- ments available to learn how to, for example, develop SSPP and integrate ICS into plans and procedures is no small, uncomplicated, and clear task. Going forward, how transit is educated on planning requirements will be the challenge. At present, industry organizations are attempt- ing to provide transit systems with advice on how to comply with NIMS, ICS, SSO, PMO, and other key safety, security, and emergency management requirements. However, as indi- cated by GAO and MAP-21, there is a great need for better coordination between DHS, TSA, FEMA, and USDOT and its modal ad- ministrations. Tailoring program guidance to assist transit systems developing EOP, SSPP, SEPP, and other plans that are based on DHS, FEMA, and TSA planning foundations must involve a coordinated program development process. If TSA is charged with the security and emergency management oversight of all USDOT modes, TSA should lead such transit industry education and training efforts in con- junction with USDOT and industry partners. TSA and the transit industry should make a good-faith effort to synthesize existing guid- ance to provide unified instructive information for the industry. How well TSA coordinates with USDOT and its modal administrations in this process will have important implications on national preparedness and resilience.