Expedited Procurement Procedures for Emergency Construction Services (2012)

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11 CHAPTER TWO EMERGENCY PROCUREMENT PROJECT CASE STUDIES I-580/880 MacArthur Maze Bridge Repair and Replacement Project—California DOT This project furnishes an example of an extreme use of time-based incentives to clearly communicate the agency’s need to complete the emergency project as rapidly as pos- sible. Almost 80 percent of the MacArthur Maze project cost was the result of the contractor earning the maximum possible incentive (Blanchard et al. 2009). It also illustrates a number of tools that the California DOT (Caltrans) used to great effect to expedite the procurement and manage the constraints on this project. Case 1—Caltrans: I-580/880 Bridge Repair and Replacement Value: $5.9 million Scope: Design and construction of 160 linear feet of I-580 overpass bridge. Replacement of I-880 deck and repair of other damaged features. Figure 4 shows the extent of the damage. FIGURE 4 I-580/880 accident and fire aftermath (Blanchard et al. 2009). Right-of-Way: Right-of-way was not an issue in this project. Permitting: California statutes for the emergency project “allowed for expedited environmental, public involvement, and contracting procedures … [and were] critical to emer- gency contract success” (Blanchard et al. 2009). INTRODUCTION Case study data collection was based on the results of the literature review. The team proposed to identify and analyze two to five projects from across the spectrum of emergency transportation projects with procurement aspects of spe- cific interest to the synthesis. The cases are separated into emergency procurement project case studies and emergency procurement case law studies. The project case studies each highlight a specific emergency procurement issue that was addressed using expedited procurement procedures for emergency project delivery. The team was able to identify and gain access to infor- mation on 10 emergency procurement projects worth more than $290 million in six states that represent the cross sec- tion of variations on project delivery methods (PDM). Table 2 summarizes the case study projects that were sampled for this report. The projects span from coast to coast and north to south. The case study projects represent the use of four different project delivery methods, including a hybrid DBB with a nested DB provision. The project types range from the replacement of a washed-out culvert to emergency replacement of an eight-lane Interstate highway bridge over the Mississippi River. EMERGENCY PROCUREMENT PROJECT CASE STUDY DETAILS The following sections relate the details of each case study project. The objective of this section is to portray the breadth and depth of the case study project popula- tion, giving the reader the background to understand how each project’s features contributed to the analysis reported in succeeding chapters. The format has been standardized for each project to permit comparison of the projects. All of the details shown in this chapter were obtained through structured interviews (either in person or telephonic) with the agency and then supplemented as required by specifics about each project found in the lit- erature. The values cited for each case are the published cost for the emergency contract and may not include addi- tional costs for incentives, quantity overruns, right-of- way, and so on.

12 Rationale: Caltrans considered a force account con- tract but ruled that out to “drive the best possible bid price and early completion date” (Blanchard et al. 2009). It also considered A+B bidding but discarded that option because the contract was expected to take less than 50 days and the agency did not want to create a situation where there was no incentive for the contractor to finish as fast as possible. It settled on an incentive-based early completion date to “allow the contractor to work as fast as possible and as economically as possible” (Blanchard et al. 2009). Procurement: Blanchard et al. (2009) describe the pro- curement as follows: This project was let as an invitation-only bid. Nine proven and experienced bridge contractors who work in the area were invited to bid. Eventually only seven submitted bids (one declined the invitation and another withdrew before the site visit). There was a mandatory pre-bid conference at the project site on Saturday afternoon and a mandatory small business outreach meeting. Over the next day Caltrans provided immediate responses to bidder inquires. The project was advertised with a $200,000 per day incentive/disincentive clause capped at a $5 million maximum. The contract time was set up for 70 calendar days with an internal milestone of 50 calendar days for opening the bridge to traffic. In addition, the contractor would be fined $200,000 for every 10 minutes the short- duration lane closures were not reopened to traffic. By creating bonus incentives of up to $5 million, nearly 100% of the state’s estimated cost for construction of the project, the state clearly conveyed that it placed a high TABLE 2 SYNTHESIS CASE STUDY PROJECT SUMMARIES Agency (case no.) Case Study Project (value) Construction Type (location) Expedited Procurement Procedure Solicitation Type (PDM) Payment Provision (designer) California (1) I-580/880 MacArthur Maze Repair and Replacement ($5.9 million) Overpass bridge replacement after truck struck pier and burned (Oakland, CA) Invitation-only bids from 9 experienced contractors IFB (DBB) UP with time incentive (in-house) Florida (2) I-10 Escambia Bay Bridge Repair ($26.4 million) Repair Interstate bridge damaged in hurricane (Pensacola, FL) Natural Disaster Emergency Contract— Invitation-only bids from 4 contractors RFP (DB) LS with time incentive (outsource) Maine (3) Route 27 Emergency Bridge Replacement ($2.89 million) Replace two bridges destroyed by flooding (Carrabassett Valley, Eustis, ME) Use of CMGC with standing contractor prequalification list by a DOT that does not have routine CMGC authority RFQ/RFP (CMGC) UP (in-house) Minnesota DOT (4) I-35W Bridge Replacement ($234 million-DB con- tract only) Replace collapsed Interstate bridge (Minneapolis, MN) Abbreviated DB procurement for mega-project. Also included because of protest of award RFQ/RFP (DB) LS + time incentive and no-excuse bonus (outsource) Missouri DOT (5) I-270—St. Louis County Slide Repair ($550,000) Emergency landslide remediation on Inter- state highway (St. Louis County, MO) Use of a “nested” DB con- tract provision in a DBB con- tract with known geotechni- cal issues to respond to a major geotechnical problem IFB with prequalified geotechnical specialty subcontractor included (DBB w/DB) Time and materials (outsource) Montana DOT (6) US Highway 2 Rockfall Mitigation ($3.0 million) Rockfall mitigation features (Flathead County, MT) Use of a DB unit price provi- sion that allowed construc- tion to begin without geo- technical investigation RFQ/RFP (DB) LS with UP items (outsource) New York State DOT (7) 981G Ramapo River Bridge Replacement ($1.4 million) Bridge replacement (Rockland County, NY) Use of Statewide Emergency Bridge IDIQ Contract Standing contract (IDIQ) Time and materials (in-house) Oklahoma DOT (8) I-40—Beckham County Bridge Pier Replacement ($315,000) Overpass pier replace- ment after truck struck pier and burned (Elk City, OK) Sole source cost plus contract to local contractor to install temporary shoring while expedited IFB developed IFB (DBB) UP with hourly I/D (in-house) Oklahoma DOT (9) I-35 Culvert Repair ($716,000) Triple box culvert replacement after wash- out by flood (Logan County, OK) Expedited procurement in 72 hours after emergency IFB (DBB) UP with hourly I/D (in-house) Utah DOT (10) SR 14 Landslide Repair ($15 million) Repair extensive land- slide damage to road and stabilize slide (Cedar City, UT) Use of CMGC contract to expedite construction through 3 work packages RFP (CMGC) GMP (outsource) I/D = incentive/disincentive; IFB = invitation for bids; GMP = guaranteed maximum price; UP = unit price.; PDM = project delivery method; DBB = design-bid-build; CMGC = construction manager/general contractor IDIQ = indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity.

13 • Issued sole source contracts to immediately begin demolition and address immediate danger of I-880 bridge collapse with temporary shoring; • Implemented an aggressive DBB procurement process based on limited competition among a select group of contractors with known experience; • Arranged bid opening so a contract award could be made immediately after bid opening; • Incentivized the emergency construction contract to minimize the construction period; and • Massed agency personnel in three shifts of field engi- neers and conducted construction submittal review and approval on site. I-10 Escambia Bay Bridge Repair Project—Florida DOT This project demonstrates an expedited DB procurement and the procedures and tools that the Florida (FDOT) used to reopen this vital link in the national highway system after Hurricane Ivan wreaked its damage on the Gulf Coast in 2004. The hurricane destroyed a 2.5-mile section of I-10 bridges over Escambia Bay. FDOT invited four contractors to submit DB proposals for the emergency replacement of the westbound bridge using Acrow prefabricated bridging, a third-generation panel bridge system based on the military Bailey bridge (Blanchard et al. 2009). They also bid on a Phase II project to repair the eastbound bridge. The damage included the loss of 3,300 feet of the bridge’s superstructure into the bay, 24 destroyed piles bents, and the requirement to reposition numerous superstructure spans that the hurricane had left misaligned. Case 2—FDOT: I-10 Escambia Bay Bridge Repair Value: $26.4 million Scope: Design and construction of temporary prefabri- cated metal bridging to restore traffic as well as replacement of bents and installation of precast concrete deck sections (Figure 5). The scope of work is as follows (Maxey 2006): • Westbound bridge (Phase 1): 12 spans destroyed; 19 spans misaligned; seven bents replaced • Eastbound bridge (Phase 2): 51 spans destroyed; 33 spans misaligned; 58 Acrow spans installed; 25 bents replaced • East end approach slab and embankment replaced. Right-of-Way: Right-of-way was not an issue in this project. Permitting: Permits were not necessary for the emergency project. Florida statutes allow permitting requirements to be waived or streamlined in an emergency. Rationale: FDOT has a “Natural Disaster Emergency Contract” form that can be implemented based on the gover- value on project completion speed. The contract set a construction completion deadline of re-opening I-580 on June 29 (53 calendar days). Time Line: See Table 3. TABLE 3 I-880 MACARTHUR MAZE BRIDGE REPAIR AND REPLACEMENT IN OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA Date Event Remarks April 29, 2007 Accident occurs None April 29, 2007 Emergency demolition contract awarded sole source Governor issues emer- gency declaration April 30, 2007 Contractor installs I-880 temporary shoring; Caltrans locates available steel and begins design Caltrans generates sev- eral feasible options around existing material May 1, 2007 Consulting engineer survey of damage Cores and samples taken and shipped to 3 labs around the country for expedited testing and analysis May 3, 2007 I-580 contract advertised None May 5, 2007 I-580 on-site bid conference I-880 deck repairs complete None May 6, 2007 I-880 girders heat straight- ened, bent caps repaired Addendum #3 to I-580 IFB sent to bidders May 7, 2007 I-880 reopened I-580 bids opened and con- tract awarded Contractor mobilized immediately upon award May 24, 2007 Construction complete— open to traffic 27 days after incident Adapted from Blanchard et al. (2009). Case 1—Summary and Major Tools for Expedited Procurement Summary: The project was completed in 27 days, with the contractor earning an early completion bonus of $5 million. This firm had gained experience in emergency bridge repair and construction during the 1994 Northridge earthquake reconstruction on the Santa Monica Freeway and the recon- struction of the Geyersville Highway 128 bridge collapse in 2006. Thus, the agency and the contractor had previously worked together in crisis situations. The contractor further incentivized the steel fabricator, the key logistics constraint, by offering to share 25 percent of the bonus. It also offered a share of the bonus money to its employees to work around the clock and beat the incentive deadline. The following is a list of the major tools used to expe- dite the emergency replacement of the I-550/880 MacArthur Maze Bridge:

14 TABLE 4 I-10 ESCAMBIA BAY BRIDGE REPAIR Date Event Remarks September 15/16, 2004 Hurricane Ivan hits Escambia Bay None September 17, 2004 DB procurement initiated and completed Prepropsal meeting at 9:00 a.m. Price proposals received at 4:00 p.m. Contract signed before midnight September 19, 2004 Contractor mobili- zation begins Construction equipment arrives September 22, 2004 Work begins None September 28, 2004 600-ton barge crane arrives Heavy picks begin October 4, 2004 Last span in position At 11:30 p.m. Day 17 October 5, 2004 2-way traffic open on westbound bridge At 6:00 a.m. November 20, 2004 Eastbound bridge opened to traffic Day 63 December 16, 2004 Construction complete 91 days after storm Adapted from Blanchard et al. (2009). Case 2—Summary and Major Tools for Expedited Procurement Summary: The overall project was completed 91 days after the storm damage occurred. The project was successful because FDOT’s well-developed emergency plan was in place before the disaster struck. The following is a list of the major tools used to expedite the emergency replacement of the I-10 Escambia Bay Bridge as reported by the scan team: • “Expedited contract execution—FDOT delegated award to the local office; work was scoped for basic requirements of the needed facility. Obtain an agreement quickly, hand- written if necessary; the formal contract can follow later. • Mobilization—Marshal people and equipment to the project site as soon as possible. Select a contractor that has the ability to bring people and equipment to an iso- lated location quickly. • Design team in place to support the project—Relocate experts to the site and in position to make quick deci- sions. Develop the design concurrent with the work. • Flexibility based on material availability—Speed can only be achieved if the DOT is willing to accept avail- able materials for repair” (Blanchard et al. 2009). Route 27 Carrabassett Valley Emergency Bridge Replacement Project—Maine DOT This project was selected for inclusion because the Maine DOT does not have the statutory authority to use CMGC nor’s declaration of an emergency. DB was selected because the urgency of the work demanded a single point of respon- sibility for design and construction, since design would be ongoing during construction (Maxey 2006). FIGURE 5 I-10 Escambia Bay Bridge repairs in progress (Courtesy FDOT). Procurement: FDOT awarded a DB contract based on its expedited procedures for emergency contracting (FDOT 2010). The final awarded contract was on FDOT’s standard form with seven pages of handwritten “assumptions and clarifications” (Blanchard et al. 2009). The contract had two phases. Phase 1 involved reestablishing traffic on the westbound bridge and had a contract duration of 24 days. It had an incentive/disincentive (I/D) of $250,000 per day capped at $3 million. The contractor completed it in 17 days and earned a $1.75 million incentive. The Phase 2 contract performance period was set at 90 days with a $50,000 daily I/D. It was completed in 63 days. Time Line: See Table 4.

15 project delivery, but it selected this delivery method as the most appropriate for this emergency project. The Maine DOT also has a prequalified standing list of contractors will- ing to work in emergencies that it used in rapidly responding to the damage caused by the flooding caused by Hurricane Irene in September 2011. Case 3—Maine DOT: Route 27 Bridge Replacement Value: $2.89 million Scope: Design and construction of temporary bridg- ing, two permanent concrete bridges, bank restoration, and approaches (Figure 6). Right-of-Way: Right-of-way was not an issue in this project. Permitting: Permits were not an issue for this project owing to Maine statutes. Rationale: The Maine DOT awarded a CMGC contract because it believed that the method furnished the most appro- priate mechanism for maximizing constructability and thus minimizing time. It permitted the in-house design team to complete the necessary design expeditiously with contractor input on crane locations, constructability, bridge type based on fabrication availability and cost, as well as input on limits of right-of-way required resulting from equipment location and access to the construction sites. The method also “reduced the level of design and specifications” (Pulver 2012) by not requiring a fully biddable set of construction documents. Procurement: The DOT had the following three goals for the procurement: • “[Load] unrestricted temporary bridges • Temporary bridges open in 2 weeks • Permanent bridges open by November 15, 2011” (Pulver 2012). The interviews were 1.5 hours apiece and centered on the following questions: • “How soon can you mobilize? • What resources are immediately available? • Innovative construction techniques? • Can you meet or beat the schedule goals? • What do you propose using for temporary bridge?” (Pulver 2012). The winning contractor was notified at 3:00 p.m. the same day as the interview, and a contract for the temporary bridges and preconstruction services was executed. Five days later the CMGC was given a set of 75 percent plan and asked to furnish a guaranteed maximum price (GMP) the next day. The original bid was 14 percent over the engineer’s estimate. Negotiations ensued, covering each estimate’s assumptions and risk. This brought the two within 5 percent of each other, and the contract for the permanent bridges was awarded. Time Line: See Table 5. Case 3—Summary and Major Tools for Expedited Procurement Summary: The project was completed 82 days after the loss from Hurricane Irene. The Maine DOT achieved all three goals that it set for the procurement immediately after the disaster. The following is a list of the major tools used to expedite the emergency replacement of the Route 27 bridges. • Created standing list of prequalified emergency con- tractors, and FIGURE 6 Damaged Route 27 Brackett Brook and North Branch bridges (Pulver 2012).

16 1. An initial “Right of Entry” easement was negotiated with each landowner, each of whom was paid a nominal $1,000. 2. Owners were then given a guaranteed time line for closing the financial part of each deal. This procedure guaranteed access to critical pieces of property for both demolition and construction activities. It was also noted that the affected property owners were “gen- erally more cooperative given the nature of the work and the emotional impact on the community of the failure of the 35W Bridge” (Warne 2008). Permitting: This project required 10 permits as a well as an emergency environmental impact analysis. To expedite the process, MnDOT requested a “Categorical Exclusion” for the project. As a result, MnDOT had to carefully manage the final scope of work to ensure that betterments did not jeopardize the exclusion. For example, proposals to rebuild the undamaged interchanges at either end of the bridge were made that, if included, would have prevented a Cat- egorical Exclusion finding and delayed the project (Warne 2008). The betterments would also have required additional funding, as they would not have been elgible under ER pro- gram provisions, further exacerbating the potential delay (MnDOT 2008). The MnDOT project team approached obtaining permits using the philosophy of: “Build the largest project possible with the smallest environmental process” (MnDOT 2008) and used the following tools to obtain the necessary permits in an expedited fashion: • Held permitting kickoff meeting with the heads of local, state, and federal permitting authorities to “ensure buy- in from the top down” (MnDOT 2008). The meeting • Reduced the level of design by in-house engineers owing to the ability to gain input from the contractor. I-35W Bridge Replacement—Minnesota DOT This project illustrates all the aspects of expediting procure- ment procedures for the emergency delivery of a major Inter- state bridge in an urban area. Not only did the I-35W need to be replaced, but the wreckage from the disaster had to be expeditiously removed from the Mississippi River to restore barge traffic on that important route for interstate commerce. Additionally, the Minnesota DOT (Mn/DOT) successfully defended a protest of award on this project. Thus, it provides a tested model for emergency procurement of a major structure. Case 4—Minnesota DOT: I-35W St. Anthony Falls Bridge Replacement Project Value: $234 million (DB contract only; no right-of-way costs, etc.). Scope: Design and construction of an Interstate bridge over the Mississippi River at St. Anthony Falls in Minneapolis, Min- nesota. The new bridge is 189 feet wide with five lanes of traffic running each direction. The central clear span over the river is 504 feet long, and the overall length of the bridge is 1,223 feet from abutment to abutment. The bridge was designed and constructed to be ready for the construction of future light rail features. Figure 7 shows the aftermath of the collapse, and Fig- ure 8 shows the plan and profile of the replacement bridge. Right-of-Way: The replacement bridge required 13 par- cels of land, of which 3 were complete acquisitions and the rest were partial takes. Mn/DOT used the following inno- vative two-step process to obtain immediate access to the properties and avoid the typical delays associated with the right-of-way process (Warne 2008): TABLE 5 ROUTE 27 BRIDGE REPLACEMENTS Date Event Remarks August 28, 2011 Hurricane Irene flood occurs. None August 29, 2011 Site investigation including boring and surveying mobilize. Internal design team begins work. Geotechnical investigation to support the design. August 30, 2011 Governor approves CMGC. Design team on site. Contractor interviews complete; selection made. 5 prequalified contractors, 1.5 hours each; notification at 3:00 p.m. August 31, 2011 Preconstruction and temporary bridge contract executed; CMGC and design team meet on site; work on temporary detour starts Detour, alignment, and utility locations determined. September 5, 2011 75% plans sent to CMGC Bid opening schedule for next day. September 6, 2011 GMP negotiated and construction contract awarded. Temporary bridges opened to traffic. Bid received at 11:00 a.m. and contract executed at 3:00 p.m. September 9, 2011 Design complete. None September 12, 2011 New bridge construction begins. None November 18, 2011 Construction complete. 82 days after flood. Pulver (2012).

17 • Obtained an agreement from the resource agencies to make sure each document received “the priority of the reviewer and it was immediately reviewed and comments returned in a very timely manner” (MnDOT 2008). resulted in agreements or understanding on permit- ting approvals, mitigation expectations, and submittal requirements, barriers to overcome, and a single point of contact with decision-making authority in each agency. FIGURE 7 I-35W collapsed bridge section. FIGURE 8 I-35W replacement bridge plan.

18 • Delegated the authority to make project scope and spe- cific design decisions to the individuals who managed the project and prepared the permit applications. • Took full advantage of existing programmatic agree- ments and categorical exclusions, wherever appropriate. • Ensured that any capacity additions were for less than the mandated 1.0 mile in length to avoid the require- ment for an Environmental Assessment triggered at that length. • Convened a meeting with the competing proposers and the affected utility companies during the procurement phase to furnish firsthand information on potential utility relocations and to provide an opportunity for the industry to ask the utilities direct questions rather than rely on the request for information process. Procurement Decision Rationale: MnDOT chose to deliver the replacement bridge using DB because it had extensive experience with the method and believed that it could attract highly experienced DB teams to the project both by incentiviz- ing the contract and through the department’s reputation from previous successful DB projects. Additionally, DB furnished a mechanism to equitably share the design and performance risk between Mn/DOT and the winning design-builder. For example, Mn/DOT assumed the risk of obtaining all but two of the permits, assigning the risk for the Coast Guard Naviga- tion permit and the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permit to the design-builder. Based on the permit- ting discussion, MnDOT was able to obtain its eight permits within two weeks of the collapse. Procurement: The procurement process for this major project was completed in “record time” (Warne 2008). The request for qualifications (RFQ) required a “much-abbrevi- ated Statement of Qualifications (SOQ) process…. designed to balance the state’s need to have key information about the proposing teams and the desire to reduce the effort required by the teams to enter the proposing process…to not do any- thing to discourage potential proposers from entering the competition for the project or to distract them from the more important efforts of putting their proposal together” (Warne 2008). Additionally, because of the aggressive time frame to complete procurement, Mn/DOT decided that those potential offerors that “couldn’t keep up the pace of the RFP process then they probably would not be able to meet the [design and construction] schedule expectations of the proj- ect” (Warne 2008). The centerpiece of the procurement process was the MnDOT Preapproved Elements (PAE) process. The unique aspect of the procurement process that was particularly important to the design aspects of the project was the use of “private and confidential preproposal meetings,” whose purpose was described as follows: Each Proposer is invited and encouraged to attend a private preproposal meeting at which the Department will address and respond to the Proposer’s concerns and questions regarding details of the project scope, administrative procedures, outstanding issues for the remainder of the bid process, and any other related matters. Each meeting would be private in that only one Proposer would meet with Mn/DOT representatives at a time. Proposers are not required to accept the meeting invitation (Mn/DOT 2010). Unlike with its previous DB projects, Mn/DOT chose to limit the number of alternative technical concepts (ATCs) that a given proposer could generate to first focus the pro- cess on high-value ATCs and to avoid the administrative requirement to review and approve/disapprove numerous ATCs of trivial or no value. Once an ATC had been submit- ted, a review panel made up of technical experts who were not on the proposal evaluation panel met with the proposer. If the ATC was acceptable, it was approved and incorporated into the proposer’s scope of work as a PAE, permitting the proposer to include the ATC-turned-PAE in both its techni- cal package and its price proposal. Flatiron-Manson (FM), the eventual winner, indicated that “MnDOT did an excel- lent job in managing the procurement process. Of particular value ...the one-on-one meetings [got] answers quickly, [and the] responsiveness saved time and effort in putting their [FM’s] proposal together” (Warne 2008). FM relied on the PAEs to include an integral riding surface and an innovative method for removing the existing foundation in its success- ful proposal. The clear definition of best value was also cited as impor- tant to the success of the selection. The design-builder was particularly pleased with the specificity and transparency of the scoring criteria in the evaluation plan. FM stated that the scoring process “sent a clear message the state val- ued higher quality and not just price” (Warne 2008). One example was awarding a 15-point bonus for eliminating up to six design exceptions, which clearly portrayed MnDOT’s desire to build the project without design exceptions and its willingness to reward creativity and innovation during proposal preparation. Additionally, Mn/DOT scheduled and conducted three 30-minute individual conference calls each week with each of the five competing teams, as well as two weekly 2-hour face-to-face meetings, which meant the agency invested 27.5 hours per week for the 3-week proposal preparation period. MnDOT also limited the proposal to no more than 20 pages with another 20 pages allowed for appendixes (typi- cal MnDOT DB proposal page limits run 120 to 150 pages). This limitation served to focus the proposers on the elements that were critical to the success of the project. The proposal evaluation panel consisted of four MnDOT engineers and representatives from the city of Minneapolis and from the Associated General Contractors (prescribed by Minnesota law), with two FHWA members providing oversight to ensure that the selection met federal requirements.

19 Upon completion of the evaluation, Mn/DOT made every effort to award the contact as fast as possible. This created a short-term situation that did not allow time to publish the results of the evaluation before contract award or to debrief unsuccessful offerors. As a result, an award protest was lodged, based primarily on the fact that the winning team also submitted the highest proposed price. Mn/DOT suc- cessfully defended the propriety of the award and the integ- rity of the process used to arrive at the award decision in both state and federal district courts. It relied on the same defense that it had previously used to defend a protest on an earlier nonemergency DB project. This is described in a paper by Shane et al. (2006) as follows: • “The evaluation plan was completely transparent. • MnDOT followed it precisely. • MnDOT could logically defend the final award decision.” A recent study on managing complex projects (Shane et al. 2011) advocates “incentivizing the key elements of proj- ect success.” The St. Anthony Falls Bridge was definitely a complex project, and MnDOT included two incentives for the prime element of project success: timely comple- tion. The project utilized a no-excuse bonus of $7 million for on-time completion if the contractor waived all future claims (Heitpas 2008). It also contained an early incentive bonus of $2 million for every 10-day period the project was completed early, up to a maximum of $20 million. MnDOT justified both incentives based on the $400,000 per day user cost that was being borne by the traveling public during the bridge outage. Time Line: Table 6 contains the timeline for the expedited procurement of this case study project. Figure 9 illustrates the design and construction schedule for the project. TABLE 6 I-35W BRIDGE REPLACEMENT TIMELINE Date Event Remarks August 1, 2007 Bridge collapses None August 2, 2007 MnDOT decides to use DB project delivery None August 4, 2007 RFQ issued None August 8, 2007 Statement of qualifica- tions received from competitors None August 8, 2007 Short list published Same day as receipt August 23, 2007 RFP released None September 15, 2007 Proposals submitted None September 19, 2007 Design-builder selected 49 days to select contractor October 8, 2007 Notice to proceed None September 19, 2008 Project opened to traffic 339 days after start of construction FIGURE 9 I-35W design and construction schedule. Case 4—Summary and Major Tools for Expedited Procurement Summary: The project was completed 339 days after the start of construction and represents a notable achieve- ment by both the agency and the design-builder. Figure 10 shows the completed bridge and underscores the magni- tude of the undertaking. The following is a list of the major tools used to expedite the emergency replacement of the I-35W St. Anthony Falls Bridge: • Used two-step right-of-way acquisition with right of entry easements to provide immediate access to the construction site followed by a guaranteed timeline for financial closure on each parcel; • Obtained single points of contact within each resource agency for all permit communication and a commit- ment to expedite the issuance of project permits; • Kept tight control of project scope to avoid unintentional delays as the result of exceeding permit constraints; • Encouraged a highly interactive preproposal period, including regularly scheduled one-on-one meetings with each competitor, whose contents were kept confidential; • Accepted confidential ATC/PAEs prior to proposal submission for review and decision; • Created a completely transparent evaluation plan and award algorithm that withstood a protest; and • Developed incentives that were directly related to the preeminent project success factor, timely completion. I-270 Slide Repair Project—Missouri DOT This project was selected for inclusion because it not only illustrates an innovative approach to including a DB provi- sion inside of a DBB contract but also provides an example of an emergency that occurred during an active construction contract, rather than a construction contract resulting from an emergency. Additionally, the case was successful in that it generated an innovative geotechnical design that permit- ted construction without lane closures on an urban freeway (McLain and Shane 2009). The case is an emergency repair

20 and stabilization project that resulted from a landslide that damaged a triple box culvert and threatened to close the eastbound lanes of I-270 in St. Louis County, Missouri. Case 4—Missouri DOT: I-270 Slide Repair Project, St. Louis County Value: $552,148 Scope: Design and construction of temporary shoring needed to protect the Interstate traffic as well as to allow quick repair of the box culvert after a landslide (see Fig- ure 11). The temporary shoring also allowed the slope to be restored with shot rock. The repair project ultimately required the design and construction of a temporary soil nail wall that had more than a hundred and fifty 40-foot soil nails spaced at 5’ horizontal and 5’ vertical and was 45 feet high. The DB subcontractor developed this innovative solution to replace MoDOT’s conventional slide plane removal-and- replace technique (McLain 2008). FIGURE 11 I-270 slide aftermath. Right-of-Way: Right-of-way was not an issue in this project. Permitting: Permits were already in place for the DBB project and not necessary for the emergency project. Rationale: The Missouri Department of Transportation (MoDOT) awarded a DBB contract on a conventional project in this location that contained a “nested” DB provision for emergency repair of slides during construction by a prequali- fied geotechnical specialty DB subcontractor as required dur- ing the contract period. The primary rationale for selecting this form of DB was to shorten the time the roadway was out of operation by having the same entity begin preliminary con- struction tasks while the design of the repair was under way. It also encouraged the use of innovative means and methods to reduce the cost of the slope repair projects. Finally, it miti- gated design risk during construction by consolidating it with one entity, the nested DB specialty subcontractor. Procurement: The MoDOT policy for a DBB project with significant geotechnical risk includes a 10- to 14-week design review period to validate the design within the con- straints of the geotechnical design report before a construc- tion contract can be advertised if the project costs more than $1 million. This is followed by another 3-week period to award the construction contract. Thus, MoDOT’s ability to react to a geotechnical emergency is hampered by its design risk mitigation policy. By adding the “nested DB provision” for landslide repairs inside the DBB contract, it avoids the delays inherent in developing a new project or the need to get waivers to speed the reaction to an emergency requirement. The nested DB provision required the prime contractor to subcontract this work with a prequalified geotechnical spe- cialty contractor that had experience in successfully com- pleting MoDOT slide repair projects. The geotechnical DB specialty subcontractor was selected prior to advertising the DBB contact on a basis of qualifica- tions and past performance. MoDOT understood the poten- tial for a landslide disrupting both construction and traffic and completed a preliminary geotechnical risk analysis, FIGURE 10 Completed I-35W St. Anthony Falls Bridge.

21 identifying the use of a soil nail wall as a response measure to a slide as the best technical option for restoring traffic. The wall was “a key design element that allowed the slope to be safely excavated top down so that a rock slope could be rebuilt with rock… [and] the nested design-build allowed the design [of the soil nail wall] to be competed quickly” (McLain 2008). The final design for the slide repair itself was completed by the MoDOT geotechnical design section and relied on the soil nail wall as the means around which the area could be stabilized with a rock surcharge. That MoDOT anticipated the landslide and took contrac- tual measures to be prepared to react expeditiously allowed the administrative portions of the procurement to essentially be prenegotiated. The nested DB subcontract was treated as an allowance, and all the bidders on the prime DBB contract used the same number for that lump sum pay item. Once the need to invoke that contract arose, the most time-consuming element was the geotechnical investigation, testing, and geo- technical design report preparation necessary to quantify the actual scope of emergency design and construction involved in the change order required to repair the landslide damage. Two previous emergency projects (Route 59 and Route 5) took 50 days from the submittal of the landslide repair proj- ect design to the authorization of the repair (McLain 2008). These designs were completed by consultants and required the procurement period necessary to consummate a consul- tant design contract. By comparison, the nested DB subcon- tract allowed construction to proceed only 5 days after the design was submitted, because the design-builder acted as a single point of responsibility for both design and construc- tion. During the design period, MoDOT conducted over- the-shoulder reviews of the design-builder’s design work, further expediting the approval of the soil nail wall design and permitting an information-rich communication environ- ment to develop so that when the MoDOT designers took over from the DB subcontractor to complete the final slide repair design, they were completely knowledgeable of the rationale used for the soil nail wall and could easily incorpo- rate it into their calculations. Time Line: Table 7 shows the sequence of events and dates. Case 3—Summary and Major Tools for Expedited Procurement Summary: The project was completed 120 days after the slide damage occurred. The design took 5 days. These peri- ods compare to an average of 205 days from slide to con- struction completion and 50 days for design for two similar projects that were procured using DBB (McLain and Shane 2009). The use of the soil nail wall permitted the construc- tion to be completed without the need to close any lanes on I-270. If a conventional slide plane removal-and-replacement method had been used, MoDOT would have needed to close at least one lane of traffic throughout construction. TABLE 7 I-270 SLIDE REPAIR IN ST. LOUIS COUNTY Date Event Remarks August 25, 1997 Slide occurs None August 27, 1997 MoDOT drilling opera- tions begin Geotechnical inves- tigation to support the change to the DBB prime contract to invoke the DB subcontract September 30, 1997 Change to contract awarded Time required to complete the geo- technical design report and quantify the scope of the DB subcontract October 29, 1997 Design for soil nail wall drawings submitted None October 30, 1997 Design for soil nail wall drawings approved None November 1, 1997 Construction begins None December 5, 1997 Construction complete 120 days after slide McLain (2008). The following is a list of the major tools used to expedite procurement in this project: • Recognized the risk of an emergency during construc- tion and mitigated that risk by building a fast-response solution into the DBB construction contract; • Developed the necessary contractual mechanism to add a “nested DB” contract with a preselected specialty design-builder; • Recognized that in-house designers lacked the techni- cal expertise to design soil nail walls and made provi- sions to expedite obtaining that expertise by means of the nested DB contract; and • Integrated the efforts of in-house designers with the specialty contractor’s designers to jointly arrive at an overall emergency design solution. US-2 Rockfall Mitigation Project—Montana DOT U.S. Highway 2 passes through the mountainous area that leads to Glacier National Park in northern Montana (Fig- ure 12). The passes on this road are highly susceptible to rockslides and historically have been blocked because of rockslides after heavy rainstorms. The Rockfall Mitigation project, though not an emergency project in itself, was pro- cured by the Montana DOT (MDT) using expedited pro- curement means owing to the urgent need to get the work started so that an actual rockslide would not close the park during tourist season. This project was selected for inclusion for three reasons. First, the primary technical problem that had to be solved was how to quantify a scope of geotechnical work when the agency did not know the minimum angle of repose for an unstable rock slope and it could not be found

22 until construction commenced. Therefore, this represents the high end of geotechnical uncertainty, and the fact that MDT chose DB project delivery represents an interesting and valu- able rationale for emergency projects with high geotechnical uncertainty. The second reason was the mechanism that MDT chose to allocate risk, unit price pay items for the uncertain features of the scope. Finally, MDT developed an innovative approach to getting as much rockfall mitigation completed as possible for the available funding, recognizing that once it had reached the end of the budget, the project was over regardless of how many linear feet of slope remained to be stabilized. FIGURE 12 US Highway 2 project map. Case 6—Montana DOT: US-2 Rockfall Mitigation Project, Flathead County Value: $3.0 million Scope: Design and construction of rockfall mitigation measures and slope stabilization along 14 miles of U.S. Highway 2 east of West Glacier. The project identified six reaches that had to be mitigated and two more that were to be fixed if the contract funding was available. Traffic control was a major issue on this job since the road provides access to Glacier National Park. The project included scaling, draped rockfall protection, trim blasting, and other techniques as may be determined by the design-builder. Right-of-Way: Right-of-way was not an issue in this project. Permitting: Permits were obtained using the routine pro- cess and were assigned to the design-builder, since the per- mits would be specific to the means and methods selected by the winning design-builder. Rationale: MDT chose DB project delivery because it appeared to be the best method for sharing the risk of geo- technical uncertainty on this urgently needed project. The preferred rockfall mitigation method was to scale back the rock faces to a safe angle of repose (see Figure 13). How- ever, there is no economical method for determining that angle other than by field trial. As a result, completing the design before letting the construction contract carried an unacceptable risk because of the high potential for differ- ing site conditions changes/claims. The project had a fixed budget of $3 million with no contingency. Therefore, MDT originally looked at using a fixed price-best proposal best value award algorithm (Gransberg and Molenaar 2004). In this manner, the contract price would have been fixed at $3 million and each competing proposal would have stated how many of the eight reaches in the 14-mile zone it could do for that amount. Unfortunately, MDT’s enabling legisla- tion requires it to use an adjusted score award algorithm, which requires the price to be divided by the technical score, with the lowest adjusted score becoming the best value (MDT 2011). The final alternative was to develop a unit price approach for those pay items that were expected to vary in quantities and bundle the remaining items into a single lump sum price. FIGURE 13 Scaling operations on US-2. Procurement: The partial unit price method shown in Fig- ure 14 allowed the technical proposal to be scored and did not constrain the competitors to a stipulated price. The RFP used the following clause to articulate this approach: Bid Price Proposals will be submitted on the blank Bid Price Proposal Requirements Form included as an attachment to this RFP. The Bid Price Proposal form will include unit prices for the items indicated, a lump sum price for the remainder of the project scope and the completion date proposed by the Firm. The unit prices will include all costs associated with the construction of the items indicated. Each unit price will be multiplied by the quantity provided by MDT to determine the total amount for each of the unit price items. The Total Lump Sum for the project will be calculated by adding the extended sum of the unit price items with the lump sum amount for the remainder of the project scope. This total lump sum will be the final contract amount. The lump sum price will include costs for all design, surveying, geotechnical work, engineering services, Quality Management Plan, construction of the project (all items except the unit price items) and all other work necessary to fully and timely complete the project in accordance with the Contract Documents. The lump sum price will also include all job site and home office overhead and profit. It is understood payment of the lump sum amount for the project will be full, complete and final compensation for all work required to complete the project. If project [unit priced quantities] overruns or under runs occur at sites, the unit prices will be utilized to extend or reduce the work at other sites to maximize the amount of work accomplished for three million dollars (MDT 2011, italics added).

23 The clause is an excellent example of a way for the owner to express its desires as well as its requirements. The phrase “an innovative aspect does not include changes to specifi- cations or established MDT policies,” clearly indicates that MDT specifications and policies must be used, although, on the other hand, innovation is encouraged in “means and meth- ods, approach to the project, rockfall mitigation techniques, use of new products and new uses for established products.” Time Line: Table 8 contains the timeline for the expedited procurement of this case study project. TABLE 8 US-2 ROCKFALL MITIGATION PROJECT Date Event Remarks February 28, 2011 RFQ advertisement date None March 18, 2011 SOQ response due date 10 days to prepare SOQ March 25, 2011 Short list date None March 25, 2011 RFP issue date None April 5, 2011 Written question deadline None April 6, 2011 Preproposal meeting None May 4, 2011 Technical proposal due date 40 days to prepare tech- nical proposal May 24, 2011 Bid price proposal due date 60 days to prepare price proposal May 26, 2011 Final selection date None May 26, 2011 Anticipated award date 87 days from RFQ June 1, 2011 Anticipated notice to proceed date None November 4, 2011 Complete no later than date Design-builders pro- posed their own schedule in their proposal and MDT evaluated it as part of the evaluation plan. MDT (2011). Case 6—Summary and Major Tools for Expedited Procurement Summary: MDT’s procurement approach on this project illus- trates an alternative for sharing the risk of geotechnical uncer- tainty on a DB project. “Unit price contracts are used for work where it is not possible to calculate the exact quantity of materi- als that will be required” (Schexnayder and Mayo 2004). In a lump sum contract, the design-builder bears the entire quantity risk. Unit pricing for specific features of work inside a lump sum DB contract allows the agency to share the risk of the final quantities of work with the contractor and reduce the price. This happens because the contractor does not have to bid the worst possible case if the quantities of work are not finite, as it would be driven to do in a lump sum award (Gransberg and Riemer 2009). Thus, it makes sense to use the DB contract payment provisions as a means to manage geotechnical uncertainty through unit pricing. This case intersected with facts found FIGURE 14 Design-build bid price proposal form with unit price items. The clause made it clear that MDT intended to spend the entire budget for this project and get as much work done as possible. This clause was followed by a second clause that described what MDT would do if all price proposals exceeded the $3 million budget. Essentially, the procedure was to ask each responsive competitor to submit a “Best and Final Offer” that detailed the scope of work that each com- petitor could complete for the specified budget. MDT would then repeat technical scoring and compute the best value based on the adjusted score. The RFP also explicitly encouraged including ATCs in the proposal. “Credit will be given for innovation in design and construction methods that minimize public impacts, minimize traffic delays, mitigate the risk of quantity over- runs, and accelerate project delivery by reducing the total project duration. Credit will also be given for design pro- posals that improve functionality and safety of the project” (MDT 2011). It contained a “Design and Construction Cri- teria Package (DCCP)” to furnish technical guidance to the design-builders during proposal preparation. The RFP described the ATC proposal process as follows: The Firm will identify separately all innovative aspects as such in the Technical Proposal and each must be explained in detail with any estimated cost increase or decrease. The Technical Proposal must clearly state whether any cost increase or cost decrease resulting from innovation is included in the base Bid Price Proposal Amount. An innovative aspect does not include changes to specifications or established MDT policies and must conform to the RFP and DCCP requirements. Innovation should be limited to the Firm’s means and methods, approach to the project, rockfall mitigation techniques, use of new products and new uses for established products. Proposed changes to the RFP, DCCP, Design Concept, specifications or established MDT policies should be identified as Alternatives or Options in the Technical Proposal and explained in detail with any estimated cost increase or decrease to be considered together with innovative aspects, as the basis for scoring Technical Proposals. The estimated cost increase or cost decrease associated with any Alternative or Option that proposes changes to the RFP, DCCP, specifications or established MDT policies must not be included in the base Bid Price Proposal Amount (MDT 2011, italics added).

24 in two Virginia RFPs and one Delaware RFP, which qualifies selective unit pricing as an effective practice. It also leads to a recommendation for future research to examine potential costs and benefits of employing selective unit pricing as a geotechni- cal risk management technique. The following is a list of the major tools used to expedite procurement in this project: • Developed a compressed timeline for short listing and award; • Enabled risk sharing through the use of selective unit pricing internal to a lump sum contract; • Encouraged ATCs through the scoring system in the DB evaluation plan; • Permitted proposers to set their own schedule and incentivized early completion through the evaluation plan weighting; and • Used Best and Final Offers after initial proposal evalu- ation to synchronize the proposed scope of the unit priced work items with the available budget. 981G Ramapo River Bridge Replacement—New York State DOT This project illustrates the use of an IDIQ contract for emer- gency bridge repair. It also demonstrates a single project that is part of a much larger overall disaster response that was necessitated by the flooding that resulted from Hurricane Irene/Tropical Storm Lee in August and September 2011. Finally, the case shows how early contractor involvement in the design process permits a highly constructable design to be completed in a short time. Case 7—981G Ramapo River Bridge Replacement; Rockland County, New York Value: $1.4 million Scope: Design and construction of two-lane bridge over the Ramapo River and demolition of existing concrete arch bridge damaged by flooding from Hurricane Irene/Tropi- cal Storm Lee. Both abutments were undermined, and the superstructure failed as the foundation settled (see Figure 15). The approach to the bridge was then washed out, mak- ing it impassable. The replacement bridge was designed by the New York State DOT (NYSDOT) Main Office Struc- tures Design Bureau. The design was purposely constrained around the use of available structural steel members. The same was true for the design of the precast deck and approach slab panels. Information on the availability of construction materials was furnished by the Statewide Emergency Bridge Contractor (Sechrist et al. 2011). Right-of-Way: Right-of-way was not an issue in this project. Permitting: Executive order declaring emergency tem- porarily suspended the routine permitting process, which eliminated most permitting issues. Rationale: NYSDOT was faced with massive infrastruc- ture damage in the wake of the two storms. The scope of the recovery operation provides a suitable context within which to understand this particular emergency project. In a nut- shell, NYSDOT accomplished the following work as part of the recovery effort: • Repaired 1,300 miles of roadway, repaired 37 bridges and more than 250 culverts using internal maintenance crews. • Emplaced 12 temporary bridges, 11 owned by NYSDOT and one owned by a contractor. • Awarded 14 emergency restoration contracts in 4 weeks. NYSDOT had instituted an IDIQ contract (called a standby contract in the DOT’s terminology) for emergency bridge repair and replacement services in 2007 (NYSDOT 2007). The contract “allows the Department to replace collapsed or otherwise unusable bridges on an emergency basis… [and] to perform other emergency bridge work such as structural repairs, erecting shoring to stabilize a damaged bridge, or demolition, removal, and disposal of a damaged superstructure or bridge components” (NYSDOT 2007). FIGURE 15 Ramapo River Bridge damage.

25 This contract is one of a number of tools available to the department for use as determined by the NYSDOT emer- gency response system, shown in Figure 16. FIGURE 16 NYSDOT emergency response framework (Sechrist et al. 2001). Procurement: The actual procurement procedure for an emergency project flows out of the Figure 16 framework. In the Ramapo Bridge Replacement Project, the IDIQ for emer- gency bridge construction was linked with in-house design teams in a delivery method that mirrors CMGC project delivery, which allows the construction contractor to have substantial input to the design process through reviewing constructability, furnishing pricing information on available construction materials, and synchronizing the design with the construction means and methods (West et al. 2012). In this case, the statewide Emergency Bridge contractor fur- nished information to the in-house design team regarding accelerated bridge construction methods (ABCs), which led to the decision to utilize off-the-shelf precast bridge deck and approach slab panels as well as to design around readily available steel sections. Because the IDIQ contract was in place, no time was wasted on the procurement process. Time Line: Table 9 is the timeline that was followed to replace the Ramapo River Bridge. Figure 17 is a picture of the completed bridge. Case 7—Summary and Major Tools for Expedited Procurement Summary: The NYSDOT response to the massive amount of damage caused by Hurricane Irene and Tropical Storm Lee in the Hudson River Valley furnishes a model for wide-scale infrastructure repair and restoration. The 981G Ramapo River Bridge Replacement Projects responded to only one among many disruptions of vital transportation service that needed to be restored. Because NYSDOT had the prescience to put the necessary emergency construction capacity in place years before the disaster through its Statewide Emer- gency Bridge IDIQ contract, it was able to restore service in less than 2 months. TABLE 9 981G RAMAPO RIVER BRIDGE REPLACEMENT PROJECT TIMELINE Date Event Remarks August 25, 2011 Executive Order (EO) 17 declaration of emergency None August 31, 2011 Inspection of damaged bridge completed This is merely 1 of more than 500 bridges inspected in the after- math of the event. September 1, 2011 EO 19 temporary sus- pension of contracting competition provisions Provides NYSDOT flexibility to address critical needs September 11, 2011 Construction begins 10 days from inspec- tion completion September 19, 2011 Design of replacement bridge complete 20 days from inspec- tion completion October 26, 2011 Permanent bridge completed 57 days from inspec- tion completion; 5 days ahead of schedule Sechrist et al. (2011). FIGURE 17 Finished 981G Ramapo River Bridge (Courtesy NYSDOT). The following is a list of the major tools used to expedite procurement in this project: • Established IDIQ contract for emergency bridge repair on a statewide basis. The contract also contains provi- sions to erect temporary bridges that are stockpiled at a bridge park on Long Island (Sechrist et al. 2011); • Integrated in-house design with Statewide Emergency Bridge Contractor input, using a process similar to CMGC; • Constrained the design team to using available steel sections; and • Employed accelerated bridge construction techniques, including standard precast bridge deck and approach slab panels.

26 I-40—Beckham County Bridge Pier Replacement— Oklahoma DOT This project demonstrates the use of an expedited DBB project delivery. It also contains an I/D provision that shows how such a feature can be used to expedite an emergency procurement. Finally, it shows how the agency split the pro- curement into an immediate need sole source award and an expedited IFB to restore the damaged bridge. Case 8—I-40 Bridge Pier Replacement Beckham County, Oklahoma Value: $315,930 Scope: A fuel truck hit the south shoulder pier of the State Highway 6 (SH-6) overpass over I-40 in Beckham County in extreme western Oklahoma and caught fire. The emergency scope of work included temporary shoring immediately after the accident that damaged the south shoulder pier. Design and construction of the replacement pier including footings, columns, and pier cap as well as repair of the parapet wall damage and smoke damage. Right-of-Way: Right-of-way was not an issue in this project. Permitting: No permits were required for this project. Rationale: The Oklahoma Department of Transportation (ODOT) had to move fast to avoid the potential of having both SH-6 and I-40 closed because of the accident and subsequent fire. This bridge is located in extreme western Oklahoma and is quite isolated. Thus, ODOT split the emergency replace- ment into two phases. The first addressed the immediate threat of collapse and involved mobilizing contractors in the immediate area to build a temporary shoring system. The sec- ond was the demolition and replacement of the damaged pier. Procurement: The temporary shoring system was pro- cured using sole source contracts for H-piling, concrete, and installation (labor and equipment). The permanent replace- ment was completed using a highly expedited form of DBB. ODOT bridge division designers completed the construction documents. Time was saved by ensuring that all the required signatory authorities were physically present at the bid open- ing; thus, the bids were opened, reviewed, and an award decision was made in the same afternoon. The contract contained the following I/D clause: The incentive/disincentive rate for this project is $1,000 per hour. The Contractor will be paid the incentive rate for each hour less than 360 hours that substantial completion is achieved. The maximum number of hours for which the incentive will be paid is 120 hours. The disincentive rate will be assessed for every hour that exceeds the time allowed for substantial completion. Hourly time charges will be assessed against the Contractor from the time notice to proceed is issued or 5 p.m. on 9-07- 07 whichever is later, and continue until the bridge is reopened to normal traffic. One half of the incentive will be placed on the first progressive estimate following the period in which it is earned. The second half will be paid on the final estimate. Disincentive will be applied to the progressive estimate following the period in which it was earned (ODOT 2007). The project’s IFB provided a 15 calendar day (360-hour) completion period. The contractor completed work in 12 calendar days, 3 days (72 hours) early, earning an incentive payment of approximately $72,000. Time Line: Table 10 details the timeline for this case study project. TABLE 10 I-40 PIER REPLACEMENT PROJECT Date Event Remarks August 30, 2007 Bridge pier hit and burned None August 31, 2007 Declaration of emer- gency by ODOT director Director has emer- gency declaration authority for projects that cost less than $500,000. August 31, 2007 H-piling deliver to site None September 1, 2007 Concrete pouring begins 2:00 a.m. September 3, 2007 Erection of temporary shoring complete 4 days after incident September 4, 2007 Construction documents complete None September 4, 2007 Mandatory prebid meet- ing held on site 1:00 p.m. September 5, 2007 IFB issued None September 6, 2007 Bids received, opened, and contract awarded 1:30 p.m. September 7, 2007 Executed contract with bonds received from contractor 1:00 p.m. September 7, 2007 Notice to proceed issued 5:00 p.m. September 19, 2007 Bridge open to traffic 21 days after accident and 3 days early ODOT (2007). Case 8— Summary and Major Tools for Expedited Procurement Summary: ODOT clearly demonstrated that the traditional DBB project delivery method can be successfully applied to an emergency procurement. The key to success on this project was that it fell within the ODOT director’s authority to declare an emergency (>$500,000). This permitted the agency to immediately address the emergency without los- ing time to receive a waiver of procurement constraints. The hour-based incentive spoke directly to the importance of the

27 loss of service; for example, every hour counted. Previous research (Anderson and Damnjanovic 2008) has shown that incentives are effective in highway construction, and this case study project was no exception, saving 20 percent of the scheduled time. The following is a list of the major tools used to expedite procurement in this project: • Mobilized immediately available construction con- tractors and local material suppliers with sole source contracts to address immediate danger of bridge col- lapse with temporary shoring; • Implemented an aggressive DBB procurement process, which included assembling all required authorities to be present at bid opening so an award could be made immediately after bid opening; and • Incentivized the emergency construction contract to minimize the construction period. I-35 Culvert Repair—Oklahoma DOT This project was the result of a localized flash flood that dam- aged a box culvert on an Interstate highway. It demonstrates an expedited DBB process for a project that threatened to close a major Interstate highway. It also demonstrates lim- ited competition procurement where only selected contrac- tors with previously proven experience in the type of work needed were invited to bid. Case 9—I-35 Culvert Repair Logan County, Oklahoma Value: $715,505 Scope: Design and construction of a 12’-14’-12’ by 78’ long reinforced concrete triple box culvert. The scope included in the IFB is as follows: • Remove the existing guardrail adjacent to the inside northbound lane. • Construct a [temporary widening] adjacent to the inside northbound lane. • Place and maintain barrier wall. • Remove a portion of the existing pavement. • Drive sheet piling adjacent to the existing structure. • Excavate and remove the existing reinforced concrete box culvert section. • Construct the new reinforced concrete box culvert section. • Backfill the new structure. • Replace pavement. • Replace guardrail (ODOT 2010). Right-of-Way: Right-of-way was not an issue in this project. Permitting: Permits were not an issue in this project. Rationale: ODOT decided to use an abbreviated DBB project delivery rather than seek an emergency waiver of competition rules. The process was authorized by the ODOT director citing a rule that allows expedited procedures to accept bids. Procurement: The procurement followed the routine process except that the IFB was issued to 12 contractors in the area of the incident whose past performance indicated that they would be well qualified to prosecute the work as fast as possible. Although this did not preclude other con- tractors from bidding, the 12 contractors on the short list were the only ones that were individually notified. The pre- bid meeting was held 31 hours after the failure was noticed. Plans were received the next morning. Bids were opened, award was made, and notice to proceed was issued on the same day. Time Line: Table 11 shows the timeline for this emer- gency project. TABLE 11 I-35 CULVERT REPAIR LOGAN COUNTY Date Event Remarks June 14, 2010 Heavy rain causes flood- ing that washes out the triple box culvert. Begins at 10:00 p.m. June 15, 2010 Shoulder settlement observed; ODOT closes lane of traffic. 10:00 a.m. June 16, 2010 Notice sent to 12 short- listed contractors with preliminary plan sheets. 10:00 a.m. June 17, 2010 Mandatory prebid meet- ing on site. 5:00 p.m. June 18, 2010 Final plans complete. 7:30 a.m. June 18, 2010 IFB issued with plans. 10:00 a.m. June 18, 2010 Bids opened and award made. 1:00 p.m. June 18, 2010 Executed contract received from contractor. 5:00 p.m. June 18, 2010 Notice to proceed issued. 8:00 p.m. June 29, 2010 Contract complete. 15 days after incident ODOT (2012). Case 9—Summary and Major Tools for Expedited Procurement Summary: This case clearly demonstrates that the traditional DBB project delivery process can be successfully applied to an expedited procurement with minor modifications. In this case, one modification was the decision to individually notify a list of area contractors with previous similar experi-

28 ence. The second modification was the compressing of the contract award administrative process by assembling all the individuals who had a role in approving a contract award at the bid opening. The following is a list of the major tools used to expedite procurement in this project: • Issued invitations to bid to a short list of qualified con- tractors (this might be called an informal prequalifica- tion process)’ • Implemented an aggressive DBB procurement process that included assembling all required authorities to be present at bid opening so an award could be made immediately after bid opening; and • Incentivized the emergency construction contract to minimize the construction period. SR-14 Landslide Repair—Utah DOT This project demonstrates the use of CMGC to expedite the procurement of a construction contractor and to leverage that capability to mitigate the risk of cost overruns resulting from compressing the project’s delivery period to its short- est state. It was also selected because both right-of-way and permitting posed significant potential issues on this project. Utah DOT (UDOT) is using CMGC delivery as a means of mitigating the delay risk resulting from third party stake- holders. The project is currently under way. Case 10—State Route 14 Landslide Repair, Cedar City, Utah Value: $15,000,000 Scope: This case study project has been named the “Restore 14 Project.” It is in response to an October 2011 landslide that destroyed more than a one-third mile sec- tion of State Route 14 (SR-14) in Cedar Canyon, dumping debris more than 100 feet deep in some areas (see Figure 18). The landslide material contains boulders that are as large as houses. The work includes stabilizing slopes, mov- ing earth and debris, and constructing a new road. Limited betterments are included to reduce the potential for future landslides and erosion of the base. The project will address five areas along SR-14: • Build a temporary roadway to carry limited traffic dur- ing the construction. • In the main slide area, move 400,000 cubic yards of material to completely restore more than a one-third mile stretch of SR-14. • Rebuild end of a tunnel located under SR-14 and restore shoulder. • Perform slide mitigation. • Install soil nail wall to repair active slide. FIGURE 18 Aftermath of landslide on SR-14 (UDOT 2012). Right-of-Way: The schedule for the repair of the landslide damage is constrained by UDOT right-of-way procurement. The design for the right-of-way that is necessary for the acquisition process started in early January 2012, and suffi- cient data were assembled to permit the UDOT right-of-way specialists to begin negotiating with landowners by the end of the month. The negotiations are under way and UDOT had secured the necessary permissions to begin preliminary construction operations on March 15to rough out an access road through the slide areas. Permitting: Permitting is also an issue on this project. A Stream Alteration Permit is required to restore the bed and banks of the creek that is located below the road. Permits from the county, the Fish and Wildlife Services, and the Utah Department of Wildlife Resources are also required. Finally, Section 106 coordination may be required with the local Native American tribe. To quantify the risk of delay because of permitting, UDOT developed two schedules and named them the “Fast Track” and “Slow Track” permitting packages. These planning packages included right-of-way, environmental documents, and the site-grading package, which is dependent on both. The Slow Track schedule is 60 days and the Fast Track schedule is 25 days. Permits were received in time to allow preliminary construction to start on March 15, 2012, to remove excess material and to build a temporary access road. Rationale: UDOT expressed its rationale for selecting CMGC project delivery in its CMGC RFP as follows: The focus of Streamlined CMGC is to use the contractor’s experience in small projects while still maintaining a fair price through open bidding. The selected contractor will partner with UDOT the owner and the designer working for UDOT. The focus is on a partnership in which we minimize risk, improve construction schedule, try new innovations, and stay within budget. An important role of the Contractor is to help acquire the information to reduce risk. Your involvement will help reduce errors in design,

29 improve constructability and meet budget goals… The CMGC team relies on the expertise of the Contractor to deliver a better product in less time and at a lower cost than design-bid-build construction processes…. Because this approach encourages innovations and minimizes risk, the construction cost is expected to be less than a conventional design-bid-build project. The role of the contractor will be to construct the project within the cost proposed, help manage the budget, and propose solutions that will achieve the goal of staying within budget (UDOT 2011). Procurement: The project was procured using an expedited version of the typical UDOT CMGC RFP procurement process that was designated “a Request for Streamlined Proposal.” Fig- ure 19 illustrates the typical CMGC procurement process with typical time frames in the major events. As Figure 19 shows, an ordinary CMGC procurement could take from 23 to 26 weeks to get both the design consultant and the contractor on board. Additionally, the contractor must furnish pricing information for specified unit price pay items and its fees. FIGURE 19 Typical Utah DOT CMGC procurement process timeline (Alder 2007). The streamlined process compressed the design and con- struction source selection process to roughly 5 weeks not only by reducing the amount of information required of the competing consultants and contractors but also by mandat- ing an aggressive set of deadlines for the agency to review proposals and award the contracts. Figure 20 is a copy of the streamlined price form used in the project. The unit prices in this submittal are intended to be carried forward into GMP negotiations as the design is advanced. The proposal evalu- ation plan allocated 50 percent of the weight to the techni- cal proposal, which included information on the contractor’s project team qualifications, its approach to completing the project, the proposed schedule, and its design support plan. The remaining 50 percent was allocated to the price submittal shown in Figure 19, as articulated by a narrative “approach to price proposal.” This narrative explains the contractor’s assumptions for means, methods, and materi- als; its perceived risks and the way they are priced; its pro- posed cost and/or time savings innovations; its thoughts on the impacts the current marketplace will have on work in such a remote location; and its plan to achieve a “favorable cost at or below traditional projects” (UDOT 2011). FIGURE 20 State Route 14 landslide repair project CMGC price submittal (UDOT 2011). After award of both the design contract and CMGC pre- construction services contract, the project team agreed to divide the work into three design/construction packages: • Package 1: Primarily grading and building a road base for limited access through the main slide. Issues involved in this package include gaining right of entry permits from private landowners to conduct construction and stabi- lizing the slide area in a manner that does not create an unsafe work environment. The work is labor-intensive and provides the basis for keeping all other work and associated costs in check and on schedule. • Package 2: Completion of construction elements on both the roadway and adjacent slopes to stabilize the main landslide area. • Package 3: Structural work to stabilize and repair other slides. The results of geotechnical investigations will define the scope of work for this package. Time Line: Table 12 shows the timeline of events com- pleted as of this writing and the projected milestones for major events yet to be completed. Case 10—Summary and Major Tools for Expedited Procurement Summary: The project is currently under way and on schedule (UDOT website 2012). The use of CMGC project

30 • Used work packaging that supported permitting and right-of-way requirements; and • Managed the risk of permit delays by developing two possible permitting schedules and then coordinating the design and construction work in a manner that could be accelerated if the permits were received ear- lier than expected by the longer of the two schedules. CONCLUSIONS, EFFECTIVE PRACTICES, AND FUTURE RESEARCH RECOMMENDATIONS The analyses discussed in this chapter resulted in the follow- ing conclusions and effective practices. Conclusions The following conclusions were drawn from the case studies: • The fastest way to react to an emergency is to anticipate it and make provisions in advance of the event. The Montana DOT rockfall remediation project, MoDOT “nested” DB contract, and NYSDOT Statewide Emergency Bridge IDIQ contract are all examples of developing the capacity to react to an emergency with- out the need to expedite procurement procedures. • Streamlined procedures for DBB, DB, and CMGC delivery of emergency projects can be developed to accelerate the procurement of design and construc- tion assets in response to a major emergency. The Oklahoma, Minnesota, and Utah DOTs furnished examples of how each project delivery method can be abbreviated to award an emergency contract in much less time than it routinely takes. Effective Practices The following effective practices were identified in this chapter: California DOT I-550/880 MacArthur Maze Bridge • Issued sole source contracts to immediately begin demolition and address immediate danger of I-880 bridge collapse with temporary shoring. • Implemented an aggressive DBB procurement process based on limited competition among a select group of contractors with known experience. • Arranged bid opening so a contract award could be made immediately after bid opening. • Incentivized the emergency construction contract to minimize the construction period. • Massed agency personnel in three shifts of field engi- neers and conducted construction submittal review and approval on site. delivery furnished UDOT with a procurement method that brought the construction contractor on the team as an active participant during the design process. This has permitted UDOT to control both cost and time. TABLE 12 STATE ROUTE 14 LANDSLIDE REPAIR PROJECT Date Event Remarks October 8, 2011 Landslide closes Cedar Canyon None October 9, 2011 Project set up and initial funding identified None October 15, 2011 Aerial survey None October 15, 2011 RFQ for design services issued None October 31, 2011 CMGC RFP advertised 23 days after event November 1, 2011 Design consultant selected 24 days after event November 3, 2011 Mandatory preproposal meeting held None November 19, 2011 Geotechnical investigation started None November 23, 2011 CMGC proposals received None December 1, 2011 CMGC selected 38 days after event December 5, 2011 CMGC preconstruction contract negotiated None December 20, 2011 Risk analysis started None January 17, 2012 Environmental document complete 101 days after event January 21, 2012 Initial funding approved by commission None January 31, 2012 ROW ready for offers 115 days after event February 1, 2012 Geotechnical analysis complete None February 3, 2012 Commission approved final funding None March 15, 2012 Construction begins on Package 1 None May 31, 2012 Construction begins on Package 2 Projected date June 1, 2012 Temporary road open to public Projected date July 31, 2012 Main slide area paving complete Projected date September 2012 Project complete Projected date < 1 year after event UDOT (2011). The following is a list of the major tools used to expedite procurement in this project: • Streamlined CMGC RFP procedure; • Used the CMGC proposal evaluation to prequalify the CMGC by assigning a high weight to the contractor’s proposed team and past experience;

31 Florida DOT I-10 Escambia Bay Bridge as Reported by the Scan Team • “Expedited contract execution—FDOT delegated award to the local office; work was scoped for basic requirements of the needed facility. Obtain an agreement quickly, hand- written if necessary; the formal contract can follow later. • Mobilization—Marshal people and equipment to the project site as soon as possible. Select a contractor that has the ability to bring people and equipment to an iso- lated location quickly. • Design team in place to support the project—Relocate experts to the site and in position to make quick deci- sions. Develop the design concurrent with the work. • Flexibility based on material availability—Speed can only be achieved if the DOT is willing to accept avail- able materials for repair” (Blanchard et al. 2009). Maine DOT Route 27 Bridges • Maintained a standing list of prequalified emergency contractors. • Reduced the level of design by in-house engineers because of the ability to gain input from the contractor. Minnesota DOT I-35W St. Anthony Falls Bridge • Used two-step right-of-way acquisition using Right of Entry easements to provide immediate access to the construction site followed by a guaranteed timeline for financial closure on each parcel. • Obtained single points of contact within each resource agency for all permit communication and a commit- ment to expedite the issuance of project permits. • Maintained tight control of project scope to avoid unin- tentional delays owing to exceeding permit constraints. • A highly interactive preproposal period included regu- larly scheduled one-on-one meetings with each com- petitor, whose contents were kept confidential. • Accepted confidential ATC/PAEs before proposal sub- mission for review and decision. • A completely transparent evaluation plan and award algorithm withstood a protest. • Incentives were directly related to the preeminent proj- ect success factor, timely completion. Montana DOT: US-2 Rockfall Mitigation Project • Compressed timeline for short listing and award. • Risk sharing through the use of selective unit pricing internal to a lump sum contract. • Encouraging ATCs through the scoring system in the DB evaluation plan. • Permitting proposers to set their own schedule and incentivizing early completion by means of the evalu- ation plan weighting. • Use of Best and Final Offers after initial proposal eval- uation to synchronize the proposed scope of the unit priced work items with the available budget. Missouri DOT I-270 Slide Repair Project • Recognized the risk of an emergency during construc- tion and mitigated that risk by building a fast response solution into the DBB construction contract. • Developed the necessary contractual mechanism to add a “nested DB” contract with a preselected specialty design-builder. • Recognized that in-house designers lacked the techni- cal expertise to design soil nail walls and made provi- sions to expedite obtaining that expertise by means of the nested DB contract. • Integrated the efforts of in-house designers with the specialty contractor’s designers to jointly arrive at an overall emergency design solution. New York State DOT 931G Bridge Replacement • IDIQ contract for emergency bridge repair on a state- wide basis. The contract also contains provisions to erect temporary bridges that are stockpiled at a bridge park on Long Island (Sechrist et al. 2011). • Integrated in-house design with Statewide Emergency Bridge Contractor input, using a process similar to CMGC. • Constrained the design team to using available steel sections. • Employed accelerated bridge construction techniques including standard precast bridge deck and approach slab panels. Oklahoma DOT I-40 Bridge Pier Replacement • Mobilized immediately available construction con- tractors and local material suppliers with sole source contracts to address immediate danger of bridge col- lapse with temporary shoring. • Implemented an aggressive DBB procurement process that included assembling all required authorities to be present at bid opening so an award could be made immediately after bid opening. • Incentivized the emergency construction contract to minimize the construction period. Oklahoma DOT I-35 Culvert Repair • Issued invitations to bid to a short list of qualified con- tractors (this might be called an informal prequalifica- tion process). • Implemented an aggressive DBB procurement process that included assembling all required authorities to be present at bid opening so an award could be made immediately after bid opening.

32 • Managed the risk of permit delays by developing two possible permitting schedules and then coordinating the design and construction work in a manner that could be accelerated if the permits were received ear- lier than expected by the longer of the two schedules. Future Research No recommendations for future research are made. • Incentivized the emergency construction contract to minimize the construction period. Utah DOT Cedar Canyon Landslide Repair • Streamlined CMGC RFP procedure. • Used the CMGC proposal evaluation to prequalify the CMGC by assigning a high weight to the contractor’s proposed team and past experience. • Used work packaging that supported permitting and right-of-way requirements.