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30 airports was slightly higher than the special-purpose airport scores. For large airports, the average score for general-purpose government airports was 24.5, versus 21.4 for special-purpose entities. For large and medium airports together, the average score for general-purpose airports was 24.2, versus 22.4 for special-purpose enti- ties. Again, ANOVA testing suggests no significant dif- ference between these groups. As discussed above, customer satisfaction is only partly within the control of the airport sponsor, who can affect, but not control TSA, customs, airlines, and other front-line service providers at airports. E. Conclusion A review of the available literature and different sources of data do not clearly reveal that any forms of airport governance are clearly better or worse than oth- ers. This is particularly the case in light of the multiple objectives governments seek to attain through their airports. While some studies suggest that airport au- thorities may have some efficiency advantages over general-purpose governments (and port authorities), financial efficiency is only one of a number of factors that airport proprietors must address when considering a change in the form of airport governance. Further, in light of the wide variation in the operation of airports within generalized categories (e.g., the forms of airport authorities and the degree of autonomy afforded to air- ports within general-purpose governments), it is excep- tionally difficult to draw sweeping conclusions. Indeed, the question may be academic for most air- ports, insofar as the governance structure for existing airports has already been chosen. As discussed above, relatively few airports change governance, and typically only do so in extreme cases of management or economic distress. Thus, for example, the Midway Airport priva- tization is being driven in large part by the pressing need by the City of Chicago to secure funds for pension and other municipal needs. Similarly, the shift of gov- ernance in Pittsburgh and Detroit was driven by per- ceived political and financial inadequacy by previous airport operators. In relatively few cases will the exist- ing political management of an airport (or a state legis- lature) determine that they are doing so bad a job that they should cede control to another entity. Nonetheless, because such cases have occurred and presumably will continue to occur, it would be useful to have additional detailed analyses of the benefits and weaknesses of different airport governance structures. In addition, such research could be valuable for the handful of new airports that may be built by entities other than an existing proprietor or ones obtaining sur- plus military bases. VI. CONCLUSION By far the greatest challenge in evaluating airport governance is to translate the information presented throughout this report into meaningful suggestions for communities considering their governance structure and the opportunities for change. As explained in detail herein, neither federal nor state law precludes transfers of control and, on the contrary, many states specifically recognize the use of myriad governance structures and grant comparable powers to each type of entity. More- over, while the studies examined in Section V reveal loose correlations between governance structure and certain performance criteria, these studies do not ac- count for the multitude of performance objectives that may be sought by airport stakeholders. Although the recognition that there is no one-size-fits-all approach to airport governance may help to dispel conventional wisdom, it provides little aid to communities looking for options and solutions. Further compounding this challenge is the fact that the historical record does not necessarily provide guid- ance as to how communities might assess their options. To repeat, while it may be significant that most of the recent changes involved the transfer of power from a general-purpose government to a single-purpose authority, the conditions prompting a change are equally important. These conditions have included alleged mismanagement (in the case of Detroit, Michi- gan), the need for a replacement airport (in the case of San Diego, California), and the need for an infusion of money (in the case of privatization in Chicago, Illinois). In other words, most of the communities making a change had a singular and dire problem that was per- ceived to warrant a dramatic change. In at least a few instances, these circumstances were perceived to be sufficiently dire to warrant the involuntary transfer of power, at times over the objection of the airport opera- tor. Numerous communities across the country have ex- amined airport governance. While a few communities have made significant voluntary changes to improve performance in the absence of a dramatic circumstance, there is a larger group of communities that have con- sidered but declined to make such changes. Many stud- ies proved inconclusive, or the political will was lacking to effect a large-scale change such as the transfer of power from a general-purpose government to a single- purpose authority. These findings lead to three observations. The first is that a community must realistically examine the poten- tial motivations for making a change in governance structure. A community would need to critically exam- ine its objectives in operating its airport and its success in achieving identified objectives and pragmatically consider whether deficiencies are sufficiently serious to warrant such a herculean undertaking. Upon determining that a dramatic change is war- ranted, the community would then need to consider which of the options for large-scale change would most likely address the perceived deficiencies. As described in Section III, the options include transfer of power from a general-purpose government to a single-purpose authority, full privatization by leasing the airport to a private operator, and commercialization of airport func- tions and facilities. Each of these options has multiple
31 permutations, particularly to account for the integra- tion of regional interests such as through intergovern- mental or joint-exercise-of-power agreements, the crea- tion of a multijurisdiction authority, and the creation or expansion of airport systems within a metropolitan area or region. At least some of the options can be considered to be a salve for specific problems. For example, full privatiza- tion under the FAAâs Privatization Pilot Program may be an option for communities in need of a large cash infusion to support other municipal functions, and crea- tion of a multijurisdiction authority can address a per- ceived lack of regional participation in airport govern- ance. The second observation is that communities should not neglect the full range of options short of a large- scale transfer of power. Again, airport performance may have as much to do with how an airport is run as with its governance form. The following list is intended to be illustrative of the types of actions that communities might consider, depending on their particular circum- stances: ⢠Changes in airport management and personnel. ⢠Changes by a general-purpose government in air- port-related procurement, contracting, and employment requirements. ⢠Creation by a general-purpose government of a board or commission to participate in airport decision- making. ⢠Creation of an advisory board by a general- or sin- gle-purpose government. ⢠Removal and reappointment of board members and commissioners. ⢠Reconstitution of an airport authority commission to adjust interests represented. ⢠Changes in qualifications required to serve on board, commission, or advisory panel. ⢠Commercialization of particular management func- tions. ⢠Commercialization of specific facilities. ⢠Intergovernmental agreements addressing land use, environmental, and other issues. The third and final observation is that, whether con- templating large or small changes, communities should comprehensively evaluate their performance and suc- cess in achieving particular goals. The science and art of performance benchmarking is rapidly evolving and should give communities a far better grasp of their per- formance than has been previously available. By can- didly looking at performance and the ways in which large and small changes in governance might further airport-specific goals, communities should be far better positioned to make those changes that are sensible and likely to lead to positive outcomes.
