Communicating the Value of Research: Contractor's Final Report (2009)

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NCHRP 20-78: Final Report Page 15 CHAPTER 2: RESEARCH-RELATED COMMUNICATIONS EFFORTS LEADING TO PASSAGE OF SAFETEA-LU Introduction This chapter describes and assesses communication efforts to promote investment in transportation research programs during the passage of the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU). This information was obtained through interviews with 24 individuals who played, and continue to play, diverse roles in funding and/or directing transportation research programs in the United States. They include congressional staff, lobbyists, research program managers, university staff and research center directors, and stakeholder group representatives.1 Background: SAFETEA-LU Passage They largely discussed the communications activities that they undertook, were aware of, or were associated with during the passage of SAFETEA-LU. But because of their diverse roles, backgrounds, and perspectives, they contributed unique and varied insights concerning the relative significance and effectiveness of these efforts and activities. This chapter also draws information from reports, articles, and other publications on SAFETEA-LU. Based on this research, we identified the shared attributes of the communication efforts and summarized some general lessons from those commonalities. This chapter focuses on policy advocacy communications. Policy advocacy can be defined as disseminating information intended to influence legislation and the passing of certain laws by targeting policymakers. We were interested in the advocacy communications efforts that influenced the funding of research programs in SAFETEA-LU and the level of funding that the programs received. SAFETEA-LU, signed into law on August 10, 2005, authorized a total of $286.5 billion in spending for federal fiscal years (FFY) 2004–2009. Of this total, $42.30 billion covered obligations that actually took place in FY 2004, which left $244.15 billion for the other years covered by the bill (FFY 2005–2009). Funding Issues This chapter is particularly focused on the advocacy communications efforts to influence the contents and funding levels associated with Title V of the legislation—Transportation Research. Funding for Title V programs totaled $2.149 billion or about 1 percent of the total funding. The federal role in these Title V programs is primarily administered or overseen by the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), Federal Transit Administration (FTA), National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA), and the Research and Innovative Technology Administration (RITA). Provisions in Title V cover short-and long-term research, technology, training, and education programs; the Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS); Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) research and related activities; and most of the University Transportation Centers (UTC) program. The transportation research programs that were funded and the level of funding each program received were the result of the convergence of several factors, some planned and some serendipitous—a “perfect storm” of forces and influences. One of the main lessons of this study is that the outcome of any one organization’s advocacy is not completely predictable. For instance, most of the universities that hosted UTCs put non-tax funds into a pool managed by the Research, 1 To protect confidentiality of interviewees, statements are not attributed to individuals.

NCHRP 20-78: Final Report Page 16 Education, and Training Reauthorization Coalition (RETRC) to retain a lobbyist to facilitate their advocacy for increased funding for existing UTCs. However, what resulted was an increase in the number of UTCs rather than the increased funding for existing centers that they were seeking. Such results characterize what is referred to as “serendipitous ripples.”2 In the case of SAFETEA-LU, the reauthorization debate took place over two years and 12 extensions—a period of time long enough for significant issues to percolate until the time of action on the part of Congress. In fact, the final eight weeks prior to the signing of the law were characterized by a flurry of political activity. In some ways, what happened in terms of SAFETEA-LU legislation was a continuation of recent trends—dramatic growth in earmarking and politicking to balance donor- donee considerations. These are outcomes that resulted from multiple simultaneous processes not anticipated by participants in any single action. The consequences of SAFETEA-LU affected many individuals and groups throughout the transportation research community, presenting opportunities for learning ways to approach the next reauthorization process. 3 Shaping the SAFETEA-LU Discussion Crafting any bill requires balancing many required elements. Some of these have political tones but there is often straightforward mathematics involved as well, and both the political and mathematical processes must be understood. The policy and communication analysis must begin with how the mathematics constitute the “playing field” that defines what is possible. Most interviewees in our study shared the common idea that the SAFETEA-LU debate was primarily shaped by two interrelated issues: (1) the total size of the funding pool and (2) the formula by which that money would be distributed among the states. The former issue was political, and the latter was political and mathematical. The total size of the funding pool was closely linked to the revenue stream provided by the Highway Trust Fund (HTF), which is funded by fuel taxes. Going into the reauthorization debate, there was uncertainty about the long-term outlook for the financial health of the trust fund. The last increase on the fuel tax occurred in 1993, and during the passage of SAFETEA-LU the Bush Administration was adamantly against current or future fuel tax increases. The sum of the states’ funding requests were much above the available funding, and when combined with the minimum return guarantee and other basic structures made the SAFETEA-LU discussion in Congress both a mathematical and political exercise, and more than simply a donee versus donor state issue. One way to do this was to consider increasing the overall funding pool by a significant amount (since donee states could not be reduced) to bring donor state shares to a level that would acceptable—in other words, giving more money to all states but giving even more to donor states. Communicating with Congress about Research The information gathered is based on a limited number of interviews and other secondary research related to the passage of SAFETEA-LU. It cannot represent all of the communications activities that occurred related to the Research Title in SAFETEA-LU, but our analysis does point out common challenges and illustrates a range of possible solutions to these challenges. As reflected in the list of interviewees, our report is based on interviews with persons on the Hill, within stakeholder associations or lobbying organizations, and in federal, local, and state agencies or at universities who are responsible for funding, directing or justifying research programs. The common threads among, or attributes of, effective and not so effective communications strategies are provided below. 2 Pippa Hall (2001). “Serendipitous Ripples: Unexpected Outcomes of a Palliative Care Educational Project.” Journal of Palliative Medicine. Vol. 4, No. 3: 345–352. 3 Donor states receive significantly less federal highway aid than their highway users pay in federal highway taxes to the Highway Trust Fund (HTF); donee states receive more federal highway aid than they pay in taxes.

NCHRP 20-78: Final Report Page 17 Communicating National Values of Research Interviewees who were knowledgeable about what it takes to be “heard” on the Hill said that it was essential to communicate a broad vision and national message theme that illustrates the value of research to constituents and local agencies. Several interviewees mentioned that chances for success were enhanced if the many diverse voices throughout the transportation community articulated the overall value of research in ways that made it easier to support research than other programs. Congressional staff are bombarded by many requests, thus it is easier for them to support programs that benefit the most number of people. It is important to provide answers to questions such as: What is the value? What relation does the research have to the current problem? What have previous projects and programs achieved? What are some effects of these previous research projects? It was important to come across as advocating “for the greater good and not to promote pet interests or narrow agendas.” It is necessary to point out that grand vision does not mean selling a complex research product. Interviewees spoke of fielding visits from “effective” lobbyist and interest groups—most came with the broad, consistent message, “we think investment in [research program] is important [for these reasons].” But some groups would come with their own agendas, which would be a “turn-off” to Committee chairs and members because these groups “reached too far or got too greedy.” A real-world example of this was one company that provided real-time travel information services. The firm wanted to grow the number of cities it served. Representatives went to the Hill to promote the value and benefits of what they do and to ensure that there was funding in the bill to cover this type of service. But they went too far—they even identified the amount of funding they wanted and the actual program that should serve as the source of their funding. This was not well received. On the other hand, the role of the American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO) in promoting investment in research was a positive example of communicating a broad vision. It was mentioned several times that Congressional staff listened to what AASHTO had to say. AASHTO represented the various state DOTs; therefore, the association was not perceived as having a conflict of interest (i.e., as in actually conducting the research for which it was seeking funds). AASHTO’s Standing Committee on Research (SCOR) was identified as having credibility with the Congress because the states are contributing their own real money to this research program. The states are not in the research business themselves so when they say, “take some of our money, spend it on pooled research, so we can do our jobs better…” this sends a significant message. Since it was pushing a “single” unified agenda for the states, the organization was perceived as credible. When seeking feedback on the bill, for instance, staffers would not go to individual state DOTs because the DOTs were represented by AASHTO. Staffers would just seek feedback from AASHTO, a matter of one-stop shopping. More broadly, with its ties to the states, AASHTO represented the governors and the voters—the ultimate constituency of the Congress. Broad Coalitions The first theme, communicating a grand vision, underscores the importance of building broad coalitions to promote a clear message to Congress. It is important to get as many people involved as possible; reaching out to committees and individuals on websites, through mailing lists, with follow- up meetings, and with face-time at related meetings will get the ball rolling. The advocacy communication efforts of those individuals who were satisfied with the outcome of research programs were implemented by broad coalitions that targeted both Democratic and Republican policymakers, spanned political ideology from the left to the right, consisted of grassroots as well as DC-centric organizations, and leveraged the reach of public, private, and academic interests. As one person mentioned, “[my program] creates a strange bedfellow coalition. We worked both sides of the

NCHRP 20-78: Final Report Page 18 political fence.” Another interviewee said, “You need to have allies to do this kind of thing.” Several examples of these broad coalitions were identified. To build support for the Transit Cooperative Research Program, a broad constituency of universities, industry associations (including the American Public Transit Association [APTA]), and FTA representatives came together. As another example, in the late 1990s FHWA, along with AASHTO and the Transportation Research Board (TRB), convened the National Highway Research and Technology (R&T) Partnership to engage the full transportation community in identification of research and technology needs and to create a common vision for a long-term highway research program. This output of this partnership was a report entitled Highway Research and Technology: The Need for Greater Investment. A Success Story Perhaps the best example cited among our interviewees was the coalition developed to advocate for a formal freight research program. The “Freight Stakeholders Network” built a broad consensus and uniform support for a National Cooperative Freight Research Program (NCFRP) to be administered through TRB. Their approach was strategic, not haphazard. They cemented their message of the need for a formal freight research program early on through grassroots networking and consensus building out in the field (i.e., among local, regional, and national (not Federal) stakeholders). They characterized their advocacy campaign as a rifle, not a shotgun, approach. They were satisfied with the manner in which NCFRP was dealt with in SAFETEA-LU and thought a factor in their success was that they brought a diverse and broad constituency on-board early so “everyone was speaking from the same sheet.” The coalition included research institutes, private sector, public sector, and academics. “It was not all government; not all industry; it was a diverse mix. We had a long leash to tell our story.” The Freight Stakeholders Network wanted to make sure that whoever Congressional staffers were to call for information about the formal freight research program, that person would communicate the common message. They went to Congress with one agenda; they got everyone who had an interest in freight research on their side. It is also important to point out that that because it was such a broad constituency, they did not rely on just a single advocacy method. Their methods included informal communication across industry and multimodal networks; the formation of semi-formal networks of experts and consultants (private sector associations) that would provide information on Capitol Hill; and the writing of position papers for delivery at meetings. The stakeholders did not push funding levels—they wanted to get the program going—not direct how much money was needed. They were willing to leave that up to the US DOT, and their Congressional supporters. Why was a broad coalition a necessary factor? It (1) added credibility to the effort and got attention, (2) enabled the advocacy campaign to highlight many different facets of the issue and increased its relevance and significance, (3) allowed the coalition to formulate a policy agenda that balanced different perspectives and be more politically acceptable, and (4) facilitated advocacy from multiple parts of the policy spectrum, bringing different contacts and resources to the table, and making it possible for the coalition to target a wider range of policymakers. The Freight Stakeholders Network appeared to be successful in each of the criteria. Not the Only Criteria for Success Not all coalitions are successful. There were factors that differentiated effective from ineffective coalitions. Most notably, it was important that the coalition identify a “common” goal that was of significant value to each participating organization. This was certainly a factor in the success of the Freight Stakeholders Network and perhaps, less so in the National Highway Research and Technology (R&T) Partnership. The common approach needed to converge around certain agreed

NCHRP 20-78: Final Report Page 19 upon objectives. It took organized leadership—as a focused core surrounded by a wider group of supporters—to bring about the common goal. When this did not happen, success was modest if at all. For instance, the Council of University Transportation Centers (CUTC) considered their success modest in terms of SAFETEA-LU outcomes. In the late 1990s, most of the Universities that host UTCs cooperated to create RETRC in preparation for the reauthorization of the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA). RETRC was reactivated during the two years preceding SAFETEA-LU. During 2003 to 2005, RETRC and CUTC’s “Strategic Partners” (AASHTO, APTA, and others) advocated for more funding for the established UTCs. Although there was a substantial increase in funding for new, earmarked centers, the UTCs did not get what they wanted. We speculate that one factor in their modest success might be the fact that UTC funding was not at the top of the priority list among the Strategic Partners. They were not speaking to achieve a common goal with the UTC program. The incentive for members of Congress may have been to create more “winners” rather than “bigger winners.” After the growth in the number of centers, CUTC leadership believes that a formulating a common goal among the UTC community in anticipation of the next reauthorization may not be possible now that a broad and diverse population of universities is interested in UTCs. Strategic and Flexible Planning The strategic plan should be developed with the goal in mind—coalesce professional opinion around an important vision and a plan that provides a campaign structure that convinces Congressional representatives that research is an important issue that deserves support. The goal is not to use the plan itself to communicate with staff or representatives. One of our interviewees recommended that a national transportation research blueprint is needed prior to the next reauthorization. “Does a Congressional staffer know where to go for a national research blueprint”? Among other things, national transportation research architecture would inform how proposed research projects would fit rationally in the scheme of things. It would provide cohesion, clarity, and a strategic vision. “If this was more cogent and clear it would be harder for Congress to earmark projects that don’t meet the criteria.” This recommendation underscores the significance of strategic planning in effective advocacy campaigns. While one would assume that systematic planning and evaluation of efforts would be a natural fixture in such campaigns, the reality was that strategy was often absent. Some coalitions did involve strategic planning early on—the Freight Stakeholders Network and CUTC are examples. These coalitions spent some time to develop a shared perspective and find common ground to orient their efforts. This common ground provided a strategic space for these groups that proved useful throughout their advocacy efforts. Even if no formal strategy was articulated, coalition members had a clear sense of the group’s objectives and how they could contribute to them. A particularly effective advocate for one research program said, “as soon as reauthorization began we identified key people on the Committee and key staff—each caucus. We did the early work to get all our constituents on the same page philosophically and strategically. At the tactical level our work was planned and coordinated. Then, we just went ahead and started talking to people—communicating our shared message.” Defining a strategic space gives coalitions flexibility of action, which is useful because the role and objectives of the coalition can change over the course advocacy efforts. Henry Mintzbert, in the Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning4 4 Mintzberg, H. (1994.) Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning. New York: Free Press. differentiates between strategy formulation and strategy formation.

NCHRP 20-78: Final Report Page 20 Strategy formulation is a formal, goal-driven planning process—actions and programs are directly derived from higher-level goals and strategies while strategy formation sees strategy as a pattern or theme that surfaces organically as the many parts of an organization respond to the environment. Advocacy and dealing with the Hill requires strategy formation. As one interviewee admonished, “Players/issues change—you have to be adaptive.” Strategy formation does not work well within hierarchical coalitions or organizations. One interviewee speculated that the militaristic structure at FHWA might be why the FHWA research budget was not supported on the Hill. All of the contact with the Hill had to go through the Administrators or the policy office. Thus, the substance and style of communications between FHWA research program managers and Congress were hindered. “Perhaps members did not feel the FHWA program was responsive to their sense of the needs.” “Administrators were not going to defend $11 million for [research program] when they have bigger fish to fry (i.e., Highway Trust Fund; minimum guarantees).” Messaging Strategies Effective advocacy relies on specific messaging strategies. For some coalitions, the primary advocacy tool was the provision of research-based information. “We’re always looking for opportunities to brief Congressional members. We just keep trying to educate people.” One stakeholder association representative said that all the information they provide to Congress is based on research; the vast majority of which is done in partnership with academic institutions. The organization believes that this adds credibility to its communications with Congress. “Facts will get your issues heard.” It is important, however, that the communications are not overly technical, but basic in their message. “We’ve done wonderful things and have the technology to do even more with additional funding,” one interviewee suggested, to stay positive but not too detailed. In its communications with Congress, NHTSA focuses on three key points (i.e., its mantra)—lives saved, injuries prevented, tax dollars saved. In this aspect, NHTSA is “framing” the highway safety issue to two core values—life and public accountability. In support of NCFRP, as another example, advocates documented how inadequate freight data and freight analysis were at the MPO level—and the importance of un-congested freight movements to regional economies—thus framing freight research as economic opportunity. Messages with a Meaning In The Tipping Point,5 5 Gladwell, M. (2000). The Tipping Point: How little things can make a big difference. Boston, MA: Little Brown. Malcolm Gladwell writes about the importance of “sticky” messages, i.e., messages that stay with people, are frequently discussed or passed on to others, and, eventually have an impact. Sticky messages come from positioning an issue in a novel or inspiring way. Several of the interviewees talked about reframing and repositioning their issues to create a connection with the Congressional audience. In this way, research to mitigate congestion becomes not just a local issue but a national and multi-state issue. Freight research is not just about trucking but is also looked at from a multi-modal perspective. The National Cooperative Highway Research Program (NCHRP) tells the story of research outcomes and impacts in language the decision makers can understand—not in “researchese.” One of our interviewees spoke about a paradigm shift that was needed in competencies and perspectives of engineers. He painted the picture of two different types of engineers: “Eisenhower engineers” and “new engineers.” The “Eisenhower engineer” builds roads; the “new engineer” connects the dots between transportation and contemporary social and economic issues, such as economic development, quality of life, or national security.

NCHRP 20-78: Final Report Page 21 Two-Way Communication for Ongoing Influence Providing new, research-based information and expert analysis to Congress to help the members understand an issue or the rationale for investment in research has another tangible benefit that is tied to the concept of “influence.”6 Consider the Interests of the Audience According to sociologists, one of the most widespread and basic norms of human culture is embodied in the rule of reciprocity. This rule requires that one person try to repay what another person has provided. This sense of future obligation makes possible various kinds of continuing relationships, transactions, and exchanges that are beneficial. We saw this rule at work in the two-way communications that took place between Congressional members/staffers and UTC directors, lobbyists, stakeholder associations, transportation agencies, etc. Interviewees mentioned that staffers’ level of expertise on transportation issues, and particularly transportation research issues, will vary considerably, depending on the committee assignments of the legislator and the tenure of the staffer. Because, as one interviewee mentioned, turnover is high with Congressional staffers, many staff members have been in their positions for only a short period of time. Very few House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee staff who worked on SAFETEA-LU are still there now, meaning that in the next reauthorization, new staffers will appreciate efforts of advocates to explain complex transportation issues in easily understood terms. By providing information support to members of Congress and their staff, the research community builds its credibility and establishes a basis for exchange when the next authorization round comes. Keeping communication constant between majority and minority staff members, and knowing who is in charge and who works for whom proves to be immensely beneficial and keeps researchers in the loop. All interviewees commented, in one way or another, that ongoing communication between decision makers and researchers was important. “You need to build communications over time. You can’t do enough communicating with Congress. Issues can get lost in the shuffle.” It is not the only way to get research support, but it can be an effective way. “What is more important than the communication mechanisms used is whether you have a history (foundation) of successful research and whether that is being communicated to policy makers. If you don’t do things that are relevant, that provide a benefit, and communicate that benefit, then, you won’t be successful in seeking funding.” Congressional staff and members of Congress needed to have confidence that there was an important problem to be solved, and that the requesting agency could solve it. One important role for the proposing research entity was to show that research may or can contribute to solving the problem. Thus, communications for this purpose needed to non-technical and practical—to link problems to solutions in a clear and simple way. The recommendation that messaging strategies should “consider the audience” is absurdly simple; however, it is not always followed. The “ask” and the rationale for it need to be tailored to the current political mood and concerns of the specific policy makers. Effective advocates demonstrated the connection between what was being requested and the interests of the member’s constituency. Using clear and concise language and specific examples, such as percentages and cost, kept the topic relevant to the audience. “Congressional members are not interested in the theory of [your issue] but in how it benefits their constituents. Whenever you visit the Hill, they expect you to ask for something. We went in and talked about what we were working on, why it’s important, and why a Congressional member should be interested in it,” said a university-based researcher, advocating for a national research program. The message should also contain information on why government should contribute funding, or in some cases lead and coordinate a particular effort (i.e., the Vehicle Infrastructure Integration (VII) project is an example). 6 Cialdini, R. (1984). Influence. New York, NY: Morrow.

NCHRP 20-78: Final Report Page 22 Importance of Illustrative Success Stories Case studies, in the form of anecdotal reports, were an opportunity to showcase research results in a way that makes the connection with constituencies. As one interviewee aptly phrased it, “a handful of dramatic stories is powerful.” This is not a technique that is unique to advocacy communications. Knowledge management experts have been promoting the power of “stories” to inspire innovation, change, and professional breakthroughs. Stories can communicate a large volume of emotional content in a short time to quickly resonate with the target audience. Success stories can speak directly to the needs of Congressional members much more than efforts to document the aggregate value of research programs—as in a cost-benefit approach. More than one interviewee mentioned the relevance of TRB’s “Research Pays Off” published in TR NEWS. One person described how he would select stories that staffers would connect with—a success story from Research Pays Off from Nebraska DOT would be sent to the Congressman from Nebraska. But, it was mentioned that TRB staff has to “beat the bushes” for examples—researchers and their customers rarely offer good examples. It was suggested that researchers (engineers) are reluctant to make claims about their results because there are always some unanswered questions. Decision makers do not work this way: they act on much less evidence or certainty. Relationship Building Many of the people interviewed noted the value of having access to decision makers or at least having an ally in the decision-making circles. This attribute might even be the lynchpin of effective advocacy. “I had a very close working relationship with my congressional delegation. Our congressional members listened to us.” One individual went so far as to say, “This is all about relationship building.” Direct contact with the members, themselves, was important. There was no substitute for face-to-face meetings with staff or Congressional members. Universities have multiple advantages over federal agencies or other stakeholder associations in the realm of relationship building.  First, virtually every large university has a full-time paid lobbyist, sometimes several that assist with many university needs. These lobbyists help move forward programs the institutions are working on, inform the Congressional members and staff on what the institutions are doing and have done, and generally keep connections with the Hill.  Second, Congressional members often have a natural connection to or confidence in their local universities. It is their alma mater or the home-state university.  Third, at the end of the day, Congressional members want to know that they did something for their state. Bringing money back to the districts is important. These three advantages provide relationships, a constituent-focused benefit and takes advantage of the expertise (lobbying) that is required in ways no different than those needed in the planning, design and operation of the road network. Testimony at hearings does not constitute effective relationship building. Usually at such testimony only about half of the committee members (or staff from those members offices) or staffers from that committee attend. Many times hearings are just for show (i.e., lip service). What is the most effective mechanism? Many interviewees identified “building a rapport with the staffers.” ITS America was singled out as being very good at this. They held events to which they invited staff and members of Congress. One such visit was a field trip to a traffic operations center operated by VDOT that was very well attended by staffers. Another example cited were luncheons hosted by the University of Minnesota on Capitol Hill. These luncheons typically had no strong agenda but

NCHRP 20-78: Final Report Page 23 allowed an exchange of ideas—even among House and Senate staff, which are not often in the same room. The Texas Transportation Institute was also mentioned as representing the “power of effectively developing a rapport with Congressional staff and then using that relationship to get across a message.” Effective relationship building is cultivated in several dimensions. One UTC director talked about his extensive local political connections; personal relationships with Congressman; how he responds quickly to Congressional requests for technical information on transportation issues; and how he widely publicizes (through the media and the Web) the center’s activities and achievements to political leadership. He talked about this as a routine communication process; not specifically tied to earmarking for particular projects. He believes, “relationships need to take on this type of personal connection to be effective.” Another person mentioned, “You can’t make cold calls.” One person who has built long-standing relationships said, “Staffers who are comfortable with you and who trust you will take time to listen to you. It is very subtle “marketing” and it takes time. You can’t be seen as being self-serving.” Working from Within More than one interviewee mentioned that it is critical that advocacy is done by individuals who understand the inner workings of Congress and the Administration and know how to “play the lobbying game.” Such individuals understand the political realities that policymakers face and work within those parameters to secure their support. “There are critical times in the legislative process at which you need to communicate with staff. So you have to be aware of the legislative schedule— know what’s going on. We watch things on the Hill to make sure things don’t happen to prevent [our program] from being supported.” The best-case scenario would be to find a legislator who could be a champion—an elected official who will talk to other elected officials. For example, one of our interviewees described how support was built for a program in his state. “We put together a task force of elected leaders; if they are leading these things, they become converted.” In order to find the champion, it is important to convince legislators that the issue is significant enough to provide an opportunity to display their leadership, yet has enough support that the political risk of their championing it is minimal. Lawmakers are looking for low-risk, high-return investments on their political capital. Others talked about the usefulness of having an “embedded” transportation research professional on the Hill. This person can serve as a resource to congressional staff. Congressional staffers often have no technical background relating to an industry, such as transportation; their education is often in law or political science. So communicating with them is often approached as with a lay person. USDOT will sometimes detail employees to help congressional staff. A state DOT could also detail someone to work on that staff. One of this NCHRP project’s panel members, Jonathan Upchurch, served a rotation as congressional staffer. He was named an American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) fellow in 2002 and went to Capitol Hill to work on re-authorization. He was staff to the Highways and Transit subcommittees, Transportation and Infrastructure Committee (House) and served as a resource and advocate for transportation research from within. Not just Upchurch but others mentioned that such individuals are welcomed in Congress to sort out the technical substantive issues. Their role is to provide sound, objective advice to maintain credibility so staffers and Members continue to use them as a resource. But at the same time, they can serve as advocates for transportation research. But Upchurch admitted that his advising went out the window during the 11th hour conference committee deliberations in which earmarking took place.

NCHRP 20-78: Final Report Page 24 Conclusions and Issues for the Next Reauthorization This chapter described and assessed the activities (i.e., political, mathematical, and communications) that influenced investment in transportation research programs during the passage of the SAFETEA- LU. The lessons learned from this experience can benefit many individuals and groups throughout the transportation research community in planning and implementing advocacy communication activities for the next reauthorization. One of the main lessons of this study; however, was that the outcome of advocacy communications is not completely predictable; regardless of how strategic and well thought out the communications with Congress are. Legislative outcomes are the result of the convergence of several factors, some planned and some serendipitous—a “perfect storm” of forces and influences. By creating strategic space, an agency can build flexibility of action to better weather the storm. In addition to providing lessons learned for the transportation research community at- large, this paper provides our NCHRP research team with a set of factors, issues, and concepts that need to be more fully examined in subsequent research tasks. In particular, these themes will be explored in the case study research, for which we will conduct in-depth evaluation of communication activities associated with several transportation research projects—from inception through funding toward implementation. In the spirit of fulfilling both of these objectives, the bullet points below present our key findings as they relate specifically to the SAFETEA-LU experience and also as they related more generally to research-related communications. SAFETEA-LU Lessons and Relevant Issues for Legislative Processes  Reauthorization is a political process. Next reauthorization will be dominated by one major issue—How are we going to fund the future transportation system? The Highway Trust Fund surplus balance will run out in the sixth year—forcing Congress to increase taxes to grow the program.  Research as a general rule does not have an advocate when and where budget decisions are made. There are more pressing needs, better cases, and more important ways for Congressional members to serve constituents. That does not mean Members do not care about research, but there are many competing priorities for their time and support.  The key is not really what the amount of Research funding is, but getting programs and projects as budget lines and ideas into the legislation.  The Basics of the legislation are determined between 2-1/2 and 1-1/2 years before the bill is passed by Congress. This is the time when information is the most valuable and necessary.  The Conference committee is significant. It needs to include someone (a champion) who wishes to have funding spent on the Research Title. The Conference is too intense, too short, and there is “no oxygen” in the room for anything other than the most important elements. If research is ignored, it will be easier to take funds from it. Squeaky wheel still gets the grease. The goal should be to ensure that there are several informed people at the negotiations who care about research. This means taking the time now to find out who they are and what topics they care about.  One thing about SAFETEA-LU passage, there were more advocates for transportation research than for previous bills. It will be important to maintain at least this level of interest and investment so transportation research does not get a smaller share of the pie next time around. The level of awareness of importance of transportation research needs to be raised with Congressional members. Transportation researchers at all levels (e.g., local, state, national, and Federal) to be willing to build relationships with local offices of members of Congress and with their DC-based staffs.  The extensions of TEA-21 (over the course of 7 fiscal quarters) put a great deal of pressure on the Research Title. The extension funding was made in the same proportion as in TEA-

NCHRP 20-78: Final Report Page 25 21. The funding, however, contained no earmarks and contained a greater percentage of apportioned programs than would have been available in the final bill. Later, when the bill reached conclusion, legislators did not want to give up earmarks, but they had to be spread over 5 fiscal years (one quarter of FY 05 and FY 06, 07, 08 and 09) instead of six, raising their relative effect. They were included in the Scope and Minimum Guarantee calculations, but this put more pressure on the Research Title and other discretionary funding.  The Democratic Party Congressional leaders have promised to make the process more open in the future, but there does not appear to be support for completely eliminating earmarks.  The funding in the Research Title is equivalent to one percentage point in the minimum guarantee percentage calculation. At this level, considering the importance of the donor- donee issue, there will be pressure to earmark the Research projects in the future. This is not a value, or political, judgment; it reflects the mathematics of the Scope and minimum guarantee equations. General Observations on Improving Research Communication to Congress  Research communications to Congressional officials should be jointly planned by the research community at-large, comprised of consistent messages that are easy for the layman to understand, and carried to officials by individuals who have a working knowledge of Congressional mechanisms and who are capability of building relationships with Congressional members and staff.  Coalitions are important. A wide base of advocates for a research program convinces legislators that there is political safety in supporting the program; the more diverse the support network, the easier it is to increase the overall relevance and significance of the research program in the political priority list and the wider the reach of the group in term of access to policy makers.  Investment in research always needs to tie back to the ultimate reasons it was useful Congressional constituents (i.e., reduce congestion, save lives, create jobs, etc). “Hit this hard and hit it often.” Advocates should focus on performance measures that show savings of time, lives, and money—these are messages that resonate with legislators, agencies, and the public. Programs that affect state DOTs are also key to influencing the research investment—maintenance, remote sensing of pavement conditions, safety, etc.  The UTCs do better because they provide immediate, positive feedback to Congress members on the use and value of their research funding, and there are “focused” winners in the local (back-home) research community. Reciprocity is fundamental to the ongoing relationships with Universities and Congressional members.  Timing influences any organization’s advocacy efforts. Issues gather momentum over time, and advocacy is most successful when it is able to spearhead this momentum and tip the scales in favor of a particular course of action. For example the success of the formal freight research program might have been due to the timing of the initiative relative to the growing national interest in the efficiency of freight operations. The changing nature of the U.S. economy—particularly, increased overseas manufacturing and "just in time" delivery supply chain operations—was a top-of-mind issue for many on the Hill. The Freight Stakeholders Network was able to link the value of an established research program to maintaining infrastructure needs to support the efficient movement of goods by truck, train, ship, or plane.  The audience for the advocacy communications will change over the term of the legislation— it may begin as grassroots organizations or state DOTs but later in the process it evolves into staff and Congress members. The messaging strategies need to consider the audience— whoever and wherever it is.

NCHRP 20-78: Final Report Page 26  Positioning an issue or reframing it in an inspiring way will increase the chances that it will be heard. “New engineers” are needed who understand the technical complexities of transportation research and can connect the dots to emotive issues—quality of life, national security, economic development.  Staffers’ time is extremely limited. The case for research needs to be presented clearly and simply (i.e., cost, scope, schedule, benefits, and a clearly stated request). Documents needs to be short, succinct, compelling (e.g., use of success stories), and include graphics.  There is no substitute for face-to-face meetings with Congress. Research advocates need to be willing to “tell a story that is easily understood and intuitively obvious.” Often people who do research are not very good at this as researchers tend to resist “dumbing down” their research. Someone is needed who can translate the research into something very easily understood. More complex ideas can be presented, but only after telling a compelling story to set the framework.  For information to be effective, it should be provided early in the process, as well as reinforced during discussions and Committee and Conference deliberations.

NCHRP 20-78: Final Report Page 27 Persons Interviewed Ann Brach, Ph.D., Senior Program Officer, Transportation Research Board; Deputy Director of the Strategic Highway Research Program (SHRP II), National Academy of Sciences William Buechner, Vice President Economics and Research, American Road and Transportation Builders Association Rod Diridon, Executive Director, Mineta Transportation Institute, San Jose State University Richard J. Dolesh, Director of Public Policy, National Recreation and Park Association Michael Griffith, Director, Office of Research and Analysis, U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration Barbara Harsha, Executive Director, Governors Highway Safety Association Graham Hill, former Staff Director and Senior Counsel to the United States House of Representatives' Transportation and Infrastructure Subcommittee on Highways, Transit and Pipelines., currently Chief Executive Officer, ICE Miller Strategies, Inc. Patrick Jones, Executive Director, and Neil Gray, Director of Government Affairs, International Bridge, Tunnel and Turnpike Association Dennis Judycki, Associate Administrator, Research, Development and Technology, Federal Highway Administration (Turner-Fairbank Highway Research Center) Tony Kane, Director of Engineering and Technical Services, American Association of State Highway Transportation Officials Joseph Kanianthra, Associate Administrator, Vehicle Safety Research, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration Jennifer Kunde, Lobbyist, Director of Government Relations, Northwestern University Bruce Layton, Lobbyist, Special Assistant to the President for Government Relations, Northwestern University William Millar, Executive Director, American Public Transit Association Lee Munnich, Senior Fellow and Director, State and Local Policy Program, Humphrey Institute, University of Minnesota; also Subcommittee Chair, Congestion Pricing Outreach Dan Murray, Vice President, Research, American Transportation Research Institute (ATRI) Neil Pedersen, Administrator, Maryland Department of Transportation's State Highway Administration Peter Peyser, Lobbyist, Blank Rome Government Relations Robert (Bob) Plymale, Director, Nick J. Rahall II Appalachian Transportation Institute, Marshall University Bill Reichmuth, Chair of American Public Works Association’s Transportation Committee and also Director, Planning, Engineering & Environmental Compliance, City of Monterey, CA Robert Reilly, Retired Director, National Cooperative Highway Research Program Shelley Row, Intelligent Transportation Systems, U.S. Department of Transportation

NCHRP 20-78: Final Report Page 28 David Schulz, founding Executive Director, Northwestern University’s Infrastructure Technology Institute Neil Schuster, President and CEO, Intelligent Transportation Society of America Jonathan Upchurch, former Congressional staffer, currently, National Park Transportation Scholar, National Park Foundation