Communicating the Value of Research: Contractor's Final Report (2009)

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NCHRP 20-78: Final Report Page 38 CHAPTER 4: IN-DEPTH CASE STUDY ANALYSIS Introduction This chapter describes in detail the seven case studies that were selected in Task 3. Each case study represents a “whole” study, in which facts were gathered from various sources during the entire lifecycle of the transportation research project. Of the seven priority cases, five represent hard science projects and two represent soft science projects. We found this reasonable, given the assumption that it might prove more difficult, and therefore more interesting, to communicate the value of hard science transportation research. Performing organizations include FHWA, state DOTs, universities, the private sector, and a broad consortium. This diversity provided a variety of communications approaches and messaging strategies to inform this study. The geographic spread of the selected projects included two national projects; two projects in the midwest; and one each in the east and west coasts and in the northwest. Finally, the audiences ranged from the U.S. congress and state legislatures, FHWA and various levels within state DOTS (executives, engineers and other staff), to the private sector, general public and the media. Our primary objective was to emphasize the lessons that were learned about effective communication practices from each case study and across all case studies. For each case study, we examined the context of the problem, the facts about the case, any challenges that were encountered during the research project—from proposal to implementation—and the outcomes. To analyze these factors, we mapped the communication flow and content, determined the communication practices that were used, deduced the participants’ understanding of their roles as communicators and advocates, determined the patterns of response to the communication strategy, and assessed the effectiveness of the communication plan for securing support for research. This information will provide the best insight into how to replicate the success in other circumstances. Our overall research strategy in conducting these case studies was to identify successful transportation research project investment decision making to examine the communication practices leading to funding and implementation. The research team considered the goals and objectives of the different transportation research projects and the extent to which they made goals formulation an important part of their communication strategy framework. An investigation of the ways in which they devised their communications strategies and the methods each used for evaluations of those strategies followed. Data were derived from multiple sources, including interviews and documents. Interviews were held with senior technical and management staff from the different transportation research programs or projects identified. Because we followed the paths of decision making and/or communication strategies in these case studies, it was necessary to interview multiple players for each case study. The interviews were pre-planned and conducted with a structured interview guide; but as with the list of interviewees, flexibility and fluidity were exercised in conducting the interviews. The request for the interview was done via email with an attached letter of introduction and a list of potential interview topics. The email was followed with a personal phone call to set a time for the interview. The case studies identified common themes, trends, and factors that influenced success. In analyzing the case studies, the goal was to “debrief success” in-depth to figure out what is working and why, and whether the attributes noted in the first two tasks played a significant role or no role at all. We considered having one case study that would investigate an example of a “failed” transportation research project investment, but were concerned that failed projects might be difficult to identify and investigate.

NCHRP 20-78: Final Report Page 39 Case Study 1: Adaptive Control Software (ACS) Lite Overview The ACS project, especially the development of ACS Lite, shows how a research project can overcome barriers and reach deployment. In the ACS Lite project:  Researchers reached out of the box to apply innovative software designed for machine controlled systems through NASA and apply it to signal timing to help alleviate congestion on urban arterials.  The public and private sectors joined together and contributed to the success of this research program. To be put into practice, research often needs to be taken up by private industry. The different cultures and constraints of industry and government often make collaboration difficult. Research is successful when there is a confluence of research that directly speaks to the topic of the day, at a time when funding is available, with a champion who can speak articulately to decision makers and technical researchers, and a team that has a ‘problem- solving’ mentality that can overcome seemingly permanent barriers to success. The ACS is one such research program. Context for Adaptive Control Software In the mid 1990s, new technologies were booming. One of the innovations that changed the field of computer technology came from NASA research on adaptive control technology. This kind of technology represented a significant forward movement in machine-controlled systems. Adaptive controlled systems ‘taught’ themselves by measuring their own performance and adapting to improve based on changing conditions. NASA developed this kind of software to fail-safe flight systems. But the genie was out of the bottle, and many applications for software which analyzed its own performance and dynamically modified itself to operate better in adverse and/or changing conditions were developed. In parallel, congestion in urban areas was worsening and becoming more of a political issue. The FHWA/Turner-Fairbank Highway Research Center embarked on research to improve traffic signal control. The goal was to take advantage of these significant advances in computer technology and to address the obsolescence of existing control algorithms for urban traffic control systems. The research yielded a program called Adaptive Control Software (ACS). Background on Traffic Control Systems The technology to control traffic systems in most urban areas was getting old. Most closed- loop systems were developed in the late 1980s and were based on an “on-street master" (OSM) controller, which supervised a small number of traffic signals. The OSM had pre- set time of day timing plans (called ‘optimized’ signal plans) that used traffic counts by direction and time of day to establish flow patterns and set the signal timings. Some of the signal timing plans were based on old count data, or no count data at all. We have all experienced the strange sensation of sitting at a red light while no traffic at all passes in the green direction. Issue to Sell: The value of building public-private partnerships to advance signal software development.

NCHRP 20-78: Final Report Page 40 “ACS Lite is a wonderful example of working with industry to put a new technology into practice.” According to Turner-Fairbank research, poor signal timing accounted for 5-30 percent of arterial congestion. Using ACS, traffic-signal timing is updated continually as real time traffic conditions change throughout the day, and in response to special circumstances. The innovation of the group at Turner-Fairbank was to seize on the promise of a technology that was ‘outside the box’ and develop an RFP to have researchers look at applying it to the problem of static signal timing. The issue of timing is always there, and when ITS had been funded in 1999, the research RFP was ready. Congestion has continued to be an actionable research topic. Mr. Raj Ghaman, of the FHWA/Turner Fairbank Highway Research Center, first requested funding for a proof of concept task to see if ACS algorithms could be applied to signal timing software. Challenges One of the challenges is that deploying ACS is costly, even though it requires less maintenance than optimized signal timing plans. Depending on the field configuration, installing the controller, communication, and detection components needed to support ACS costs between $10,000 and $40,000 per intersection. The cost of maintaining this infrastructure is estimated at $1,000 per intersection per year. In addition, ACS was designed for large cities, which typically do not utilize closed-loop systems (CLS). Given these barriers, FHWA identified a need to develop software suitable for use in small and mid-sized cities, where CLS is more common. FHWA researchers developed a new software tool called ACS Lite with the following objectives:  Keep the signal settings and timing current.  Serve as a cost-effective retrofit for existing National Electrical Manufacturers Association (NEMA)- compliant CLS.  Be capable of being retrofitted for an existing system as well as an add-on to new system deployments.  Require minimal equipment or communication replacement for deployment.  Have backward compatibility with controllers that are of NEMA TS-1 specification.  Be limited to NEMA-based CLS for its initial system application.  Be targeted to linear or arterial systems for its initial application. It is important to this project to note that OSM systems, while owned and deployed by local government agencies, are manufactured by competing private companies. FHWA designed the original hardware architecture so that ACS Lite would reside in a general purpose, field-hardened central processing unit and connect to a serial port on the OSM. However, this scheme would not work for all manufacturers due to the complexity of the modifications to the OSM software. One of the major challenges to developing ACS Lite was the proprietary nature of each manufacturer’s modifications to the OSM software. Overcoming Barriers to Success One of the major lessons in the ACS Lite case study is the problem solving nature of the approach by the research team. At this point in the story, ACS Lite might have been stillborn, and only large urban areas would be implementing adaptive signals. Industry is protective of their secrets, and adverse to the risk of sharing the details of their systems with FHWA and risk losing them to a competitor. To encourage private industry participation, the FHWA research team offered a carrot to the

NCHRP 20-78: Final Report Page 41 major industry players: they could have the ACS-Lite software free, and FHWA would pay half of the development costs for the ‘bridging’ software (called an application program interface) for each participating manufacturer. This carrot offered a big reward—better product and low development cost—for the risk of participating in the research with fellow competitors. Working through the industry group (NEMA), FHWA invited signal and system manufacturers to participate in the research. Four companies accepted the invitation: 1) Econolite Control Products Inc. 2) Eagle Traffic Control Systems 3) Peek Traffic Corp. 4) McCain Traffic Supply Inc. An application program interface (API) was developed for each vendor’s application. The ACS Lite product, when deployed, will help public agencies with small and mid-sized systems manage their congestion, particularly where poor traffic signal timing causes the congestion. Also, small and mid-sized cities will have a new tool that responds to changes in traffic conditions in near real time, as compared with no response under time-of-day operation. Embedded Case Studies: The technical implementation Econolite Application, Gahanna, Ohio, USA The first deployment of ACS Lite occurred in 2005 in the city of Gahanna, Ohio, a suburb of Columbus, Ohio. Gahanna has a CLS along Hamilton Road, with Interstate 270 (1-270) to the south and Clark State Road to the north. Hamilton Road serves as a connection between Columbus to the north and I-270 to the south. Although Hamilton Road does not serve as a major route, local traffic managers classify it as a principal arterial. To prepare the system for the ACS Lite deployment, video detectors were installed in three locations: northbound Hamilton Road, north of the 1-270 interchange; southbound Hamilton Road, north of Clark State Road; and westbound Clark State Road, east of Hamilton Road. ACS Lite uses these system detectors for signal-offset selection. In addition, loop detectors were installed in the center lane of both northbound and southbound Hamilton Road at Granville Road. This is the major and most congested intersection in the system, and ACS Lite used loop detectors to optimize the Hamilton Road and Granville Road signal splits. All modems were upgraded to the 9,600 baud rate because of the constricted bandwidth of the original twisted- pair communication media. The reason for the upgrade is that ACS Lite needs to obtain the signal performance for the previous cycle for each intersection on a per cycle basis. An API was written for ACS Lite to interface with Econolite’s field equipment. Normally the software is designed to interface with the OSM. In this case, however, the researchers deemed that it would be too costly to modify the OSM software to recognize ACS Lite and process data requests. Therefore, they opted to modify ACS Lite to bypass the OSM and go directly to each intersection over a spare communication circuit. Researchers collected field data for five weekdays during morning and evening peak periods to assess the system performance before and after the deployment. Eagle Application, Houston, Texas, USA The second ACS Lite deployment took place in 2006 on State Route 6 in western Houston, Texas. State Route 6 connects to I-10 to the south and extends beyond George Bush Intercontinental Airport to the north. The part of State Route 6 selected for the field test consists of nine signalized intersections beginning with Clay Road and ending at West Little York Road to the north. This subsystem

NCHRP 20-78: Final Report Page 42 is part of a larger CLS maintained by the state of Texas. The system was last retimed in the fall of 2004. The system hardware consists of nine Eagle signal, model EPAC300 608 M52 controllers with an OSM. The communication media consists of a twisted-pair copper wire operating at 1,200 baud. No system detectors are located along State Route 6. The northbound detector at Clay Road and the southbound detector at West Little York Road were used for selecting the system offset. Each detector associated with the intersections of State Route 6 at Clay Road, Keith Harrow Boulevard and West Little York Road was used to optimize the signal split. As in the case of the Gahanna field test, researchers developed an API for the Houston test. Because Eagle OSMs routinely collect the data that ACS Lite processes, the researchers did not need to modify the OSM software. Therefore, they used the original hardware architecture. As noted earlier, the system modems were upgraded to 9,600 baud. The procedures for collecting the field data were similar to those used in Gahanna. In this case, the performance was even better. However, the greater benefits are attributed to higher traffic volumes over the Gahanna site. Peek Application, Bradenton, Florida, USA FHWA researchers planned an ACS Lite application for State Route 70 in Bradenton, Florida. The system consists of 10 traffic signals in a Peek-manufactured CLS from U.S. 301 east toward and including the signalized intersection of Caruso Road. State Route 70 is a convenient bypass around the city, connecting to 1-75 toward the east. System engineering is complete, and the equipment changes have been identified. The field test and data collection took place in May 2006. Bibliography Adaptive Control Software, Turner-Fairbank Highway Research Center, Office of Operations R & D, HRTS-04- 037 HRDO-03/12-03(500)E, 2003. Ghaman, Raj “Adaptive Control Software – Lite: Some Early Results,” presented at TRB Signal Committee Meeting, July 11, 2006, Woods Hole, Massachusetts. Persons Interviewed Raj Ghaman, Federal Highway Administration, telephone interview, August 28, 2007 with e-mail follow-up. Marci Kenney, Federal Highway Administration, telephone interview, June 18, 2007.

NCHRP 20-78: Final Report Page 43 Ill-83 Bridge, Lake Villa, Illinois Case Study 2: Northwestern University New Bridge Steel Overview and Background In October of 2006, the Illinois Department of Transportation (IDOT) completed a highway bridge carrying State Route 83 over a Canadian National Railroad line near Lake Villa, Illinois. The bridge was made of about 500 tons of a new steel developed by materials researchers at Northwestern University, partially supported with funds from Northwestern’s U.S. Department of Transportation (USDOT) Tier I national center of transportation excellence.8 This case study focuses on the implementation of the results of this research through the modification of one bridge and the construction of another. Implementation of research results is normally the ultimate objective of research. In this case, implementation was particularly important, because practical, field demonstration of this new material was a significant step for certifying it as a viable bridge steel and for promoting diffusion of this product through a real world example. Bringing a new steel to market is difficult, because the market for structural steels—bridge steels in particular—is relatively small compared with the gross tonnage for sheet 8http://midwest.construction.com/features/archive/0 709_feature2.asp, accessed September 15, 2007. steels and bar products for automobiles and appliances. The domestically- owned steel industry has been shrinking, and it is not to the advantage of domestic producers to encourage the proliferation of small-volume products. Yet there are needs for domestically-produced structural steels, and much research has gone into the development of such steels, supported by the U.S. Navy, the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), and others. The researchers in this case, Emeritus Professor Morris E. Fine and Research Professor Semyon Vaynman, of the Materials Science and Engineering Department at Northwestern University, are material scientists who have spent part of their careers working on the development of improved steels. For bridge and other applications, these researchers were looking for a weathering steel—one that developed a natural, stable coating of corrosion products that would protect the steel members without the need for painting. For ease of manufacture they wanted a steel that did not require quench and tempering to develop its strength. Meaning that, after rolling into plate it did not need immediate immersion in water or other liquid coolants (quenching), but developed sufficient strength when it was air cooled. And they sought a steel that was more easily weldable. While most steels can be welded, they generally require preheating before the welding process to avoid creating a brittle, heat-affected zone in the fused parts. Of course the steel needed to have high tensile strength and Issue to Sell: The value of previous research to convince implementers to use new technology.

NCHRP 20-78: Final Report Page 44 toughness—but too much strength is not desirable because reducing plate size to benefit from higher strength can lead to structures that were too light and flexible. They achieved the properties of weldability, toughness, and atmospheric corrosion resistance by adjusting the composition of the steel, particularly by lowering carbon content and adding copper and nickel. This new steel developed at Northwestern University came to be known as NUCu (Northwestern University Copper) steel in its experimental form.9 The research extended over about ten years, and work on steels of similar composition is still in progress. Support for the work that led to NUCu came from numerous sources over the development period, including, direct funding from the FHWA, Northwestern’s Federally- funded Infrastructure Technology Institute,10 The result is a plate steel with a higher yield strength—70,000 psi IDOT and other state departments of transportation, and several steel companies. 11 Requisites for Implementing Research Results —that achieves this strength without quench and tempering. It is readily welded without preheating, and it is a weathering steel that does not require painting. It is tougher than competing steels at low temperatures. Logically, the incentives for implementation of research results come from the advantages that new technology or method brings:  Improvement in performance.  Reduction in life cycle costs. 9 M.E. Fine and S. Vaynman, “Development and Commercialization of High Performance Steel,” Final Report, grant number DTRS98-G-0016, July 18, 2003. http://www.iti.northwestern.edu/publications/fine/Fi ne_Steel_Final_Report.pdf, accessed September 16, 2007. 10http://www.iti.northwestern.edu/about/index.html, accessed September 15, 2007. 11 psi = pounds per square inch.  Reduction in implementation or application (here fabrication and/or construction) costs. NUCu steel offers benefits in these categories. It should be less costly to manufacture than competing steels that require quench and temper treatment or proprietary thermomechanical processing. Its life cycle costs are expected to be lower because it does not require painting. Implementation effort— and presumably costs—are lower because it is readily welded without preheating. Its yield strength is sufficient for economical applications in bridges. There are stronger steels available; permitting the use of less materials, but this can lead to lighter and excessively flexible structures. Implementing results of research—particularly physical research that involved building something—in this case changing the way something is built, requires collaboration and cooperation among numerous actors. This can be a substantial challenge, a potentially complex trail that can be difficult—or impossible—for researchers to identify and follow. It is more common for researchers to produce their products and make them available, often through publications, and let the marketplace determine the implementation, if any. In the case of NUCu steel or a similar material product, getting it into a field application is critical to large-scale market acceptance, and to generating benefits from the extended research efforts. To accomplish this, it is necessary to show that the application is, first, feasible, and then desirable, and an improvement over previous materials. But feasibility and performance are generally not enough to navigate through the implementation process. A strong advocate who at once is independent but has a stake in the implementation process is a necessary key to success. NUCu and the Northwestern team had that advocate in Christopher Hahin, a senior metallurgical engineer in IDOT’s Bureau of Materials and Physical Research. Hahin recognized the need for an improved bridge steel, he understood

NCHRP 20-78: Final Report Page 45 and contributed to the underlying science, and he embraced the advantages that this new steel promised to bring. He was also excited about innovation in materials. He pressed for the development, testing, and implementation of the new steel from inside IDOT, the first customer agency. Proof Testing the New Steel The research team, IDOT, and others tested small heats of the steel at several points in the development process.12  American Iron and Steel Institute, through the Northwestern University Steel Resources Center (NUSRC) The IDOT Bureau of Materials and Physical Research conducted some tests in its own laboratories since the agency needed its own, independent assurance that NUCu would perform as promised. While the researchers were fine-tuning their alloy, IDOT worked with contract laboratories to assess the strength, toughness, weldability, and other properties of NUCu. The development was evolutionary and collaborative, aimed at specific performance and properties targets, involving an extended process of design, heat preparation, testing and evaluation. The initial development of this new steel was accomplished with 100 and 300 lb. laboratory heats made at Inland Steel’s research laboratory (now ArcilorMittal Steel USA) and U.S. Steel Company’s research laboratory. For commercial evaluation, much larger heats are needed, far beyond the capacity of steel company research laboratories. Thus it was necessary to work with steel manufacturers to produce these heats, and to secure necessary funding. A 70-ton test heat was made by Oregon Steel Mills. Development support—both money and contributed work effort—came from several sources, again in a stepwise fashion. These sources included:  The Federal Highway Administration 12 “Heat” is a metallurgical term for a batch of molten steel, varying in weight from 15-100 tons.  Northwestern University Infrastructure Technology Institute  Inland Steel  U.S. Steel  Illinois Department of Transportation  Prof. Morris Fine, who used his own funds to buy some NUCu cast steel slabs from Oregon Steel Mills for additional evaluation Chris Hahin of IDOT encouraged the use of NUCu steel for the seismic retrofit of the Poplar Street Bridge that carries I-55, I-64 and US route 40 across the Mississippi River at St. Louis. The retrofit involved adding redundant steel members, but there was resistance to relying on a product untested in the field, so NUCu made up only 20 percent of the new steel for this bridge. Production heats that went into bridge components were on the order of 70-100 tons. It was necessary to work with steel manufacturers to produce these heats, and to secure transportation project funds for them. The results on the Poplar Street Bridge, using steel made by Oregon Steel, particularly the ease of welding and high toughness, were satisfactory, paving the way for expanded use. The feasibility and performance evidence were coming into place from numerous laboratory tests that were consistent and corroborating. The Poplar Street Bridge application, although not a complete bridge structure, provided field confirmation of the laboratory results. A full bridge application was the next logical step in the application process. Full Field Implementation A number of entities had to agree to make a full-scale bridge application of NUCu possible. Principally, a complete bridge application depended on the owner of the facility, in this case IDOT, requesting the use of the new steel. Here the knowledge-based advocacy of Christopher Hahin was a critical factor. Before the construction of the Lake Villa Bridge, Mr. Hahin submitted a ballot to the American Society for Testing & Materials (ASTM) to

NCHRP 20-78: Final Report Page 46 have NUCu classified as a standard structural steel, and it was subsequently classified as ASTM A 710 Grade B. Engineers in the district office where the target bridge was located also had a role in the decision, as did engineers in the IDOT Bureau of Bridges The consulting headquarters office. All were supportive because the properties of NUCu (now A 710 Grade B) had by then been established to be superior to commonly used steels through laboratory tests and the Poplar Street bridge application. design engineers were not an obstacle because the strength characteristics of the new steel were within the range of other high strength steels. While fabricators13 Similarly, if a material presents construction challenges, are generally able to build whatever the buyer wants, the degree of difficulty of fabrication will affect bid prices. Furthermore, the bridge building market is small, and the community of steel bridge builders is smaller still. Thus, there tends to be a close working relationship among bridge professionals. If a fabricator has problems with a material or design, the customer (IDOT) and the designers will know about it and work to avoid resistance. According to IDOT, there are few enough fabricators in the market to make it wise to accommodate their needs in both design and material specification for bridges. Because A 710 Grade B (NUCu) steel is readily welded without preheating the weld zone, the fabricator found it to be quite attractive. contractors 13 In steel construction, fabrication of the major components (beams, girders, and secondary members) that will go into the structure itself means cutting, fitting, welding and pre-assembly, normally conducted off-site. may resist using it, and/or the costs are likely to increase. A 710 Grade B (NUCu) presented several construction advantages over traditional steels. Its weathering characteristics eliminated the need to paint the bridge and made transport and assembly easier by eliminating the need to protect—and touch up—pre-painted surfaces. This led to a savings not only in construction costs—almost equal to the cost of the steel itself—but also in long term maintenance costs. This made the product particularly appealing to the IDOT Bureau of Bridges and the district office. The Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) also played a role in this implementation. FHWA had funded some of the Fine-Vaynman steel research in the past, so the research relationship was not new. In the A 710 Grade B (NUCu) development stage, FHWA provided funds to make some of the steel for testing. It also provided partial funding for the IL-83 bridge under the Innovative Bridge Research and Construction Program (IBRC).14 Resistance to Certification and Implementation Implementation of new technology may meet resistance from those who benefit from current technology: competitors may wish to protect market shares, and other entities may prefer not to change the way they do business. While it does not appear that there were entities that simply wanted to avoid change, the effect of competing suppliers arose in the bridge steel certification process for A 710 Grade B steel. The primary organization establishing voluntary standards for materials is ASTM International, formerly the American Society for Testing and Materials.15 14 Standards are set by volunteer committees of experts, which naturally include suppliers, researchers, and users of the materials. In this case it appears that representatives of steel companies that are offering competing products played a role in slowing certification of A 710 Grade B steel under the A709 standard, which specifically designates certain steels as “structural steel for http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/bridge/ibrc/, accessed September 16, 2007. 15 http://www.astm.org/cgi- bin/SoftCart.exe/index.shtml?L+mystore+rrgt8912+ 1190008610, accessed September 1, 2007.

NCHRP 20-78: Final Report Page 47 bridges.”16 Other steels can be used in bridges, but A709 is the standard ASTM classification, and designers prefer to specify steel from this classification. Currently, NUCu steel is classified as A710 Grade B structural steel,17 Communications Channels to Support Implementation which makes it eligible for use in bridges. It is likely that this resistance will not prevent certification of A 710 Grade B as a bridge steel, but it will only delay this label. Efforts to gain A709 certification continue on several fronts, led by the IDOT metallurgical engineer and the Northwestern researchers. Several communications channels were used to show the key parties in the implementation of A 710 Grade B (NUCu) its characteristics and values. Among these were the following:  Personal communications within professional relationships based on shared activities and interests, including service on professional committees. The community engaged in steel research, certification, and design is small, and the researchers, suppliers, and potential users of A 710 Grade B (NUCu) were in frequent contact, communication, and collaboration. Not all of these contacts were positive—as stated, there is resistance to the certification and use of A 710 Grade B (NUCu) from competitors—but these professional relationships made communication easy, established the credibility of the researchers, and provided opportunities for advocacy. 16 http://www.astm.org/cgi- bin/SoftCart.exe/DATABASE.CART/REDLINE_P AGES/A709A709M.htm?E+mystore, accessed September 16, 2007. Popular stories emphasize the field implementation- that’s real to lay people, including decision makers. And it’s confirmation that others have used this material with success. 17 http://www.astm.org/cgi- bin/SoftCart.exe/DATABASE.CART/REDLINE_P AGES/A710A710M.htm?E+mystore, accessed September 16, 2007.  Presentations at technical conferences, where researchers and potential users could interact.  Press coverage, which carried the message about A 710 Grade B (NUCu) to a wider audience. These stories originated with the public relations unit at Northwestern, which prepared press releases and more comprehensive stories. These were vetted for accuracy by the researchers themselves.  Papers and reports in scholarly, professional, and trade publications that target prospective implementers. The process that led to this implementation might better be characterized as a collaboration between researchers (Profs. Fine and Vaynman) and customers (Christopher Hahin and others at IDOT). Much of the basic science effort was accomplished by the researchers using funds from a variety of sources and working independently for the bridge application described here. The final development (leading to the implementation on the Lake Villa Bridge) was the result of a collaborative effort linking researchers and customers that included fine tuning the alloy itself, testing, evaluation, certification, preliminary application (Poplar Street Bridge), and a large scale application (Lake Villa Bridge). There were several bases for this joint work, including:  Shared professional interest in advancing the state of the art by developing a superior steel product for bridges.  Recognition that A 710 Grade B (NUCu) offered superior characteristics for IDOT bridge applications, particularly savings because there is no need to paint this steel, and its weldability. Message Content Communications topics of importance in promoting the implementation of this research included:

NCHRP 20-78: Final Report Page 48  Feasibility – the fact that this new material could be produced, fabricated and installed in the field.  Proof of performance – that the new steel provided both desired and promised improvements in performance. Performance dimensions included strength, toughness over a range of ambient temperatures, weldability, and self-weathering (eliminating the need for painting). Performance was documented through testing by the developers, additional tests conducted by the owner-adopter (here IDOT), and tests conducted in independent laboratories at the request of IDOT. The experimental use of NUCu to add redundant members on the Poplar Street Bridge was a proof-of-concept test in a relatively safe setting, adding confidence about the feasibility and performance of this material. That several rounds of tests were performed suggests the importance of confirming performance and of the adopting agency’s own test results. Resistance to Change Although this implementation of research results was accomplished successfully, it does illustrate some of the obstacles to changing practices in the field, in this case the choice of materials. Adopters needed high confidence to advance the implementation, not a surprise for a structural component with obvious life-safety implications and potentially high visibility. Furthermore, competing interests may have been less than supportive in efforts to utilize A 710 Grade B (NUCu) in the field as well as to certify it as an A709 bridge steel. The active support of a champion for NUCu, its standardization as ASTM A 710 Grade B, and the persistence of the developers were key factors in navigating through the obstacles to implementation. Persons Interviewed Morris E. Fine (Professor Emeritus, Materials Science and Engineering Department, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL), personal interview, July 17, 2007. Christopher Hahin (Metallurgical Engineer, Illinois Department of Transportation, Bureau of Materials & Physical Research, Springfield, IL), telephone interview. David F. Schulz (Executive Director, Infrastructure Technology Institute, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL), personal interview, May 28, 2007. Semyon Vaynman (Research Professor, Materials Science and Engineering Department, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL), personal interview, July 17, 2007.

NCHRP 20-78: Final Report Page 49 Case Study 3: California Seismic Bridge Retrofit Program Overview and Background The story of Caltrans’ seismic retrofit research might be simply described as one minute of research-confirming events (earthquakes) that followed years of investigation, testing and deployment. The event, in turn, prompted more years of additional investigation, testing and deployment on new problem areas that were identified. The research was clearly shown to be beneficial in these events, but the research would not have been funded or supported without several key players and communication strategies. Context of Seismic Retrofit Research The important events of the seismic research program can be categorized as an earthquake, followed by a research effort or a response. The major seismic events and the significant effects that came from each are summarized in a timeline since the early 1970s to orient the reader. The technical details are not particularly important to communicating the value of the research, but the variety of different treatments and their evolution over time is a significant part of the story. 1971 San Fernando Earthquake (6.6) The first relevant quake in the series is the 1971 quake in the Los Angeles area.  Highlighted the need for retrofits to the bridge column-beam linkage; the beams had slipped off the top of the columns.  Solutions – Straps, cables and wider column tops were designed to hold the beams in place to make it more difficult for the beams to slip off.  The years following the 1971 quake saw relatively low spending on retrofits and research.  Comprehensive upgrade of the Bridge Seismic Design Specifications and Seismic Construction Details.  Adoption of site-specific seismic design philosophy; more complicated designs tailored to local conditions rather than one-design-fits-all. 1986 Whittier Earthquake (6.0) The Whittier earthquake was a relatively minor event that caused minor damage, but it did suggest a path forward and a set of steps.  After the quake, basic research was begun into practical methods of retrofitting bridge columns on the pre- 1971 bridges. The program was carried out at University of California – San Diego.  Began a statewide Highway Bridge Seismic Retrofit Program to systematically reinforce the older bridges. Program was completed in 1989 after approximately 1,260 bridges on the state highway system had been retrofitted at a cost of over $55 million. 1989 Loma Prieta Earthquake (7.0) A significant earthquake that had major consequences including the significant failure of the I-880 Cypress Street Viaduct in Oakland (44 fatalities) and one section of the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge. Eight counties were declared a disaster area after the earthquake.  The bridges that had been retrofitted with the Caltrans post-1973 design Issue to Sell: The value of diverting funding from transportation programs to support seismic bridge research.

NCHRP 20-78: Final Report Page 50 specifications and confinement details performed well. Pre-1971 column designs were found to be inadequate.  Of the more than 4,000 state, county, and city bridges in the area, only 100 were damaged in the earthquake. Only 25 sustained major damage.  Of the 800 bridges in the area that used the newer (post-1972) seismic forces and details in their design, only one suffered damage.  Following the quake, research focused on three areas: 1) Columns – Structures researchers examined the design of columns and beams. 2) Soil – Ground movement caused a great amount of damage in 1989. The problems caused were significant in themselves, but the uncertainty of how to address them also caused problems for future designs. 3) Soil-structure interaction – The partnership of structures and soil researchers was a key to connecting researcher knowledge to the problems.  Seismic retrofit funding was increased to $300 million annually after 1989. Bridge seismic research funding was increased from $0.5 million to $5 million annually with an initial $8 million from the special State Emergency Earthquake Recovery legislation.  The seismic research program evolved from fixing the symptom (the 1971  cable restraint was identified as treating the symptom) and beginning to work on the problem. Treating the symptoms, in essence, transferred the problem to the next weakest link; understanding the problem allowed a complete solution to be developed. 1994 Northridge Earthquake (6.7)  The Northridge quake tested the design retrofits developed after the 1989 quake. None of the retrofit structures suffered serious damage (60 bridges in the area of the quake reopened to traffic the following day). Several of the non- retrofit bridges collapsed.  Significant failures included the I-10 Santa Monica Freeway on the Wilshire corridor.  Success of structures in the earthquake area sold the program but also identified other needs and the need for continued investment.  Caltrans seized the moment and learned how to rebuild bridges quickly (in I-10 corridor). This required a combination of several innovative contracting and purchasing procedures, but no compromise in safety or disadvantaged business enterprise goals. The case study suggests that one main catalyst for much of the research value was earthquakes. Their occurrence sparked interest in research as well as confirming the value of the changes and improvements in design and construction practices developed from the previous earthquake and research. Figure 4-1 is an illustration (not to scale) of the relationship between the events and the effects.

NCHRP 20-78: Final Report Page 51 Figure 4-1: Relationship Between Earthquakes and Responses Note: Earthquakes represent very high levels of activity for a short time. The retrofit program tailed off before the 1986 Whittier quake, increased after the 1989 quake and declined only slightly through the 1990s. The research program increased dramatically after the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake. Communicating the Value of Seismic Retrofit Research The seismic retrofit research efforts are split into two major groups: understanding the motion of the ground during a quake and identifying structural needs to resist the earthquake forces. Each of these subject areas has a variety of constituencies, research communities and in some cases, different sponsors and audiences. The research value communication methods and goals are similar, however, and are presented together. The value of the research was communicated on at least two levels; the value of the findings in improving designs and design specifications and by encouraging additional research to solve other problems. Rapid Implementation The value of the findings themselves was demonstrated by the use of the results of experiments even before the reports were written. In several cases there was a technical memorandum written within a week of a test summarizing the test results. These were subject to revision and interpretation in later full project reports, but in many cases the results clearly indicated a better approach to design of a particular element. In these situations, the new approach was adopted and designs revised to take advantage of the new knowledge. Communicating Research Findings to Decision Makers The new products and designs were used to justify spending and to generate and maintain interest among decision makers. The findings provided support for difficult decisions that were made to re-allocate funds away from new capacity projects and toward retrofit efforts. Using the best projects (those that were readily communicated and understood) as the public face of the seismic retrofit research program allowed funding to flow to the entire research and retrofit project effort and offered the public a glimpse at the solutions being crafted and the progress that was being made. The role of research champions has long been noted, but the role of researchers as their own best advocate was noted. “Don’t be quiet when something works” was the way one interviewee put it. Failure is a good teacher as well, but too often success is not identified and celebrated. In the first few weeks after the Loma Prieta quake, the presence of well-respected researchers with national credibility not only led to their involvement in designing the Activity Level Very High ● ● ● ● Low ● Earthquake Research --- Retrofit Program 1971 1986 1989 1994

NCHRP 20-78: Final Report Page 52 research program and targeting substantial investments in research and testing, but also provided the basis for decision maker actions. This represented a tremendous amount of “immediate leveraging” of expertise that had been accumulated over many years. This ability and credibility must be developed in advance of the event if it is to be useful in selling or expanding the program; it cannot be gained in a week. Partnerships The research sponsors, other researchers and other agencies were all involved in several phases of the research. The “hands-on” relationship between Caltrans and the researchers ensured that the research projects and tests were aimed at creating results that were useful at the design and construction level, as well as allowing the researchers to experiment with a variety of ideas. Involving research peers not only allowed for more rapid review and implementation of results, but the pressure to be prepared for meetings (sometimes held quarterly) moved the research along briskly. Important issues were being investigated, but one interview subject suggested that researchers often “feel more intimidated by the thought of peer review than any level of DOT staff insistence on schedule adherence.” Combinations of funding sources and expertise were also responsible for creating value from the research. On the front end—obtaining funding—several sources were tapped to address design and construction issues. Caltrans’ Division of Engineering Services (DES) funded a broad range of seismic design studies at an annual expenditure of $5 million after the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake (up from $500,000 before the quake). The Caltrans Division of Research and Innovation was a major partner with the California Energy Commission and the Pacific Gas and Electric Company in a research program carried out at the Pacific Earthquake Engineering Research Center (PEER) at the University of California- Berkeley. This partnership included funding in the amounts of $4.5 million from Caltrans, $4.5 million from the Energy Commission and $2 million from PG&E. The program took two years to obtain Caltrans funding during which the utility funding supported the effort. This combination not only allowed the program to start sooner and solve California’s problems earlier, but also led to much better understanding and design code changes that were transferred to other places in the United States. On the research end, the goal of this program, known under the acronym PEARL (Program of Earthquake Applied Research for Lifelines), was to understand the ground motion (“the ground moves under everyone”) using the differing expertise of all the agencies. The University of California-Berkeley led the research partnership which was really a virtual research center with research institutions and experts from many locations on the West Coast. Flexibility The way that the research process was organized was also important to the creation of value. Caltrans management saw the value of the research products and, rather than using traditional oversight committees and lengthy proposal processes, some project funds were allocated in streamlined processes that put research supervisors in the role of investment advisors who used information from technical experts to decide where Caltrans would gain the best return on their funding. These decision makers were accountable for program results, but had the flexibility to approve shorter or smaller investigations that resulted in a more nimble and responsive program that took advantage of opportunities as they were discovered. Using multi-disciplinary advisory panels that examined technical results and were responsible for decisions resulted in better deployment and took advantage of the institutional memory.

NCHRP 20-78: Final Report Page 53 Allocating Funds to Seismic Retrofit and New Capacity Projects After the Loma Prieta earthquake in 1989, the Legislature enacted a statute declaring seismic retrofit to be the highest priority use for state highway funds. At the same time, they enacted a temporary 1/4-cent sales tax for seismic retrofit work that raised about $700 million. The retrofit work was done first with the special sales tax, with backup from regular state highway funding. While capacity projects were not deleted or reprogrammed in order to fund the seismic retrofit, the estimate of funds available for future projects was somewhat reduced. After the Northridge earthquake, and prior to any legislation, the California Transportation Commission agreed to set aside about $1.35 billion for seismic retrofit work on state highways. As a result, the 1996 State Transportation Improvement Program (STIP), which would have normally programmed new capacity projects for two added years, in fact deleted about $500 million in existing projects. Subsequently, the Legislature placed Proposition 192 on the ballot, a bond measure to provide $2 billion for seismic retrofit, including at least $650 million for toll bridges (later increased to $790 million). It was approved by the voters, allowing the regular state highway funds to be rededicated to capacity work. The major diversion of regular state highway funds to seismic retrofit work was for the toll bridges in the San Francisco Bay Area, particularly the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge. Over the years, the funding plans approved by the Legislature have taken $4.315 billion in State Highway Account funds for the toll bridge seismic retrofit projects. These were funds that otherwise would have funded capacity projects all over the state. Again, these funds reduced the ability to add new projects to each STIP. The seismic retrofit program was given a high priority for funding, but that funding had broad support. In one case, this led to support for new funding (the temporary sales tax). In another, it led to public support for general fund borrowing (Proposition 192). After the Loma Prieta earthquake, the funding came primarily at the expense of the regular Caltrans program. This was particularly notable because it required shifting highway funding from other regions to the Bay Area as part of a larger legislative agreement. Challenges As with any highly technical research topic, educating the audience and providing a way for them to be involved in decision-making without requiring extensive briefings is a significant challenge. A combination of the seriousness of the threat, personal commitment on the part of the researchers and administrators, and communication between the research and the decision makers was used to overcome the challenges in this case. Serious Threat The potential for fatalities during an earthquake was an undeniable force in communicating value; this same force is not present in other research projects and the use of such threats should obviously not be manufactured by other project communicators. But the success in both sustaining the program and resolving seismic issues points to the importance of selecting evaluation factors that resonate with decision makers and the public. It was clear in reviewing funding and programming decisions that Caltrans leadership understood the seriousness of the threats, but they also felt the public’s concerns. Personal Commitment Every interviewee referred to the role of the late James E. Roberts (former Bridge Engineer and Chief Deputy Director of Caltrans) as crucial to the speed of response and the sustained research effort over many years. “Jim saved thousands of lives” was not an uncommon summary of his contribution.

NCHRP 20-78: Final Report Page 54 Examples included:  Conducting meetings between researchers and Caltrans staff immediately after the Loma Prieta quake to outline short-term research efforts to structurally test a remaining portion of the Cypress (I-880) structure. This opportunity to examine the structural response of a bridge to a controlled set of forces was used as an excellent research test, and as a chance to demonstrate the reaction speed of Caltrans to the problems and to provide decision makers with a way to signal their ability to direct resources to solutions.  At Roberts’ direction, Caltrans began a valuable partnership with utility companies and regulators to study ground motion and its affect on structures. The obvious common interest in ground motion was reinforced by the ability of the private companies and utility regulators to allocate research funds to the efforts faster than Caltrans could. In this situation, the research partnership not only produced products in a shorter time period, it also used the combined expertise of the utility companies who had been investigating ground motion for several years.  When Proposition 192 was put to the voters to fund the seismic retrofit program, Roberts appeared in a television commercial (despite the fact that there was some question as to whether it was allowed) to encourage the public to support the program. Communication within the Research Community and to Decision Makers Several traditional communication mechanisms were used to encourage researchers to work together—quarterly meetings, open tests, peer reviews of papers, etc.—but there were also innovative approaches that could be used in similar circumstances. In one situation there were disagreements between model outputs. These arose from the relative paucity of data; one obvious solution was to develop more detailed information and a better understanding of the models. The experts were engaged in an iterative process involving the submittal of model results for a particular scenario. These were compiled and sent out for the group to review without labels attached to the model results. In some cases the differences were significant and related to coding errors or relatively simple “fixes”; in the anonymous environment these could be solved and re- submitted. The next project meeting focused on remaining substantive differences, how the models worked and what additional tests should be conducted to improve the models. Research decision makers included top management from Caltrans, the Governor’s Department of Finance, the Legislative Analysts Office, individual Legislators and various research funding groups. The diversity of these groups was met with an equally diverse set of communication types from briefings, invitations to product or design tests, or technical memoranda on specific topics. As diverse as these groups are, however, their similar goals should be noted. As former Caltrans Director James van Loben Sels put it, “I wanted research to help me do my job.” Legislators were looking for some consistency of opinion or corroborating evidence about the best path just as research directors were attempting to decide in which projects to invest. Figure 4-2 is a summary of the environment that these very different groups operated within and provides a perspective on the needs for what might be termed “inter-level” communication. Upper level decision makers and their staff may face a dozen issues in a day that they must gain some knowledge and act on, while researchers spend their careers in one discipline. Researchers were most effective when the strength of their research results were combined with communication mechanisms that recognized both the expertise and time constraints of their audience.

NCHRP 20-78: Final Report Page 55 Figure 4-2: Expertise Differences that Define Communication Needs High Low Legislative & Executive Decision Makers Earthquake Researchers Profession Make decisions across a range of subjects or topics Requires expertise in a specific topic Emphasis of Skill Set Required by Profession

NCHRP 20-78: Final Report Page 56 Figure 4-3 is a good example of this approach. The diagram was an initial depiction of the range of variation in the data related to ground motion forces on structures at different distances from the earthquake epicenter. The diagram is somewhat complicated, but the effect is clear; if more knowledge can reduce the significant variation in expected forces (a factor of 10 difference in the expected ground motion at a location 10 kilometers from the epicenter), designs can be just as safe and much less costly (in this case, the cost of resisting the force might be less than half of the highest values). Such communication lets the decision makers see the need for research and the pay- off from improved knowledge. It is relatively easy, then, to maintain open communication lines on the progress toward reducing the expected variation, identifying problems with tests, design, schedule or budget. Figure 4-3: Variability of Peak Ground Acceleration for a Given Distance from Earthquake Fault Source: Thomas Shantz, Senior Research Engineer, Caltrans Division of Research and Innovation LL CJR 11 Variability of Motions 6 Most Extreme Recordings Nearly 10x Range in Motions at Same Distance

NCHRP 20-78: Final Report Page 57 Outcomes The seismic retrofit research program has been cyclical but much higher since the early 1990s, with earthquake events providing both the confirmation that past changes were effective and providing impetus and direction to the next round of improvements. Caltrans researchers and designers as well as University researchers have obtained funding from a variety of sources, pursued a number of collaborative research arrangements and assisted in changing resource allocations to address substantial construction needs. The quake-research cycle has been completed at least three times representing a virtuous cycle that combines momentous events and credible, affordable, well- communicated and understood responses. There is no argument that fortuitous events (from a research support perspective) such as earthquakes form a significant part of the communication mechanism. These precise elements may not be replicable in other research efforts but it is also clear that the combination of a clear problem, credible researchers and proven research products was very compelling. These factors, on some level, are present in most successful research programs. Communication Techniques “Simple and concise” are good guidelines for almost any communication, but when attempting to influence decisions on technical issues by non-technical individuals it is vital. Illustrative examples include the Cypress structure test and other experiments (visual demonstrations); key graphics that create visual relationships between data and decisions; and examples tailored to the audiences. The media and decision makers were invited to observe tests of structural elements and designs. These effectively communicated the researchers’ expertise and the action- oriented Caltrans approach to problem solving in ways that charts and computer models could not. It also provided decision makers with a forum to discuss the issues and communicate their role and emphasis on resolving problems. Some saw these as trivial photo opportunities, but when viewed from the public’s perspective, this serious issue had the attention of very high- level officials who wanted the public to be informed. Certainly there was an element of “salesmanship” involved in these events. The involvement of both seismic researchers and communication experts and the combination of their expertise early in the process helped ensure that the public and leadership remained supportive of the research efforts that were making a difference. The key graphical element of early decisions to invest in research was an illustration of the “communication payoff.” The earliest version of this graph (Figure 4-3) made a virtue of the uncertainty in the data. The payoff to Caltrans from better understanding was obvious. The physics are important but the example used was persuasive; there was a difference between $10 million and $100 million cost in the design modifications to address the problem on the Bay Bridge design. Eliminating the “I don’t know how much extra design I need to incorporate” factor was profitable and allowed Caltrans to convince contractors and designers to implement different design elements. The Right Stuff Communication elements of the seismic retrofit research program exhibited many elements of good practice. With a nod to the test pilots at Edwards (CA) Air Force Base, these are presented as “right” elements of a communication plan designed to demonstrate the value of research.  Right issue – How relevant is it?  Right importance – How serious is it? What is the negative effect of doing nothing?  Right time – Capitalize on events. There is a cycle of interest—something is important for a while and then it is overtaken by the next event.

NCHRP 20-78: Final Report Page 58  Right research – Must be credible and at least some of the products must lead to implementation. A combination of “sizzle” or “wow factor” projects and “work” projects is appropriate. The general interest projects can help sell the program, but those typically build on many other less interesting projects.  Right message – Research must be pushed toward implementers, decision makers and the general public, otherwise it will not be used. Use “human terms” to communicate value, not just cost-effectiveness.  Right recognition of uncertainty – Some scientists want to apply caveats to every conclusion. The fair and simple conclusions from a project or a test are lost in a “fog of uncertainty” and qualifying remarks. The solution is not “spin,” it is explaining the data and what it means. “Make the points and then shut up” is the way one successful communicator/researcher expressed their view on successful presentations.  Right format – Anything more than three or four pages is too long for a summary. Details are good, but only after the reader is “sold” on the ideas.  Right scale – Use anecdotes and personalize the findings to the extent possible. The value is easier to understand if it is at a scale that is familiar. The anecdote must be connected to the research findings for credibility, but short illustrations are the way many non-technical readers connect with technical findings.  Right outcome – If sponsors and other peer researchers are involved all along, there is no need for a sales pitch at the end. The products or results get used because users have seen the data.  Right communication methods – Using a combination of targeted approaches to get the messages to the audience created support for research. Whether they were video for the general public, short slide shows with easily understood graphics for decision makers, short summaries of projects for technical and non-technical audiences or rapidly summarized test results, the methods were targeted to communicate findings, implementable solutions and the benefits of action.

NCHRP 20-78: Final Report Page 59 Bibliography 1996 State Hazard Map. http://www.dot.ca.gov/hq/esc/earthquake_engineering/seismology/seismicmap.html, accessed September 24, 2007. Background Notes on U.S.G.S. video provided by Loren Turner, Caltrans. Caltrans Division of Research And Innovation, Research Reports and Summaries. http://www.dot.ca.gov/newtech/researchreports/two-page_summaries.htm, accessed September 24, 2007. Drago, James. “Public & Media Relations.” Proceedings of The September 2000 Post Earthquake Highway Response And Recovery Seminar. Held in St. Louis, Missouri. http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/modiv/media.htm, accessed on September 24, 2007. Pacific Earthquake Engineering Research Center. http://peer.berkeley.edu/research/lifelines.html, accessed September 2007. Maurice Power, Brian Chiou, Norman Abrahamson, Yousef Bozorgnia, Tom Shantz, and Clifford Roblee, “An Overview of the Project of Next Generation of Ground Motion Attenuation Models for Shallow Crustal Earthquakes in Active Tectonic Regions.” 2007. Saad El-Azazy, Ph.D., P.E., Seismic Bridge Design Improvements Through Research Implementation, Program Goals Paper. Structures Technical Advisory Panel For Research, Caltrans. http://www.dot.ca.gov/hq/esc/earthquake_engineering/stap/, accessed September 24, 2007. Seismic Design Criteria. Caltrans Office of Earthquake Engineering. http://www.dot.ca.gov/hq/esc/earthquake_engineering/sdc/sdcpage.html Persons Interviewed , accessed September 24, 2007. Seismic Ground Motion Research Partnership, Budget Change Proposal-15. California Department Of Transportation. July 1999. Shock Waves: One Hundred Years after the 1906 Earthquake. Produced by the 1906 Centennial Alliance and The Department of the Interior, U.S. Geological Survey. General Information Product #40. 2006. David Brewer (Chief Deputy Director, California Transportation Commission), review comments on case study draft paper, received on October 2, 2007. Jim Drago (Chief, Bridge Maintenance Information, Division of Maintenance, California Department of Transportation), personal interview, August 23, 2007. Wes Lum, P.E. (Chief, National Liaison, Division of Research and Innovation, California Department of Transportation), personal interview, August 21, 2007. Mehdi Morshed (Executive Director, California High-Speed Rail Authority), personal interview, August 21, 2007. Clifford J. Roblee, Ph.D, P.E. (Executive Director, NEES Consortium, Inc.), personal interview, August 23, 2007. Thomas Shantz, P.E., G.E. (Senior Research Engineer, Caltrans Division of Research and Innovation), personal interview, August 22, 2007. Charles Sikorsky, Ph.D, P.E. (Office of Earthquake Engineering, Division of Engineering Services, California Department of Transportation), personal interview, August 21, 2007. Loren L. Turner, P.E. (Senior Transportation Engineer, Caltrans, Division of Research & Innovation, GeoResearch Group), personal interview, August 21, 2007. James van Loben Sels (Former Director, Caltrans), personal interview, August 22, 2007.

NCHRP 20-78: Final Report Page 60 Case Study 4: Virginia Fiber-Reinforced Polymer Bridge Deck Overview In 2006, the Virginia Department of Transportation (VDOT) employed an innovative material, fiber-reinforced polymer (FRP), and a new adhesive bonding technique to rehabilitate the bridge deck of the historic Hawthorne Street Bridge in Covington, Va., which was closed to traffic in 2002 due to corrosion and other infrastructure damage. Research on the usability of this new material and technique was led by the Virginia Transportation and Research Council (VTRC), VDOT’s research division, and the Virginia Cooperative Center for Bridge Engineering at Virginia Tech. The Research Council was awarded funding on behalf of VDOT through the Federal Highway Administration’s (FHWA) Innovative Bridge Research and Construction (IBRC, now the Innovative Bridge Research and Deployment) program.18 Over the past six years, thanks to the joint efforts of the Research Council and VDOT, the Commonwealth of Virginia has been awarded more than $5 million in funding through IBRC, the most of any state. That success can be attributed to identifying a relevant issue for a given project; long-term business partnerships among organizations; collaboration efforts with these partners; favorable reputations; focused planning; the ability to recognize and seize 18http://vtrc.virginiadot.org/PubDetails.aspx?PubNo =07-CR14, accessed September 14, 2007. opportunities; and clear communication of their quality research. Most notably, the success of the research program has provided a more effective transportation system for Virginia, resulting in saved lives, time and money. Context Deterioration of our nation’s existing infrastructure system has become a growing concern in the United States. A recent report by the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE), released in 2005, highlights how deficient our nationwide infrastructure system has become by estimating it would take an investment of $1.6 trillion to get everything— bridges, public schools, dams, railways, roadways—up to satisfactory standards.19 19 “Public Private Partnerships: Innovative Contracting before the Highway and Transit Subcommittee Transportation and Infrastructure Committee US House of Representatives,” American Society of Civil Engineers, April 17, 2007. Rising construction costs and the decreasing value of the gasoline tax have made it difficult for federal and state governments to expand and maintain the infrastructure needed to support our growing population. With recent catastrophes such as the 2007 steam-pipe explosion in New York City and the Interstate 35W bridge collapse in Minneapolis, it’s apparent the nation needs innovative solutions to begin rehabilitating our aging infrastructure. Issue to Sell: The value of polymer bridge technology for funding and deployment. Hawthorne Street Bridge, Covington, VA

NCHRP 20-78: Final Report Page 61 Of these aging structures, bridge deck rehabilitation is the most prevalent issue in need of attention. Almost half of the 600,000 bridges nationwide were built before 1940. As a result, nearly 180,000 of these bridges are considered “structurally deficient” or “functionally obsolete,” with the majority of those cases attributed to deteriorating and substandard bridge decks. Using traditional methods of financing and construction, the ASCE estimated it would cost $9.4 billion a year for 20 years to bring all existing bridges up to standards.20 The Virginia Transportation Research Council is a national leader in transportation research, promoting advances in materials, structures, pavements, safety, traffic engineering, and systems operations for various federal programs, including the U.S. Department of Given the deteriorating state of the infrastructure and the financial challenges, there’s a need for a lightweight deck that could be used to repair some of these bridges and bring them to a safe and efficient operating capacity. One program dedicated to this cause has been the FHWA’s IBRC program. FHWA established the IBRC program in 1998 to provide direction and funding to help state departments of transportation develop and implement innovative technologies and materials in bridge repair. The program’s ultimate goal is to encourage development of these technologies to help produce new, cost- effective and innovative material for highway bridge applications, while also working to promote safety and congestion relief. The advancement of these technologies is paramount. IBRC funds allow state DOTs monetary freedom so they can peruse these advances, in many cases, enlisting the help of universities to conduct the necessary research and testing. Bridges on all public roads are eligible for the funding, with each application processed through the state DOT, in this case, VDOT. 20http://www.bismarcktribune.com/articles/2007/09/ 21/news/state/139681.txt, accessed on September 14, 2007. Transportation, FHWA, as well as state agencies within the Commonwealth. VTRC is responsible for all research conducted by VDOT, specializing in developing innovative materials and engineering practices deployed by VDOT, including bridge rehabilitation projects. Established in 1948, VTRC is a partnership between VDOT and the University of Virginia (U.Va.), with an additional and growing partnership with Virginia Tech. Funded primarily by the state along with FHWA grants, the Research Council has an approximate annual budget of $16.9 million.21 Background Its research and recommendations were the backbone of VDOT’s proposal for IBRC funding for the Hawthorne Street Bridge rehabilitation. The Hawthorne Street Bridge was a prime candidate for the first deployment of an FRP deck for vehicular traffic in Virginia. Located in the historic district of Covington, the 106- year-old cast-iron thru-truss bridge provides convenient passage over the CSX rail line, which bisects the town. The limited number of bridges across the railway forced vehicle traffic to use underpasses that were prone to flooding, causing problems for emergency vehicles. The bridge’s proximity to a fire station makes it a critical part of the town’s emergency response mobility. The challenge was to rehabilitate the bridge to provide emergency vehicles access, increase the life expectancy of the bridge from exposure to salt and ice in the winter, while at the same time preserving its historic value (In fact, the bridge was eligible for inclusion on the National Register of Historic Places). Additionally, because of right-of-way issues with intersections on either side of the bridge, VDOT could not build a new structure that would meet current federal standards. The only option was to rehabilitate the bridge. The solution for doing so would be provided by the 21http://vtrc.virginiadot.org/DynamicPage.aspx?Pag eId=4, accessed on September 14, 2007.

NCHRP 20-78: Final Report Page 62 “Once again, this is a great example of VDOT’s teamwork and our engineering expertise that is recognized nationally, as well as our collaborative work with Virginia Tech.” Research Council through years of planning, research and testing. In 1997, engineers at Virginia Tech and VTRC, in collaboration with FRP manufacturer Strongwell Corporation, began researching and testing the usability of a fiber-reinforced polymer material for highway structures. Traditionally, FRP has been used by the marine and aerospace industries but was thought to have potential in the transportation industry as an alternative to the steel and concrete traditionally used in bridge decking. The majority of this research was conducted by Virginia Tech's Engineering Science and Mechanics/Civil & Environmental Engineering departments at their Structures and Materials Research Laboratory. Within a few years, the research team was ready to test the design’s durability and overall performance in a real world environment at the Troutville, Va., weigh station on Interstate 81. The weigh station was located just north of Blacksburg and the Virginia Tech campus along this major interstate corridor. The team installed two sections of the proposed FRP decking on the off-ramp heading toward the weigh station. Once completed, the team observed more than 1 million cycles of performance from the 13,000 trucks that entered the weigh station daily. After concluding the durability and performance testing, VTRC’s attention turned toward drafting a proposal to the FHWA for IBRC funding to help reduce the costs of further experimentation and development. The continued collaboration efforts among the Research Council, VDOT, Virginia Tech, Strongwell Corporation, and FHWA would contribute most to their ultimate success. Selection Committees The process VDOT uses to identify projects to submit to FHWA for this funding is a collaborative effort and an effective first step toward success. The process involves finding a logical balance between structure and technology, or those technologies that can best solve the relevant transportation deficiencies present throughout the Commonwealth. This process typically begins with the VDOT/FHWA’s IBRC Selection Committee and VDOT’s Research Advisory Committees identifying and ranking the technologies that have the greatest potential. The IBRC Selection Committee, made up of members from VTRC, VDOT and state representatives from the FHWA, meets several times a year to discuss various innovative technologies, materials and engineering practices that panel members are interested in submitting for IBRC funding. Each item is evaluated on a few criteria: potential, feasibility, proposed timeline, and costs. Ultimately, the selection committee’s goal is to rank these potential technologies, materials and practices, which will assist it in identifying the most favorable proposal candidates. The selection committee also enlists the assistance of the VDOT/VTRC Bridge Research Advisory Committee. Comprised of VDOT and VTRC material and structures engineers and administrators, as well as university professors, this committee meets “twice a year to identify structures related research needs and to disseminate information on research findings that are relevant to bridge design, construction, maintenance, rehabilitation and asset management.”22 22 Dr. Michael C. Brown, personal communication. One of its many agenda items is to discuss materials and technologies that should be considered by the IBRC Selection Committee in its evaluations. The valuable and diverse collaborations among organizations produce a thoughtful and actionable list of ranked technologies that is then submitted to VDOT along with a list of candidate structures associated with each. VDOT’s willingness to offer up structures based on these recommendations plays a large part in the

NCHRP 20-78: Final Report Page 63 “These federal grants reflect on the great reputation of the Virginia Transportation Research Council and the cooperative relationship among VDOT’s Structure and Bridge Division, FHWA and the Council.” success of the project and illustrates the respect VDOT has for the Research Council’s reputation and the trust it holds for VTRC’s research and engineering skills. In this case, the Hawthorne Street Bridge was selected as the perfect rehabilitation candidate for using the newly designed FRP deck. By installing the stronger and more lightweight FRP deck material, engineers would be able to preserve the historic cast-iron thru-truss bridge, but more importantly, reduce the dead-load weight, lowering the total weight of the bridge itself, while nearly tripling its live load capacity from 7 tons to 20 tons, a limit that would allow for use by emergency vehicles. Proposal As soon as a structure and technology have been identified and a plan outlined, VDOT submits its proposal for IBRC funding to FHWA. Through the proposal process, VDOT relies on three aspects: communicating the VTRC research, feedback from the state representative at FHWA, and the valued reputation of their partnerships. When presenting their research findings, VDOT and VTRC focus on making it clear and concise—not necessarily simple, but in a format where the important aspects of the research are highlighted and brought to the attention of the evaluator. Highlighted sections include lab reports and/or documents summarizing field test results, which give the proposal evaluator confidence in the research, and comfort with their subsequent recommendations. From FHWA’s point of view, these are precisely the details needed to make effective IBRC evaluations. Some examples of quality proposals included PowerPoint files outlining step-by-step explanations of the technology, the research and tests conducted, and how the technology will improve the transportation structure. This point relates back to a previous factor— selecting a relevant project. The strength of the proposal relies on the research innovation’s ability to rehabilitate the structure and effectiveness of providing legitimate advancement for the transportation industry. This process starts with the selection committees. Another advantage, VDOT submits the proposal through the FHWA state representative, a liaison of sorts, who’s able to review and offer feedback before formal submission. This relationship helps VDOT and VTRC to write stronger proposals year after year. The liaison assists by shepherding the proposal through the IBRC evaluation process. Long-term professional relationships such as this are invaluable to the success of VDOT and VTRC gaining funding, as they continue to embrace the advantages of collaborations, discussed in more variety in the next section. In the case of the Hawthorne Street Bridge project, VDOT received $346,239 in 2004 from IBRC to fund research and material for the bridge rehabilitation, $55,000 of which was used to offset FRP manufacturing costs,23 Challenges Encountered, Actions Taken with the remainder used by engineers at Virginia Tech to evaluate how the FRP decking would perform on this particular bridge. One of the challenges VDOT faced was organizing a timeline for deployment that would consider the needs of the research team as well as those of the construction team. The construction engineers were unfamiliar with the research team’s process and the time they needed to prepare the material for installation. On the other hand, the construction team had its own timeline in mind that it’s accustomed to working with. As 23http://vtrc.virginiadot.org/PubDetails.aspx?PubNo =07-CR14, assessed September 14, 2007.

NCHRP 20-78: Final Report Page 64 “VDOT’s corporate tenets recognize RESEARCH as one of its core businesses.” a result, both teams needed to be on the same page and organize a timeline that worked for both teams. Additionally, interjecting a new experimental technology into the hands of general contractors and construction engineers who are unfamiliar with the new material can present different challenges. To overcome this challenge, the research and construction teams held frequent meetings early in the process to determine roles, organize a timeline and answer questions. Opening the doors of communication was a pivotal point of emphasis to assure both parties were on the same page. In these meetings, engineers from VTRC, Virginia Tech and Strongwell Corp. were able to discuss the important details that the general contractors, project designers and construction engineers needed to be aware of. Another challenge overcome earlier in the process can be represented in two parts— convincing VDOT to commit a bridge and convincing the district engineers and general contractors to use the new FRP material—with each relying on a similar solution, trust in the research. Both VDOT and the engineers were risking their reputations on this new technology being a success. Normally, engineers don’t have the option of taking risks; therefore, the Research Council had the responsibility to clearly communicate the level of research and testing conducted on the FRP decking. Engineers need meticulous research results that outline measures taken to certify the new technology. The tests conducted at the Troutville weigh station and at Virginia Tech’s laboratories provided just that. Secondly, the fact that the Research Council is focused solely on transportation research alludes to its dedication, professionalism and commitment to its research. This independent research voice is confidently heard by the FHWA and its IBRC team. The collaboration efforts by VTRC contribute greatly to the positive reputation of the organization. Its favorable relationship with Strongwell Corp., manufacturer of this FRP deck, which was developed during the five- to six-year partnership reinforces the quality of its work. The business relationships formed between VDOT, VTRC, Strongwell Corp., and ultimately FHWA over the many years of working together helped build favorable opinions of one another. Finally, VDOT’s access to the academic expertise at the University of Virginia and Virginia Tech through their VTRC partnership is an invaluable and rudimentary advantage, which gives them access to multiple academic resources that can be used to solve the multitude of transportation issues facing the Commonwealth of Virginia. External Communications In addition to the interagency communication outlined in this case study that helped secure the IBRC grand dollars, it’s important to note the external communication conducted by VTRC public affairs staff. Its media relations efforts allowed the Research Council to increase public awareness about the research team’s accomplishments in preserving the historic Hawthorne Street Bridge and improving the city of Covington’s emergency- response capabilities. VDOT and the Research Council issued news releases and other information about the bridge rehabilitation during the process and upon its completion. Both local news media around Virginia and transportation/industry journals publicized the project. All of this outreach helped to further educate the public on the success of this initiative and it’s benefits to the community. Once completed, VDOT and the City of Covington organized a ribbon-cutting ceremony to celebrate the reopening of the bridge. The event drew much attention, including the attendance of the local General Assembly delegate, the mayor, transportation

NCHRP 20-78: Final Report Page 65 officials and members of the historic society, as well as the general public. By increasing awareness of this innovative restoration project, the Research Council brought the project’s accomplishments to attention of both the public and the government. When they see the return on a relatively small amount of money invested in innovative transportation research, federal and state legislators are more likely to continue providing the research divisions of transportation departments and others the necessary resources. Communicating the value of these innovations helps reinforce the research conducted by the Virginia Department of Transportation and the Virginia Transportation Research Council, assuring future funding opportunities. Outcomes The fundamentals of “communicating the value of research” involve the following criteria:  Identify a relevant issue or problem.  Identify favorable technologies, materials or practices that can effectively fix a transportation deficiency.  Present clear and concise research tailored to the interests of the evaluating agency.  Build business relationships with an emphasis on open communication to build credibility.  Create partnerships to bring together state agencies, academic institutions and research engineers.  Collaborate with business partners during the proposal process.  Gain momentum from successes and highlight your successes through external communication with the public and government officials. Persons Interviewed Michael C. Brown, Ph.D., P.E. (Research Scientist, Virginia Transportation Research Council, Charlottesville, VA), telephone interview, September 19, 2007. Thomas E. Cousins, Ph.D., P.E. (Professor of Structural Engineering and Materials, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg, VA), telephone interview, September 19, 2007. Ann M. Overton (Public Affairs Manager, Virginia Transportation Research Council, Charlottesville, VA), telephone interview, August 31, 2007. Julius Volgyi, P.E. (Assistant State Structure and Bridge Engineer, Virginia Department of Transportation, Richmond, VA), telephone interview, September 21, 2007.

NCHRP 20-78: Final Report Page 66 Case Study 5: Missouri Statewide Installation of Median Cable Barriers Overview and Background Research using the state’s database of crash sites and crash types led to the conclusion that cross-median crashes were a major source of fatalities and severe injuries in the state of Missouri. Because these types of crashes usually involve high speeds, head- on crashes and multiple fatalities they are highly visible to the public. There is an underlying sentiment at work as well: often people realize that the driver is a cause or at least partially at fault in many crashes, however, victims in cross-median crashes may be simply driving along the highway. That many of these crashes involve multiple victims in vehicles further highlighted the problem. History of Cable Barrier Use In the late 1990s, a Missouri Department of Transportation (MoDOT) engineer in the St. Louis area was tasked with finding solutions to the problem of increased fatal crashes along I- 44, whether by crossing the median or not, and implementing these solutions to reduce crashes along a high volume section of I-44 just outside the metro St. Louis area. The first stage in the process was a comprehensive look at the issue and the root causes. The project had a limited budget to use for the purpose so only low cost spot improvements were feasible. The solutions implemented included: shoulder rumble strips, guardrail improvements, and six miles of median guard cable in spot locations with a high frequency of cross-median fatal and non-fatal crashes such as at ramp merges and tight curves. Another late 1990’s cable project was along I-435 in the metro Kansas City area. This roadway was also experiencing a high incidence of cross-median crashes. In the early 2000’s, MoDOT’s Central Office staff determined that there were similar cross-median crash concerns on the rural sections of I-70 from Kansas City to St. Louis and on I-44 from St. Louis to Oklahoma. Both highways had 40-foot grass medians, which were approved when the highways were built in the 1950’s, but are not sufficient for the traffic volumes or vehicle types now using the highways. Based on the successful limited experience with median cable barriers on I-44 and I-435, MoDOT determined median cables were the best solution to the statewide issues on I-70 and I-44. In 2003, cable installation began on I-70 from St. Louis to Kansas City and in 2005 work began on I-44. By 2006, the installation of 429 miles of median cable barrier was fully completed. Median cable barrier posts are designed to break away when struck thus engaging a vehicle with the cables and effectively catching and decelerating vehicles. Cable barriers are more successful at keeping vehicles in the median than rigid systems, such as guardrails and concrete barriers, where vehicles are sometimes redirected into driving lanes after striking the barriers. Depending on the median slope and the amount of preparation work needed, the state estimates installation of median cable barrier costs at $60,000 to $100,000 per mile and maintenance costs at $6,000 to $10,000 per mile, per year. Issue to Sell: The value of statewide installation of median cable barriers. Cable median barrier in Missouri. Photo: M issouri D O T

NCHRP 20-78: Final Report Page 67 Missouri has over 32,000 miles of road maintained at the state DOT level. Approximately 5,000 miles are major roads, which account for 80percent of miles traveled and 45 percent of fatalities. Although MoDOT is divided into ten districts, cross-median fatalities needed to be addressed at a system wide level to best use available safety funds. This focus on a statewide solution to a specific crash type is something new and noteworthy. The solution needed to be statewide because data demonstrated that after the high-traffic, high-incidence areas had been addressed, other cross-median crashes were occurring at random locations and it is difficult to predict where the location might be. This program is somewhat unique because the focus is on a crash type rather than just crash locations. After the high- incident locations have been addressed, the way to eliminate this crash type is to proceed as MoDOT has done and implement the prevention mechanism, median cable barriers, across the state thus preventing crashes in low as well as high incidence areas. The philosophy expressed by one team member is “have a need, meet the need and don’t cut corners. Building good projects everywhere instead of perfect projects somewhere, leads to system wide thinking not just chasing after accidents.” In the early 2000’s several factors came together to implement the statewide cable barrier program at MoDOT: a new director turned MoDOT’s focus on system-wide improvements on the highest traveled roadways and not just spot improvements scattered around the entire MoDOT system; mandatory FHWA safety funding resulting from the lack of an Open Container law in Missouri forced money to be spent on safety projects; and the incorporation of the formerly separate Missouri Division of Highway Safety into MoDOT brought a new focus on safety. With the MoDOT focus changed from all crashes to a new focus on crashes with fatalities and severe injuries, cable barriers seemed to sell themselves because the data was so compelling and it became obvious that median cables were effective and relatively inexpensive. Recent crash data has shown that MoDOT has virtually eliminated a specific type of crash (cross- median crashes) at a relatively low cost. Challenges Encountered In the 1990’s projects, MoDOT was inexperienced with installing cable barrier. They adapted information from New York state, South Dakota and others for low-tension cable installation guidelines. Slope installation issues were a major part of the early challenges. Low-tension cable barrier is generally known to be most effective when installed on relatively flat, open medians. However MoDOT had to install it in locations with steeper median slopes due to hilly terrain. While this installation was less than ideal, a MoDOT follow-up study concluded that even on steeper slopes than recommended the cable barrier is still effective with a 95 percent capture rate. Over time, these slope issues have been overcome through both research and vendor innovations in high-tension cable systems. Maintenance issues were greater than expected because there were many more cable hits than anticipated. In some installation areas the cables were being hit and needed repair before installation was even finished. Also in some locations in Missouri, private fiber optic cable is located in the median, which means that the fiber optic owner must identify potential conflict locations prior to replacing cable posts leading to a delay in repair of the cable. “Have a need, meet the need and don’t cut corners. Building good projects everywhere instead of perfect projects somewhere, leads to system wide thinking not just chasing after accidents.”

NCHRP 20-78: Final Report Page 68 With the significant number of cable repairs routinely required, MoDOT’s maintenance personnel had to be convinced that more barrier cable was a good idea even though it would add to the already heavy maintenance workload and strained budget. Open communication with MoDOT’s maintenance leadership acknowledged the issues of increased costs to maintain the cable barriers, but also that doing so was worth the effort through reduced fatalities. They sought solutions as a team. A cost analysis of newer proprietary high-tension cable products showed that it will likely pays for itself (higher cost for installation but lower maintenance costs). Another challenge is that police, fire and EMS vehicles were formerly able to cross open medians at essentially any location in response to dispatch calls. MoDOT focused on communicating with these groups at the outset of the statewide installation project to 1) understand their issues and concerns with reduced access, and 2) convey the benefits to them of fewer highway fatalities with continuous cable runs. As a result MoDOT now designs more emergency crossovers between interchanges for police, fire and EMS vehicles to access the opposite direction and they have ongoing conversations. Changes made to strategy included changing the type of cable used on future projects from a generic low-tension system to proprietary high- tension systems. The decision was data-based and data-driven by the number of hits, maintenance costs, financial data and cost analysis for life cycle of the systems. Vehicles entering a median are now captured by the cable barriers where previously some would have stopped in the median or (on rare occasions) some would make it across both the median and the opposing lanes of traffic without a crash. (Cable barriers clearly reduce the number of fatalities on Missouri interstates but may increase the amount of property damage to vehicles that are captured by cable barriers. MoDOT is of the opinion that the trade off of fatal crash reduction for increased property damage is well worth it. Communication Strategies Multiple communication strategies were and needed to be used. For a project of this size (the statewide installation), a number of people have been involved over the years and in a variety of roles at the state DOT. MoDOT has produced various reports on cable barriers for differing audiences. An early 2000’s internal report showed the original I-44 “spot location” installation virtually eliminated cross-median fatalities where the cable was installed. Another report evaluated the effectiveness of low-tension cable installation on slopes. AASHTO did not recommend low- tension cable installation on slopes steeper than 6 to 1, however, some areas of the original I-44 installation had been on steeper slopes and the report showed the cable is performing well. Eventually the issue became a moot point as manufacturers developed high-tension cable products approved for installation on steeper slopes. The most recent report was a comprehensive analysis of and a direction for MoDOT’s Cable Median Barrier Program and focused on what works and what doesn’t and answers the question “Where else should we install guard cable, and at what point will the program be completed?” MoDOT engineers will continue to evaluate divided highways, both interstate Cable median barrier prevented a truck from crossing a median. Photo: M issouri D O T

NCHRP 20-78: Final Report Page 69 and non-interstate, to determine the benefit of adding cable barriers in additional locations. Communication must occur in a variety of ways. People involved in this project mentioned focusing on their personal communication skills and strategies. One pursued a strategy of personal communication (simply talking with others higher up in the organization) at department meetings and emails to decision makers over the course of years to continue emphasizing his belief in the effectiveness of median cable barriers. If you think something is going well, get the attention of decision makers on it. This person also mentioned that continually repeating the message kept it in mind. Use early data and resources in the local MoDOT office as well as the Central office to promote the findings of the early research. Installing cable barrier in some small locations early on provided ‘test’ sites that were frequently referred to for the success they experienced. One person suggested being pushy almost to the point of being obnoxious. Continually being an advocate for cable barriers over the years. Another said, “Don’t be afraid to challenge conventional wisdom. If you have used good logic, stand up for it” and defend your findings. A personal interest in this topic and belief in the product provides motivation for those involved. One person mentioned driving across the state of Missouri many times and thinking ‘it’s ridiculous that there isn’t more cable’ in the rural areas. When the cities (St. Louis and Kansas City) are able to install cable, people in rural areas are more likely to ask why they don’t have it. Thus, this project benefited from the products’ visibility to the public. As one person involved put it, “I don’t like writing reports and I’m not good at it. So, I find someone who is.” Participants used their personal strengths and skill areas to move the project forward. Another key player in the statewide installation has given numerous presentations at ITE conferences, engineering conferences, safety meetings and to other state DOTs around the country on MoDOT’s resounding success with installation of cable median barriers. Focus on crash types and not on specific locations. Fatal crash locations are random, but crash types are not, so the statewide installations were key to eliminating this type of crash. Presentations need to focus on this aspect of the project. Strategies for communicating and ‘selling’ the benefits of guard cable to MoDOT upper management included:  Continued support of cable barriers is tied to the research, especially research about how to install it, where and why. The decisions made by MoDOT senior management and leadership are data driven.  Senior management may have only five minutes to spend on a topic, so the message must be tailored to the audience.  Be clear and basic in words and graphics.  Say about half of what you want to say. Most engineers want to carefully describe a project in detail, but when you have a limited amount of time, be sure to carefully limit your comments and presentation to allow plenty of time for senior management to ask questions. This ensures that all the topics that are of interest to them are covered. A 30/70 rule is appropriate: 30 percent for the Fatal crash locations are random, but crash types are not, so the statewide installations were key to eliminating this type of crash.

NCHRP 20-78: Final Report Page 70 presentation, and 70 percent for questions and discussion.  Keep in mind that senior management’s backgrounds will lead to differences in areas of interest and concerns.  Senior managers are interested in ‘big pictures,’ concepts and funding issues. They may listen to many researchers from the DOT or universities. These engineers are highly interested in their particular topics and think that others are too. They are eager to share all they know.  The concept that ‘less is more’ is key to remember. If using PowerPoint, know how long it takes you to get through each slide. Having less than one slide per minute is a good rule of thumb.  Always allow plenty of time for questions because the questions are the topics or items that are really of interest to your audience.  When dealing with non-engineers, be sure to use language that everyone can understand. It may help to visualize that you are talking to your grandmother or mother. The following suggestions were given for making effective presentations:  Engineers may have a tendency to think people know more than they actually do; avoiding this assumption will allow the researcher to better connect with the audience.  Good speakers are exciting and thought provoking as opposed to nervous, cautious readers of their presentation. A good presenter feels comfortable on stage and with the audience and makes a connection to the audience. Also, it is important to be the expert in your area so that you feel comfortable talking about the subject.  Researchers who do become good presenters have a tremendous advantage in promoting the value of their research, being invited to speak at conferences, disseminating their work and bringing positive publicity.  Ask for feedback on your presentations. In the community of researchers, no one will tell you if you gave a poor presentation unless you ask. The Role of the Media Press coverage on this project has been very positive. MoDOT has not called Town Hall type meetings about the cable barrier installation because the press and the public are supportive of it – they see the number of cable hits when they drive down the road, so the story tells itself. The message here is so strong and easy to communicate that the implementation is fairly easy to justify. For press releases, relay the crash data in terms that everyone can understand and relate. Analysis of Post-Communication Situation The analysis is continual because of the data available. MoDOT generally knows within hours if a cross-median crash occurs. It is rare, but possible for vehicles to get past the cable barrier. Also the barriers were not designed to stop semi-trucks although in practice they have been found to do so. Additionally, communication about the cable barriers has been found to build on itself. The more the topic is communicated the more questions arise from within and from outside of the state. Missouri benefited from North Carolina’s work with cable barriers and now shares its research with other states. A lesson learned about communicating research is to do it liberally. While people in Missouri have been giving presentations on cable barriers for over two years, they are still encountering many people who have never seen the presentation. Writing papers for TRB, giving presentations, attending web conferences and webinars increases attention and awareness of the research. As states like Missouri share their research and implementation data it benefits the entire transportation research community.

NCHRP 20-78: Final Report Page 71 Bibliography Chandler, Brian, “Eliminating Cross-Median Fatalities: Statewide Installation of Median Cable Barrier in Missouri.” Research Pays Off, TR News 248 January – February 2007, p29 – 31. Murphy, Kevin, “Missouri Strings Cable Barriers Along I-70 Median,” The Kansas City Star, August 26, 2005. Persons Interviewed Brian Chandler (Traffic Safety engineer, Missouri Department of Transportation, Jefferson City), telephone interview, September 13, 2007 with email follow-up. Tom Evans (District Traffic Engineer, Missouri Department of Transportation, Kansas City), telephone interview, September 13, 2007. Randall Glaser (Project Manager, Missouri Department of Transportation, St. Louis), telephone interview, September 14, 2007 with email follow-up. Joseph Jones (Engineering Policy Administrator, Missouri Department of Transportation, Jefferson City), telephone interview, September 21, 2007.

NCHRP 20-78: Final Report Page 72 Case Study 6: Oregon Mileage Fee Concept and Road User Fee Pilot Program Overview and Background In 2001, the Oregon legislature began its legislative session with an educational hearing on future fuel-efficient vehicles (i.e., hybrids, national gas, biofuel, etc.) The chairman of the house committee on transportation, Bruce Starr, left that session concerned that the fuel tax might become a declining revenue source for Oregon’s road system. He led an effort in the 2001 Legislative Assembly to address the long-term viability of Oregon’s road finance through the passage of House Bill 3946, which mandated the formation of a 12 member Road User Fee Task Force (“Task Force”). The Task Force was charged with designing a revenue collection strategy that could effectively replace the fuel tax as a long-term, stable source of funding for maintenance and improvement of Oregon’s road system. Appointments to the Task Force were made according to the requirements of statute. Task force membership consists of four legislators, two Oregon Transportation Commissioners, a city mayor, a county judge, a transportation research academic, a private businessperson, a representative of the Highway Users Conference, and a public policy analyst. The Task Force will sunset in 2010. Context The legislation also required that the Oregon Department of Transportation (ODOT) staff the Task Force and develop, design, implement, and evaluate pilot programs to test the fuel tax alternatives identified by the Task Force. ODOT had no one in-house who could do this. James Whitty was hired in 2001 to run the Task Force. His title currently is: manager, Office of Innovative Partnerships and Alternative Funding. His background was as a lawyer, followed by years in public policy lobbying. From 2001 to 2004, he was the only staff, with outsourced technical assistance as needed. Staff was added in 2004. As administrator for the Task Force, Mr. Whitty’s direct report was to the ODOT chief executive; at the same time, he and his staff were ultimately “beholden” to the Task Force, not to ODOT. This enabled him to work somewhat outside the system or at least not be constrained in communications activities by ODOT channels and concerns. The Task Force started out with $320k in federal funds and $90k in state funding; about 80 percent of this was Federal Highway Administration, (FHWA) funding and 20 percent was state. They had asked for more but only got $320k. The Task Force received a subsequent federal grant for $900k, basically making up what they did not get for the start up. The total $1.22 million in federal funds, and state match, was not enough to commence and complete the pilot test. After the conceptual phase (summer 2003), they received an additional $944k grant from FHWA in 2004 to implement the pilot test. With total federal funding of $2.164 million, along with $771,000 in state funds, the conceptual development, pilot development and operation of a pilot test were feasible. Issue to Sell: The value of implementing a mileage fee program as a gas tax replacement. “Oregon will be well served in finding a solution to this concern before it becomes an emergency.” Senator Bruce Starr Road User Fee Task Force Chair

NCHRP 20-78: Final Report Page 73 Facts about the Case The mission of the Task Force was to develop a revenue-collection design funded through user pay methods, acceptable and visible to the public, that ensured a flow of revenue sufficient to annually maintain, preserve, and improve Oregon’s state, county, and city highway and road system. Conceptual Phase Representing the Task Force and ODOT, Mr. Whitty spent nearly two years holding meetings, reviewing research (i.e., literature review, presentations and reports), and having discussions with experts. Through these meetings, the Task Force adopted a public outreach process and received comment from a number of stakeholders. A large part of this outreach was making the case for developing a new funding source for the Oregon road system as an ultimate replacement for the gasoline tax. After 16 months of research and outreach, the Task Force concluded that the fuel tax was an excellent revenue source, but it had to be replaced. As a replacement, the Task Force recommended a user fee—specifically, a mileage fee that would be based on vehicle miles traveled. The Task Force’s vision involved data and fee collection at either fuel service stations or at an independent center. Mileage data would be gathered through an “electronic odometer” such as a global positioning system or odometer tag. The mileage data from the electronic odometer would be uploaded to data readers via radio frequency transmission and forwarded to a computer for fee billing. The rate applied would be approximately 1.22 cents per mile driven, which is roughly equivalent to the current state fuel tax on gasoline for the average passenger vehicle. The electronic odometer device would be required for new vehicles purchased in Oregon or brought into the state. HB 3946 required ODOT to begin a pilot test of the recommended strategy no later than 2003. However, the pilot test was not begun until 2006. Mr. Whitty’s office used 2003- 2005 to develop a pilot program that would meet the numerous standards and criteria set by the Task Force in a 2003 Legislative Report, including guarantee of privacy, affordability, technical practicality, system reliability and accountability, and minimum burden on private sector. Thus, a number of technological challenges had to be addressed and decisions made in order to develop a practical test of the Oregon Mileage Fee Concept. During 2003 and 2004, the Task Force and ODOT collaborated to refine the design features of the mileage fee system. This collaboration entailed an iterative process of research, analysis, policy development, and evaluation. There was input from industry and public sector experts as well as the expression of public sentiments and concerns during an ongoing public involvement effort. ODOT contracted with consultants from Oregon State University and Portland State University to examine alternative policy and technology options supportive of a user-fee system. An internal working group at ODOT also met weekly throughout 2003–2005 to identify and solve administration issues. Also ODOT needed to ensure user participants (the motoring public) were satisfied with the operational and administrative aspects of the test so that participants would want to continue to participate through the end of the program. A focus group was held. Also ODOT met with representatives of the Oregon Petroleum Association, Western States Petroleum Association, American Civil Liberties Unions, and auto manufacturers to discuss issues related to the pilot program. Pilot Test Phase In spring 2006, ODOT started a pilot test of the mileage-based fee and congestion pricing. The pilot test program consisted of a two-step process that supported potential adoption of a mileage fee for Oregon that contained a time- of-day pricing component. The first step involved small-scale testing of an electronic

NCHRP 20-78: Final Report Page 74 odometer for mileage data collection; radio frequency technology for summary mileage data transmission; and related technology to support a mileage fee. The second step involved using the same technology for large- scale testing of the behavioral elements of a time-of-day component to a mileage fee (congestion pricing) as well as the mileage fee. In 2004, after the completion of an operational test, the Oregon State University researchers recommended the technology be further developed to improve its ease of use. Accordingly, ODOT applied for and was awarded additional FHWA funding under the Value Pricing Pilot Program in order to ensure the technology would function as required when the Pilot Program participants—real drivers, real service station owners, and real service station attendants—used it. Following conclusion of the pilot test in March 2007, the next step is a refinement of technologies; no private firm has a prototype to sell for either the vehicles or the service stations. ODOT did not anticipate that further technological refinement would be necessary before working with the automobile industry and fuel distribution industry on technological specifications. It has been projected that it will take 3–5 years of additional technology refinements to get something ready for implementation. There is some interest from the private sector (PPP), but no government funding resources. ODOT estimates that it needs about $12–15 million as sign of endorsement from government that is viable for a PPP. Currently, Mr. Whitty is focused on building support for the mileage-based program. He is traveling to different states to market the idea of conducting pilot projects to build momentum for the concept. He believes this will lead to ultimate adoption of a mileage-based user charge program. He is targeting DOTs and legislatures in key large states (Texas, Florida, California, Georgia) and assisting strong inquiries in smaller states (Minnesota, Colorado, Maine), national industry groups (e.g., American Public Works Association, American Association of State Highway Transportation Officials, and National Association of Region Councils) and other groups, such as the Transportation Research Board. This strategy is focused on raising awareness and visibility of the program (i.e., getting it nationally recognized) so that it will have a greater chance of successful implementation in Oregon. Timeline 2001: Task Force by House Bill 3946 March 2003: Task Force, administered by ODOT, recommends to the Oregon Legislature and ODOT a mileage-based fee for testing in a pilot program. May 2004: ODOT and OSU successfully test on-board equipment that counts and communicates mileage so that gas stations can collect information and deduct the gas tax while adding the mileage-based charge. Summer 2005: A pre-pilot using 20 vehicle tests the VMT collection, zone differentiation, and data reading elements of the program. Fall/Winter 2005: Recruitment of volunteers for the Pilot and equipping cars with on-board equipment begins in Portland, Oregon. March 2006-2007: The Road User Fee Pilot Program commences with approximately 300 vehicles. Summer/Fall 2007: Final report and recommendations made to the Oregon Legislature and ODOT.

NCHRP 20-78: Final Report Page 75 Challenges Encountered The Road User Fee Task Force was a small, but high profile program. Mr. Whitty decided early on that it should be managed in a very open manner, with a large amount of public outreach effort, considering the program’s size. The program has both supporters and opponents. Opponents’ concerns were focused on privacy issues, the potential for rewarding the least fuel-efficient vehicles, and the belief that distance-based fees would be in addition to the fuels tax, not a replacement. Early in the process, opponents were quite vocal. However, ODOT took the position of addressing opponents’ concerns in public outreach and education efforts, instead of backing away from them or ignoring them. With time, many opponents have become supporters. Neither the Task Force nor ODOT had a formal communications strategy. But it had a goal— to move the public to understand the problem of limited transportation funding so that they could accept a solution. Mr. Whitty did not know how to do this himself; and he had no staff. Grants did not come with money to outsource a media strategy ($50K for public outreach). He could have used media expertise. His next step is to ensure that the appropriate development steps are taken leading to drafting legislation. Public acceptance is the key to this happening. The Oregon legislature can believe that the concept makes sense—but legislation will not be forthcoming without public acceptance. The public needs to say, “we consent.” Mr. Whitty believes a significant challenge in his case, but also a challenge in general, is that the public does not understand what is going on in terms of transportation finance. “Until we get the public to understand that the system needs saving, we can only do what the public let’s us do.” Everyone is dealing with this issue—state Departments of Transportation (DOTs), metropolitan planning organizations (MPOs), and legislators. He believes that the communications need to come from the legislators—not the DOTs. We need a communications plan that legislatures can employ. Communication on this issue should not come from the DOTs because the DOTs tend not to be trusted by the public, especially in the area of advocacy. Communications Strategies The Road User Fee Pilot Project generated a large amount of national and international interest. Mileage-based fees are new and are still considered experimental and innovative. For this reason, ODOT and the Task Force deliberately chose to reach out to the public, not to generate publicity, but to ensure understanding of “Why Oregon was pursuing this?” This public education was done with an understanding that the motoring public will not respond positively to change quickly and will need time to accept the nature of the problem and become comfortable with viable solutions. The public outreach activities that were used included:  Open meetings of the Task Force.  Holding geographically diverse public hearings.  Holding a focus group.  Openness and providing assistance to the media.  Specific outreach to representatives of the retail fueling station industry.  Presentations to stakeholder groups.  Presentations to transportation professionals.  Presentations to state and local government entities.  Providing information to other jurisdictions (states, nations, and localities) when requested. The Task Force accommodated public testimony at each of its meetings. Three public hearings were held around the state. Task Force staff held two stakeholder meetings, in January and June 2002, to inform stakeholders of the process and proceedings and to gather comment on the process and Task Force recommendations. Task Force staff made several presentations to stakeholder groups and

NCHRP 20-78: Final Report Page 76 legislative panels. Presentations to the public and other groups started with a simple PowerPoint presentation about the Task Force. Audience questions were noted. Then, the PowerPoint presentation was altered based on the questions for the next time. In this way, the presentations continuously evolved to include what people needed to hear. The Task Force never had a public document. There were no resources for its production. The first printed document, a primer, was produced in July 2007 for the National Surface Transportation Policy and Revenue Commission. The Task Force and ODOT relied on the Website as the primary vehicle for an exchange of information. It was through this interactive Web site (http://www.odot.state.or.us/ruftf) that the Task Force received public comments. Mr. Whitty responded to all written and electronic correspondence submitted by the public on the development of the mileage fee concept and associated pilot program. Media reports were also used to inform the public about the work of the Task Force. The idea was to communicate regularly and often. News articles and editorials appeared in newspapers and newsletters across Oregon and the nation. Mr. Whitty gave numerous radio interviews to stations broadcasting through Oregon and the nation, and a few in the United Kingdom. He was also interviewed for a major network television evening news story broadcast nationally. Conclusions/Lessons Learned The Road User Fee Task Force is successfully communicating the value of its mileage fee concept and road user fee program. The elements of success are noted below.  Total transparency and total honesty. The Task Force staff placed all process documents and reported decisions on the Website. Nothing was hidden from the public or other stakeholders. (Note: this led to putting everything produced on the Website, except quarterly reports to FHWA and consultant contracts).  Total accessibility. Mr. Whitty agreed to interviews requested by every mainstream media reporter and spent as much time with them as they wanted. The Website was interactive and every attempt was made to respond point-by- point to each email (except those which were simply throwing an insult). He took every opportunity to make presentations about the project externally to the general public and business groups and internally to the state government/legislature.  Fearless advocacy. “If we like the work we've done, then we should be able to generate good explanatory arguments for whoever asks a question.” The Task Force staff never shied away from an opportunity to present their work to those willing to listen, learn and challenge. (Note: Task Force staff decided not to do talk shows on radio or TV because those programs are not about listening and learning.)  Perpetual openness. The Task Force staff welcomed critical feedback on their proposed approach and was willing to alter their approach when they learned something valuable. The Task Force staff continually questioned their own assumptions, stances and approaches. However, if others made wrong assumptions about their work, the Task Force staff quickly corrected them, publicly (if possible), if their assertions were made public.  Engage opponents. To obtain the goal of public acceptance, the Task Force staff needed to understand opposing arguments and attitudes. This helped to create the best supporting arguments and understand weaknesses in their approach (for which they could adjust the concept if desired). They also found this helpful for understanding why the opponents oppose—what is the basis for their vexation?

NCHRP 20-78: Final Report Page 77  Teach potential allies. There were natural allies for their approach. The Task Force staff took every opportunity to teach potential allies the fundamentals of their approach and encouraged allies to join them.  Continual reassessment. All elements of the program must undergo reassessment, from the key conceptual structures to the message delivered to the general public and media. A project is like guiding a raft down a river. One has the means to go all the way but must be attentive to rocks, eddies and white water and adjusts accordingly if the destination is to be reached. Bibliography Road User Fee Task Force. Report to the 72nd Oregon Legislative Assembly on the Possible Alternatives to the Current System of Taxing Highway Use through Motor Vehicle Fuel Taxes, March 2003. The Seattle Times. “Oregon to Test Mileage Tax as Replacement for Gas Tax.” July 5, 2004. Oregon Department of Transportation. Oregon’s Mileage Fee Concept and Road User Fee Pilot Program. Report to the 73rd Oregon Legislative Assembly on Proposed Alternatives to the Current System of Taxing Highway Use through Motor Vehicle Fuel Taxes, June 2005. Whitty, J., J. Svadlenak, and D. Capps. Public Involvement and Road User Charge Development: Oregon’s Experience. March, 2006. Research Spotlight. A Publication of the Texas Senate Research Center, April, 2006. Persons Interviewed James Whitty (Manager, Office of Innovative Partnerships and Alternative Funding, Road User Fee Task Force), telephone interview, September 2007.

NCHRP 20-78: Final Report Page 78 Case Study 7: Legislative Advocacy for Programmatic Research - The National Cooperative Freight Research Program Overview and Background The National Cooperative Freight Research Program (NCFRP) was mandated in the most recent surface transportation authorization act, Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU). The program is authorized at $3.75 million per year through 2009. It is sponsored by the US Department of Transportation's Research and Innovative Technology Administration (RITA) and managed by the National Academies through the Transportation Research Board (TRB). Program governance comes from an Oversight Committee made up of a representative cross section of freight stakeholders. The Public Interest in Freight Research To build Congressional support for a federally- sponsored freight research program, it was first necessary to establish that there was a public interest in freight issues. Historically, freight has been considered to be in the domain of private sector of carriers and shippers, among others. The public interest was further diminished when the industry was deregulated through the Staggers Act (railroads) and the Motor Carrier Act (trucking) of 1980. Deregulation not only diffused public interest in freight industry issues, but it also eliminated some data collection programs, and as a result some resources previously available for freight research were lost. Thus, freight research issues were not approached systematically and comprehensively in national programs; when decisions were made about public funding for transportation research, freight was “not in the clubhouse.” A variety of factors have changed both the role and consequences of freight transportation in the U.S., and together these have piqued the public interest in freight issues. The rapid globalization of manufacturing and distribution at once increased flows and amplified the demand for rapid, reliable and efficient goods movement. The economic implications of bottlenecks in the distribution system became more evident and more important. Shippers, carriers, and government as well began to see freight movement as an integrated, multi-modal system—the logistics sector. The choice of shipping mode, driven by performance and costs characteristics, had real economic, social, and environmental consequences of importance to the public and its decision makers. Freight moves substantially on the public road network, and most ports and all of the inland waterways system are publicly owned and operated. As roads became congested and the infrastructure was stressed by many heavy trucks, the public interest in the efficiency and safety of highway freight grew clearer. And a systematic perspective demanded inclusion of the railroads—which in some cases could offload the highway system and thus contribute to solving problems of publicly owned transportation infrastructure. While individual firms and trade associations could advocate for, and engage in, research focused on their businesses, no strong entity had a multi-modal perspective on research, and none took responsibility research at the interfaces between modes, at a time when intermodal movement of freight was becoming the norm for all but bulk commodities. There were numerous questions on the freight agenda that appeared to warrant research. Importantly, there was and is a belief that Issue to Sell: The value of a national freight research program.

NCHRP 20-78: Final Report Page 79 research results often lead to more money for projects, investments that can improve capacity, increase reliability, reduce costs, etc. Research problem statements were generated by TRB freight committees, but these did not produce financial support for research, and there was some belief that these statements were too strongly focused on highway issues. And there was a difference in interests and perspectives between public sector freight advocates and the freight industry itself. A Coalition of Freight Interests The Freight Stakeholders Coalition (FSC) was formed in the early 1990's as the freight community began to recognize the benefits of coordinating its efforts to bring national attention to freight issues and to lobby for funding for freight-related projects in the surface transportation authorization bills—the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA) and the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21, 1998). The FSC brought together trade and professional organizations, comprising a multi- modal community of business and government interests, to advocate for the freight issues.24 24 Current members of the FSC are: American Association of Port Authorities Association of American Railroads American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials Association of Metropolitan Planning Organizations American Trucking Associations Coalition for American’s Gateways and Corridors Intermodal Association of North America Inland Rivers Ports and Terminals Associations National Association of Manufacturers National Association of Regional Councils National Association of Waterfront Employers The National Industrial Transportation League National Retail Federation Retail Industry Leaders Association U.S. Chamber of Commerce Waterfront Coalition World Shipping Council http://www.freightstakeholders.org/, accessed September 2, 2007. FSC has been described as a “fractured family” of competitors and collaborators, a mixture of private and pubic interests not always in agreement, but linked by the common bond of engagement in freight transportation—carriers, shippers and public agencies. When SAFETEA-LU was being crafted, FSC was said to have been better prepared than in past reauthorization efforts, and it offered this nine- point agenda for the new bill.25  Protect the Integrity of the Highway Trust Fund  National Highway System (NHS) Freight Connectors  National Freight Advisory Committee  Freight Cooperative Research Program  Expand Freight Planning Expertise at the State and Local Level  Innovative Financing and Tax Incentives Proposals  The Borders and Corridors Program  Streamline Environmental Permitting for Freight Projects  Congestion Mitigation and Air Quality Improvement Proposal FSC played an important role advocating the inclusion of NCFRP in SAFETEA-LU by making it a part of its program and establishing a constituency of economic and political importance for freight research. The credibility of FSC came from its membership and their individual and collective influence. Those members included some fierce competitors, and their working toward common ends added to the credibility of the coalition. Grounding support for NCFRP in industry, state and local government, rather than a research organization (e.g., TRB), or a federal agency (e.g., FHWA), added weight (economic power), distance (beyond the beltway), and breadth (diversity of interests) to the political support. In addition to the position of the FSC, both AASHTO and the American Trucking 25http://www.intermodal.org/stakeholders_files/safet ea_lu.shtml, accessed September 2, 2007.

NCHRP 20-78: Final Report Page 80 Associations advocated the NCFRP as a part of their separate agendas for the reauthorization bill that became SAFETEA-LU.26 While FSC provided general support for the freight cooperative research program, formally it only advocated one specific research area, the annual collection of freight origin- destination data to support research and policy studies. To secure support for NCFRP, it was not only necessary to convince the Congress; prior to that it was essential to get the backing of the advocacy groups themselves. The diversity of members and their interests within the FSC made building consensus a challenge. While research may not have been at the top of the priority list for every member of the coalition, a general freight research program was something this multi-faceted coalition could agree on. Both highway and transit interests had their sectoral research programs in the National Cooperative Highway Research Program (NCHRP) and the Transit cooperative Research Program (TCRP), both supported with public funds. The establishment of the NCFRP was an easily-argued target for coalition support. 27 Role of AASHTO Thus, the FSC argument in favor of the research program was quite general; rather than promising specific research results, it was based on the importance of the field, its problems, and their connection to the national economy. While American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO) was a part of the FSC, it had its own long history of advocacy for transportation and transportation research. AASHTO senior staff members reported that freight issues, including NCFRP, 26 Freight Transportation Strategies Needed to Address Planning and Financing Limitations, General Accounting Administration Report to the Committee on Environment and Public Works, U.S. Senate, December, 2003, GAO-04-165, pp. 72-73. 27http://www.intermodal.org/stakeholders_files/doc uments/Cooperative percent20Research percent20Program.pdf, accessed September 2, 2007. were on the AASHTO priority agenda for SAFETEA-LU, and that AASHTO provided some of the language for the bill. And, the AASHTO spokespersons had solid domain knowledge which strengthened their advocacy efforts. The AASHTO argument for support of freight research was fundamental, focused on importance of the freight sector and its problems, rather than on freight research products: “....11 percent of gross domestic product, 100 percent of the economy depends on freight movement...” The legislative process that created SAFETEA- LU was extraordinarily long—the bill was approximately two years late in passage. Much of the content of SAFETEA-LU was finally settled in the conference committee that worked feverishly at the end of the process. Which advocates were still standing at that point was important in determining what components of the bill survived. The FSC remained in support, but some say this group was less unified because of issues of modal competition and concerns about diversion of highway trust funds to other modes and uses. Perhaps more importantly, in contrast to AASHTO, FSC did not have the staff infrastructure to keep representatives working in Washington during all of the SAFETEA-LU deliberations. AASHTO stayed with the legislative process throughout the conference committee negotiations. Since the conference committee works behind closed doors, the key advocacy work had to be done in advance of, and outside of, the committee deliberations. The organization and its staff have an established relationship with the Congress and its relevant committees. Senior AASHTO representatives talked regularly to members of the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee staff. AASHTO’s credibility comes from the entities it represents, its long-term engagement in transportation advocacy, and its service as a reliable source of information, both offered (pushed) and in response to queries (pulled).

NCHRP 20-78: Final Report Page 81 As one AASHTO staffer put it: “...you can’t start this (advocacy) in the 11th hour - that gets peoples’ [negative] attention... the relationship [with the Congress] is based on exchange. We’ve done stuff for them, given them information, answered questions...” The final version of SAFETEA-LU contained this non-restrictive research agenda for NCFRP:28  Techniques for estimating and quantifying public benefits derived from freight transportation projects. The national research agenda required... shall include research in the following areas:  Alternative approaches to calculating the contribution of truck and rail traffic to congestion on specific highway segments.  The feasibility of consolidating origins and destinations for freight movement.  Methods for incorporating estimates of international trade into landside transportation planning.  The use of technology applications to increase capacity of highway lanes dedicated to truck-only traffic.  Development of physical and policy alternatives for separating car and truck traffic.  Ways to synchronize infrastructure improvements with freight transportation demand.  The effect of changing patterns of freight movement on transportation planning decisions relating to rest areas.  Other research areas to identify and address emerging and future research needs related to freight transportation by all modes. 28 Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy For Users, 109th Congress Public Law 109-59 SEC. 5209. http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi- bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_cong_public_laws&do cid=f:publ059.109, accessed September 2, 2007. This agenda was said to have been added by AASHTO to provide some specificity in the bill. The list is a broad compendium of topics that were both representative of freight issues and non-controversial; there is no evidence that this was a consensus agenda emanating from the FSC. The program components focus on relationships, methods, and policies rather than infrastructure and hardware research, areas which presumably were already well supported through on-going government and industry efforts. Proof of the effectiveness of the NCFRP advocacy effort is illustrated by the failures of other freight program components, which showed that Congress was not buying everything on the freight agenda. For example, the FSC-advocated investment program in intermodal connectors was not funded, nor was its proposed National Freight Advisory Committee established. The Chicago Region Environmental and Transportation Efficiency program (CREATE), intended to increase the efficiency of this primary railroad hub, was supported at only $100 million in contrast to the $600 million requested. In NCFRP Congress bought a modest, neutral program, one less risky than an investment in one of several competing modes, but perhaps a program less appealing than earmarks that sent resources back to their districts. This underscores the challenge of public investments in freight programs: competing interests make it difficult to find common ground in the freight arena. NCFRP seems to have offered that common ground. Feasible Implementation Plan NCFRP was supported with an understanding that it would be operated in a similar manner to the already-successful NCHRP and TCRP, which were models of efficiency, sustainability, and responsiveness to their constituencies. This provided a well-defined and proven implementation strategy. The responsiveness of the research agenda to the interests and needs of this constituency was

NCHRP 20-78: Final Report Page 82 ensured by the requirement for a program Oversight Committee representing both private and public sector interest.29 A Champion for Freight Research Its relatively modest investment level—about 0.04 percent of the SAFETEA-LU package—meant that NCFRP was not a major threat to other favored projects. AASHTO, alone and in conjunction with the Freight Stakeholders Coalition, appears to have been the ultimate champion for the NCFRP. While the FSC was a more broadly-based group, it was less unified on SAFETEA-LU, and AASHTO had a much longer history, a strong and deep staff commitment to the program, and the resources to continue advocacy of its legislative program up to the point of passage of the bill. This case illustrates the importance of a strong and consistent champion for the research program. The Freight Stakeholders Coalition was an important, high credibility advocate for the NCFRP; AASHTO, as the lead advocate with a long record of high impact success, made a strong commitment to NCFRP. Among the keys to securing support for NCFRP were these:  Credible advocacy group representing the key stakeholders – multi-faceted, an industry statement rather than the view of a single firm.  Arguments focused on issues of broad, current, national interest – not parochial in terms of businesses or locations.  Consistent advocacy – not a last minute thing – but based on a long-term relationship between the Congress and the advocacy groups.  Credibility earned through exchange of information – collaborative advocacy groups responding freely to information requests and offering high quality advice. 29http://www.trb.org/shrp2/SHRPII_OversightCom mittee.asp, accessed September 9, 2007.  Feasible program with proven implementation path – at a scale consistent with the need, and an operating plan that ensured success.

NCHRP 20-78: Final Report Page 83 Persons Interviewed Christina Casgar (at the time Federal Highway Administration, currently, Goods Movement policy Manager, San Diego Council of Governments), telephone interview, July 6, 2007 and follow-up in August 2007. Leo Penne (Program Director, Intermodal and Industry Activities, American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials), personal interview, July 18, 2007. Jean Godwin (Freight Stakeholders Coalition and Executive Vice President/General Counsel, American Association of Port Authorities), email exchange, September 6, 2007. Robert Reilly (Former Director, National Cooperative Highway Research Program, Transportation Research Board - retired), telephone interview, April 28, 2007.