U.S. Marine Salvage Assets and Capabilities in a Maritime Disaster (2009)

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14 SECTION 2 Working Group Questions and Summaries of Key Points After the plenary sessions, workshop participants were divided into six preassigned working discussion groups. Each group, led by a member of the workshop planning committee, focused on one of six areas (lists of questions that were addressed by the specific breakout groups appear later): Group 1. Environmental and response safety issues; Group 2. Legal, insurance, and cabotage issues; Group 3. Security, incident scene, and forensics issues; Group 4. Logistics, utilities, and hidden infrastruc- tures issues; Group 5. Communications, economics, and political factors; and Group 6. Debris staging, dredging, and disposal issues. Each group was asked to consider four general questions: • What is each participant’s overall reaction to the hypothetical response and recovery scenario as presented? Does it appear feasible and practical? Are the needed assets available? Can they be mobilized as planned by the responsible organizations? Is the schedule realistic? Is the management structure in place and will it work? • What is each participant’s overall reaction to the detailed presentations with regard to channel clearance, debris removal, and channel assessment tasks? Do the steps as outlined appear feasible and practical? Are the needed assets available and can they be mobilized as planned by the responsible organizations? Is the sched- ule realistic? Is the management structure in place and will it work? • What key steps or major topics appear to be miss- ing from the hypothetical scenario? • What are the major impediments that might pre- vent conducting a successful response as presented? ENVIRONMENTAL AND RESPONSE SAFETY Group- Specific Questions Environmental • What environmental agencies should be involved? in what roles? with what authority? • Are there any special environmental concerns in the areas of the salvage operations? What are they? How might they be addressed? Are endangered species a concern? • What permits, if any, may be required to conduct the salvage operations? How long might this process take? How might it be expedited because of the nature of the problem? • What oil spill cleanup assets are available? Where are they? How and how soon can they be marshaled? • What other environmental aspects should be considered? Response Safety • Besides USCG, what agencies have a role in safety considerations? • Who ensures that the salvors are conducting safe and effective operations?

• Is there a safety czar? If so, who is it, and by what authority? Other • Are there any specific OSHA concerns that should be considered? • Are there special issues or problems that may arise if the water is contaminated in the area of the salvage operations? Responses Hypothetical Response and Recovery Scenario • The scenario was thought to be reasonable and possible: – The scenario could be worse; other ancillary tar- gets may be attacked. – Closure of the Panama Canal could exacerbate response and recovery. – A second event is possible after first responders arrive. – The blast radius could cripple USCG command and control personnel. • Assets for response exist: – Priority consideration should be given to U.S.- owned assets; avoid Jones Act issues. – The inactive and Ready Reserve Fleet (RRF) could be considered. – It would be better if heavy lift was located in LA/LB. – Ongoing logistical support may be a challenge. – There is a need to maintain and update the asset inventory (in existing plans such as the Area Con- tingency Plan). • The crime scene investigation time line is likely to be longer than indicated in the scenario. • The scenario has global consequences; its impact is not merely local or national. • The priority of the oil spill response needs further consideration. • Overarching legislation to allow the emergency response and recovery command to cut through unfore- seen regulatory obstacles may be necessary. Channel Clearance, Debris Removal, and Channel Assessment Tasks • These issues are treated satisfactorily. • Oil spill considerations should be addressed more thoroughly; action on this affects crime scene investiga- tion and salvage assessment time lines. • The prioritizing of wreck removals should be con- sidered; clearing M/V Panther would allow some access to both ports. • Gas pockets can form under docks when fuel spills are not cleaned quickly. Key Steps or Major Topics Missing from the Scenario • The dredging possibility is not fully explored. • Oil spill action is not fully explored. • There is a potential to exploit obsolete and cur- rently unused terminals. • The national response to the attack (airport clo- sures, heightened threat levels) could slow LA/LB response and recovery. • Other innovative and undefined methods to move containers and petroleum should be considered before the incident. Major Impediments to a Successful Response • Rules and regulations that work well in “normal” situations may impede necessary action in such a major event. • Existing plans (local, state, and federal) may not be consistent, thereby introducing procedural and jurisdictional conflicts. • Ongoing drills, exercises, and training are required to maintain proficiency. Role and Authority of Environmental Agencies • Roles and authorities are not fully understood. – More than 10 state and federal agencies have interests. – There is a reliance on goodwill and cooperation. – Agencies and organizations include Oil Spill Pre- vention and Response, EPA, the South Coast Air Quality Management District, the California Air Resources Board, the California Environmental Pro- tection Agency, State Lands, the Fish and Wildlife Service, and the National Marine Fisheries Service. – The following agencies and organizations are involved in hazardous material (hazmat): the Los Angeles Fire Department at LA and at LB, the Regional Water Quality Board, the Department of the Interior, the Civil Support Team (which would 15WORKING GROUP QUESTIONS AND SUMMARIES OF KEY POINTS

operate like a strike team), and the California Coastal Commission. • Local marine firefighting plans and hazmat response plans should be reviewed. • Contractors will play a key role. • USCG has authority for most actions and permits; hot work and dive permits will be needed— this is not thought to be an impediment. Specific Environmental Concerns in Salvage Operations • The following are concerns with respect to oil spill cleanup: – The spill response will be conducted in accordance with UC priorities on the basis of contingency plans. – The potential for containment of spilled oil in the vicinity of the vessel may affect salvage opera- tions and ongoing investigations. • The following points were made concerning endan- gered species and protected resources and sites: – Participants believed that natural resources trustees would not make these issues an impedi- ment to salvage, although they are a concern. – The need for cultural resources review should be recognized. Permitting Processes • The UC will coordinate approvals through the Inci- dent Action Plan process to include emergency consulta- tions and local port expertise. • The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90) provides federal indemnification, but not at the state or local level. Other Environmental Issues • Contingency plan issues that may be of a sensitive nature (e.g., water intakes) should be considered. • As part of the salvage plan, consider viscous oil removal and oil removal to barges or dracones. Agencies with a Role in Safety (Besides USCG) • OSHA and the California Department of Occupa- tional Safety and Health would have roles. • Within the UC structure and site safety plan devel- opment, contractors have a primary role and concern with safety. • Under the Stafford Act, the federal OSHA is the lead agency for safety. • Local response agencies (e.g., fire department, law enforcement) will collaboratively develop public safety response, including perimeters and potential evacuation. Ensuring Safe and Efficient Salvage Operations • Within the UC, salvors have a primary role. • USCG approves salvor safety plans. • The UC has top- level responsibility. OSHA and Other Concerns • OSHA requires all workers to be trained in haz- ardous waste operations and emergency response. • Volunteers should be integrated into the command structure. LEGAL, INSURANCE, AND CABOTAGE Responses to General Questions The group was asked to consider the four general ques- tions listed at the beginning of this section. • There is concern about the structure of the response. One concern is the assumption that the case would immediately be federalized. What is really meant by “federalize”? Only if it were an incident of national significance would the federal government take control. • The scenario may be overly optimistic— impediments increase over time once the “grace period” has passed. More resistance to waivers and lack of compliance with environment regulations can be anticipated. • The scenarios and responses are optimistic. • The issue of responder immunity to civil liability is missing. • There is a possibility that USCG would resist federalization. • There may be pressure from special interest groups and other stakeholders, all of whom have a say. • Responder immunity to civil liability could be an impediment. Questions and Responses Concerning Financial and Insurance Issues • Who will pay? Sources of funds include responsible parties (certifi- cate of financial responsibility/P&Is); Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund; USACE; Stafford Act; possibly the Compre- 16 U.S. MARINE SALVAGE ASSETS AND CAPABILITIES IN A MARITIME DISASTER

hensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA); and the state oil spill fund. • Will there be access to pools of funds— Tanker Owners Voluntary Agreement Concerning Liability for Oil Pollution/Contract Regarding an Interim Supple- ment to Tanker Liability for Oil Pollution, International Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage in Connection with the Carriage of Hazardous and Nox- ious Substances by Sea, and federal pollution or emergency funds? This is discussed above. • What are the mechanics for getting the funds to flow? Will salvors work on a written guarantee to pay, and who will guarantee? P&I clubs will initially cooperate under the terms of their contracts with individual companies. • What will be the impact of terrorist exclusions in club and insurance policies? – TRIA may not be adequate. – The impacts of the terrorism exclusion may accelerate federalization. Foreign Flag and Crew Access • Will TWIC be required for the foreign workers? How can that be accomplished in a timely manner? No, they must be escorted, but they do require immi- gration documents that allow them to be here unless there is a waiver. However, there are sometimes prob- lems getting TWIC holders as escorts. • Will U.S. salvors be discriminated against in favor of cheap foreign labor and salvors? Is this a violation of cabotage laws? How can availability of salvors be recon- ciled with demand in light of cabotage laws? – DHS will not grant a Jones Act (46 USC 55102) waiver without adequate justification; however, a DOD request will require DHS to do so. – There is a specific statute (46 USC 80104) precluding foreign- flag vessels from conducting salvage operations in U.S. waters absent a waiver by DHS. Again, a DOD request will require that DHS waive this prohibition. P&I Clubs • What role will the P&I clubs play in contrast to established funds (federal, international)? This is covered above. • Will there be credits for payments made in good faith if it is subsequently discovered that such payments were not the liability of the club? How would this be reconciled? The Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund is available to pay claims that are compensable under OPA 90. There will not be credits for wreck removals. Salvage Issues • After successful salvage or wreck removal, who owns the hull? Who is responsible for oil that came from the hull? This is addressed in the salvage contract. • Is there any legal possibility or precedent to press equipment into service if such equipment is on higher- value commercial jobs? How would this be accom- plished? by court order? by previous agreements? How could this be enforced against equipment owners? There are laws providing for federal requisition of such vessels, and they require just compensation. • When does the status change from salvage to debris? • Among the equipment issues are ownership, com- pensation, and damages. SECURITY, INCIDENT SCENE, AND FORENSICS Group- Specific Questions Crime or Incident Scene Access and Control • It is likely that the two original casualty vessels and their surrounding waters will be regarded as “crime scenes” with a need to limit access. What are the immediate (hours or days) and long- term (weeks or months) law enforcement expectations for securing these crime scenes? How might access control to the crime scenes be implemented? • How might salvage surveys and salvage execution be facilitated (commercial salvage crews would need to work inside these crime scenes throughout)? Maritime Safety and Security Zones How would access to and movement within safety and security zones be controlled? What impacts would the safety and security zones have on salvage survey, plan- ning, and execution (wreck removal)? Forensic Considerations • If some (or all) of the original casualty vessels are considered as potential forensic evidence, careful han- dling, chain of custody, and accountability issues arise. How would law enforcement and salvage crews coordi- nate their activities to enable salvage crews to remove the 17WORKING GROUP QUESTIONS AND SUMMARIES OF KEY POINTS

wrecks and at the same time preserve the viability of potential forensic evidence? • What law enforcement expectations exist in terms of underwater evidence gathering (underwater video, sampling, etc.)? How can these activities be conducted in conjunction with salvage survey and planning efforts (to be conducted by commercial salvage crews)? • As wrecks and contents are removed from the water, what are the expectations in terms of handling and chain of custody (commercial salvage crews would be removing the wrecks and their contents)? Foreign Salvage Assets • What issues are associated with utilization of inter- national assets and crews? • What would be the process for handling these inter- national salvage crews in view of TWIC requirements? Responses General Comments The UC (including training and exercise) would help avoid or alleviate many potential conflicts (e.g., crime scene investigation versus salvage priority). The scenario is inconsistent. The size of the explosion and the damage to vessels are not consistent with catastrophic damage out to 1 mile. Broader national issues [e.g., immediate reactions of other port authorities, national threat levels, the possibility of a sequence of incidents (9/11 analogy)] will compound the difficulties, at least in the short term. Priorities, logistics, and other challenges will be affected. TWA 800 is a useful analogy. Crime or Incident Scene Access and Control Law enforcement will set boundaries for the crime scene immediately after the incident. Subsequently, once threat assessment is completed (all dangers cannot be ruled out in this case), salvage workers can work hand- in- hand with law enforcement to carry out both salvage and crime scene investigation functions. The characteristics of the location— underwater and surrounded by water, inside a controlled port— make it relatively easy to secure the crime scene. Forensic Considerations • Law enforcement designates collectors of evidence to work alongside all first responders and salvors to pre- serve chains of custody. Everything collected is potential evidence. • Search and rescue will be the initial priorities. • People conducting operations in the field (e.g., cleaning up oil spills) should be briefed to be alert for possible evidence. • Through local media, ask the public to report find- ing any possible evidence. Maritime Safety and Security Zones Safety and security zones would be adjusted as needed. Foreign Salvage Assets • In this instance, TWIC is not an issue— it can be addressed by escorting foreign workers or workers with- out a TWIC card (work- arounds are possible). Everyone entering a crime scene will need to be credentialed. • Jones Act and cabotage issues (e.g., bringing in heavy- lift equipment from overseas) can be addressed through a DOD waiver process. LOGISTICS, UTILITIES, AND HIDDEN INFRASTRUCTURES Responses to General Questions The group was asked to consider the four general ques- tions listed at the beginning of this section. • The group participants responded that the scenario was feasible, assets were available, the management structure would work, and the schedule was realistic. • Participants indicated that the steps were feasible and practical, that the assets would be mobilized, and that the schedule was realistic. On the assumption that a National Incident Management System structure will be used, the group participants indicated that the manage- ment structure would work. • There is an assumption that the supply chain will be addressed by another party. • The issue of land intermodal transportation appears to be missing. • The major impediments are human capital (includ- ing availability, safety, environment, capability), inter- modal transportation, and labor (the fear factor). Discussion of Group- Specific Questions • Is there a plan in place that identifies 18 U.S. MARINE SALVAGE ASSETS AND CAPABILITIES IN A MARITIME DISASTER

– Command post sites? Yes. – Logistics operations sites? 1. USCG and first responders use the CG facil- ity, but they found that it is too small. They are looking for alternative sites with larger areas that are still accessible for personnel. Not every- one has access to IT. 2. Inoperability is covered. Everyone is given a communications plan. – Transportation operations sites? USCG has some, but they are not designated. Universities (MOUs) predesignated, prepriced (sign an emer- gency code). – Engineering group site? Yes. – Accommodations and transportation for work crews? Yes. If they are not responding with per- sonal vehicles, the Los Angeles County Metropoli- tan Transportation Authority (MTA) with all bus companies in the county will organize to be a responder; MTA will coordinate through the Emer- gency Operations Center (EOC). – Staging areas for trucks and railcars? Practical staging (trucks particularly). – Shipping company representatives? Yes. – Surface transportation detours? Yes (evacuation plan, traffic detour plan); strength of unified struc- ture (allow local as a coordinated decision for evac- uation, not CG); the Alliance (detailed plans of evacuations for all of Los Angeles County, all haz- ard evacuation). • Have personnel been assigned to the above sites by title? Have essential personnel been identified who would be required to be on site? – Yes. – Los Angeles County: EOC, three separate teams with backups for each team member; personnel as liaisons; if no authority, then not present. – USCG: no name or title, but have commitments to fill those roles. – Emergency management is highly personal; ports need training and exercising; must be competent. • Does the personnel list include local and state engi- neers and utility company representatives? Does the per- sonnel list include representatives of local and state government who have been assigned specific roles and given decision- making power? Yes. • Are engineering plans available for all affected areas? Where are they located? Plans are available. For LA/LB, they are in the EOC; department operations center (plans, maps, communica- tion all terminals); ICS system for civilians. • Are there any combined sewer overflow or other water issues? The answer is not known. • Is a blast radius study available? – According to Los Angeles County, the collateral damage workshop scenario is too extreme and not viable; the blast radius should be reduced. – No shoreside assets are available. – According to USCG, no blast radius study is at hand (there are too many variables to be critical). • Is an infrastructure inspection plan in place for all underwater installations? Is an infrastructure plan in place for all land installations? – USCG: Only underwater pertains to high- value assets, check for attachments or explosives, beyond that other property owners have responsibility. – Port: Assign people specifically (POG search for bombs and physical damage). FAT (engineer, real estate, environmental) consult for repairs. • Is there a plan for finance personnel in logistics? Who will supply the personnel? – Port of LA/LB: City emergency plan [various departments creating a business continuity plan; medical, evacuation, accommodations, finance, risk; tenant input incorporated for port complex (needs contact database)]. – Port of Portland: Vulnerability plan, but insur- ance risks are not developed. – Salamander, ETteam. • Is there a plan for medical assistance for work crews and center personnel? The plan is in development (LA/LB is furthering the plan). • Is there a plan for diversion of incoming vessels to other ports and corresponding plans for ground trans- portation of goods? Will personnel be able to relocate to diversion ports as needed for loading and unloading? – CCDoTT— approved. – USCG— has not (seismologists). • Should contact be made with seismologists? Contact should be made with seismologists or anyone with experience in local natural resources. COMMUNICATIONS, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICAL FACTORS Group- Specific Questions Communications • What communications problems might be antici- pated among the various agencies and other organiza- tions? How might they be alleviated? • How should communications systems be set up and managed (frequencies, protocols, equipment com- patibility, etc.)? 19WORKING GROUP QUESTIONS AND SUMMARIES OF KEY POINTS

• What lessons have been learned from local drills or other related exercises? Command • What problems might be encountered in the response command structure? How might they be overcome? • Is the command structure now in place adequate for this kind of response effort? What actions, such as more local or regional drills or organizational changes, might lead to an improved or more effective structure? • What “lessons learned” from local drills or other exercises may be of help? Public Relations • What public relations problems are anticipated during an operation of this nature? • How is public relations handled under normal con- ditions in the Ports of LA/LB and how should it be mod- ified for this scenario? What actions can be taken to minimize problems? Are there any “lessons learned” from local drills that may be of help? Economics • When maritime commerce is stopped or interrupted as in this scenario, what actions can be expected from the business community and local stakeholders to pressure responders? How can responders anticipate such pres- sures and how can they best accommodate them? • What data are available to estimate the economic impact of closure of the Ports of LA/LB and how can the data be used to better prepare for a disaster such as this? • What funding methods and structures are in place for a response effort such as this? Is a better funding structure needed and should it be developed? What fund- ing problems might occur and how best might they be alleviated? Responses Funding Issues • There are multiple sources of response funding (FEMA, USCG, COE, RP, PA); each agency has its own funding authority. • UC needs to set priorities and clarify up front how money flows, and it should include these factors in readiness planning. • The time frame to resolve who is responsible and who pays is uncertain. • Use lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina to help deal with potential problems after a terrorist attack. Schedule and Economic Impacts • Long recovery time stresses local economy (espe- cially fuel supply). • Work- arounds to expedite response in critical areas are possible (e.g., temporary pipeline, lightering, dredging). • The prioritizing of ship movements (preestab- lished) should be considered. • Consider pre- positioning heavy- lift assets. • Trade- offs between environmental protection and economic impacts may require national intervention. • Work closely with all players in the international trade network. Command Structure and Communications • The UC should include FBI, labor interests, com- mercial shipping interests, and insurance. • The command structure needs agency representa- tives with authority and adequate resources. • The communications system should not rely on cell phones. • Planning for adequate media and public relations should be begun early and should be continuous. DEBRIS STAGING, DREDGING, AND DISPOSAL Responses to General Questions The group was asked to consider the four general ques- tions listed at the beginning of this section. • The scenario is so hypothetical that it is scary. • The estimated time frame is optimistic; the real challenge is opening up the port to commerce. • Who is making the decisions with regard to open- ing up the port to commerce (as contrasted with “clear- ing the channel”)? • Who is speaking for commerce? • There is a question with regard to availability of fuel. • There are supply chain options. • Parts of the port will open up in stages right away— within 10 days. • Who is determining priorities, the ports or the shippers? • What is missing here? The shippers’ ability to divert cargo (e.g., ship through San Francisco). 20 U.S. MARINE SALVAGE ASSETS AND CAPABILITIES IN A MARITIME DISASTER

• The crude oil supply is limited— this is the most critical. How can the crude be transported to the refineries— barge traffic, rerouting? • Go through Cerritos Channel with tug and barge? El Segundo? The railroad bridge creates a problem. It is doable. • Obtaining cash flow quickly is critical to operations. • A standardized methodology is needed for approval of expenditures and operations. • Is there any fatal flaw in the way this scenario has been developed? • What if additional ports are attacked, stretching recovery capability and resources? • Operationally, it is not likely that all this heavy- lift equipment would be available. Usually, it is in use. More could be paid so that contracts could be broken. Legisla- tion with an “out” clause to allow equipment to be avail- able for a federal emergency could be passed. • Legislation to acquire assets from ongoing federal projects without penalty for a national emergency could be passed. • If ports are closed down all over the country (e.g., 9/11), the equipment becomes available. But if only one port is attacked, equipment may be committed elsewhere. • The proposed solution is not complete, but there are alternatives. • The following is an example of an alternative that is missing: bring in USACE and dredge an alternative channel— do a survey, design an alternative route, and dredge. • There may be a lack of private industry and Cus- toms and Border Protection (cargo) involvement. • Public reaction in California may be underestimated. • How can mass transit be increased to relieve pres- sures for commuter fuel demand? • There is potential for ship lightering of cargo and petroleum. • Carriers will divert cargo, where possible, to other ports. • Is there a short- sea shipping alternative? Discussion of Group- Specific Responses At the beginning of the discussion, participants identified three issues of concern: • What is the definition of “debris”? “If it has no sal- vageable value. . . .” • Constructed total loss. • There is a distinction between debris with value and debris that has to be disposed of. The group then went on to address their specific questions. • What regulatory agencies would have permit requirements or regulatory oversight of the transfer site, debris removal, and final disposal or recycling? – EPA does a lot with debris removal. – EPA is missing from this discussion (along with FEMA, the Maritime Administration, health agen- cies, the California Environmental Protection Agency, water boards, local government, etc.). – FEMA would pay for the removal of debris in these circumstances. – What about contamination, “debris” outside the federal channel? There is a need to mark or remove it to facilitate the long- term salvage of the ships. There will be a debris field in the water and on the land. – EPA has jurisdiction on land (only for haz- ardous? What about nonhazardous? Among the landowners are counties, cities, and the California Coastal Commission; some are private). – USACE is responsible for dredge debris. • How would real estate be secured for these activi- ties, and in what time frames? – Is there a construct for obtaining real estate? Agency- to- agency— no private organization will take the risk of contamination. Is this the function of USACE? There is a real estate group within USACE. – Who takes care of ultimate disposal? A decision will be made at some point. USACE is the contracting agency. – Some will go in the United States; some will have to be placed in a landfill. – A process must be set up for screening materials (hazmat, debris, etc.). • What protocols would be implemented to prevent accidental spills or discharges of hazardous substances from the debris on land or water during transfer and transport activities? – There are already procedures and protocols in place for handling this. Are there potential prob- lems that go beyond standard practices? – Time = money. – There is a need to develop standard practices to deal with the expected materials. – There is probably a lot of variation among local- ities with regard to these protocols and expectations. – Who takes the lead in developing the procedures? – Maritime Area Security Team. – Scenarios should be run through. What is miss- ing in the scenario is the “landside”—a land- based contractor who can set up a receiving area. – Ultimately, oil debris has to be placed on land. – Coast Guard/EPA. – Area Maritime Security Plan: include plan. – Procedures should be in place. 21WORKING GROUP QUESTIONS AND SUMMARIES OF KEY POINTS

– Can we write them down by locale? That would give a place to start in case of an event. – Who is the responsible agency? – Temporary staging areas could be delineated. – There is a difference between contaminated material and hazardous material. – The cost of doing this is miniscule compared with the damage of lost business in the port complex. – Who would determine the potential economic value of the debris and handle its sale and disbursement? – If it is salvageable, then it is not debris? It may have a value but not be considered debris from the owner’s standpoint. A scrap consultant can be brought in as a subcontractor. Valuing as scrap could be considered. – Segregating the debris from each vessel from the beginning would be good. – Legal issues with regard to debris could be key. (Is this the domain of another group?) • What special conditions would need to be consid- ered with regard to the crime aspects and issues of human remains at the point of transfer, transport, and disposal or recycling? – Human remains can give rise to complex con- cerns (police, etc.). These concerns can shut down activities. – Are containers also debris? – What about debris related to “crime scene” concerns? – How to stage and segregate debris is the crucial issue. – If opening up the port to commerce is crucial, that will shape how some of these problems play out. • What long- term monitoring may be required at the disposal site? – If debris is dumped in the water (e.g., 65 miles out), who does the long- term monitoring? Then it would be “final disposition” (103 site)—does it need to be monitored? London Dumping Conven- tion? Hazardous materials (e.g., PCBs) must be removed. – The preferred, simpler way is to take it out to sea and dump it. – There will still be storage issues for forensic rea- sons. Storage should be planned for. – Store it on the barge until it can be disposed of at sea. – Cutting up ships could release toxic materials. – But in this case, there should be an ability for long- term storage so that it can be sorted out later. • Would there be any special requirements by local or regional government for on- land disposal or by federal or state agencies for in- water disposal? Would these require- ments be covered in a permit or other authorizations? – There would be endangered species and envi- ronmental windows requirements. Nonindigenous species being brought in by equipment from other areas or nations to help out with the crisis would be a concern. – How would final liability be handled for the debris disposal? – In New York, a blanket policy was put into effect for the whole project. Debris went to Fresh Kills. Forensic evidence was reviewed by the FBI; New York City then had the responsibility. Ultimately, the landowner is responsible. Buy insurance. – Whoever touches it last owns it. – Hand it to EPA? – The good news is that the port will be open in 10 to 20 days. – But what is the bad news? There are obstacles to achieving the objectives: – Equipment may not be available on the West Coast. – Debris does not have a definition. – Salvageability is an issue. – Decision tree: 1. Debris: a. M/V Panther, M/V Voyager, and so forth. b. Materials: i. Dredged material ii. Casualties iii. Cargo iv. Collateral damage v. Hazmat vi. Human remains vii. Other 2. Waste: nonhazardous, hazardous, biological a. Criminal reconstruction (for law enforcement) Obstacle: Breadth of criminal investigation (what is waste?) b. Staging areas (where is evidence sorted and guarded?) c. Disposal offshore Obstacle: Jurisdiction for disposal and criteria for decisions 3. Recyclable materials a. Obstacle: Process needs to be stream- lined. Use of equipment (e.g., barges) that is needed for clearing the port. Contract vehicles for disposal. b. Nonhazardous: Dump at sea (404/103) or place in an upland site (RECRA). Jurisdiction? 22 U.S. MARINE SALVAGE ASSETS AND CAPABILITIES IN A MARITIME DISASTER

c. Concern: Permission to dump at sea is unlikely. What about hazardous or contami- nated materials (upland disposal/CERCLA)? Lessons Learned See disposal flowchart (Figure 1). • Debris field – Confine debris field – Collect – Decontaminate • Who? – First responder (Who is the first responder? police? surveyors? cleanup/containment?) – Contractor – Lawyers • Lessons learned – Debris disposal processes are in place . . . but. – There are many practical issues (because of the amount of debris). – Staging areas for site, workers, decontamina- tion, criminal reconstruction, and so forth— need real estate assistance early in response. – Oil cleanup is a big issue because of mixed debris field. – World Trade Center cleanup illustrates the issue of volume of debris created by the blast (scale is immediate survey issue to scope). – Driven by liability concerns. – A final dredging/survey is needed to clear port channels for navigation (long process). – Using alternative routes to terminals relieves pressure on salvage operations. – Other considerations: 1. Early containment of oil and debris is needed to keep material out of San Pablo Bay (S- booms could be used— port- supplied “security boom”). 2. A definition of “wet debris” is needed because of ownership/responsibility issues and funding stream implications. Recovery Objectives 1. Reopen port to commercial activities and offset impacts of attack (redirect goods flow and petroleum; 24/7 operations— CPB assistance). 2. Contain, collect, and remove debris and oil. 3. Clear channels and reopen navigation channels. 23WORKING GROUP QUESTIONS AND SUMMARIES OF KEY POINTS