U.S. Marine Salvage Assets and Capabilities in a Maritime Disaster (2009)

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38 Salvage Response Case Study Response Michael Herb, Office of the Supervisor of Salvage and Diving, U.S. Navy Captain Richard Hooper, Naval Sea Systems Command Mauricio Garrido, Titan Salvage NAVSEA 00C Salvage Response Case Study Port of Los Angeles/Long Beach Response Supervisor of Salvage & Diving Navy Supervisor of Salvage and Diving Naval Sea Systems Command www.supsalv.org

39SALVAGE RESPONSE CASE STUDY: RESPONSE LA/LB Port Disaster and Recovery Response Management Response objectives: Restore vessel traffic and port operations Mitigate pollution Wreck removal management team (WRMT) developed and led by SupSalv and coordinated through existing West Coast emergency salvage contract. Individual wreck removals treated as parallel operations led by project managers and salvage masters from salvage companies under central management of WRMT. Navy organic diving and salvage/EOD forces assigned by NORTHCOM to support assessment and initial clearance effort. After initial on-site assessments, each operation submits wreck removal plans and work commences on fifth day after attacks. Mooring plans for crane barges prepared and submitted to the WRMT prior to the commencement of the operation to de-conflict with other response activities in the area. Salvage, site safety, pollution removal plans, etc. submitted prior to commencement of operation. Security and investigation coordinated under the Unified Command, who facilitates with the WRMT to ensure safety during investigations. LA/LB Port Disaster and Recovery Interdependence Response ManagementNational Response Team (NRT) Joint Field Office (JFO) Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO) Incident Command System/ Unified Command Crime Scene Investigation Effort Environmental Interests Wreck Removal Effort Pollution Response Effort Transportation/ Commerce Interests Port Response and Recovery Wreck Removal Management Team (WRMT) (SupSalv, Crowley/Titan) OPERATIONS PLANNING LOGISTICS FINANCIAL Regional Response Team (RRT) NORTHCOM DHS/USCG; FEMA; FBI/NTSB; ACE/DOD; Stakeholders ASA, NOAA, SERT, MDSU, MSC,

40 U.S. MARINE SALVAGE ASSETS AND CAPABILITIES IN A MARITIME DISASTER LA/LB Port Disaster and Recovery Salvage personnel: SupSalv and Titan Salvage mobilized advance team to Los Angeles within 4 hours and initiated contacts with potential manpower and equipment resources. ASA member companies offered their support and proceeded to mobilize advance personnel Second-tier personnel mobilized by the individual contractors 24 hours after advance teams Two Navy MDSU companies available in 48 hours All first- and second-tier response personnel arrived in Los Angeles within 48 hours Portable salvage equipment: Contractors began staging/loading portable salvage equipment at respective facilities for trucking to designated central staging area determined by WRMT. Transport time lines based on a two- driver schedule: East Coast – 5 days Gulf Coast – 3 days Seattle – 1 day San Francisco – 8 hours Salvage Team and Equipment LA/LB Port Disaster and Recovery Floating equipment: Area U.S. flag equipment (deck and heavy-lift barges, etc.) and U.S. West, Gulf, and East Coasts assets identified. Most contractors initiated towage preps, but not prepared to commence mobilization without a contractual commitment Some assets were present in Long Beach at the time of the incident Local assets were engaged by Crowley-Titan during the on-site assessment phase to support both underwater and topside operations Each lead contractor chartered equipment necessary for its specific project directly (centrally managed) considering estimated transit times for floating assets Based on the salvage plans, the WRMT was able to forecast the “best case” total project on-site time line (slide 17) Salvage plan assumes use of all U.S. flag lift derricks WRMT to balance operational/economic considerations of cutting more/smaller pieces versus waiting for larger (foreign flag) lift assets Salvage Team and Equipment (cont.)

41SALVAGE RESPONSE CASE STUDY: RESPONSE LA/LB Port Disaster and Recovery Lift Asset Transit Time Limited heavy-lift resources on the U.S. West Coast (BASED ON 8 KNOTS AVERAGE SPEED) LA/LB Port Disaster and Recovery Lift Asset Matrix Salvage plan assumes U.S. flag derricks Operational efficiency: days gained using foreign flag derricks (greater capacity= fewer cuts/rigging/lifts, less refloat prep, etc.) TUG MARY ANN M/T SUPERIOR Sunk Partial Sinking at Berth US West Coast based 700 ton Derrick Barge US West Coast based 300x100 Barge with US Gulf based 300 ton Pullers(12) (2) US Gulf Derricks w/ 1,400 ton capacity (2) OCONUS Derricks w/1,800 ton capacity (1) US Gulf 700 ton Derrick (1) OCONUS 1100 ton Derrick (3) US Gulf Derricks w/ 2,500 ton capacity (1) US West Coast + (2) US Gulf + (1) + US East Coast Derricks total 3,300 ton capacity OCONUS Derrick Barge w/ 4,000 ton capacity HEAVY LIFT MOBILIZATION PHASES: ASSET CHARTERING PERIOD 1 2 2 4 2 4 2 2 7 TOWAGE CONTRACTING PERIOD 1 1 2 3 2 3 4 4 4 TRANSIT TIME 2 5 25 43 25 43 26 32 32 TOTAL MOBILIZATION PERIOD 4 8 29 50 29 50 32 38 43 HEAVY LIFT DELAY FACTORS: ACCESS/SECURITY RESTRICTIONS 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 OIL SPILL RESPONSE INTERFERENCE 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 STATE & LOCAL REGULATIONS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 TWIC/IMMIGRATION RESTRICTIONS 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 PANAMA CANAL TRAFFIC 0 0 2 1 2 1 2 1 0 TOTAL ESTIMATED DELAYS 5 8 4 3 4 3 4 3 2 OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCY GAIN N/A N/A 0 -3 0 -3 0 -10 -17 M/V VOYAGER lennahC ni knuS yllaitraP knuS Exploded and Sunk M/V STELLAR ACE M/V PANTHER

42 U.S. MARINE SALVAGE ASSETS AND CAPABILITIES IN A MARITIME DISASTER LA/LB Port Disaster and Recovery Response and Wreck Removal Time Line LA/LB Port Disaster and Recovery Wreck Removal Comparison

43SALVAGE RESPONSE CASE STUDY: RESPONSE LA/LB Port Disaster and Recovery Tug MARY ANN Wreck Removal Assessment: On bottom, her port side in 84 ft. The bow is set-in and punctured. About 8 ft of the forward bottom has various tears. For the most part, the hull appears intact. DO is slowly rising from the vents and house. Plan: Primary lift by 700-ton derrick barge currently located in San Francisco. 150-ton crane barge as a support platform; divers identify rigging points and rig wreck in a basket configuration. Upright tug on the slings and the subsequent lift to the surface. Once tug breaks the surface, patched, dewatered, and stabilized. Once stabilized, the tug towed to designated lay-berth. LA/LB Port Disaster and Recovery M/V VOYAGER Wreck Removal Assessment: The M/V VOYAGER is resting upright in 84 ft of water. The vessel lightship weight is 22,000 tons. Of about 1,073 metric tons of HFO/MGO, only 200 of HFO confirmed remaining in a starboard forward fuel storage tank. Of load of 3,150 total containers, deck load was 1,068. Deck load of containers and the cells have been heavily damaged by the explosions and subsequent fires. Dangerous Cargo Manifest (DCM) has been transmitted by owners and indicates that there were 42 containers containing dangerous cargoes. It appears that only 5 of those containers are intact on deck above #1 and #2 hold. Of 384 20-ft containers, 96 were reefers containing fruit and meat; unknown how many are intact but cargo is spoiling and causing a health hazard to salvage workers. Plan: Remove remaining petroleum products and damaged containers on deck Hull removed by cutting (total of seven cuts) into sections; mid-body cut into five separate sections; aft section in way of holds 7, 8, and 9 and fwd section in way of hold 1 will be refloated. Heavy lift using 3 U.S. Gulf/East Coast derricks with 2,500-ton total capacity

44 U.S. MARINE SALVAGE ASSETS AND CAPABILITIES IN A MARITIME DISASTER LA/LB Port Disaster and Recovery M/V VOYAGER Wreck Removal (cont.) LA/LB Port Disaster and Recovery M/V STELLAR ACE Wreck Removal Assessment: The M/V STELLAR ACE is lying on starboard side in 54 ft of water with 6 ft of her port side exposed. The lightship weight is 2,800 tons but vessel is fully flooded. Of 387 metric tons of IFO 180, 98 tons of HFO and 10 tons of miscellaneous pollutants, it is likely that nearly half has leaked into the harbor. 48 militarized vehicles, trucks and humvees remain in cargo hold and 18 on deck with approx. 5 gal. of engine oil and 5 gal. of antifreeze each. No penetration of the cargo hold has been made due to safety concerns. Plan: Remove remaining petroleum products Vessel will be parbuckled and overturned upright using 2 derricks from U.S. Gulf with 1400-ton total capacity Once righted, heavy lift and dewatering required to bring vessel to surface and stabilize Shift vessel to anchorage M/V STELLAR ACE

45SALVAGE RESPONSE CASE STUDY: RESPONSE LA/LB Port Disaster and Recovery M/V STELLAR ACE Wreck Removal (cont.) LA/LB Port Disaster and Recovery M/T SUPERIOR Wreck Removal Assessment: M/T SUPERIOR is “hinged” about 5 frames aft of amidships. Stern rests on bottom in 35 ft of water with 15 ft of main above water. 20x20 ft hole on port side just above turn of the bilge as well as other significant damage. Forward half of ship still floating, but structure warped / damaged by heat from fires that burned away majority of 6,310 metric tons of acetone cargo in the forward tanks. Pockets of acetone remain in 12 tanks. Tanks being ventilated and only 4 remain within flammable limits. About 3,120 metric tons of propylene glycol remains in 8 tanks. The four aftermost of these tanks were breached by the explosion and released about 2,000 tons into the harbor. 48 tons of HFO remain in starboard aft tank and 20 tons in the day tank of engine room. Unknown how much of 36 metric tons of MGO remain. Plan: Remove remaining bunkers and cargo, certify all tanks gas free Separate two hull sections in way of the “hinge” by chain /exothermic cutting Forward section floated away Aft section will be rigged for barge ramp lift on U.S. West Coast 300x100ft barge using 12 U.S. Gulf based 300-ton hydraulic pullers Secure aft wreck section on deck of barge, transport to lay-berth

46 U.S. MARINE SALVAGE ASSETS AND CAPABILITIES IN A MARITIME DISASTER LA/LB Port Disaster and Recovery M/T SUPERIOR Wreck Removal (cont.) LA/LB Port Disaster and Recovery M/V PANTHER Wreck Removal Assessment: PANTHER resting on port side with bow in 45 ft of water just off Fl G “9” Naval Base Mole Long Beach and the stern in 78 ft of water extending into the main ship channel. Sideshell damage on port side identified and determined that it can be patched/sealed at least temporarily Crew reports indicate approx. 705 metric tons of petroleum products remain 4,123 vehicles on 14 different decks remain and discharged about 8 metric tons of gasoline, 11 metric tons of oil and 23 metric tons of anti-freeze dispersed throughout the hold Plan: Remove remaining petroleum products Parbuckle using 20 pullers/winches and a U.S. Gulf based 700-ton derrick barge to apply approx. 4,500 tons of force required As the port sideshell is exposed, patch damage Seal other hull openings, refloat, and shift to predesignated anchorage

47SALVAGE RESPONSE CASE STUDY: RESPONSE LA/LB Port Disaster and Recovery M/V PANTHER Wreck Removal (cont.) LA/LB Port Disaster and Recovery The removal of sunken oceangoing vessels requires multimonth periods and considerable funding to accomplish. Estimated direct economic impact to the state of California due to loss of imports and exports from Port of LA/LB is $18.3 billion/month * J.Y. Park, University of Southern California; 2007; “The Economic Impacts of Dirty Bomb Attacks of the LA/LB Ports: Applying the Supply-Driven NIEMO (National Interstate Economic Model)” Cost Projection ~$330 MTOTAL PROJECT COST

48 U.S. MARINE SALVAGE ASSETS AND CAPABILITIES IN A MARITIME DISASTER LA/LB Port Disaster and Recovery Conclusions The U.S.-based salvage industry is capable of responding to and handling a major port incident. U.S. Navy Salvage and EOD capability are critical to expediting response to worst case marine casualties inflicted by terrorist acts. Leadership and prioritization conflicts can create significant delays at the onset of a major marine casualty caused by terrorist attacks. Threat of potential third-party liability exposure may dilute the response to a major marine casualty. Strict enforcement of local government regulations may be detrimental to response objectives. LA/LB Port Disaster and Recovery Challenges Encountered Initial casualty assessments delayed by law enforcement and crime scene investigative activities. Containment booming and skimming coordinated by California OSPR and certain terminals resulted in delays to underwater surveys and vent plugging by on-site assessment phase. Conflicts between vessel underwriter representatives and the Unified Command prevented a smooth start of operations, insurers initially insisted on handling their respective casualties. Individual interests of multiple RP-appointed qualified individuals (QI) and spill management companies created conflict as each tried to take the lead. Inter-company contracting was problematic due to variety of formats and clauses, particularly those dealing with third-party liabilities. With more than 50 contractors involved, each with individual tariffs for its personnel and equipment, it was difficult to determine acceptable daily rates and prevent opportunistic pricing. Concerns over responder immunity prevented several contractors from supporting the response. Port of Los Angeles and Port of Long Beach Police diver permit requirements created delays.

49SALVAGE RESPONSE CASE STUDY: RESPONSE LA/LB Port Disaster and Recovery Challenges Encountered (cont.) High-volume, fast boat traffic operated by police, Fish and Game, etc., required space management (safety hazards for diving operations). Designated nesting areas (approx. 15 acres) for the endangered California least tern prevented the staging of salvage equipment at certain locations. The TWIC requirements became a major obstacle during the response phase of the operation as out-of-state salvage workers were prevented from entering the port. Some salvage specialists employed by foreign affiliates of U.S.-based companies were delayed or prevented from entering the United States. Regulatory intervention by the South Coast Air Quality Management District (SCAQMD) halted operations due to volume of diesel-driven equipment. Local labor unions offered their support but insisted in payment of prevailing wages (Appendix IV) resulting on an average 250% increase in labor rates for divers. Funding delays created adverse cash flow strain during the peak periods of the operation. The LA/LB Area Contingency Plan (ACP) was comprehensive but focused on response to major oil spills and not harbor clearance operations. (Being worked.) BACKUP SLIDES LA/LB Port Disaster and Recovery Recommendations SupSalv coordinate with federal/state agencies, oil spill response community, and salvage industry to plan and hold salvage-specific exercises and awareness briefs in major ports. Initiate a study to investigate feasibility of developing pre-positioned portable heavy-lift assets in vulnerable regions, to include consideration of legal/funding/maintenance mechanisms. Establish a working committee (with members from marine insurance, vessel operators, salvage community, state/federal government) to develop an integrated funding strategy for national- level salvage/wreck removal incidents. In support of an integrated response, enhance communications between DoD/Navy salvage capability and the salvage industry to share knowledge, ascertain equipment compatibility, and pre- establish mutual aid protocols.

50 U.S. MARINE SALVAGE ASSETS AND CAPABILITIES IN A MARITIME DISASTER LA/LB Port Disaster and Recovery Heavy-Lift Assets- U.S. Flag Name T ype Owner Location Flag Ma in Lift (tons) Valhalla Crane Barge Manson West Coast USA 250 DB 24 Crane Barge Manson West Coast USA 400 Haakon Crane Barge Manson West Coast USA 400 DB Pacific Crane Barge General West Coast USA 200 revolving DB General Derrick Barge General West Coast USA 700 DB Los Angeles Crane Barge General West Coast USA 350 revolving DB 5 Crane Barge Traylor West Coast USA 400 revolving DB Long Beach Crane Barge Connolly-Pacific West Coast USA 350 Atlantic Horizon Derrick Barge Horizon US Gulf USA 453 revolving Arapaho Derrick Barge Tetra US Gulf USA 589 revolving Pacific Horizon Derrick Barge Horizon US Gulf USA 635 revolving Wotan Crane Barge Manson Gulf US Gulf USA 453 revolving Mr Two Hooks Stiff leg DB Laredo US Gulf USA 800 Illuminator Stiff leg DB Laredo US Gulf USA 408 IOS 800 A-Frame International US Gulf USA 800 Non-ASA Heavy Lift Assets (400-1000 ton) Name T ype Owne r Location Flag Ma in Lift (tons) Big T Derrick Barge T and T Marine Galveston USA 450 Columbia, New York Crane Barge DonJon LA Wilmington, NC USA 400 Chesapeake Derrick Barge DonJon LA Port Newark, NJ USA 1000 D/B BOAZ Derrick Barge Bisso Marine GOM USA 250 D/B BIG CHIEF Derrick Barge Bisso Marine GOM USA 100 D/B CAPPY Derrick Barge Bisso Marine GOM USA 700 ASA Heavy Lift Assets (400-1000 ton) SMIT in ASA but Foreign Flag LA/LB Port Disaster and Recovery Recommendations (cont.) Explore possible methods (legislation, regulations, MOUs, etc.) at federal/state levels to more clearly establish “responder immunity” for salvors. Explore possible methods (legislation, regulations, MOUs, etc.) at federal/state levels to facilitate rapid and temporary waiver of regulations/permitting requirements that pose an undue risk of delay to critical salvage operations in the national interest. Invite International Salvage Union (ISU) to prescreen Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) for ISU personnel.

51SALVAGE RESPONSE CASE STUDY: RESPONSE LA/LB Port Disaster and Recovery Heavy-Lift Assets – Foreign Flag Na me Owner / Ma nage r Fla g DP Mooring Ma x Lift (tons) DERRICK LAY BARGES Huasteco Ductos Marinos Mexicanos Mexico n/a 8-point 2032 static Castoro Otto Saipem Bahamas n/a 12-point 1814 revolving Hyundai 60 (ex-DB 60) HHI Panama n/a 14-point 1578 revolving Mixteco Mexicanos Construcciones (CMM) Mexico n/a 8-point 812 revolving Abouzar 1200 Kito (NITC) Iran n/a 10-point 1088 overbow Saipem FDS Saipem Bahamas DP3 na 600 0083tniop 21?anihCCOONCgnaiJ naL gnivlover 0002tniop-213PDamanaPamereeHredlaB McDermott Derrick Barge No 50 McDermott Panama DP 8-point 3199 revolving Sapura 3000 Acergy/Sapura Unknown DP2 ? 3000 0061tniop-013SPDG&V tS skcurT aeS81 nocsaJ DB Hercules Global Vanuatu DPS3 8-point 1814 overstern gnivlover 045tniop-21a/namanaPmepiaSrelwarC gnivlover 8181tniop-01a/namanaP leetS noppiNoihsoruK Lewek Champion EMAS Singapore DP2 8-point 800 527tniop-01a/namanaP leetS noppiNII oihsoruK DLB - KP 1 McDermott Panama n/a 10-point 544 revolving Acergy Polaris Acergy Panama DP3 10-point 1500 gnivlover 528tniop-8a/nsamahaBmepiaSII orotsaC Hyundai 2500 HHI Korea n/a 10-point 1451 revolving Global Seminole Global Vanuatu n/a 8-point 725 fixed McDermott Derrick Barge No 27 McDermott Panama n/a 12-point 1270 revolving McDermott Derrick Barge No 30 McDermott Panama n/a 12-point 2086 revolving DERRICK BARGES gnivlover 1541tniop-01enoNocixeMocixeM arotcurtsnoCacetloT gnivlover 0017tniop-213PDamanaP amereeHflaihT SHL Newbuild TBC SHL Cyprus DP3 8-point 5000 revolving Stanislav Yudin SHL Russia None 8-point 2500 revolving gnivlover 0051tniop-8enoNEAUCCPN0002-SLH Saipem 3000 Saipem Bahamas DP3 8-point 2400 tonnes gnivlover 1272tniop-21enoNamanaP amereeHdomreH gnivlover 9442tniop-01enoNamanaPttomredcM101-BD DB William Kallop OSFI Vanuatu None 8-point 1624 dexif 0052nwonknUa/nanihCSSEOCoaH iL aD FOREIGN FLAG HEAVY LIFT ASSETS (1000 ton +)