Transit Security Update (2008)

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133 APPENDIX E SUMMARY OF SURVEY RESULTS Survey respondents: Of the 45 respondents, 35% were multimodal transit agencies including rail-only agencies, 58% were bus-only agencies, and 7% were ferry systems. If a specific question received fewer than 10 responses, the question was excluded from this survey summary. Threats (Q1, 35 responses: 13 multimodal/ferry, 22 bus) In terms of threats, multimodal agencies considered a greater range of potential threats to be threats than bus agencies considered. All multimodal agencies and most bus agencies indicated that explosives, shootings, and hijackings were the primary threats. Many multimodal agencies also indicated that chemical/biological releases and sabotage were considered to be primary threats. Fewer than 10% reported that radiological and cyber crimes were considered to be primary threats. Multimodal Agencies Bus Agencies Explosives (100%) Radiological (8%) Explosives (86%) Radiological (5%) Chemical (92%) Cyber crimes (8%) Chemical (14%) Cyber crimes (5%) Biological (92%) Hijackings (85%) Biological (14%) Hijackings (95%) Sabotage (77%) Shootings (85%) Sabotage (68%) Shootings (91%) Performance Measures (Q2–Q3, 17 responses) Agencies were asked to list the security performance measures being used. Most agencies (82%) reported that they do not use performance measures. Of the agencies that did, they used crimes per 100,000 passengers; crimes per 100,000 unlinked trips (one agency); security personnel per 1 million unlinked passenger trips; and percent of frontline personnel who have completed transit security training. Attributes of Perpetrators (Q4–Q5) These questions did not yield many responses. Number of Threats/Incidents and Trends for These Threats/Incidents (Q6–Q8) These questions did not yield many responses. These responses included the following: Sabotage: One commuter rail system reported that many tie clips had been removed from the rail infrastructure in 2006. The same system had experienced tampering with rail signals (5 instances in 2000 vs. 10 in 2006), and tampering with electronic message sign (5 instances in 2000 vs. 10 in 2006). Bomb threat: A subject boarded a bus with a black bag in March 2006 and announced he was going to blow up the bus; no injuries occurred. Suspicious bags periodically left at a transportation center required evacuation. No bombs were found. Cyber Security, Trends, and Attributes of Perpetrators (Q9–Q11) These questions did not yield many responses.

134 Reports of Suspicious Activity (Q12, 22 responses) Changes in suspicious activity reports are shown below: System Security Data and Analysis (Q13) a) Security Data Used for Security Planning (33 responses): The security data collected in addition to Part I and Part II crimes include threats, suspicious activity, persons, and items; results of threat and vulnerability assessments; number of security personnel by location; the number of security checks by location and average response time of security personnel; ingress and egress at all facilities; calls for service data by location; training data; location of transit centers; number of vehicles; contact information for personnel; public comments; accident data; and landscaping information. b) Sources of Data on Offenses Already Listed in the Survey (33 responses): System reports (87%) Police reports (73%) Other (0%) c) Sources of Data on Other Security Matters (33 responses): System reports (87%) Police reports (70%) Other: Online news (3%) d) Crime Mapping, Trend Analysis, or Other Data Analysis (12 responses): Crime trend analyses and crime trend analyses by location (75%); some report that they use this information for resource allocation purposes. Crime mapping (25%) Threat/vulnerability analysis (8%) e) Data-related issues or concerns (11 responses) The following data-related issues or concerns were identified by the respondents: x Notification and documentation on all relevant incidents from frontline personnel x Development of security metrics x Development of a more consistent way to compare crime and security incidents x Creation of more accurate data (e.g., data can be incorrectly categorized) x Combination of safety and security data for analysis purposes x Elimination of transit security funding from the federal government Increase Decrease No change 60% 0% 40% 86% 0% 14% 9% 48% 43%In the past two years Answer Options In the past decade (since 1997) Since September 11, 2001

135 Changes since September 11, 2001 (Q14a–h, 33 responses) Increase Decrease No change Unknown 33% 7% 40% 20% 20% 0% 53% 27% 13% 0% 73% 13% 33% 7% 53% 7% 0% 7% 53% 40% 40% 0% 47% 13% 13% 0% 67% 20% 7% 0% 60% 33%Violence-related legal actions? Passenger complaints of violence or potential violence? Passenger complaints of excessive security? Passenger requests for increased protection? Worker days lost as a result of violence-related incidents? Post 9/11: Patronage? Offenses against passengers? Offenses against workers? Major Post-9/11 Changes in Security Practices: (Q14-second part, 32 responses) The majority of responding agencies (91%) reported implementing Transit Watch or a similar employee and passenger outreach program and increased security training for frontline employees and counterterrorism training for their security personnel. Many (75%) reported increasing the number (or hours) of security personnel; some (53%) reported adding personnel to locations where there were none— patrols onboard transit vehicles and adding access control to bus depots and rail yards and other transit facilities; a few reported initiation of undercover efforts. Many agencies reported undergoing threat and vulnerability assessments and receiving intelligence information from federal agencies (66%); some agencies reported engaging in local and regional counterterrorism committees, and intelligence information-sharing with local responders and neighboring transit agencies. A few agencies reported a change from contract security to an in-house police force. Other agencies reported using CPTED (Crime Prevention through Environmental Design) techniques—lighting, surveillance/video, video deployment within buses, access control, fencing, and landscaping—and CPTED in planning, design, construction, operations, and disposal phases; configuration management; explosives detection canine teams, mandatory identification (ID) badges for employees; review and revisions to their emergency plans and operating procedures; Memorandums of Understanding with local law enforcement; initiation of undercover assignments; participation in drills; hiring officers dedicated to cyber security; advisory system based on the Homeland Security Advisory System; increased regional collaboration; designation of Sensitive Security Information; use of audio technology; and heightened sense of awareness of suspicious activity and higher likelihood of reporting it. Current Security Investments and Impacts (Q15, 33 responses) a) Transit agencies reported making medium to high investments in the following areas: Technology (85%) Security Staff (39%) Employee Training (85%) Customer Outreach and Education (82%) Design (CPTED)/Situational Crime Prevention (91%) Other: Interaction with Local Public Safety Agencies (3%) b) In terms of the impact that prior security investments have had, practically all agencies reported that security investments have had a positive impact on crime mitigation, terrorist deterrence and detection capabilities, and the public/passenger perception of security. Agencies also reported that 9/11 attacks combined with their public outreach efforts raised passenger and employee awareness, improved employee preparedness, and increased security in terms of both deterrence and detection. Some agencies reported results of specific strategies. such as a drop in vehicular burglaries and theft after passenger education efforts about not leaving valuables in vehicles. Other agencies reported a marked decrease in crime after implementing increased surveillance of transit facilities.

136 Security Personnel (Q16) a) Type of Security Enforcement (25 responses; 10 multimodal, 15 bus) Multimodal* Bus* 1. Full-time Sworn Officers: System Employees 73% 33% 2. Full-time Sworn Officers: Contractors 2% 26% 3. Full-time Non-Sworn Officers: System Employees 16% 12% 4. Full-time Non-Sworn Officers: Contractors 2% 15% 5. Part-time Sworn Officers: System Employees 3% 5% 6. Part-time Sworn Officers: Contractors 4% 9% 7. Part-time Non-Sworn Officers: System Employees 0% 0% 8. Part-time Non-Sworn Officers: Contractors 0% 0% *Percents shown are the percent of the total security personnel reported by responding agencies. b) Post-9/11 Increase in Security Staff Hours (18 responses; 9 multimodal, 9 bus) All multimodal responding agencies reported that they have moderately or significantly increased either the number of their security personnel or security staff hours after 9/11. One-third of bus agencies reported that they had not altered their security staff size or hours. The rest had increased either the number of their security personnel or security staff hours after 9/11 by a small or moderate percentage. Security Measures Survey respondents were asked the purpose(s) for which measures had been implemented—crime, terrorism, and/or quality of life. For all measures, 73% of respondents reported that crime reduction was the purpose, 52% indicated counterterrorism, and 49% indicated improvement of quality of life. Crime reduction was a major objective for all of these measures. Responses by category ranged from 58% to 86% with access control and surveillance/inspection receiving the highest percentages of responses. For counterterrorism, the responses were mixed—ranging from 25% (transit vehicle design) to 75% (surveillance/inspection). For quality of life, the responses ranged from transit vehicle design (31%) to communications (65%). Crime Terrorism Quality of Life Access Control 86% 54% 36% CPTED 64% 32% 55% Transit Vehicle Design 68% 25% 31% Surveillance/ Inspection 83% 75% 46% Operational Strategies 81% 44% 50% Technology 58% 67% 58% Communications 70% 55% 65% All (Wtd. Avg.) 73% 52% 49% Years of deployment: Only about half of those who had responded to these questions indicated the year or years of deployment, but those who did respond stated that some of the measures had been implemented long before 2001, while others had been recently implemented. Access Control (Q17, 22 responses) Transit agencies reported having admission control using encoded cards, manual verification, memorized code, mechanical lock, and/or electronic locks. No agency reported having a biometric admission control

137 system in place. Fencing and gates used by agencies were mechanical, electronic without an alarm, or electronic with an alarm. Agencies also used explosive detectors, intrusion sensors, random ID checks, vehicle access control, and parking measures and vehicle barriers. Responses were evenly distributed among these access control measures. CPTED/Situational Crime Prevention (SCP) (Q18, 22 responses) Most (91%) respondents employed internal design/configuration and lighting to enhance security; 32% indicated that site selection/building placement and 27% indicated that physical or natural barriers were used. Transit Vehicle Design (Q19, 16 responses) Transit vehicle design measures are typically considered to be a subset of CPTED/SCP measures. The majority of respondents, 87%, stated that public address systems were used in their systems, 69% stated that their system used a silent alarm and/or panic button, and 25% stated that their system used a silent alarm and/or panic button with AVL (Automatic Vehicle Location). The remainder was distributed among the other design measures: 19%, enhancement of visibility; 6%, transit operator compartment; and 6%, vehicle access control. They were implemented over a wide range of years starting from the pre-1970s to the present. Surveillance/Inspection (Q20, 24 responses) Closed-circuit television (CCTVs) with recorders was the surveillance/inspection measure used by 92% of responding agencies (a few agencies reported using CCTVs without recorders); 92% also reported that they used undercover or plainclothes officers; 37% conduct roving patrols without canine inspections and 17% use roving patrols with canine inspections; and 29% of agencies practice behavioral assessment by transit staff or security staff. Other respondents reported that they practice random sweeps; conduct explosives or narcotics canine inspections; employ fare checkers; and perform manual, visual, or electronic inspections of persons/baggage. Operational Strategies (Q21, 16 responses) Operational strategies used by transit agencies were as follows: x Fleet Management/Vehicle Tracking x Inventory Control x Limiting Station Access x Modification of Dispatcher Responsibilities x Modifying Pre-Trip Inspections x Modifying Hours of Service x Parking Lot, Vehicle Flow/Placement Re-Configuration x Strategic Location of Bus Stops The responses were evenly distributed among the strategies. Technology (Q22, 24 responses) Public address system and radio communications for staff were used by 92% of the respondents; 79% of agencies used CCTV either for surveillance or for recording incidents/passenger traffic; 58% also had an emergency alert system for employees. The remainder of the measures received fewer than 10 responses.

138 Surveillance or Inspection measures used by transit agencies were as follows: x Automatic Train Control/Monitoring x AVL x Biological Detector x CCTV: for surveillance x CCTV: for recording incidents, passenger traffic x Chemical Detector x Emergency Alert for Employees x Emergency Phones/Call Boxes for Passengers x Explosives Detector: Portable, Tabletop x Intelligent Video to ID Suspicious Activity x Intrusion Sensors and Alarms x Public Address System x Radio Communications for Staff Communications Security (Q23, 20 responses) 95% of responding agencies reported that they have network security; 90% have power supply backup; and 70% have redundant communications systems. One respondent implemented access control for their dispatch control center. Security and Policing Management (Q24) a) Budgeting (Too few responses) b) Human Resources Practices (22 responses) 100% of responding agencies reported that they have implemented background checks on new hires; 50% reported they have updated their performance appraisal system since September 11. A few agencies reported initiating fingerprinting of employees since September 11. Others reported that they already had these practices before September 11. c) Security Planning (24 responses; 13 multimodal, 11 bus) 100% of responding multimodal agencies and the majority of all responding agencies indicated that they have up-to-date security-related plans. Of bus agencies, 18% indicated that they do not have an up-to-date security plan or an up-to-date Continuity of Operations Plan; 9% indicated that the do not have an up-to-date emergency plan or incident response plan; 9% also indicated that they have not yet integrated an incident command system into their plans. d) Assault Mitigation Techniques (22 responses) 100% of responding agencies reported that they practice some type of technique to mitigate conflict; 100% reported that they have passenger codes of conduct and presence of security or transit personnel to mitigate assaults. Half of responding agencies indicated that their personnel use verbal techniques and a much smaller percentage, 14%, indicated that they use nonverbal techniques to resolve and mitigate conflicts; only two of the responding agencies indicated that they use restraining techniques for conflict mitigation. Nearly half, 45%, of responding agencies indicated that they practice community policing and have roving security patrols; other agencies (41%) indicated that they provide specific training in conflict resolution techniques; 18% of the agencies responded that they participate in school outreach efforts to discourage juvenile offenders; a few agencies responded that cameras installed for other purposes also act as a deterrent to conflict escalation.

139 Passenger Outreach, Education/Training, and Awareness Programs (excluding employee training) (Q25, 35 responses): Transit Watch Program 77% Crime Prevention Program 51% Toll-Free Number 11% Evacuation Instructions 48% Other Training (Q26, 195 responses from 39 agencies) 41% of training occurred in-house, 38% was through NTI, 5% through APTA, 5% through TSI, and 10% through other sources. 76% of training was delivered using the classroom method, 23% through a workshop, and the rest was a combination of video/DVD, interactive CD or online training without an instructor. The audience was evenly distributed among frontline personnel, security personnel, and supervisory personnel. The duration for 69% of the training classes was between 1 and 4 hours, while the remainder was 8 hours or more. The following classes titles were mentioned by the respondents: x Transit Watch x System Security Awareness for Transit Employees x System Security of Operators x Security Awareness Train-the-Trainer x Recognizing Terrorist Activity x Terrorist Recognition and Response x Strategic Counterterrorism for Transit Managers x The Mark (Video/DVD) x Other NTI Transit Security DVDs x Behavior Recognition Train-the-Trainer x Incident Response to Terrorists x Terrorism Awareness x Transit Terrorist Tools and Tactics x Transit System Security and Design Review x National Incident Management System (NIMS) Incident Command System (ICS) 100, 200, 300, 400, 700, and 800 x Homicide/Suicide Bomber x Domestic Preparedness x Emergency Management x Transit Emphasis Inc. Management Service x Transit Vehicle Emergencies x Crime Prevention x CPTED x Firearms, arrest control technique, taser, baton, pepper spray x Peace Officers Standards and Training (POST) x First Aid/CPR x Customer Service/Customer Relations Drills and Exercises (Q27, 22 responses) x 82% of responding agencies reported that they conduct 1–2 interagency drills/exercises per year; 9% reported that they do not conduct any; and the rest reported that they conduct more than 1–2 per year. x 82% reported that they conduct one or two intra-agency drills/exercises per year; 9% reported that they do not conduct any; and the rest reported that they conduct more than one or two per year. x 23% reported that they conduct one or two simulations or tabletop exercises/workshops per year; 41% reported that they do not conduct any; and the rest reported that they conduct more than one or two per year.

140 Covert Testing (Q28, 16 responses) Most agencies (81%) responded that they do not perform any type of covert testing of their security personnel or frontline workers. A few agencies reported that they do perform covert observations of operators with respect to safety and security, including pretrip inspections along with passenger relations, Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) compliance and on-time performance. One agency reported that they perform hostage drills on buses once a year; another reported that night-time entry into transit facilities is tested; and another reported that transit vehicle panel/compartment door access is checked randomly to verify adherence to standard operating procedure. Cooperative Relationships (Q29, 26 responses) 100% of responding agencies reported that they have cooperative relationships with external agencies and a majority (85%) reported that they have cooperative relationships with other units within the agency itself; some (42%) reported that they engage in intelligence-sharing. Cyber Security (Q30, 16 responses) 100% of responding agencies reported that they have a firewall for their computer network; most (94%) have access control using passwords and only two have access control using biometric technology. Other measures that were reported by agencies included access control to the server room, power backups and redundancy, and constant backup of data. Effective Security and Policing Measures (Q31, 37 responses) The Five Most Effective Counterterrorism Measures Named by Respondents 1. Transit Police Officers/Security Personnel Patrols/Sweeps (90%) 2. Security Training for Transit Employees and Police/Security Personnel (88%) 3. Video Technology (85%) 4. Public Education/Transit Watch and Outreach (80%) 5. Intelligence Information (60%) Other effective counterterrorism measures mentioned included access control, perimeter security, presence of transit employees, fare checking, plainclothes officers, threat detectors, local counterterrorism groups, Surface Transportation Joint Operation Network to share operations with local agencies, passenger security inspections, signage, station design, lighting, building and facility design, interagency/interoperable communications, pretrip inspections, HSAS, drills, and transit police dispatch linkage to statewide police and emergency communications. The Five Most Effective Crime Prevention Measures Named by Respondents 1. Transit Police Officers or Security Personnel Patrols/Sweeps (90%) 2. Plainclothes Officers/Undercover Vehicles (83%) 3. Video Technology (74%) 4. Presence of Transit Employees (60%) 5. Lighting and Visibility (60%) Other effective crime prevention measures mentioned included the enforcement of passenger codes of conduct, officer training, driver training, fare checking, perimeter security, access control, data collection/analysis, school outreach efforts, radio communications, bait car program/undercover cars, public education at park-and-ride facilities, employee reward for reporting crimes, intelligence-sharing with local law enforcement, employee ID, and canine inspections. Evaluations of Security Interventions/Measures (Q32, 17 responses) Evaluations of security interventions or measures are performed by 82% of the respondents by measuring their impact on the problem at hand. Specific testing and evaluations of new equipment were also performed.

141 Innovative Practices or Measures (Q33, 26 responses) Following are the responses to the question on measures being practiced in an innovative way or any innovations in policy, program, or research: x Passenger Security Inspections—Behavioral Assessment x Passenger Security Inspections—Passenger Bag Inspections x Passenger Security Inspections—Explosives Detection Canine Teams x Training for first responders provided by the transit agency x Development of Tactical Operations Guide to train first responders x Interactive Crime Statistics Map x Use of administrative employees to augment officers at rail stations x Video cameras linked to motion detection x Video cameras linked to alarms x School outreach, with the transit system considered to be an extension of the school so that school disciplinary rules apply to the students using the system x Use of blast mitigating trash receptacles x Use of clear trash receptacles x Emergency response team x Placement of report cards with crime statistics on vehicles in park and ride facilities x Gang violence training for bus drivers x Bus drivers training to assist the public when necessary x Advertised presence of undercover officers x None (38%) Obstacles in Security and Policing Management (Q34, 35 responses) The greatest obstacle in security and policing management that was reported by survey respondents was by far the lack of resources to implement desired security measures. x Lack of resources (91%) x Lack of customer support (40%) x Lack of qualified workers or technical expertise (31%) x Lack of management support (6%) x Lack of customer support (9%) x Lack of tested, market-ready technology solutions (6%) x Other responses included the following: í Intelligence received is often too general to be of specific use to their system í Motivation of transit employees in implementing security practices í Motivation of officers in performing ordinary crime assignments, because antiterrorism assignments are viewed as being more prestigious and desirable than ordinary crime-related assignments í Unionized transit workers are reported to be concerned about the increased time needed to perform security-related tasks í Two transit agencies expressed the need for the development of a Memorandum of Understanding with TSA regarding the federal Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response (VIPR) program. Currently, confusion as to the composition of the VIPR team and their responsibilities diminishes the effectiveness of the program within the agencies.

ACRP OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE* CHAIR JAMES WILDING Independent Consultant VICE CHAIR JEFF HAMIEL Minneapolis–St. Paul Metropolitan Airports Commission MEMBERS JAMES CRITES Dallas–Ft. Worth International Airport RICHARD DE NEUFVILLE Massachusetts Institute of Technology KEVIN C. DOLLIOLE UCG Associates JOHN K. DUVAL Beverly Municipal Airport STEVE GROSSMAN Oakland International Airport TOM JENSEN National Safe Skies Alliance CATHERINE M. LANG Federal Aviation Administration GINA MARIE LINDSEY Los Angeles World Airports CAROLYN MOTZ Hagerstown Regional Airport RICHARD TUCKER Huntsville International Airport EX OFFICIO MEMBERS SABRINA JOHNSON U.S. Environmental Protection Agency RICHARD MARCHI Airports Council International— North America LAURA McKEE Air Transport Association of America HENRY OGRODZINSKI National Association of State Aviation Officials MELISSA SABATINE American Association of Airport Executives ROBERT E. SKINNER, JR. Transportation Research Board SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER W. JENKS Transportation Research Board *Membership as of September 2008.*Membership as of June 2008. TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH BOARD 2008 EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE* OFFICERS Chair: Debra L. Miller, Secretary, Kansas DOT, Topeka Vice Chair: Adib K. Kanafani, Cahill Professor of Civil Engineering, University of California, Berkeley Executive Director: Robert E. Skinner, Jr., Transportation Research Board MEMBERS J. BARRY BARKER, Executive Director, Transit Authority of River City, Louisville, KY ALLEN D. BIEHLER, Secretary, Pennsylvania DOT, Harrisburg JOHN D. BOWE, President, Americas Region, APL Limited, Oakland, CA LARRY L. BROWN, SR., Executive Director, Mississippi DOT, Jackson DEBORAH H. BUTLER, Executive Vice President, Planning, and CIO, Norfolk Southern Corporation, Norfolk, VA WILLIAM A.V. CLARK, Professor, Department of Geography, University of California, Los Angeles DAVID S. EKERN, Commissioner, Virginia DOT, Richmond NICHOLAS J. GARBER, Henry L. Kinnier Professor, Department of Civil Engineering, University of Virginia, Charlottesville JEFFREY W. HAMIEL, Executive Director, Metropolitan Airports Commission, Minneapolis, MN EDWARD A. (NED) HELME, President, Center for Clean Air Policy, Washington, DC WILL KEMPTON, Director, California DOT, Sacramento SUSAN MARTINOVICH, Director, Nevada DOT, Carson City MICHAEL D. MEYER, Professor, School of Civil and Environmental Engineering, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta MICHAEL R. MORRIS, Director of Transportation, North Central Texas Council of Governments, Arlington NEIL J. PEDERSEN, Administrator, Maryland State Highway Administration, Baltimore PETE K. RAHN, Director, Missouri DOT, Jefferson City SANDRA ROSENBLOOM, Professor of Planning, University of Arizona, Tucson TRACY L. ROSSER, Vice President, Corporate Traffic, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Bentonville, AR ROSA CLAUSELL ROUNTREE, Executive Director, Georgia State Road and Tollway Authority, Atlanta HENRY G. (GERRY) SCHWARTZ, JR., Chairman (retired), Jacobs/Sverdrup Civil, Inc., St. Louis, MO C. MICHAEL WALTON, Ernest H. Cockrell Centennial Chair in Engineering, University of Texas, Austin LINDA S. WATSON, CEO, LYNX–Central Florida Regional Transportation Authority, Orlando STEVE WILLIAMS, Chairman and CEO, Maverick Transportation, Inc., Little Rock, AR EX OFFICIO MEMBERS THAD ALLEN (Adm., U.S. Coast Guard), Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, Washington, DC JOSEPH H. BOARDMAN, Federal Railroad Administrator, U.S.DOT REBECCA M. BREWSTER, President and COO, American Transportation Research Institute, Smyrna, GA PAUL R. BRUBAKER, Research and Innovative Technology Administrator, U.S.DOT GEORGE BUGLIARELLO, Chancellor, Polytechnic University of New York, Brooklyn, and Foreign Secretary, National Academy of Engineering, Washington, DC SEAN T. CONNAUGHTON, Maritime Administrator, U.S.DOT LEROY GISHI, Chief, Division of Transportation, Bureau of Indian Affairs, U.S. Department of the Interior, Washington, DC EDWARD R. HAMBERGER, President and CEO, Association of American Railroads, Washington, DC JOHN H. HILL, Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administrator, U.S.DOT JOHN C. HORSLEY, Executive Director, American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials, Washington, DC CARL T. JOHNSON, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administrator, U.S.DOT J. EDWARD JOHNSON, Director, Applied Science Directorate, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, John C. Stennis Space Center, MS THOMAS J. MADISON, JR., Administrator, Federal Highway Administration, U.S.DOT WILLIAM W. MILLAR, President, American Public Transportation Association, Washington, DC NICOLE R. NASON, National Highway Traffic Safety Administrator, U.S.DOT JAMES S. SIMPSON, Federal Transit Administrator, U.S.DOT ROBERT A. STURGELL, Acting Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration, U.S.DOT ROBERT L. VAN ANTWERP (Lt. Gen., U.S. Army), Chief of Engineers and Commanding General, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Washington, DC Abbreviations used without definitions in TRB publications: AAAE American Association of Airport Executives AASHO American Association of State Highway Officials AASHTO American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials ACI–NA Airports Council International–North America ACRP Airport Cooperative Research Program ADA Americans with Disabilities Act APTA American Public Transportation Association ASCE American Society of Civil Engineers ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers ASTM American Society for Testing and Materials ATA Air Transport Association ATA American Trucking Associations CTAA Community Transportation Association of America CTBSSP Commercial Truck and Bus Safety Synthesis Program DHS Department of Homeland Security DOE Department of Energy EPA Environmental Protection Agency FAA Federal Aviation Administration FHWA Federal Highway Administration FMCSA Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration FRA Federal Railroad Administration FTA Federal Transit Administration IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers ISTEA Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 ITE Institute of Transportation Engineers NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration NASAO National Association of State Aviation Officials NCFRP National Cooperative Freight Research Program NCHRP National Cooperative Highway Research Program NHTSA National Highway Traffic Safety Administration NTSB National Transportation Safety Board SAE Society of Automotive Engineers SAFETEA-LU Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (2005) TCRP Transit Cooperative Research Program TEA-21 Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (1998) TRB Transportation Research Board TSA Transportation Security Administration U.S.DOT United States Department of Transportation need SPine Width