3

Successful Disposition Case Studies

Rebecca Robbins, planning committee member and predisposal unit head at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), moderated this session, which used case studies to highlight examples of successful low-level waste (LLW) management and disposal within current regulatory frameworks. The case studies presented situations in which previously challenging LLW streams¹ were successfully managed and disposed of. The first two presentations in this session provided case studies from the United States; the next two presentations focused on case studies from outside the United States. A discussion was held after all of these case studies had been presented.

The comments from the moderators, the panelists, and other workshop participants are their own. They do not necessarily represent official views of their employers, governments, or other organizations that may be mentioned in the presentations or discussions.

Dr. Robbins began the session by requesting the workshop participants, as they listened to each case study, to identify the “key characteristics” that contributed to its success. Key characteristics include the practices, activities, attitudes, and actions with respect to the case studies and associated regulatory frameworks.

Melanie Pearson Hurley, headquarters liaison in the Office of Field Operations within the Department of Energy (DOE), presented a DOE case study. Greg Lovato, deputy administrator at the Nevada Division of

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¹ “Challenging LLW streams” are defined as LLW streams that have potentially non-optimal or unclear disposition pathways due to their origin or content and incompatibility with existing standards, orders, or regulations.

Environmental Protection (NDEP), provided examples of key characteristics for successful disposition from the perspective of a state regulator. For international case studies, Miklos (Mike) Garamszeghy, design authority and manager of technology assessment and planning for the Canadian Nuclear Waste Management Organization, provided two examples from Canada and Gérald Ouzounian, international director for the National Radioactive Waste Management Agency (ANDRA), provided a case study from France.

3.1 UNITED STATES CASE STUDIES

Case Study 1: Separations Process Research Unit Tank Waste Sludge

Mrs. Hurley presented the Separations Process Research Unit (SPRU) project as DOE’s case study. In the early 1950s, research on plutonium and uranium separation techniques such as PUREX and REDOX² was performed at SPRU within the Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory (KAPL).³ KAPL, now an active naval nuclear laboratory, is located near Schenectady, New York, adjacent to the Mohawk River. The inactive SPRU facilities occupy about 5 acres of land immediately adjacent to KAPL.

The research at SPRU was performed on a laboratory scale and supported larger operations at both the Hanford Site in Washington and the Savannah River Site in South Carolina. Radioactive liquid and sludge wastes resulting from the SPRU research were stored in seven tanks located on site. The SPRU project timeline was established by the demolition dates for the buildings in which the research was performed and the wastes were stored. There was a strict requirement that the sludge waste be removed and disposed of by spring 2014.

Figure 3-1 provides a cross-section and plan view of two facilities at SPRU. The top drawing is a cross-section of the G2 building, which housed the laboratories, hot cells, and separations processing and testing equipment, and the H2 building, which was used for liquid and solid waste processing. The G2 and H2 buildings are connected by an underground tunnel. The lower drawing in Figure 3-1 shows the plan view of buildings G2 and H2. The tank farm in the lower-right corner of the figure is the focus of this presentation.

The radioactive waste from chemical processing was stored in the H2 tank farm (seven underground concrete-enclosed stainless steel tanks). This waste included about 200 cubic feet (5.7 cubic meters) of sludge consisting

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² REDOX (reduction oxidation) and PUREX (Plutonium and Uranium Recovery by Extraction) are processes for separating uranium and/or plutonium from irradiated fuel and targets.

³ In the 1950s, KAPL was a government research laboratory created by the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (a predecessor agency to DOE).

of fine particulates and liquids containing fission products, mostly cesium and strontium, and long-lived transuranic (TRU) radionuclides, primarily plutonium-239. The sludge contained 36 curies of total radionuclides, including 2.5 to 6.5 curies of TRU radionuclides. The concentration of the long-lived TRU radionuclides in the final waste packages ranged from 11.5 to 65.5 nanocuries per gram (nCi/g).

The total mercury content of the sludge was more than 1 percent, and it contained high levels of lead, chromium, and cadmium. This led to an initial determination that the sludge may be a Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) characteristic hazardous waste⁴ for metals. This waste classification would have complicated the management of the sludge because the hazardous component would be regulated by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in addition to DOE’s regulation of the radioactive component. However, two toxicity characteristic leaching pro-

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⁴ “EPA: Defining Hazardous Waste: Listed, Characteristic and Mixed Radiological Wastes,” accessed February 25, 2017, https://www.epa.gov/hw/defining-hazardous-waste-listedcharacteristic-and-mixed-radiological-wastes#character.

cedures (TCLP)⁵ confirmed that the hazardous component of the waste was only at 0-3 percent of regulatory levels, due to the low solubility of the metals in the sludge. Consequently, the sludge was determined to not contain hazardous waste and could more simply be managed under DOE orders.

DOE Order 435.1, Radioactive Waste Management, was used to guide decisions on disposing of the sludge from SPRU. The Order allows for the disposition of LLW in federal or commercial facilities. An exemption request must be approved by DOE headquarters for waste to be disposed of in a commercial disposal facility. Approval will be given if commercial disposal demonstrates compliance with regulations and waste acceptance criteria (WAC), is cost-effective, and is determined to be “in the best interests of the United States government.”

There were two disposal options for the SPRU sludge: the Nevada Nuclear Security Site (NNSS), a DOE disposal site in Nevada, and Waste Control Specialists (WCS), a commercial disposal site in Texas. Both disposal options were explored, and WCS was selected, in part due to the compressed schedule⁶ for completing cleanup of the SPRU tanks (spring 2014).

DOE worked closely with Texas regulators and WCS on establishing the waste profile⁷ through the standard process described in the WCS Waste Acceptance Plan.⁸ Texas regulators accepted DOE’s policy that waste is not formally classified until all processing is completed and a stabilized waste form is produced. Mrs. Hurley identified this close collaboration as a “key characteristic” for successful disposition of the sludge.

The plan was to have the waste stabilized using a mixture of cement, fly ash, and slag that was then solidified in the final waste package for transportation and final disposal. The sludge solidification system at SPRU was designed and cold tested off site by the vendor and then installed in the H2 tank vault area. Cold-test operations were conducted on site prior to hot operations to ensure the system would perform as designed.

Figure 3-2 is a schematic of the H2 tank vault area and processing systems. Mrs. Hurley noted that there was an airborne release of radioac-

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⁵ TCLP testing determines the mobility of organic and inorganic chemical species within in liquid, solid, and multiphasic wastes. TCLP testing follows specific guidelines established by EPA.

⁶ DOE had an existing contract with WCS, and WCS allowed for a shorter waste profile review time.

⁷ “Waste profiles” are required documents for shipping and acceptance of waste. The waste generator must submit a waste profile of each waste package for approval by the disposal facility prior to shipment. The disposal facility reviews the waste profiles to confirm the waste is compliant with the WAC of the disposal site.

⁸ “Application for License to Authorize Near Surface Disposal of Low-level Radioactive Waste, Appendix 5.2-1: Waste Acceptance Plan Revision 9,” see Section 5.2: Waste Profile Approval, accessed February 25, 2017, http://www.wcstexas.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Waste-Acceptance-Plan.pdf.

tive material at SPRU in 2010. As a consequence of this event, the EPA required DOE to construct a tent enclosure over the H2 facility with portable ventilation units (contained in the outer tent, Area H2 Tent, shown in Figure 3-2). Underneath this larger tent is another tent (Existing Big Top Tent in Figure 3-2) that originally served as a weather enclosure over the tank farm. This weather-enclosure tent was retained when the larger enclosure was constructed to add another level of protection.

Within the Big Top Tent are two additional tents, the Tank Containment Retrieval and Solidification Containment Tents (see Figure 3-2). The sludge retrieval, mixing, processing, and characterization operations were carried out in these tents. Batches of sludge were retrieved from the 509E Tank,⁹ mixed to suspend the solids in the waste, transferred to the final waste package, and then combined with cement, fly ash, and slag. The mixture was periodically checked by a penetration test to determine when it was solidified. If there was any remaining free water, additional cement mix was added.

The waste package was moved into a shielded temporary storage area set up in the G2 building (Figure 3-1).¹⁰ The cement mixture curing times were long because the storage area was unheated. Once fully cured, the waste packages were shipped to WCS for disposal.

Sludge processing began on September 9, 2013, and the final shipments to WCS were completed on February 27, 2014.¹¹ Nearly 10,000 gallons of sludge were processed and solidified in 28 liners. The liners were shipped to WCS via trucks. (There were two liners per truckload and a total of 14 truck shipments.) This campaign removed the majority of the radionuclides from the SPRU site and allowed DOE’s deactivation activities to continue in the H2 basement as scheduled.

While this case study highlights many successes, there were obstacles to overcome, including the following:

• Working within a decades-old facility with limited physical and onsite storage. There was no lay-down area where more than one liner could cure at the same time, and the temporary storage area in the G2 building allowed for 3 to 4 liners at a maximum.
• Retrieving sludge from the 509E Tank, including cleaning out solids near the bottom of the tank.
• Working with a waste stream (sludge) that is difficult to characterize and process. A continuous mixing system was used to keep

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⁹ In 2010, the sludge was consolidated into a single tank, the 509E tank, in preparation for waste processing and disposition.

¹⁰ Mrs. Hurley noted that, at the same time the liners were temporarily stored there, deactivation activities were also taking place to prepare for demolition of the G2 building.

¹¹ The schedule accounted for the fact that concrete would not fully cure during the winter months (the SPRU tanks were covered by an unheated processing tent).

• solids suspended in the waste so that the final waste form was homogenous.

• Performing the sludge processing work immediately adjacent (less than 25 feet or 7.6 meters) to a currently operating research and development laboratory and during deconstruction of the G2 building.
• Performing this work in a tent-type containment structure (Figure 3-2). Portable ventilation units and the HEPA¹² filters were used to ensure that safe working conditions were maintained.
• Addressing waste classification uncertainties. DOE performed historical research and additional evaluations to show that the sludge waste was not high-level waste and could be managed as LLW.

Several key management practices contributed to the success of this project:

• A dedicated and technically competent workforce that understood the mission objective and the importance of safety, including an excellent DOE federal project director.
• Frequent communications among the DOE participants, DOE staff from headquarters, NNSS, DOE’s consolidated business center in Cincinnati, and KAPL, the adjacent research and development laboratory. Support from a “Senior Integrated Project Team” was also key to the success of the project.
• Cold testing of the treatment system at the vendor site and on site prior to operation enabled the right combination of nozzles, sluicing, and camera angles to confirm that the solids were removed from the 509E Tank.
• Early and frequent communication and engagement with the waste disposal experts from WCS.
• Coordination with the expertise throughout the DOE complex on packaging and transportation.

A participant asked Mrs. Hurley how DOE verified that solidification was adequate during cold testing. She responded that the cold testing was primarily to confirm the pump’s ability to mix the solids and liquids and to confirm homogeneous mixing. Solidification was not tested or verified during cold testing; rather, a cement and fly ash “recipe” that was used successfully at other sites was used to solidify the SPRU sludge.

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¹² HEPA is the acronym for high-efficiency particulate air.

Case Study 2: Low-Level Radioactive Waste Streams Reviewed for Disposal at the NNSS: Key Characteristics, Variation, and Management

Mr. Lovato’s presentation included an overview of the waste disposal sites at the NNSS, the waste profile review process, key waste stream characteristics and their variation, and key management steps taken to address some of those different characteristics.

Mr. Lovato explained that NDEP was participating in the workshop because of a memorandum of understanding between the governor of Nevada and the secretary of DOE. One of the goals of the agreement is to hold a workshop to bring more transparency and predictability to DOE’s waste disposal decisions. Mr. Lovato expressed thanks that the workshop was taking place. He noted the desire by Nevada citizens for context and predictability in DOE disposal decisions and asked the workshop participants for help in developing a LLW classification system that would foster greater confidence in future disposal decisions; he also admitted that these requests were tall orders.

Mr. Lovato suggested one way to think about Nevada’s participation in this workshop is illustrated by a famous line from the movie Jerry Maguire, in which the sports agent, played by Tom Cruise, is trying to negotiate a contract for a professional athlete, played by Cuba Gooding, Jr. The sports agent repeatedly asks the athlete to “Help me, help you.” The goal of the memorandum of understanding between Nevada and DOE is to “Help us, help you.”

The NNSS is located about 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas. The Area 5 disposal facility is a secure, 740-acre site located in the southeast corner of the NNSS (see Figure 3-3). The disposal facility is used to dispose of mixed LLW¹³ under a RCRA permit with the state of Nevada. The waste is disposed at depths of up to 24 feet (7.3 meters).

Area 5 receives less than 5 inches (13 centimeters) of annual rainfall, and depth to groundwater is 770 feet (235 meters). Infiltration of precipitation below the plant root zone ceased between 10,000 and 15,000 years ago. Consequently, migration of the waste to groundwater is less of a risk than surface erosion from thunderstorms.

NNSS accepts approximately 1.0-1.5 million cubic feet (28,000-43,000 cubic meters) of LLW, mixed LLW, and classified waste¹⁴ per year from more than 25 different DOE facilities. This amounts to between 5 and 10

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¹³ LLW containing hazardous chemicals is referred to as “mixed LLW.”

¹⁴ DOE defines “classified waste” in Order 435.1 as (DOE, 1999, p. I-2): “Radioactive waste to which access has been limited for national security reasons and cannot be declassified shall be managed in accordance with the requirements of DOE 5632.1C, Protection and Control of Safeguards and Security Interests, and DOE 5633.3B, Control and Accountability of Nuclear Materials.”

percent of the volume of wastes disposed of across the DOE complex, including DOE wastes disposed of at commercial disposal sites (Marcinowski, 2016).

NDEP is a member of the Waste Profile Review Team. The team includes DOE, contractors, and three members of NDEP and meets weekly to review waste profiles against the NNSS WAC. If a waste stream does not meet the WAC, it will not necessarily be rejected for disposal at the NNSS. The performance assessment for the facility can be reanalyzed to determine whether the waste stream under consideration would meet the facility’s performance objectives.

LLW can have a broad spectrum of characteristics. Table 3-1 provides a list of key characteristics of the LLW and mixed-waste streams considered for disposal at the NNSS. (This list was developed by Mr. Lovato based on his experiences at the NNSS.) The table shows that these waste streams have a wide range of half-lives, activities (expressed as a ratio to WAC thresholds), and plutonium equivalent grams.

Using a “plutonium equivalent grams” (PE-g) is a way to normalize the activity of different isotopes in a single package to a single standard (the activity of plutonium-239). This normalization allows for the easy determination of whether a package meets the WAC for the NNSS. (The WAC specifies a PE-g limit for each package.) The WAC for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) also contains a plutonium equivalency criterion. The list of radionuclides in the WAC for the NNSS is far longer than that for WIPP, suggesting that the NNSS deals with a more diverse range of waste streams. In fact, waste characteristics at the NNSS can have a 6-17 order-of-magnitude range in values (see Table 3-1).

Waste management decisions are usually handled on a case-by-case basis to ensure that waste streams are appropriate for disposal at the NNSS and that stakeholder concerns are addressed. Some of the management steps used at the NNSS include decisions to adjust burial depth or transportation routing, conducting exercises in outreach and notification, and ensuring conditions on any waste profile approvals are met.

Case-by-case decisions can seem ad hoc, subjective, and reactive with-

TABLE 3-1 Variation of Key Characteristics in NNSS LLW Profiles.

SOURCE: Modified from G. Lovato, Nevada Division of Environmental Protection.

out a reference system to compare the decisions to—especially when viewed from the outside. Nevada is interested in facilitating alternatives to disposal at the NNSS, for example by the preventing waste streams from being created and finding alternative disposal locations.

Mr. Lovato suggested a potential categorization scheme for LLW that could aid in final disposition decisions (Table 3-2). This scheme proposes a few key physical, chemical, and radiological characteristics and hazards of LLW that should be considered for its safe and secure management and disposal. Also included are key characteristics of a disposal site (i.e., location, security, and control options such as inherent and engineered barriers of a site). A new regulatory framework would break down these characteristics based on the variety of potential LLW streams and transparently list the proposed disposal criteria.

Mr. Lovato suggested that the regulatory framework should be scalable when considering new LLW streams: concerns about the new LLW stream from the waste generators, recipients, public, and DOE should be captured; options for addressing those concerns should be identified using characteristics similar to those in Table 3-2; and options for the management and disposal of a new LLW stream should be compared against each other in a transparent way. The idea is that this new framework could be created a priori without having knowledge of the LLW streams. This type of regulatory framework would be helpful in providing context on LLW disposal decisions.

Mr. Lovato encouraged the participants not to lose heart in terms of trying to develop a better LLW categorization scheme. He acknowledged that past LLW disposal decisions were likely made for expediency and were weighed against what disposal options and regulatory frameworks were available at the time. But it is incumbent upon us in the present day to improve the system, so that future stakeholders have much-needed context for the decision-making process, which may ultimately improve stakeholder confidence in LLW management and disposal decisions.

TABLE 3-2 Potential Categorization Scheme of LLW to Guide Disposition Decisions

SOURCE: Nevada Division of Environmental Protection.

Dr. Robbins asked a clarifying question related to Nevada’s desire to facilitate alternatives to the creation of waste streams. Was there a particular waste stream that does not fall within the NNSS’ remit to accept? If so, can the NNSS discuss the possible acceptance of this waste stream with the waste generator?

Mr. Lovato explained that it is important to the NNSS and Nevada to not only look for alternative disposal options, but also alternative technologies for generating wastes. For example, the NNSS is seen as the disposal facility for sealed sources. But in Nevada’s view, disposal of sealed sources should not default to a single location. So, Nevada is considering alternatives, such as reducing the use of sealed sources to begin with or by considering alternative disposal pathways, so that the NNSS is not relied on for disposal of all sealed sources.

3.2 INTERNATIONAL CASE STUDIES

Case Studies 3-4: Two Low-Level Waste Case Studies from Canada

Mr. Garamszeghy’s presentation was split into three parts: background on Canadian nuclear regulation and management, a case study on the Port Hope Area Initiative (PHAI), and a case study on the Deep Geological Repository for low- and intermediate-level wastes. The PHAI disposal facility is currently under construction. The Deep Geological Repository facility for low- and intermediate-level wastes is still in the regulatory approvals phase.

There are 19 operational power reactors at four sites in Canada (three sites in Ontario and one in New Brunswick). All are CANDU¹⁵ pressurized heavy water reactors, and all are owned by the provincially owned electric utilities (Ontario Power Generation [OPG] and New Brunswick Power). Eight of the reactors in Ontario are leased to a private firm for operation, but OPG retains the responsibility for the waste produced by these reactors and for their decommissioning. There are seven other power reactors in Canada in different stages of decommissioning. There are also seven research reactors in Canada, two reactors (one operating, the other shut down) at the Canadian Nuclear Laboratories (located near Chalk River, Ontario) and the others at universities.¹⁶ There are numerous other historic and legacy sites undergoing decommissioning or remediation.

The Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) is the federal nuclear regulator, equivalent to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

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¹⁵ CANDU refers to CANada Deuterium Uranium reactors. For more information, see: “Canadian Nuclear Association: CANDU Technology,” accessed February 25, 2017, https://cna.ca/technology/energy/candu-technology/.

¹⁶ “Canadian Nuclear Association: Research Reactors,” accessed February 25, 2017, https://cna.ca/technology/research-development/research-reactors/.

(USNRC) in the United States. Unlike Agreement States in the United States, the CNSC has not devolved any regulatory responsibilities to Canadian provinces.¹⁷ The Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency (CEAA) is the federal agency responsible for the environmental assessment process. In the past there was a Joint Review Panel, which was a project-specific panel set up jointly by the CNSC and the CEAA, to review environmental assessment applications and specific license applications. This process is no longer used for nuclear projects. The proponent or the project owner/operator also has responsibilities as the eventual license holder. The proponents prepare the environmental assessment, the safety report, and the thousands of pages of support documentation.

The CNSC takes its authority from the Nuclear Safety and Control Act of 2000. It is a “quasi-judicial administration tribunal” that reports directly to Parliament. The commission members are independent and mostly part-time. All of the commission hearings are open to the public and are webcasted.

The CNSC has federal jurisdiction over both nuclear facilities and activities, much the same as the USNRC. It also provides regulatory oversight of all the licensees and disseminates objective scientific, technical, and regulatory information to the public—a fairly important role when it comes to public engagement for nuclear- and waste-related projects. The decisions of the CNSC can only be challenged through judicial review in federal court. The CNSC’s decision making is transparent and science-based, at least in theory.

Risk assessments that apply to waste disposal include both a normal evolution scenario (climate change and gradual loss of engineered barriers) and disruptive scenarios (such as human intrusion). The assessment timeframe encompasses the time of maximum calculated impact (e.g., peak dose). In the case of a radioactive waste disposal facility, that time may be several million years in the future. The dose constraint for the normal evolution scenario is 0.3 milliseiverts per year (mSv/yr), equivalent to 30 millirem per year (mrem/yr). For disruptive scenarios, it is usually only a guideline of 1 mSv/yr (or 100 mrem/yr).

Canada has several types challenging LLW streams including:

• Higher activity wastes
  • — significant amounts of carbon-14 from CANDU reactors,
  • — irradiated/activated zirconium and niobium hardware from reactor refurbishments,
  • — high-activity cobalt-60 waste, and

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¹⁷ Mr. Garamszeghy identified one exception as some uranium mines in Saskatchewan, which has a dual federal-provincial regulatory framework.

• • — stored tritium (each storage canister holds about half a million curies of tritium).
• Waste from small waste generators who may have difficulty identifying disposal pathways, especially for intermediate-level waste; and
• Large volumes of historic wastes, of which characteristics and quantities not always well documented.

The PHAI will dispose of approximately 2 million cubic meters of waste, mostly soils, in engineered mound-type facilities with multicomponent caps. This disposal will take place in two locations near Port Hope and Port Granby, located east of Toronto. The Port Hope facility is expected to be in operation in 2017; the Port Granby facility is expected to be in operation in 2018. Most of the wastes to be disposed of in these facilities are located at these facilities or nearby.

The history of the sites that are hosting these facilities can be seen in Box 3-1. The Port Hope site was used first for radium refining and later for uranium refining. These activities contaminated the site and produced large volumes of waste. A task force was established in 1988 to find a site in Canada to dispose of the Port Hope wastes. The task force was unable to reach an agreement with a community in Canada to host a site primarily because of concerns about transporting large volumes of radioactive waste.

In 1997, Hope Township initiated a proposal to construct a long-term waste management facility near the Port Hope site. The PHAI was initiated in 2001, and environmental assessments were completed for Port Hope and Port Granby projects by 2009. Part of the agreement includes the Property Value Protection (PVP) program, which will compensate homeowners should the value of their property be reduced by the presence of the facilities.

The CNSC granted the construction license for the facility in Port Hope in 2009 and a construction license for Port Granby in 2011. The federal government made a major commitment of more than $1 Canadian billion to fund the construction of the two sites in 2012.

The Deep Geological Repository for low- and intermediate-level waste will be used to dispose of OPG-owned waste (i.e., waste from the operation and maintenance of OPG-owned facilities). The repository site is located near the Bruce Nuclear Generating Station on the eastern shore of Lake Huron in Ontario.

The community near the Bruce station volunteered to host the disposal facility. The community preferred that a single facility be used to dispose of all of OPG’s waste. Accordingly, a deep geologic repository was designed for co-disposal of low- and intermediate-level wastes. A near-surface facility would not have been able to accept all of the intermediate-level wastes

currently stored on the site. Also, a single deep geologic repository is less costly than building two separate disposal facilities.

The repository has a design capacity of about 200,000 cubic meters as packaged for disposal at a reference depth of 680 meters. Operation was originally expected to begin in the mid-2020s. The repository is currently in the regulatory review process (which is taking longer than the originally scheduled 2 years).

The official hosting agreement was signed in 2004 and was approved by the community in 2005 based on an independent poll of all year-round and seasonal residents.¹⁸ It provides approximately $30 million in compensation to both the official host town (Kincardine) and other surrounding communities. The compensation is tied to project milestones until the repository construction is complete. After disposal operations begin, the compensation is akin to an annual fee.

The environmental assessment and licensing documentation was submitted to the CSNC in April 2011, but Canadian federal elections delayed the appointment of the Joint Review Panel until January 2012. The Joint Review Panel then implemented a public comment period that was originally planned to last for 90 days. However, the period was repeatedly extended and lasted for more than 1 year. There were, in total, 31 days of public hearings, which created 20,000 pages of documentation and more information requests from the Joint Review Panel and public. The Panel’s report was submitted to the CSNC in May 2015; it strongly recommended the repository proceed to the licensing phase.

CEAA then held a public comment period. A decision by the Minister of Environment was expected in September 2015 but was subsequently extended to December. Another Canadian federal election in fall 2015 resulted in a change in government. The new minister asked for more work to be done. The responses to the minister’s request are expected to be submitted by the end of 2016 with a final decision by the minister on the environmental assessment in early 2017.¹⁹ If the minister approves the project it will move to the licensing phase.

This project has had several successes. Throughout the public review—with extensive local, national, and international scrutiny—the scientific evidence remained sound and passed all credible challenges. Despite a number of changes in government, local leadership, and residents, the politicians

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¹⁸ There is a large contingent of weekend cottage owners in the area. When the poll was conducted, both full-time and part-time homeowners were contacted.

¹⁹ Note: the most recent update on this process was posted on April 15, 2017. The public comment period was closed on March 7, 2017. On April 5, 2017, CEAA requested additional information from OPG. “CEAA: Deep Geologic Repository Project for Low and Intermediate Level Radioactive Waste,” accessed April 27, 2017, http://www.ceaa-acee.gc.ca/050/detailseng.cfm?evaluation=17520.

and the local community remained supportive. The project delays have allowed some opposition groups in Canada and the United States to organize and gain some support. Some members of the public became confused between two nuclear waste disposal projects planned in the same area, one for OPG’s low- and intermediate-level waste and the other for spent fuel. Public outreach continues, and OPG continues to respond to public questions and concerns. The formal decision by the Minister will define the project’s next step.

Case Study 5: The French Case: Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management

Dr. Ouzounian’s case study provided insight into the French approach to disposing of very low-level waste and LLW. He noted that his presentation focused mostly on the LLW because it is more challenging and more interesting in terms of approach and process.

ANDRA is responsible for the long-term management of all radioactive waste produced in France. The agency is independent from waste producers and reports to ministers in charge of the environment, energy, and research. It has approximately 650 employees with an annual budget of €250 million. ANDRA’s work is performed within the framework of the Planning Act of June 28, 2006 on the sustainable management of radioactive materials and wastes.²⁰

Safety of the population and protection of the environment are set by a national framework law and are of the highest priority in determining disposal pathways for waste. Forecasts and inventories of waste lead to a National Management Plan, which is used to identify disposition pathways for all types of waste.

There is an effort to identify a safe disposition pathway proportionate to the hazard for each type of waste. French regulations do not allow for clearance of wastes from nuclear-related activities. France uses a policy of “waste zoning” at the generator’s plant to segregate waste from zones that generate radioactive waste from those that do not.

The French radioactive waste classification scheme is shown in Figure 3-4 and described below:

• Intermediate-level and low-level wastes are generated by the day-to-day operations at the nuclear power plants (NPP; green box in Figure 3-4). These wastes, previously disposed of at the Centre de la Manche disposal facility (CSM), are currently being sent to the

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²⁰ “ANDRA: Overview of national policy concerning radioactive waste management,” accessed February 25, 2017, http://www.andra.fr/international/pages/en/menu21/national-framework/overview-of-national-policy-1593.html.

Centres de stockage de l’Aube (CSA), which has been operational since 1992.

• Intermediate-level and high-level wastes are generated during uranium fuel recycling (i.e., reprocessing) (pink box in Figure 3-4). This waste will be stored in the geological disposal facility, the Cigéo Project.²¹
• Very low-level waste is generated from shut-down and decommissioning (or dismantling) operations. This waste is disposed of at the Centre Industriel de Regroupement, d’Entreposage et de Stockage (CIRES) facility (upper blue box in Figure 3-4).
• Low-level, but long-lived, waste, is generated from graphite gas-cooled reactors and, for example, from the production of rare earth metals (lower solid blue box in Figure 3-4).

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²¹ France has made progress toward addressing its intermediate- and high-level wastes through the Cigéo Project, constructed in a clay formation at 500 meters depth and expected to be commissioned by 2025.

Waste from small producers or other nuclear activities can span the range of waste types shown in Figure 3-4 but represents a minor part of the inventory.

There are two characteristics shown in Figure 3-4: activity levels and half-lives. Activity levels (rows in Figure 3-4) span orders of magnitude (less than 100 becquerels per gram [Bq/g] to more than 1 billion Bq/g) because there are specific threshold values for each radionuclide. Activity levels for very low-level waste range from 0 to 100 Bq/g with an average value of approximately 10 Bq/g. Waste is classified as “short-lived” or “long-lived” based on whether its half-life is less than or equal to or greater than 31 years, respectively (columns in Figure 3-4). The 31-year half-life is approximately the half-life of cesium-137, which is 30.17 years.²²

It is not possible from an operational standpoint to separate short-lived and long-lived radionuclides in NPP waste. There are always some long-lived radionuclides in this waste. WAC for very low-level and low-level disposal facilities in France allow for the disposal of waste containing certain amounts of long-lived radionuclides.

The principles behind radioactive waste disposal in France are, first, to contain and isolate the waste until it reaches a level of activity that does not represent significant hazard to the public or the environment (the monitoring phase in Figure 3-5). And, second, to limit the transfer of waste to the biosphere and to humans (the post-monitoring phase in Figure 3-5). As seen in Figure 3-5, the containment phase lasts for about 300 years for near-surface disposal of waste with low levels of activity and several hundreds of thousands of years for geological disposal of high-level waste.

Dr. Ouzounian described the CSA disposal facility for low-level and intermediate-level short-lived waste. The facility was licensed and commissioned in 1992 with a total capacity of 1 million cubic meters—enough capacity to contain all of the low- and intermediate-level radioactive waste generated by the present fleet of French NPPs (58 reactors). The CSA facility was designed to contain and isolate the waste for 300 years, as required by the monitoring requirement mentioned previously, and to meet the requirements for the long-term post-monitoring phase.

The French waste disposal system employs the “defense-in-depth” concept with a multi-barrier system. The system consists of the waste package, which includes a containment material enveloping the waste (the first barrier); the disposal vault, which includes a network control gallery to control water that may flow through the disposal facility and final cover (the second barrier); and the geological environment, which has natural barriers such as

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²² The Planning Act of June 28, 2006 on the sustainable management of radioactive materials and waste specifies that the half-life cut-off between short-lived and long-lived waste is 31 years.

clay to retard waste migration (the third barrier). This third barrier is the most important barrier in the post-monitoring phase.

Figure 3-6 is a schematic of the defense-in-depth disposal concept. A draining layer underlays the disposal facility, which in turn is underlain by an impermeable layer. The water table is shown with an outlet, labeled as “source” in the figure.

Inventory monitoring is essential for the effective management of radioactive waste—especially for managing long-lived radionuclides such as carbon-14, chlorine-36, and some beta emitters. NPP operators do not generally monitor for these isotopes because they do not impact daily plant operations. Therefore, the French regulator has established specific characterization requirements for these radionuclides for disposal purposes. For near-surface waste disposal, long-lived radionuclides are the major contributors to public doses in the post-monitoring phase.

Dr. Ouzounian’s presentation also introduced France’s approach to safety assessments, details on waste control acceptance criteria, and examples highlighting key aspects of safe operations and the defense-in-depth concept. Of particular relevance to this workshop was a discussion on the WAC for waste packages. These include:

• Radiological content
• Physical characteristics
• Chemical stability
• Gas generation
• Expected performance for long time periods
• Leaching rate
• Uniform distribution within the waste package (no hot spots)

Dr. Ouzounian provided historical perspective on the progression of safety rules, disposal concepts, and protection criteria in France. The safety rules were defined progressively, learning through the operational experiences of disposal facilities. Documents were updated and improved according to the experience of the operators—not the regulatory body. However, any changes to improve the safety rules are validated and endorsed by the regulatory body. General operational rules, and safety and radiation protection criteria, are also updated continuously.

John Applegate, the planning committee chair and executive vice president for University Academic Affairs of Indiana University, asked where the WAC (bulleted list above) came from and whether they had a risk basis. Dr. Ouzounian noted that the WAC were generated from safety assessments. Mr. Applegate also commented that experience at the prior disposal facility (CSM) appeared to be very helpful in designing the new facility (CSA), to which Dr. Ouzounian strongly agreed. All the incidents and malfunctions

that occurred with the first disposal facility—which was designed without the benefit of detailed computer models—allowed for improvements to the new facility. The first safety regulations (1984 and 1985) are the result of the experiences from the first facility.

Dr. Ouzounian also noted the importance of adapting to knowledge gained from waste disposal experience in general. The process of developing an approach for the management and disposition of nuclear waste began in 1969, and much has been learned progressively. For example, it is now clear that the physical processes likely to occur should be well-understood and well-described, which requires high-quality modeling due to the long timescales involved. It is not possible to run an experiment for 100 to 300 years (or longer) to determine what may happen. The values, characteristics, and sources of hazards that are used in our assessments are the result of the models. This is why waste disposition decisions are site-specific, and also why we cannot transpose from one site to the other.

Dr. Robbins asked for clarification on one aspect of the French waste classification scheme. Is the irradiated graphite shown in Figure 3-4 considered LLW or intermediate-level waste according to the French classification scheme? Dr. Ouzounian explained that it is considered to be low-level but long-lived radioactive waste. One of the disposal options being studied is to segregate different types of graphite for disposal in different types of facilities depending on its irradiation level and activity.

3.3 DISCUSSION: KEY CHARACTERISTICS OF LLW AND CHALLENGING LLW STREAMS

Workshop chair John Applegate moderated the closing discussion on the first day’s presentations. He noted that three organizing elements for managing challenging LLW streams were discussed:

• Characteristics of the waste. Defining waste characteristics is a technical issue. Mr. Applegate suggested that one could identify which characteristics are most important for making LLW disposal decisions. Alternatively, one could identify which characteristics are not important and are unnecessarily complicating waste disposal decisions.
• Waste management practices. Mr. Applegate asked whether participants could identify management practices that were unnecessarily slowing waste management decisions.
• Regulatory framework. Mr. Applegate asked participants to identify aspects of the current U.S. regulatory framework that are perceived to be failing. What can we learn from the experiences of other nations and international bodies? Mr. Applegate noted that

Flexibility as a Double-Edged Sword

Kevin Crowley, director of the Nuclear and Radiation Studies Board at the National Academies, suggested that diversity and flexibility within disposal decision making is a double-edged sword. There is not much trouble handling diversity and flexibility from a technical standpoint. Where decision makers tend to fail is when they try to explain the diverse and flexible process to the people they serve. Dr. Crowley noted the importance of clearly communicating with the people who are served about the decision process: say what you are going to do, and do what you say you are going to do. Clear communication may be difficult when a system is too flexible and diverse.

Dr. Ouzounian argued that flexibility is crucially important, but it cannot be “free” flexibility. The flexibility needs to exist within a regulatory framework with clear rules, and one must be able to demonstrate that alternatives are safe and effective.

Mr. Applegate asked what a diverse and flexible framework might look like for LLW management. Mr. Garamszeghy responded that there are probably a couple approaches for establishing such a framework. One might use a performance standard, which requires a demonstration of how waste containment will be achieved. As long as the site is operated within an approved performance standard, there would be flexibility to make disposal decisions that meet that standard. This would be more flexible than a system that is based on compounding and conflicting regulations on allowable disposal options by waste type. Mr. Garamszeghy acknowledged that detailed regulations provide additional guidance to the user, but they also make it difficult to find innovative solutions when exceptions are presented.

Paul Black, chief executive officer of Neptune and Company, Inc., noted that although flexibility is critically important, cost-benefit analysis should also be considered in regulatory decisions and discussions. The current U.S. regulatory framework limits flexibility in strange ways because of competing regulatory structures. In order for the structure to change for the better, Dr. Black argued, one should strive for regulations that are simple and guidance that is process-oriented (rather than prescriptive) and based on cost-benefit considerations. The U.S. Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has the responsibility to evaluate new policies and rulemakings. As part of that evaluation, a cost-benefit analysis must be performed. OMB

has developed guidance on using cost-benefit analysis.²³ Dr. Black suggested that both DOE and the USNRC should consider this guidance.

Mr. Applegate offered ALARA²⁴ as an example of a cost-benefit construct. Dr. Black strongly agreed and suggested that sustainability is another example. Sustainability balances three pillars: costs/economics, sociopolitical factors, and environmental factors. Dr. Black suggested that a framework for regulatory decision-making should combine the sustainability context (National Research Council, 2011b) with OMB’s approach and guidance. Dr. Ouzounian noted that before cost-benefit can be assessed, safety must first be robustly demonstrated with a defense-in-depth approach.

Jennifer Heimberg, rapporteur and National Academies staff, asked Mr. Lovato whether he found it beneficial to have flexibility with the way DOE regulates over the USNRC’s approach. She asked for any specific examples that showed how DOE’s flexibility was utilized. Mr. Lovato noted that the NNSS does not have advance information about the variety of waste streams that will require disposal, so the DOE Orders are a good management structure for evaluating different types of waste streams. As an example, he cited radioisotope thermoelectric generators (strontium-90 sources originally from the Air Force) that required disposal. This waste had to be evaluated slightly differently from other waste streams; the flexibility in the DOE Orders allowed for that. However, he noted that it is always helpful to have a framework (e.g., the USNRC waste classification system) that can be used to explain waste management decisions to members of the public. Mr. Lovato was not advocating that a USNRC framework be used for DOE waste, but he cited it as the type of framework that is helpful for discussions with the public.

Elevating the Importance of Site Characteristics

Mr. Garamszeghy previously suggested that performance assessments be used as a framework for allowing flexibility in decisions while also providing boundaries. Mr. Applegate took this idea a step further by suggesting the following: One of the criticisms of the current U.S. regulatory framework is that it focuses on waste sources. What if the framework

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²³ “Circular A-4: Regulatory Impact Analysis: A Primer,” accessed March 27, 2017, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/regpol/circular-a-4regulatoryimpact-analysis-a-primer.pdf. Circular A-4 is referenced in the Trump administration’s interim guidance: https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/02/02/interim-guidanceimplementing-section-2-executive-order-january-30-2017.

²⁴ ALARA is “as low as reasonably achievable” and refers to the practice of reducing exposure to ionizing radiation through every reasonable effort. “USNRC: ALARA,” accessed February 25, 2017, https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/basic-ref/glossary/alara.html.

instead focused on disposal facilities? In other words, disposal decisions would be based on whether the waste could be safely disposed of in a facility as demonstrated by a performance assessment, irrespective of the waste source. For example, for waste potentially being sent to WCS, one would ask, “What does it take to make it safe there?”

Mr. Shrum supported this idea and restated it in another form: “Consider the waste. It can go here. It can’t go there.” He noted that performance assessments have been done at all of the U.S. disposal facilities and is required under 10 CFR Part 61. But Mr. Shrum noted a potential communication problem with this approach: those whom we serve do not necessarily understand the details of a performance assessment, so they will not necessarily trust the output of the analysis. He said that the members of the public often do not understand that performance assessments are used to guide—not make—decisions. He supported Mr. Applegate’s approach, but he noted that effective ways would need to be developed to educate the public for this approach to be successful.

He also noted that scientific understanding of radioactive wastes and disposal facilities have grown significantly since the 1950s, when commercial radioactive wastes were first disposed of. Mr. Shrum argued that this new understanding must be used to inform current disposal decisions. The nuclear industry as a whole has not been very good at describing the technical rationale for disposal decisions to the public, and, Mr. Shrum believes, that will have to change as part of a new framework.

Dr. Crowley noted that the workshop was intended to focus on exceptions. There are many exceptions to the existing regulations and rules, and there are questions about the best way to handle exceptions in the future. One option is to change the rules to include the exceptions. But this is unlikely in the short term. Another option is to establish procedures to handle the exceptions, for example by establishing “mini rules” that may not be incorporated into the regulations. Those mini-rules could be implemented at disposal facilities using their WAC, which of course are based on performance assessments.

However, it is difficult to anticipate the full variety of wastes that might come to a facility during its design or construction stages. On the other hand, one could probably think about unanticipated wastes during the design and construction stages and determine how they might be handled. Facility-specific performance assessments are a reasonable way to proceed.

Mr. Applegate commented that Dr. Crowley appeared to have endorsed his idea of focusing on disposal facilities instead of the waste source. A disposal facility could develop WAC to which waste streams are matched. Dr. Crowley agreed that this approach could work as long as the analysis was done within the framework of the current regulations. A near-surface disposal facility is only going to take certain types of waste; the framework

suggested by Mr. Applegate should not be used to try to dispose of highly radioactive waste in near-surface facilities.

Dr. Black disagreed with the approach suggested by Mr. Applegate, primarily because he is not content with current regulations for radioactive waste disposal. They are overly conservative, so WACs developed using the existing regulations will also be overly constraining. For example, the inadvertent intrusion scenario in the regulations makes no sense for arid disposal sites according to Dr. Black.

Several years ago, Dr. Black developed a performance assessment for the Nevada Test Site (now NNSS), which allowed a user to enter the characteristics of a waste stream and get an answer within hours on whether it could be disposed of at the site (DOE, 2006 and Crowe et al., 2005). Dr. Black argued that this is a better approach than WACs for evaluating whether a waste stream can be disposed of in a particular facility.

Taking Advantage of Knowledge Gained

Mr. Shrum previously introduced the idea of taking advantage of knowledge gained over decades of disposal operations, and Dr. Ouzounian also mentioned this idea in his case study. Scott Kirk, director of regulatory affairs at BWXT, raised this issue for further discussion, noting that the nuclear waste disposal industry has matured over the past 40 years. Modern state-of-the-art disposal facilities such as the WCS facility in Texas are remarkably different in siting and design than older disposal facilities such as Barnwell, which was state of the art in 1969. The modern sites are in arid environments, far removed from water tables, and designed with insights from 40 years of operating experience. These modern sites might be suitable for disposal of challenging LLW waste streams that could not be disposed of in older facilities. It would be useful to assess the suitability of current regulatory requirements against these modern facilities.

Charles Maguire, drector of the Radioactive Materials Division within the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality, highlighted the current state of regulations through an analogy. Most of the huge gothic cathedrals in Europe took approximately four generations to build. The last generation to work on the cathedral had little understanding of the reasons for the size, shape, or composition of the cornerstone. Yet the cathedral was built on it, and the generations of workers that followed improved their skills as cathedral construction progressed. Mr. Maguire noted that we are about to pass our nuclear knowledge on to a fourth generation of workers. But we are telling these workers to use the same tools and techniques as previous generations. We are not “getting better.”

Mr. Maguire asserted that we have to get better and to apply what we learn. We now take without question what the generation before said was

essential, and we do not apply what has been learned about mitigating risk. He concluded that we need to make sure that as we build up the structure it becomes more beautiful or practical and that we are on a path to do better. Otherwise, we may end up with a regulatory framework that no one can afford to use.

From the Outside Looking In: Public Perception

Ms. Edwards suggested that terminology is important in communicating with the public, and that the LLW classification system makes clear communications difficult. Previously, one could refer to Class A LLW as a hazard that lasted about 100 years, Class C waste as a hazard that lasted 500 years, and high-level waste as a hazard that lasted tens of thousands of years. This hazard differentiation is important because the public can become confused between high-level and low-level waste. But the 1,000-year compliance period for certain types of LLW in the proposed 10 CFR Part 61 regulation blurs the previous hazard distinctions.

Mr. Camper noted that USNRC staff were trying to address the disposal of large amounts of depleted uranium and used this opportunity to add a requirement that was not previously embodied in the regulation (but should have been). The existing 10 CFR Part 61 does not specify a period of compliance but the proposed 10 CFR Part 61 rulemaking specifies a two-tiered approach to a period of compliance, i.e., Tier 1 at 1,000 years and Tier 2 up to 10,000 years.

Mr. Garamszeghy noted that the public perceives “nuclear” and “waste” as highly dangerous in part because of the complicated and prescriptive regulations that govern them. The thought is, “It must be dangerous because there are all these regulations to protect us.”

Mr. Applegate asked Mr. Garamszeghy to expand on his presentation about compensating the communities in which the Port Hope and Port Granby LLW facilities were sited. Was there a “general sense of fairness” argument? Or was it seen as compensating for risk? Or simply paying for the privilege? Mr. Garamszeghy explained that the intent of the PVP program was never to, for lack of a better word, “buy” public support. Rather, it was recognized that building and operating the LLW facility would strain the local communities in terms of a number of new people coming in and wear and tear on public facilities, for example. The PVP program ensured that the local towns, communities, and people were no worse off after the facility was in place than they would be if the facility was not there.

Dr. Crowley commented on the recurring topic of public perceptions and communications. The term “educating the public” is often used. He finds this term to be denigrating because it suggests that the public is not educated and that, if it were, the public would agree with the experts’

conclusions—which is not always the case. Two-way communications are required to understand the concerns that the people who live around sites have about those sites.

Dr. Ouzounian noted that the term “stakeholders” is no longer used in France. Rather, the terms “concerned” or “interested parties” are used because this involves all parties, including waste producers and academics.

He also noted that the French Parliament passed a law in July 2016 as the result of a public debate on social benefits and responsibilities. The current generation benefits from the electricity generated by nuclear power plants, so it should be responsible for solving the waste management problem for following generations. The law required that a master plan describing all the major milestones of the lifetime of each disposal facility be developed and periodically reviewed. Initially, the planned review period was 10 years. However, Parliament decided that reviews will occur every 5 years with the involvement of all concerned or interested parties.

Dr. Ouzounian also commented on compensation to local communities. Compensation is provided because of expected damage to the infrastructure and the environment, resulting for example from large numbers of trucks on the roads during construction, not from increased risk. Parliament had another important debate in 2006. One side was arguing that nuclear industries were “buying the public” by giving money to communities. The other side was argued by the high commissioner for nuclear power in France. He pointed out that one community will accept the waste that belongs to all French people benefitting from electricity. This one community shows their solidarity with the country. He argued that, therefore, it was the responsibility of the rest of France to also show solidarity by supporting the community in developing its territory and its activities. This latter argument was accepted by the Parliament and ended comments about “buying the people.”

Dr. Black also commented on communication and public perception. He recalled that Mr. Shrum said that issues with LLW are more political than technical. The politics really come down to stakeholders, which means everyone associated with the disposal facility or the potential facility and the affected communities. The different outcomes for the Yucca Mountain and WIPP facilities provide a good example. In both cases, decisions on facility siting and construction were influenced by stakeholders and the political environment rather than the technical analyses. Dr. Black believes it is important to understand and “get on top of” the stakeholder issues before addressing regulatory change.

Mr. Camper spoke about the evolution of stakeholder engagement on USNRC decisions. Earlier in his career at the USNRC, staff would create new regulations and guidance documents without public input. But that changed over time for a number of reasons, not the least of which were

regulatory failures. Stakeholders and interested parties demanded that decisions not be based entirely on the USNRC’s scientific analyses. These demands have changed the way new regulations are developed and released.

“Regulatory Morass” Redux

Dr. Black commented that the “regulatory morass” that he referred to previously includes TRU waste. Defense TRU waste must be disposed of at WIPP, a deep geologic repository, but commercial waste containing less than 100 nCi/g of TRU nuclides can be disposed of in a near-surface disposal facility meeting the requirements of 10 CFR Part 61. Also, there are multiple regulations from DOE, USNRC, EPA, and the states for disposal facilities, some of which overlap or are in conflict.

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