Summary

As ballistic missile technology proliferates, and as ballistic missile defenses are deployed by both the Russian Federation and the United States, it is increasingly important for these two countries to seek ways to reap the benefits of systems that can protect their own national security interests against limited missile attacks from third countries without undermining the strategic balance that the two governments maintain to ensure stability. This report provides the technical rationale for the advantages of cooperation between the United States and the Russian Federation on the development and use of regional missile defense systems.

The statement of task that guided the work of the joint committees of the National Academy of Sciences and the Russian Academy of Sciences is as follows:

The feasibility of cooperation between states in the field of national security is dependent on the state of their overall political relationship. Today, U.S.-Russian relations are poor and are not conducive to new technical cooperation. Although the joint committees are convinced that the cooperation described in this report is in the security interests of both the United States and the Russian Federation and would not pose a threat to strategic stability, factors beyond the scope of their analysis make such cooperation unlikely over the short term. Differing views of the conflicts in Ukraine and Syria and of treaty compliance^* have maintained political tensions between the two states at levels that many view as reminiscent of the Cold War.

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^* Both the United States and the Russian Federation have alleged that the other party violated the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty). The full text of the treaty is: INF Treaty, signed December 8, 1987, available at https://www.state.gov/t/avc/trty/102360.htm, accessed on October 23, 2018; Pifer, S., January 22, 2018, “Russia Denies it Violates the INF Treaty. OK, Show It (Op-ed),” The Moscow Times, available at https://themoscowtimes.com/articles/russia-denies-it-violates-the-inf-treaty-ok-show-it-op-ed-60200, accessed on October 24, 2018.

The benefits of cooperation can only be realized in practice in the context of a corresponding cooperative political and strategic environment. Unfortunately, such an environment does not currently exist. Missile defense cooperation described in this study will be possible only if positive changes occur in the overall strategic environment. This will require great political, diplomatic, and technical efforts on both sides.

The joint committees have neither the mandate nor the ability to bring about such positive changes. They believe however, that the approach set forth in the following chapters is technically sound and, when conditions permit its implementation, would improve the security of both countries. They also believe that there will come a time when it will be politically feasible for the Russian Federation and the United States to cooperate in ways that directly enhance the security of both nations and that therefore should be acceptable to both governments. The findings and recommendations set forth below are offered for implementation at that time.

The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty precluded^* both the Russian Federation and the United States from possessing land-based missiles of ranges between 500 and 5,500 km.³ For convenience, the joint committees refer to such missiles as intermediate-range ballistic missiles, or IRBMs, throughout this report. As a result, improving each nation’s ability to defend against such missiles should have no significant impact on the strategic balance between the two states. Cooperation in areas of national security must be executed carefully to be constructive and sustainable, but the joint committees emphasize that such cooperation is both feasible in principle and potentially of significant value to enhancing the security of both countries.

Today, several countries are developing missile programs. A select number of them are considered in this study due to the lack of transparency about these programs and a lack of understanding about these countries’ policies and motivations, as well as the possibility of future internal instability in these countries. These combined factors make these missile programs potential threats that may not be deterrable by classical means. The joint committees’ analysis of these threats is based on technical capabilities of select missile programs. They have not considered the intent of countries to use these missiles, and have not analyzed the degree to which the states involved currently pose, or are likely to pose in the future, an actual military threat to either the Russian Federation or the United States. Intermediate- and medium-range missiles from any of the

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^* On February 2, 2019, the United States submitted its formal notice of withdrawal from the INF Treaty to the Russian Federation. See Amy F.Woolf, “U.S. Withdrawal from the INF Treaty,” CRS Insight, February 1, 2019, available at https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/IN10985.pdf, accessed June 26, 2019. On March 4, 2019, the Russian Federation signed an executive order suspending the Russian Federation compliance with the INF Treaty. See The Kremlin, “Executive Order suspending Russia’s compliance with the USSR-US INF Treaty,” March 4, 2019, available at en.kremlin.ru/d/59939, accessed on June 26, 2019.

states considered in this report could present a physical threat to the territory of the Russian Federation as well as to U.S. allies and deployed U.S. forces.

Defense against ballistic missiles is technically challenging, especially in the case of medium-range ballistic missiles because of their short flight times. In this context, technical cooperation on ballistic missile defense can help substantially, including in the domain of situational awareness (alert and tracking) as advocated in this report.

Internal Russian analysis (which has not been reviewed in technical detail by U.S. committee members) suggests that having such data would reduce the number of interceptors necessary for dealing with small attacks (e.g., up to five attack missiles) against an individual military-industrial center in Russia by a factor of about one-half.^* In other words, to defend against a hypothetical attack on such a center in Russia without additional data obtained from information sharing, five interceptors may be needed to confidently strike the incoming missile. Whereas, with the additional data available through information sharing, two to three interceptors may be needed to confidently strike an incoming missile. From the U.S. perspective, information sharing, including data from LEO satellites, could provide many of the benefits promised by the now-cancelled Precision Tracking Space System.^† From the U.S. perspective, these benefits are calculated in terms of time saved prior to interceptor launch, thereby increasing the chances of a more accurately aimed interceptor launch. A LEO satellite system with a more agile pointing system and moderately capable infrared sensors could provide an earlier firing solution than without such a satellite system, enabling earlier interceptor launch and thereby improving effectiveness, both in terms of targeting the threat missile and in terms of the area defended.

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^* Russian ballistic missile defense is structured around the defense of a set of such centers as described in Chapter 3.

^† This system is designed for space-based tracking of ballistic missiles, enabling simultaneous homeland, regional, and theatre missile defense. Missile Defense Agency, 2013, “Missile Defense Agency: Fact Sheet,” available at https://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/ptss.pdf; accessed on June 7, 2019.

The purpose of such a Joint Information-Sharing Center would be to gain practical experience in implementing data-sharing efforts. Such a center would provide a sensible way to create a common information database and would be a first step toward militarily significant information sharing in near-real-time. The center would be tasked with developing the ability for each country to conduct common operations, should relations between them allow it. As those procedures develop, the countries would consider whether the ultimate near-real-time sharing would occur at the Joint Information-Sharing Center or in a separate, newly constructed center.

These measures (listed below and described in Chapter 6 of this report) have not been analyzed in depth and may or may not be technically feasible:

• Intelligence-based information exchange
• Shared ground-based and sea-based radar early warning and tracking data
• Other cooperative measures
  • Joint observations of test flights
  • Deconfliction of operations
  • Coordination of operations to address common threats
  • Establishment of a joint coordination center for pooling of information and deconflicting of operations
  • Joint tabletop and command-post exercises

Many of these measures would require a greater degree of mutual trust than now exists between the United States and the Russian Federation. Although they are beyond the scope of this report, these measures may deserve consideration in the future.

These findings lead the joint committees to make the following recommendations:

Concrete steps toward this end could include establishing joint government-to-government policy and technical committees to address policy and technical considerations in implementation of the information sharing advocated here. Such sharing must be carefully managed to protect sensitive information yet allow for the security benefits of cooperation. Specifically, the joint committees propose that a joint team of military technical experts be established to explicitly define initial activities that could be pursued cooperatively. In practice, the data selected for sharing would not be raw data, and experts from the United States and the Russian Federation may determine that the sharing of near-real-time data is most feasible.

Experience gained in past joint efforts should be especially useful as the basis for implementing these recommendations. The government committees associated with the previously agreed-upon center would be suitable bodies to examine and draw lessons from past experience.

The Russian Federation and the United States are on a dangerous course, heading into uncharted waters with real potential for misunderstandings and instability. When political conditions allow, the countries should engage in discussions of the new multidimensional strategic stability environment, initiate cooperation in areas that serve both countries’ interests, and begin to rebuild trust and confidence that will serve as the foundation for greater stability.

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