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EASE OF USE (NOMINAL SCALE OF DIFFICULT-MODERATE-EASY) INDUSTRY USE (NOMINAL SCALE OF HIGH- MED-LOW) TIME TO IMPLEMENT (NOMINAL SCALE OF LONG- MEDIUM-SHORT) LABOR INTENSIVE (SCALE OF UP TO 3 $S) COST TO IMPLEMENT (SCALE OF UP TO 3 $S) EFFECTIVENESS (SCALE OF UP TO 5 STARS) DIFFICULT Requires extensive effort to accomplish MODERATE Requires some effort to accomplish EASY Requires minimal effort to accomplish UNKNOWN Data not available HIGH More than two-thirds of transit agencies MEDIUM Between one-third and two- thirds of transit agencies LOW Less than one-third of transit agencies UNKNOWN Data not available LONG More than one year MEDIUM More than three months but less than one year SHORT Three months or less $$$ Requires extensive new staff or makes heavy demands on current human resources $$ Requires some additional staff time $ Can be implemented with current staff, perhaps with training $$$ Requires extensive new facilities, equipment, or publicity, or makes heavy demands on current resources $$ Requires some additional equipment, facilities, and/or publicity $ Limited costs for equipment, facilities, and/or publicity Demonstrated to be effective by several high-quality evaluations with consistent results Demonstrated to be effective in certain situations Likely to be effective based on balance of evidence from high- quality evaluations or other sources Effectiveness still undetermined; different methods of implementing this countermeasure produce different results Limited or no high-quality evaluation evidence Table 18. Countermeasures rating scale. T ools and S trategies for E lim inating A ssaults A gainst T ransit O perators, V olum e 2: U ser G uide C opyright N ational A cadem y of S ciences. A ll rights reserved.
41 Violence directed at drivers, operators, or other transit employees can be particularly difficult to prevent or deter because violent reactions by a customer or passenger are unpredictable, even when triggered by an argument, anger at the quality of service or denial of service, delays, or some other precipitating event. However, many times a violent act is preceded by a threat. The threat may have been explicit or veiled, spoken or unspoken, specific or vague. In other instances behavior may be observed by others that may suggest the potential for some type of violent act to occur. Dealing with threats and threatening behaviorâ detecting them, evaluating them, and finding a way to address themâ may be the single most important key to preventing violence. This chapter outlines a 7-step âincident-basedâ threat assessment response protocol and evaluation methodology based on effective practices found in transit agencies and literature review. The work- able and deployable process assists transit organizations and their employees in (1) identifying and reporting threats and threatening behavior, (2) conducting threat assessment of specific incidents, and (3) managing specific threats of violence against individual transit operators. The complete methodology is included in Appendix E. Threat Assessment Protocol Step 1. Planning The first step is to establish priorities and structure to address operator assaults in the transit organization. Planning allows the organization to clearly define roles and responsibilities, and identify approaches to respond to threats and assaults to drivers and other employees. Company policy and SOPs document the results of planning. The policies and procedures set by the transit agency can shape mitigation approaches. Company policy for dealing with driver assaults and threatening and/or disruptive passengers that is robust and fully endorsed by senior management is a critical component of a preventive strategy. Step 2. Training Preparing operators to respond effectively to escalating engagements with passengers through focused training on topics such as defusing a volatile situation and customer service can reduce incidents of assault. Giving operators tools so they can overcome difficult situations with conflict resolution training, stress management, customer care and service, and self- awareness while at work can mitigate potential contributions to threatening or violent incidents with passengers or co-workers. C H A P T E R 4 Threat Assessment Response Protocol and Evaluation Methodology This section outlines an âincident-basedâ threat assessment response protocol and evaluation methodology based on effective practices found in transit agencies and literature review. It assists transit agencies in: ⢠Identifying and reporting threats and threatening behavior; ⢠Conducting threat assessment of specific incidents; and ⢠Managing specific threats of violence against individual transit operators. Tools and Strategies for Eliminating Assaults Against Transit Operators, Volume 2: User Guide Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
42 Tools and Strategies for Eliminating Assaults Against Transit Operators: User Guide Step 3. Addressing Threats and Threatening Behavior Understanding the types of threats and assault an operator may encounter while on duty are important to developing procedures to reduce instances of assault. Agency definitions should incorporate overall route factors and previous threats or acts of violence against an operator. Deciphering early warning signs of problematic behavior can be critical to an agencyâs ability to interdict it. It is important to recognize the need to distinguish between unruly/disruptive behavior that ultimately threatens customer and employee safety and security and merely rude and/or obnoxious behavior. Step 4. Threat Assessment A risk management program that identifies, analyzes and measures specific risks the orga- nization may face supports the planning process. Effective threat assessment includes the assessment of the credibility and potential viability of an expression of intent to do harm and an evaluation of the intent and capability of the actor to carry out the threat. Step 5. Threat Management Gathering information on threats to analyze them and make an assessment regarding the potential for violence is critical to defusing and managing the incidents and minimizes the effect on the workplace. Measures designed to encourage employees to report violence or threats, along with suggested channels (e.g., designated office or person, hotline number, suggestion box, union representative, front-line supervisor, or manager) are critical to threat management. Step 6. Threat Assessment Teams and Incident Response The goal of threat assessment is to place a threat somewhere on a hierarchy of dangerousness and on that basis determine an appropriate intervention. Formal threat and incident inves- tigation processes such as threat assessment teams that identify potentially violent situations and recommend procedures for responding to those situations can be effective in reducing assaults and incidents of violence. Step 7. Evaluation Strategies for developing safety and security protocols to help prevent assaults against transit operators are only as effective as the information that is collected. Agencies can use incident reports, surveys, performance metrics, and internal teams to evaluate the efficacy of updated safety and security measures, allocate resources based on trends, and identify new strategies to create or improve proactive responses to threatening and violent incidents. As an agency works on developing its evaluation protocol, it must consider the framework within which reported threats and violence against operators will be reviewed and corrective actions defined. Key elements of the protocol and evaluation methodology are discussed in more detail below. Policy and Standard Operating Procedures According to TCRP Synthesis 93: Practices to Protect Bus Operators from Passenger Assault, most transit agencies have standard operating procedures (SOPs) in place for responding to operator assaults. Many agencies have written policies that address workplace violence preven- tion but they vary widely in content, scope, and application. The typical SOP addresses various types of accidents and other incidents, not just operator assaults. The SOPs reviewed as part of TCRP Synthesis 93 provided operators and respondersâincluding agency police and security, supervision, human resources, and support staffâwith information on what to do should an assault occur. In general, the SOPs instruct the operator to Standard Operating Procedures ⢠Driver, Supervisor and Management duties ⢠Procedures for unruly passenger prevention ⢠Procedures for unruly passenger management ⢠Communication and coordination ⢠Prevention strategies ⢠Post-incident actions Tools and Strategies for Eliminating Assaults Against Transit Operators, Volume 2: User Guide Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
Threat Assessment Response Protocol and Evaluation Methodology 43 secure the vehicle to protect the passengers, the operator, and the vehicle, and to summon emergency assistance using the appropriate communications devices. SOPs for operators were found to be included in agency-issued handbooks or manuals. An effective assault preventive strategy also requires an awareness of the passengers as well as an awareness among all employees of how the transit agency will respond to assaults and disruptive actsâthe type of response and consequences to the perpetrator of assaults, threats, and unruly behavior. It also requires a robust, comprehensive policy that addresses prevention, training (and periodic re-training), handling problem passengers, categorizing of incidents, reporting of incidents, the supervisor/managerâs responsibility, prosecutions, communication, and procedures to be followed. Training TCRP Synthesis 93 found that the majority of agency managers noted that a significant number of assaults may have been instigated by the behavior or action of the operator, and may have been prevented by the operator. Although attacks on operators are not always due to the inability of the bus operator to defuse the situation, aggressive behavior of operators could, and often does, result in violent engagements. Transit agencies are making progress in preparing their operators to respond effectively through focused training on topics such as defusing a volatile situation and customer service. Some provide training in physical response. Training courses on assaults and post-event practices include: ⢠Violence in the Transit WorkplaceâPrevention, Response, and Recovery (National Transit Institute, NTI), ⢠Harassment Prevention for Transit Employees (NTI), ⢠Harassment Prevention for Transit Supervisors (NTI), and ⢠Customer Service Skills (available from multiple sources). TCRP Synthesis 93 found that factors included among those affecting the risks of threatening or violent incidents against an operator are stress, overall well-being, anger, and fatigue from additional outside employment, working split shifts and assigned hours per shift, recent shift changes, and use of certain over-the-counter medications. Training classes could help increase an operatorâs awareness of the previously listed factors, how they may impact his or her interactions with passengers and co-workers, and strategies to minimize or eliminate adverse impacts. Examples of these courses include those highlighted in the National Center for Transit Research (NCTR) report, Bus Operator SafetyâCritical Issues Examination and Model Practices. ⢠âFatigue and Sleep Apnea Awareness for Transit Employeesâ by the Transportation Safety Institute (TSI), ⢠âToolbox for Transit Operator Fatigue: Putting the Report Into Actionâ by NTI, and ⢠âThe Runcutter Courseâ or other route scheduling and review courses by private vendors. Operator focus on improved physical coordination can also mitigate potential contributions to threatening or violent incidents with passengers or co-workers. Distracted operation of a transit vehicle can be the result of operator error in following the agencyâs policies and proceduresâ for example, operating a vehicle while either engaging in visually or manually complex tasks (e.g., taking oneâs eyes off the road or hands off the steering wheel) or losing mental focus. Such behaviors and actions can lead to a three-fold increase in near-crash or crash risks compared to attentive operating of a transit vehicle. Tools and Strategies for Eliminating Assaults Against Transit Operators, Volume 2: User Guide Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
44 Tools and Strategies for Eliminating Assaults Against Transit Operators: User Guide The following training classes and subjects can help increase an operatorâs physical coordination and come up with strategies to minimize or eliminate adverse impacts. ⢠Defensive driving and simulation-based training classes that address rear-end, fixed-object, pedestrian/bicycle, and other types of transit vehicle collisions, as well as techniques to reduce fatalities, injuries, and employee and passenger risks and ⢠Operating a transit vehicleâuse of signals, use of mirrors, pulling into traffic, etc. Examples of applicable courses include those highlighted in the NCTR report, Bus Operator SafetyâCritical Issues Examination and Model Practices.10 ⢠Bus Collision Prevention and Investigation Seminar (TSI), ⢠Safety, Security, and Emergency Management Considerations for FTA Capital Projects (TSI), ⢠Wireless Distractions Training Resource Program (Florida DOT), ⢠Curbing Transit Employee Distracted Driving (TSI), ⢠Transit Bus System Safety (TSI), and ⢠Transit Industrial Safety Management (TSI). Improved communication can greatly reduce the operatorâs chance of an escalating threaten- ing or violent situation with a passenger or co-worker. Communication-focused courses include those offered through The Canadian Urban Transit Associationâs (CUTA) Transit Ambassador Program and NCTRâs Bus Operator Safety report. ⢠Essentials of Customer Service ⢠Effective Communications ⢠Managing Customer Feedback ⢠Managing Stress ⢠Maintaining a Peaceful Environment on Transit Vehicles ⢠Difficult Situations ⢠Dangerous Situations ⢠Diversity in Transit ⢠In the Driverâs Seat ⢠Advanced Customer Service Training for Experienced Operators ⢠Customer Inside and Out ⢠The Customer-Focused Organization ⢠Special Needs Situations ⢠Effective Announcements ⢠Gang-related violence Threat Assessment Teams and Response Protocols Effective threat assessment consists of two elements: an assessment of the credibility and potential viability of an expression of intent to do harm and an evaluation of the intent and capability of the actor to carry out the threat. The goal of threat assessment is to place a threat somewhere on a hierarchy of dangerousness and on that basis determine an appropriate inter- vention. If a threat is immediate, specific and critical the obvious response is to notify police or security services right away. A threat that is veiled or less specific that does not appear to present a potential for immediate violence may call for less urgent measures. In the transit environment this latter category can be particularly difficult to measure because employee exposure to the actor may be irregular as to date, time or even location. 10Staes, L., Goodwill, J. A., and Yegidis, R. (2014). Bus Operator SafetyâCritical Issues Examination and Model Practices. National Center for Transit Research, University of South Florida. Tools and Strategies for Eliminating Assaults Against Transit Operators, Volume 2: User Guide Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
Threat Assessment Response Protocol and Evaluation Methodology 45 FTAâs Security Self-Assessment includes key questions to ask about investigation protocols: ⢠Does the organization have a formal accident/incident investigation process and have managers/ supervisors who must report to accident scenes that have been formally trained on investigation processes? ⢠Does the organization have a formal methodology for determining the risk level of threats and are approaches and/or recommendations for managing risk included? ⢠Does the agency have a threat assessment team established? ⢠Are there standard forms/checklists to document investigations? ⢠Does the manager/supervisor training include responsibilities in investigations? Threat assessment teams have been created to receive, investigate and respond to reports of threats to determine the potential for violence. The format, scale, and implementation of these measures vary greatly among transit agencies. Examples of threat assessment or similar task forces established to address and reduce assaults on operations include: ⢠Amtrak Threat Assessment Team (TART) members have varied roles in handling potential workplace violence situations. The role of the TART is to gather information, analyze it, make an assessment regarding the potential for violence, develop a plan to defuse and manage the incident, and respond to the incidentâs effect on the workplace. In addition, the TART team meets quarterly to review incidents and statistical reports, discuss how the incidents were resolved and identify any trends.11 ⢠Chicago Transport Authority (CTA) has a bus operator assault committee composed of bus operators, union officials, management and police. They discuss assault statistics, locations of the assaults, the number of individuals in custody, and measures being taken to reduce the number of assaults.12 ⢠The Maryland Transit Authority (MTA) Service Safety Task Force (SSTF), created to tackle the issue of reducing assaults on operators, consists of internal MTA staff and external stake- holders who worked together to examine a host of elements intrinsic to the safe operation of any public transportation system including organizational policies, procedures, and pro- cesses, engineering and technology factors, human factors, public outreach, community involvement, safety and security awareness, recruiting, and training. Their work included an examination of the organizationâs policies, procedures, safety culture, and operating envi- ronment. It developed pragmatic solutions, which involved changes to existing procedures; new safety initiatives; technical and engineering solutions; and innovative media and market- ing solutions that led to a 40% reduction in aggravated assaults on operators and a significant reduction in associated workers compensations costs.13 Response protocols gathered into an emergency action plan are a good idea. After-action reports and/or de-briefs, including participation of both union representatives and the victim, are essential. The emergency action plan should describe: ⢠Procedures for calling for help; ⢠Procedures for calling for medical assistance; ⢠Procedures for notifying the proper authorities (security personnel and the police); ⢠Emergency escape procedures and routes; ⢠Securing the work area where the incident took place; and ⢠Training and education for employees in workplace violence issues and the emergency action plan. Table 19 illustrates some transit agency incident response protocols. 11AMTRAK Involvement in Handling Workplace Violence Incidents. 12Nakanishi, Y. J., and Fleming, W. C. (2011). TCRP Report 93: Practices to Protect Bus Operators from Passenger Assault. Transportation Research Board, National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D.C. 13APTA, 2014. Tools and Strategies for Eliminating Assaults Against Transit Operators, Volume 2: User Guide Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
46 Tools and Strategies for Eliminating Assaults Against Transit Operators: User Guide Transit Agency Response Protocol Amtrak, Workplace Violence Policy When an emergency situation exists call Amtrak Police at: 800-331-0008 and/or 911 for immediate service. lf there is an immediate threat of violence, the manager shall: ⢠immediately contact the Amtrak police. ⢠contact the EAP to provide support to the employee. ⢠contact the TART, if necessary, to help coordinate a full response. Société de Transport de Montréal (STM), Sécuribus Program, 2013 Société de Transport de Montréal (STM) has put in place a protocol for intervening in cases of assault; the protocol dictates a rapid response that involves all parties concerned: driver, field supervisor, Bus Control Centre radio operator, inspectors, and so on. A formal procedure was drafted to set out the roles and responsibilities of everyone involved when a driver is assaulted. All buses in the fleet are equipped with an emergency call button that drivers can use to request help. As soon as the call is received, the police, the STMâs Security and Control staff and field supervisors are dispatched to the scene. At the same time, pressing the button turns on the 9-1-1 display on the outside of the bus. If there is a threat to the operator, but there are no weapons involved and no physical contact has occurred, Metro Transit Police (MTP) is dispatched to the scene. If MTP is not available, local police are notified. Metro Transitâs District Supervisor will also respond to check the operatorâs welfare when appropriate. Central Ohio Transit Agency (COTA), COTA Short-Range Transit Plan, Security and Emergency Services, 2007, 2013 COTA has established an emergency protocol with tools to assist bus operators in events, such as assaults. Destination signs can be activated to read âEmergency, Please Call Police.â Once activated a silent alarm is sent to COTAâs radio control room. There are also emergency alarms on board and a âpriority buttonâ on the driverâs radio. The system is monitored by police dispatchers for immediate assistance as needed. San Bernardino Omnitrans, 2024 San Bernardino Omnitrans emergency communication protocol training covers the use of radios, phones, overt communication tactics, use of alarm buttons, and video indexing. They have also launched a âwhistle defense program,â which is completely voluntary. Through this program bus operators are provided safety whistles to alert those in the area that they have an emergency or are in a threatening situation. Table 19. Emergency response protocols. Tools and Strategies for Eliminating Assaults Against Transit Operators, Volume 2: User Guide Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.