Expediting Aircraft Recovery at Airports (2012)

Below is the uncorrected machine-read text of this chapter, intended to provide our own search engines and external engines with highly rich, chapter-representative searchable text of each book. Because it is UNCORRECTED material, please consider the following text as a useful but insufficient proxy for the authoritative book pages.

5 chapter one IntroductIon “Let’s face it, none of us, whether we are an airline or airport operator, are immune to the challenges that a disabled aircraft brings” (Olsen 2009, p. 31). Aviation has inherent risks. Although substantial resources are invested industry-wide to mitigate these risks, accidents and incidents do occur in the aviation industry. Aircraft acci- dents and incidents can occur during any phase of flight, as well as during ground maneuvering of aircraft. According to Advisory Circular (AC) 150/5200-31C, Airport Emergency Plan (AEP), an aircraft accident is Any occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft that takes place between the time a person boards the aircraft with the intention of flight and the time such person has dis- embarked, in which a person suffers death or serious injury as a result of the occurrence or in which the aircraft, includ- ing cargo aircraft, receives substantial damage (FAA 2009, p. 109). This same AC defines an incident as “an occurrence other than an accident that affects or could affect the safety of operations” (FAA 2009, p. 109). Whether defined as an accident or incident, such events may involve multiple aircraft types, sizes, and configurations. Airport operators have learned that there is no “one size fits all” approach to accident/incident response and resolution. There are common phases and considerations, but airport operators know that, even with planning and preparedness, each aircraft incident/accident is unique, a concept that airport operators, as well as aircraft owners/operators, must be aware of. According to the Flight Safety Foundation (FSF) (2009), the challenge of runway safety can be divided into three areas: runway incursions, runway confusion, and runway excursions. Runway incursions are defined as “any unau- thorized intrusion onto a runway, regardless of whether or not an aircraft presents a potential conflict” (“Runway Safety” 2009, para. 2). Runway confusion results when a pilot uses a runway other than the one assigned. Runway excursions occur when an “aircraft on the runway surface departs the end or the side of the runway surface” (FSF 2009, p. 4). A runway excursion can occur during takeoff or landing and can be intentional or unintentional. Of the 1,429 commercial transport aircraft accidents involv- ing major or substantial damage from 1995 through 2008, 30% were runway-related, and 97% of those were runway excur- sions (FSF 2009, p. 5). The number of runway excursion acci- dents was “more than 40 times the number of runway incursion accidents, and more than 100 times the number of runway con- fusion accidents” (FSF 2009, p. 5). There are five types of runway excursions (“Runway Excursion” n.d., para. 3): • A departing aircraft fails to become airborne or success- fully reject the takeoff before reaching the end of the designated runway. • A landing aircraft is unable to stop before reaching the end of the designated runway. • An aircraft taking off, rejecting takeoff, or landing departs the side of the designated runway. • An aircraft attempting a landing touches down within the undershoot area of the designated landing runway within the airport perimeter. • An aircraft uses a runway or taxiway other than the des- ignated one for a takeoff or a landing. According to the FSF, 79% of excursions studied during 1995 through 2008 occurred during landing. Of the excur- sions that occurred during landing, 53% were veer-offs and 47% were overruns (FSF 2009). A veer-off is an excursion in which “an aircraft departs the side of a runway” (FSF 2009, p. 4), whereas an overrun is defined as an excursion in which “an aircraft departs the end of a runway” (FSF 2009, p. 4). Of the 21% of excursions that occurred during takeoff from 1995 through 2008, 37% were veer-offs and 63% were overruns (FSF 2009). Figure 1 suggests that over- runs are the most common type of takeoff excursion, while veer-offs are the most common type of landing excursion. Regardless of whether an excursion occurs during takeoff or landing, or is categorized as a veer-off or overrun, it typically results in a disabled aircraft. A disabled aircraft is one that “cannot or should not be moved using its own motive power, but can be towed using its own serviceable under-carriage” [or if unserviceable, by means of cranes, trailers, and other specialized equipment] (Air Mobility Command 2006, p. 8).

6 FIGURE 1 Aircraft Excursions, 1995–2008, by type. Source: Flight Safety Foundation (2009). Lessons Learned from Transport Airplane Accidents (Source: www.faa.gov) According to the FAA, runway excursions during takeoff or landing have been a factor in a number of high-profile accidents. Additionally, some of these departures from the end or sides of a runway during takeoff or landing have resulted in severe aircraft damage and passengers and crew fatalities. Several high-profile accidents categorized as landing/takeoff excursions by the FAA are profiled here. United Airlines Flight 227, Salt Lake City, Utah, November 11, 1965 United Airlines Flight 227, a Boeing 727, crashed during an attempted landing at Salt Lake City Airport. The captain failed to recognize and arrest an excessive sink rate on final approach, resulting in a touchdown 335 ft short of the runway. The main landing gear sheared off, causing a breach in the fuselage, and the airplane caught fire while sliding down and off the right side of the runway. Failure of the main landing gear ruptured fuel lines and generator leads, causing the fire. The entire roof and cabin area forward of the fuselage breach was consumed by fire. Forty-three of the 85 passengers aboard were killed. All six crew members survived. The Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) determined that the accident was survivable—none of the passengers sustained any traumatic injuries that would have precluded their escape. All 43 fatalities were attributed to the fire that was caused by a broken fuel line. The CAB also estab- lished that similar future events could not be ruled out, and that the airplane should be designed to have a higher degree of survivability in these types of events. Pacific Western Airlines Flight 314, Cranbrook, British Columbia, Canada, February 11, 1978 A Boeing Model 737-275, powered by two Pratt & Whitney JT8D-9A engines, and operated by Pacific Western Airlines, crashed during landing at Cranbrook, British Columbia, Canada. The accident was determined to be the result of a loss of control during an attempted go-around after touchdown. This loss of control was the result of a thrust asymmetry fol- lowing an incomplete stowage of the thrust reversers. The acci- dent killed 42 of the 49 people on board. Reverse thrust was selected on both engines upon touch- down, then immediately cancelled because of a need for a go- around in order to avoid collision with a snow removal vehicle on the runway. The aircraft lifted off and cleared the vehicle. However, the thrust reverser stow sequence was interrupted at liftoff, leaving the reversers in a partially deployed position. By design, hydraulic pressure used for the thrust reverser deploy/ stow cycle was shut off as the aircraft became airborne. The thrust reverser on the right engine stowed fully and regained forward thrust, while the reverser on the left engine failed to fully stow and, following liftoff, gradually deployed fully due to aero- dynamic loads. The resulting thrust asymmetry caused a loss of roll control and the subsequent crash. Continental Airlines Flight 603, Los Angeles, California, March 1, 1978 At approximately 0925 Pacific Standard Time on March 1, 1978, Continental Airlines Flight 603, a McDonnell Douglas Model DC-10-10 airplane, overran the departure end of Run- way 6R at Los Angeles International Airport, California fol- lowing a rejected takeoff. As the airplane departed the wet, load-bearing surface of the runway, the left main landing gear collapsed and fire erupted from the wing area. The airplane slid to a stop approximately 664 ft beyond the departure end of the runway. The left side of the airplane was destroyed. Of the 184 passengers, two infants, and 14 crewmembers on board, two passengers were killed and 28 passengers and three crew- members were seriously injured during the evacuation of the airplane. Air Ontario Flight 1363, Dryden, Ontario, Canada, March 10, 1989 Flight 1363, a Fokker 28 airplane operated by Air Ontario, departed Thunder Bay (Ontario) about one hour behind sched- ule, on a flight to Winnipeg, with an intermediate stop in Dryden.

7 During the stop in Dryden, heavy snow fell, covering, and freezing on the wings. Flight 1363 arrived from Winnipeg with an inoperative auxiliary power unit; because the airport had no ground start equipment, the flight was required to keep one engine running during passenger loading and unloading. With an engine running, it was not possible to deice the airplane even with the heavy snowfall at Dryden. At 12:09 local time, with ice accumulations on the wings, the airplane started its take-off roll using slush-covered runway 29. The pilot flying rotated the airplane at the prescribed speed; however, the airplane lifted off momentarily and then settled back onto the runway. Following a second rotation, the airplane lifted off at the 5,700 ft point of the 6,000-ft runway. No altitude was gained and the aircraft settled in a nose-high attitude, striking trees. The aircraft crashed and came to rest in a wooded area approximately 3,200 ft past the departure end of the runway catching fire. Both pilots, one flight attendant, and 21 passen- gers were killed. Forty-four passengers and one crew member survived with injuries. The investigation commission concluded that the captain, “as the pilot-in-command, must bear responsibility for the decision to land and take off in Dryden on the day in question. However, it is equally clear that the air transportation system failed him by allowing him to be placed in a situation where he did not have all the necessary tools that should have sup- ported him in making the proper decision” (accidents-ll.FAA. gov n.d.). Air France Flight 072, Papeete, French Polynesia, September 13, 1993 Air France Flight 072, a flight from Los Angeles, California to Tahiti was assigned the VOR DME (VHF omnidirectional radio range/distance measuring equipment) approach to run- way 22 at Faa’a International Airport. It was night, and the weather conditions were clear. The airplane was on a stabilized approach in the landing configuration with the auto pilot disconnected, and auto-throttles engaged. At the missed approach point, the automatic flight system initiated a go-around. The pilot physically held the throttles back with his hand, countermanding the automatic flight system, and continued the approach. During landing, the thrust lever for the left outboard engine slipped out of the pilot’s hand and, commanded by the automatic flight systems, increased to full forward thrust. During the landing rollout, the thrust asymmetry generated with multiple engines in reverse thrust and one engine at forward takeoff thrust caused the airplane to veer to the right and depart the runway on the right-hand side, near the end, coming to rest in a lagoon adjacent to the runway. All passengers were successfully evacuated with only four minor injuries. Southwest Airlines Flight 1248, Chicago, Illinois, December 8, 2005 On December 8, 2005, Southwest Airlines Flight 1248 overran the runway during landing at Chicago Midway Inter national Airport. The airplane rolled through a blast fence and an airport perimeter fence, and onto an adjacent roadway where it collided with an automobile before coming to a stop. A pas- senger in the automobile was killed, one passenger received serious injuries, and three others received minor injuries. Of the 103 passengers and crew aboard the airplane, 18 passen- gers received minor injuries, and the airplane was substantially damaged. NTSB “determined that the probable cause of the accident was the pilots’ failure to use available reverse thrust in a timely manner to safely slow or stop the airplane after landing, result- ing in a runway overrun. This failure occurred because the pilots’ first experience and lack of familiarity with the airplane’s autobrake system distracted them from using reverse thrust during the challenging landing. Listed contributing factors were Southwest Airlines’ (1) fail- ure to provide its pilots with clear and consistent guidance and training regarding company policies related to arrival land- ing distance calculations; (2) programming and design of its onboard performance computer which did not present inherent assumptions in the program critical to pilot decision making; (3) plan to implement new autobrake procedures without a familiarization period; and (4) failure to include a margin of safety in the arrival assessment to account for operational uncer- tainties” (www.ntsb.gov n.d.). Also contributing to the accident, as stated by NTSB, was the pilots’ failure to divert to another airport with more favor- able landing conditions and the absence (at Midway Airport) of an engineering materials arresting system, which was needed because of the limited runway safety area beyond the departure end of the runway. Comair Flight 5191, Lexington, Kentucky, August 27, 2006 On August 27, 2006, at approximately 6:06 a.m. local time, Comair Flight 5191, a Bombardier CL-600-2B19, crashed during takeoff from Lexington, Kentucky’s Blue Grass Air- port. All 47 passengers and two of three crew members were killed. The first officer survived with serious injuries. This airport has two runways: one identified as runway 8/26, and designated for “daytime VFR use only,” and intended primar- ily for general aviation operations; the other identified as 4/22, intended for commercial airline operations. At the time of the accident, runway 8/26 was 3,501 ft long, and runway 4/22 was 7,003 ft long. Despite being directed by FAA air traffic control to taxi and takeoff from runway 22, the crew of Flight 5191 incorrectly tax- ied to runway 26 and attempted to takeoff from the shorter run- way (8/26). Night visual meteorological condition prevailed at the time of the accident. Investigators determined that without sufficient runway length to attain the target rotation speed of 142 kts, Flight 5191 was unable to takeoff. The airplane struck a perimeter fence, trees, and terrain at the end of the runway, where it was destroyed by impact forces and fire (accidents-ll. faa.gov n.d.). Although each of these accidents has different causal fac- tors, they are each categorized as landing/takeoff excursions. Each also resulted in a disabled aircraft that needed recovering. Whether or not the airports involved were prepared for such an event, they were faced with a disabled aircraft and the com- plexities associated with the recovery of that aircraft.

8 The recovery phase, according to Traiforos (1990), can be divided into three additional phases (which are all discussed in chapter five of this report from both the airport operator and aircraft owner/operator perspectives): 1. Pre-recovery or planning phase—The planning that takes placed in preparation for a disabled aircraft event. 2. Recovery phase—The actual process of recovering a disabled aircraft. 3. Post-recovery phase—The process of removing all materials and equipment, inspecting, and reopening any closed areas for operations. Although planning by the airport operator and aircraft owner/operator takes place during the pre-recovery or plan- ning phase in anticipation of a disabled aircraft event, the recovery phase places responsibility on the aircraft owner/ operator. Generally, the airport operator will play a support role by assisting the aircraft owner/operator with acquiring local resources and coordinating activity on the airport. How- ever, the aircraft owner/operator is ultimately responsible for removing the disabled aircraft. Even though this report pro- vides information on the removal of disabled aircraft and the benefits of developing an ARP from an airport operator perspective, the aircraft owner/operator is responsible for removing disabled aircraft in a timely manner, with disabled military aircraft being recovered by the military. Finally, dur- ing the post-recovery phase, the aircraft owner/operator will ensure that materials and equipment are removed from the site, which the airport operator will verify by inspecting and reopening closed areas. If the recovery phase involves recovering a disabled air- craft, several goals typically guide the process. First, it is important to ensure the safety of all personnel involved in the recovery process. This is made possible by involving quali- fied personnel, using the proper equipment and procedures, and adhering to safety practices. A second goal is to recover the aircraft without causing secondary damage. Primary dam- age is that caused by the accident itself, whereas secondary damage is that damage caused during the recovery process. Secondary damage can be avoided by selecting the appropri- ate recovery methods based on a thorough survey of the partic- ular situation. Finally, airport operators are well aware of the need to keep any pavement closures (runways in particular) to a minimum. The recovery of disabled aircraft therefore involves competing objectives. The main objective of the airport operator is to have the aircraft moved as soon as possible to allow a return to normal operations. Expediting this pro- cess will minimize the impact on airport operations, sub- sequently resulting in fewer aircraft delays. Although it varies among airports, a closed runway can have signifi- cant consequences on the national airspace system, and a rapid return to normal operations will reduce these national impacts. According to Olsen (2008), on average, a disabled air- craft event (whether categorized as an accident or inci- dent) occurs weekly somewhere in the world. Although the majority of disabled aircraft events involve small aircraft, in most instances, the disabled aircraft results in a runway closure. According to the Bureau of Transportation Statis- tics, 4.19% of all national aviation system delays during the January through October 2011 period were the result of a closed runway(s). Depending on the airport, the delays caused by runway closure can be significant. For instance, during this same period, 8.98% of airline flight delays at Salt Lake City International Airport were caused by runway closure(s) (BTS 2011). Once an aircraft becomes disabled, it is necessary to initiate recovery. According to AC 150/5200-31C, recovery is defined as “the long-term activities beyond the initial crisis period and emergency response phase of disaster operations that focus on returning all systems at the airport to a normal status or to reconstitute these systems to a new condition that is less vulnerable” (FAA 2009, p. 256). According to AC 150/5200- 31C, the recovery phase is the third and final phase of an emer- gency, after the response phase and the investigatory phase. These three phases of an emergency are: 1. Response phase—The portion of the initial response effort when activities are focused on the dispatch and arrival of emergency first responders, initial fire sup- pression, rescue operations, and dealing with any haz- ardous materials issues. 2. Investigatory phase—An aircraft incident or accident usually entails some type of activity specific to the gathering and analysis of information, and the drawing of conclusions, including the determination of cause. This activity may, depending on conditions, begin dur- ing the response phase and continue through the recov- ery phase. The investigation is normally the respon- sibility of the NTSB. Although at some airports the fire department is not under airport operator control, emergency first responders are responsible for meet- ing the criteria in AC 150/5200-12, Fire Department Responsibility in Protecting Evidence at the Scene of an Aircraft Accident. Currently, there is no analogous AC directed at airport operators. 3. Recovery phase—Returning the airport to a normal operational condition as soon as possible is extremely important. Airports will likely have a separate set of plans, standard operating procedures, to cover this activ- ity. Recovery activities can begin during the response phase and continue through the investigatory phase, depending on the situation. It is helpful to describe the relationship between the AEP and other emergency response plans [e.g. the local jurisdiction(s) Emer- gency Operations Plan] regarding aircraft accident response and recovery actions on the airport (FAA 2009, pp. 111–112).

9 Although this goal of the airport operator is admirable, it is not the primary goal of the aircraft owner/operator and its insurance company. Although the value of the aircraft may dictate whether the insurance adjustor arrives on the scene, the aircraft owner/operator and its insurance company are both focused on preventing secondary damage to the aircraft. The aircraft owner/operator and insurance company will make every effort to ensure that no additional damage to the air- craft is caused during the recovery process, even if the air- craft remains on the runway another 12 hours as a result. It is therefore crucial to consider these two competing objectives in any aircraft recovery effort (Olsen 2008). Although several goals are common among all recovery efforts, each disabled aircraft event is unique. According to Bombardier (2005, p. 1), the aircraft recovery process is also unique because of— 1. The accident or the incident itself. 2. The location of the aircraft. 3. The amount of aid that is locally available. 4. The weather conditions when the accident/incident occurred, as well as the effects of weather before and during the recovery operation. 5. The personnel available to help with the recovery. As a result, response and recovery operations may vary. Aircraft recovery can be divided into the following catego- ries, based on the location and extent of aircraft damage (Traiforos 1990; Olsen n.d.): 1. Minor or light recovery 2. Major or medium recovery 3. Heavy recovery 4. Salvage. A “minor” or “light” recovery involves minor or no appar- ent damage to the aircraft. In these instances, the aircraft either remains on the paved surface or departs the runway with one or more of its landing gear (see Figure 2). The land- ing gear are fully extended and locked, seldom requiring spe- cialized equipment for recovery. Although the aircraft may need to be towed for repair, a recovery of this magnitude can typically be handled by airline or fixed base operator (FBO) personnel using ordinary ground-handling equip- ment. Examples of minor or light recoveries include an air- craft with a blown tire, loss of steering, or inoperative brakes (Traiforos 1990; Olsen n.d.). A “major” or “medium” recovery refers to an event involving serious damage to the aircraft. These instances may involve an aircraft that remains on the runway or has departed structural pavement (see Figure 3). One or more landing gears are not, or are only partially, extended. The aircraft may have landed long and skidded off the runway, resulting in a run- way excursion, or the aircraft may remain on the pavement, disabled as the result of a collapsed landing gear or a gear- up landing. Specialized equipment and skilled personnel are needed to lift the aircraft, after which the compromised gear can be extended, locked, or repaired, thus allowing the air- craft to be towed (Olsen n.d.; Traiforos 1990). A “heavy” recovery is necessary when one or more land- ing gears are separated from the aircraft or are so heavily damaged that the aircraft cannot be towed on its own land- ing gear (see Figure 4). Almost all heavy recoveries involve an aircraft that has departed structural pavement. Often, the aircraft is bogged in mud, snow, sand, or soft earth, requir- ing extensive excavation to free the landing gear. In these instances, specialized equipment and personnel are neces- sary to lift and move the aircraft. Typically the aircraft landed short, overran the runway, or had an excursion from the side of the runway (Olsen n.d.). A “salvage” operation occurs when an aircraft is severely damaged or destroyed by impact with the ground or water, or when a fire occurs. In these situations, the aircraft is con- FIGURE 2 Minor aircraft recovery. Source: Anonymous. Used with permission. FIGURE 3 Major aircraft recovery. Source: Anonymous. Used with permission.

10 3. Aircraft salvage—An accident or incident in which the aircraft sustains substantial damage and the insurer considers the hull a constructive loss. Regardless of how an aircraft recovery operation is cat- egorized, it is important for airport operators to be aware of the many facets surrounding the recovery of disabled aircraft. As Olsen (2009) was quoted as saying at the beginning of this chapter, airports are “not immune to the challenges that a disabled aircraft brings” (p. 31). Therefore, this Synthesis Report has been written to inform airport operators of the many complexities of aircraft recovery, albeit by means of a slightly different methodology than a typical ACRP synthesis. For instance, the data collection performed for this synthesis did not include a survey, as is typically the case, primarily because not all airports have experienced disabled aircraft events. Additionally, the goal was to obtain unique informa- tion about specific disabled aircraft events, which justified a case study approach. The various cases were chosen based on panel input and the author’s professional experience. Specific roles were targeted for interviews, although not all personnel were available for interviews. This synthesis also focused pri- marily on the few references available on this topic. The report is organized as follows: • Chapter two discusses the regulatory and nonregulatory guidance currently available on this topic. • Chapter three presents the roles of personnel typically involved in aircraft recovery. • Chapter four discusses various complications that may arise during the recovery process. • Chapter five introduces the concept of an Aircraft Recov- ery Plan to be developed by an airport operator and dis- cusses, in detail, typical aircraft recovery procedures. • Chapter six presents five case studies of disabled air- craft events, including the results of interviews with personnel involved with these events. • Chapter seven presents concluding thoughts and topics for further research. • Appendix A is a planning chart that can be useful in understanding the basic recovery steps. • Appendix B presents a sample form for Disabled Air- craft Recovery Operations and Emergency Contact Information. • Appendix C is a sample ARP. • Appendices D–I contain the interview frameworks used for the personnel interviewed for the case studies. sidered beyond repair. The salvage process is then designed to remove and relocate the airframe and/or pieces of aircraft. Secondary damage is not a concern with a salvage operation, although preserving evidence may need to be considered. Depending on the size of the aircraft, a salvage process will justify a considerable amount of supplies and equipment, as well as skilled recovery personnel. This process may take place over several days under the supervision of investiga- tive personnel such as NTSB and/or FAA (Traiforos 1990). Although these four categories of aircraft recovery are common at U.S. airports, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) suggests only three categories of air- craft recovery (2009a, pp. 1–4): 1. Aircraft debogging—The removal of an aircraft from a runway or taxiway excursion where the aircraft has become bogged down but has relatively little or no damage (referred to as a “debogg”). 2. Aircraft recovery—Any aircraft that is unable to move under its own power or through the normal use of an appropriate tow tractor and tow bar. Examples include— 1. One or more landing gear off the hard surface of a runway, taxiway, or apron; 2. Aircraft bogged down in mud or snow; 3. One or more landing gear collapsed or damaged; or 4. An aircraft that is considered to be economically repairable. FIGURE 4 Heavy aircraft recovery. Source: Anonymous. Used with permission.