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Overview The world has changed. Lines are now blurred: lines between nations, regions, and peoples; lines between disciplines, tools, and applications of chem- istry, physics, and biology; and lines between the use of technologies for good or evil. As capabilities have spread around the globe, small groups and individuals have gained access to instruments of harm that once belonged exclusively to nation states. When vast armies threatened, the United States found tools to reduce the threat. In recent years, the United States has had to shift the empha- sis of its hard-tool set from heavy artillery and armor to more agile and flexible light infantry, special operators, and precise delivery of kinetic weapons. It must now do the same with its soft tools and apply them with similar agility and precision. This transformation will require enlightened and engaged leadership; effective communication across the U.S. government; a networked culture of cooperation among like-minded nations; and the engagement of new partners in academe and industry and with nongovernment organizations (NGOs). The National Defense Authorization Act of 2008 called for a National Academy of Sciences study that would assess new initiatives for the Department of Defense Cooperative Threat Reduction (DOD CTR) program, particularly in the Middle East, Asia, and the Democratic Peopleâs Republic of Korea, and identify options and recommendations for strengthening and expanding the CTR program. Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar crafted the original CTR program as an innovative response to threats posed by the collapse of the Soviet Union; similar creativity is needed now to develop an enhanced program that involves new players, new places, and new programs. When the Soviet Union fell, a disheartened and dispersed military force remained in place, still responsible for tens of thousands of nuclear weapons, See Appendix A for the full text of the legislation.
GLOBAL SECURITY ENGAGEMENT hundreds of tons of chemical weapons; and a massive biological weapons research, development, and production infrastructure. Much of the remaining weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capability existed in closed cities and limited access areas, many of which were known only by postal codes and never appeared on official Soviet maps. The potential loss of weapons and the vulner- ability of weapons materials and expertise drove a sense of urgency. U.S. negotiators arrived in Moscow with no specific plan and through constructive discussions between senior military officers, officials, and technical experts, the Cooperative Threat Reduction program was born. The initial focus was to assist the Newly Independent States (NIS) of the former Soviet Union (FSU), particularly those in which nuclear weapons were located. The DOD CTR program was initially authorized by Public Law 102-228. The law defined three primary program objectives: (1) assist the former Soviet states to destroy nuclear, chemical, and other weapons; (2) transport, store, disable, and safeguard weapons in connection with their destruction; and (3) establish verifiable safeguards against the proliferation of such weapons. In 1992, these objectives were expanded to include dismantling missiles and mis- sile launchers; destroying destabilizing conventional weapons; preventing diver- sion of weapons-related scientific expertise; establishing science and technol- ogy centers; facilitating demilitarization of defense industries and converting military capabilities and technologies; and expanding military-to-military and defense contacts. The DOD CTR program had few precedents to guide its initial develop- ment, but there was a sense of urgency that was shared by leaders in both Russia and the United States, in some cases for different reasons. Russiaâs new leaders were interested in remaining the sole nuclear power in the region, but also recognized that foreign financial assistance would be critical to consolidate, safeguard, and in some cases dismantle weapons systems as well as to help the country through a turbulent economic period. U.S. leaders were concerned about the potential threat from four new nuclear states, about accountability for any U.S. assistance provided for threat reduction, and how to ensure that assistance provided was not used to sustain or enhance former Soviet weapons capabilities. DOD policies, procedures, and rules developed to implement its CTR program were complex, and the process of putting agreements into place to govern the new program activities were unfamiliar to the leaders of the NIS. In the United States, some individuals in Congress were unconvinced that the program was in U.S. national security interests and saw the program more as foreign assistance. Despite a long record of CTR accomplishments, the challenge of demonstrating the national security benefits of CTR 2.0 will also require an ongoing set of consultations between the executive and legislative branches to ensure that members of Congress and their staffs understand the programâs strategy and approaches.
OVERVIEW During the 15 years that followed passage of the Nunn-Lugar legislation, DOD invested nearly $7 billion to safeguard and dismantle vast stockpiles of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, or related materials and delivery systems, within a framework of cooperative engagement. From the beginning, the DOD CTR program worked closely with sister programs in the Department of State and Department of Energy, forming a set of U.S. government (USG) CTR efforts. These programs have evolved over the years, often in response to congressional directions, restrictions, prohibitions, or preferences. Much of DODâs CTR engagement has been through large integrating contractors that have implemented expensive and extended engineering demili- tarization or construction projects. As many of the engineering projects near completion and as U.S.-Russian relations evolve, the volume of program activ- ity in Russia has contracted significantly, from a budget of nearly $375 million in 1999, to slightly more than $150 million in 2008. Some DOD CTR work, especially in biological nonproliferation, is expanding beyond Russian states in the FSU under the Biological Threat Reduction Program; constructing effec- tive border security and export control systems also continues throughout the region. But the emphasis has shifted from destroying and securing weapons facilities and engaging former weaponeers to increasing security through build- ing detection and disease surveillance capability, whether for detecting bio- logical events or stopping traffickers. Likewise, the metrics of success for USG CTR programs have been changing from âweapons and systems destroyedâ to ânonproliferation capabilities enhanced.â These metrics need to evolve further to reflect the importance of intangible as well as tangible program outcomes, and to better reflect program impact in partner countries. Intense oversight by Congress and more than 40 Government Account- ability Office reports on the DOD CTR program activities were driven by an early sense of caution regarding the potential that these programs might con- tribute to helping Russia enhance its military power. These controls may have provided management security, but they also resulted in a bureaucratic burden that, according to one person closely involved, âalmost monitored the program to death.â Officials in partner countries as well as in U.S. agencies were frus- trated by implementation delays that often were interpreted as U.S. reluctance to cooperate. A new approach that highlights program transparency is needed to provide the assurance that public funds are being spent responsibly, while allowing for program flexibility. Since its inception, the DOD CTR program has made significant contribu- tions to reducing the spread of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. The Amy Woolf. 2008. Nonproliferation and Threat Reduction Assistance: U.S. Programs in the For- mer Soviet Union. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service. 11 pp. Accessed at http://fas. org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL31957.pdf, May 19, 2009. Ibid.
GLOBAL SECURITY ENGAGEMENT program is justifiably proud of the tangible results it has achievedâdeactivating thousands of warheads, destroying intercontinental ballistic missiles and their silos, dismantling strategic submarines and bombers, neutralizing chemical weapons, and destroying or converting biological weapons production facilities; redirecting former weapons scientists and engineers; and initiating biological surveillance efforts in Russia and the NIS. These activities have also had intan- gible results in the hundreds or thousands of personal relationships among scientists, engineers, military officers, and government officials in the FSU and the United States. These relationships support frank and open communication despite periods of bilateral tensions. The National Research Council committee that authored this report con- cludes that U.S. national security and global stability would be enhanced by expanding the nationâs cooperative threat reduction programs beyond the for- mer Soviet Union and readdressing their form and function. To this end, the committee has looked broadly at how the original cooperative threat reduc- tion programsâor CTR 1.0âcan be upgraded and improved to create a new approach to global security engagement, which we call CTR 2.0 (see Box O.1). In this study, the committee explored how the CTR concept can best be applied to contemporary WMD and terrorist threats on a global scale. Although the end of the Cold War presented a diverse and complex set of challenges, the issues were largely concrete and identifiable. But the threats of the 21st century are fundamentally different. The rapid globalization of com- BOX O.1 What Is CTR 2.0? CTR 2.0, an expression borrowed from the software industry, refers to a more advanced and comprehensive approach to cooperative threat reduction. It comprises a set of programs and projects undertaken by the United States, as part of a cooperative network that includes a wide range of countries, international organizations, and nongovernment partners, to prevent, reduce, mitigate, or eliminate common threats to U.S. national security and global stability that have emerged in particular since the end of the Cold War.Â The preferred mechanism and long-term goal for the cooperation is partnership, which means that the countries participating should be ready to share responsibilities forÂ project definition, organization, management, and financing accord- ing to a rational division of labor, capacity (including budget capacity), or technical capability. Although CTR 2.0 engagements may have to begin under less than ideal circumstances, the goal for countries engaged under CTR 2.0 is shared responsibility through engagement and partnership.Â CTR 2.0 should be capable of rapid response as well as longer-term programmatic engagement.
OVERVIEW munications, transportation, and knowledge allow threats to be networked, agile, adaptable, and difficult to quantify. New tools and programs are needed to respond to these threats. In the committeeâs view, a fundamentally different approach to CTR is required. The risks that the United States faces today are no longer reduced signifi- cantly by friendly neighbors to the north and south and vast oceans to the east and west. The world is smaller than it was in 1992. Ignoring globalization is not an option, whether in economics, public health, combating terrorism, or reduc- ing the threat of WMD. While our technological and military capabilities will continue to play an essential role, engagement is also one of the most important tools in the national security arsenal. Forging partnerships will require strong and creative leadership from the White House; dedicated and attentive leader- ship in government departments and agencies; and updated, integrated, and effectively coordinated CTR programs. Relevant, sustainable CTR 2.0 programs that employ hard and soft capabilities and are tailored to a specific country or region will energize and strengthen CTR 2.0 and result in tangible and intan- gible national security benefits. This report does not look comprehensively at all opportunities that might be available for the application of DOD CTR as an element of CTR 2.0, but during the committeeâs deliberations and in its discussions with experts, several program needs and opportunities were identified. These include some activi- ties already associated with DOD CTR, such as promoting biological safety, security, and surveillance programs; supporting the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention; and enhancing border security assistance that can be applied to new regions and countries, such as the Middle East, Asia, and Africa. New program areas were also identified, such as promoting the imple- mentation of the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 and promoting chemical safety and security. Following the CTR 2.0 model, all of these activities would fall under coordinated strategic guidance and engage a broad range of partners. The CTR 2.0 model envisioned by the committee and developed in this report can be summarized through the reportâs recommendations identified below. Each chapter concludes with that chapterâs findings and recommendations. Recommendations For approximately $400 million per year over the past 15 years, the DOD CTR program has demonstrated that direct engagement can roll back and elimi- nate programs to design and produce nuclear, chemical, and biological weap- ons. For less than a total of $7 billion over 15 years, these programs have deacti- vated thousands of nuclear warheads, supported chemical weapons destruction, Ibid.
10 GLOBAL SECURITY ENGAGEMENT transformed former biological weapons facilities, redirected former weapons scientists, and fostered communication among former enemies. In addition to WMD dismantlement, destruction, consolidation, and security, these programs have also increased transparency and helped foster higher standards of conduct and operations and the development of a security culture, as well as collabora- tion between civilian and military experts of the United States and the former Soviet states. These and other engagement activities have directly and indirectly enhanced U.S. national security and global security and stability. The global spread of advanced technologies, the rise of asymmetric war- fare, and the growing global interdependence of peoples, economies, and politics have made discerning an adversaryâs intentions more important than ever before. The footprints of weapons-producing laboratories and the size of todayâs âstrategicâ weapons grow smaller every day and their âdelivery systemsâ may be individuals or commercial cargo carriers. Hence, discovering weapons activities is far more challenging now than it was when CTR began. Having the capacity to evaluate intentions will be key and depends on communicating directly with people in places where such capabilities exist. If the U.S. govern- ment engages only where it knows weapons are being produced, it will engage neither as much as it should, nor where it must. CTR 1.0 relied heavily on DOD for its implementation. But responding to 21st-century threats demands a much broader range of capabilities, expertise, and âfaces.â In some instances, a military face may not always be most effective, as suggested by the difficulties DOD had in its efforts to engage Russia in coun- tering biological threats. In addition, CTR 2.0 will support the implementation of bilateral and international nonproliferation, arms control, and counterter- rorism agreements, and innovative initiatives and activities such as the Prolif- eration Security Initiative, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, and UNSCR 1540. To succeed, CTR 2.0 will require sustained White House leadership and the full cooperation of cabinet secretaries and agency heads. Recommendation 1-1: The DOD CTR program should be expanded geograph- ically, updated in form and function according to the concept proposed in this report, and supported as an active tool of foreign policy by engaged leadership from the White House and the relevant cabinet secretaries. CTR 1.0 was designed to deal with yesterdayâs strategic weapons. The DOD CTR program has evolved into a complex enterprise in which what is âbestâ for a foreign partner may be decided without that partnerâs input. Many program efforts depend on the U.S. contracting process that can take years to complete, and initiating even small projects can take many months. In the new, more nuanced security environment, the traditional programs and their metrics will need to be complemented by new, more flexible efforts and measures of success.
OVERVIEW 11 At the heart of CTR 2.0 is a presumption of cooperation. Programs must have roots in the partner country and partners should be involved in a pro- gramâs design, planning, and implementation. Targeted engagements supported by the Department of Health and Human Services or the Department of Agriculture or the Environmental Protection Agency may complicate terrorist efforts to exploit the resources, capabilities, or sympathies of a population more effectively than the multimillion dollar construction projects that characterized CTR 1.0. Recommendation 2-1: The White House, working across the executive branch and with Congress, should engage a broader range of partners in a variety of roles to enable CTR 2.0 to enhance global security. At a minimum this will require â¢ Becoming more agile, flexible, and responsive â¢ Cultivating additional domestic and global partners to help meet its goals â¢ Building mutually beneficial relationships that foster sustained cooperation CTR 1.0 engagements have become a portfolio of loosely coordinated actions implemented by departments and agencies across the USG. For CTR 2.0 to be effective, its form must match its functions. Strong White House lead- ership and sustained engagement at senior levels of all departments and agencies that contribute will need to become the norm. The National Security Council (NSC) and the Homeland Security Council (HSC) are already collaborating in biological global security engagement in an effort known as the âUnited States Bioengagement Strategy.â This mechanism brings together representatives from the entire program spectrum, regardless of whether agencies have a legislatively mandated national security mission, initially to exchange program informa- tion and subsequently to fashion government-wide engagement strategies for several countries. The purpose is to âpromote coordination,â find âgaps in current activities,â and help stakeholders understand âwhich programs should be developed or expanded.â A valuable outcome of this effort will be sharing information systematically among agencies about ongoing activities in a specific country or region. This effort may be a useful model for coordination in other areas. Once interagency coordination becomes routine, broader collaborations should be sought with a range of domestic and international partners. This will allow the U.S. government to match policy objectives with the most effec- tive tools across such activities as WMD dismantlement and engagement of weapons specialists, export control and border security, regulatory assistance and reform, and security partnerships. The long-term goal should be to build
12 GLOBAL SECURITY ENGAGEMENT networks of expertise capable of addressing threats and moving from assistance to partnership. Recommendation 3-1: CTR 2.0 should be directed by the White House through a senior official at the National Security Council and be implemented by the Departments of Defense, State, Energy, Health and Human Services, and Agriculture, and other relevant cabinet secretaries. Recommendation 3-1a: Domestically, CTR 2.0 should include a broad group of participants, including government, academe, industry, nongovernmental organizations and individuals, and an expanded set of tools, developed and shared across the U.S. government. Recommendation 3-1b: Internationally, CTR 2.0 should include multilateral partnerships that address both country- and region-specific security challenges, as well as provide support to the implementation of international treaties and other security instruments aimed at reducing threat, such as the G8 Global Partnership, the Proliferation Security Initiative, United Nations Secu- rity Council Resolution 1540, and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. Professional colleaguesâfriend or foeâthroughout the world respect intellect and technical competence. Relationships provide opportunities for communication, access, and even transparency in times of great national ten- sion, and may be one of the most important achievements of CTR programs. From the early DOD CTR senior-level military exchanges to recent collabora- tions in disease surveillance, close relationships formed around professional interactions persist, even where tensions between countries are heightened. Because of the fundamental change in the nature of threats and the pace at which events occur, the ability to communicate directly with a specialist in another country on a regular basisâto discuss an emerging disease with a fel- low public health official or a terrorist attack in his or her countryâhas greater national security significance today than it did when CTR was founded. CTR 2.0 should value and foster such ties and find appropriate metrics to reflect their value to national security. Recommendation 3-2: The executive branch and Congress need to recognize that personal relationships and professional networks that are developed through USG CTR programs contribute directly to our national security and that new metrics should be developed to reflect this. Congress has done much over the years to amend legislation in ways that allow USG CTR programs to operate more broadly and effectively, but some
OVERVIEW 13 legal and policy underpinnings of the current CTR 1.0 efforts are cumbersome and dated and often diminish the value of programs. Although the DOD CTR authorizing legislation has undergone some fundamental, positive changes, several issues need to be addressed if CTR 2.0 is to operate optimally. Some of these may require congressional action; others may be resolved by executive branch action. The committee believes that these changes will require regular consul- tation between the legislative and executive branches. Senators Nunn and Lugar have been strong and vocal champions of CTR 1.0, and without their vision and commitment the program would not exist. But CTR 2.0 is an even more complex and possibly larger endeavor; it, too, will require congressional champions and a forum in which both they and critics can discuss the many issues that will inevitably arise. The committeeâs observations about the need for stronger leadership, coordination, and cooperation in the executive branch apply equally to Congress. International CTR partners have little or no understanding of the U.S. gov- ernment or its processes. Bureaucratic machinations, which can delay project implementation for many months, can appear to U.S. partners as reluctance to work with them. DOD in particular must reconsider its approach to umbrella agreements, geographic limitations, and the metrics by which it measures pro- gram success. Comingling authorities are needed to make it easier to work together across countries and organizations. Contracting procedures need to be streamlined, and a projectâs sustainability should be considered before engage- ment, not as an afterthought. Giving CTR 2.0 leaders, decision makers, and implementers appropriate legal and policy authorities will make engagements more efficient, timely, and valuable, and give partners a more positive percep- tion of our commitment. This will lead to greater confidence, transparency, and, ultimately, enhanced national security. Recommendation 3-3: The legislative framework, funding mechanisms, and program leveraging opportunities should be structured to support more effec- tive threat reduction initiatives across DOD, other U.S. government depart- ments and agencies, international partners, and NGOs. Recommendation 3-3a: Program planning should be developed out of a stra- tegic process and be matched by a strategic budget process that produces a multiyear budget plan and distributes funding across agencies based on agency ability to respond to program requirements. As needed, agency legislative authorities should be revised to include a national security dimension. Recommendation 3-3b: Congress should provide comingling authority to all agencies implementing programs under CTR 2.0 as a way to encourage other partners to contribute funds to global security engagement efforts.
14 GLOBAL SECURITY ENGAGEMENT Recommendation 3-3c: To maximize the effectiveness of CTR 2.0, the DOD CTR legal frameworks and authorities should be reassessed. DOD should undertake a systematic study of the CTR Umbrella Agreement protection provisions, what purposes they serve in particular circumstances, whether there might be less intrusive means of accomplishing the provisionsâ goals, and when the provisions are necessary in their present form. In addition, all USG CTR programs should identify legal and policy tools that can promote the sustainability of U.S.-funded CTR work and provide greater implementa- tion flexibility. Recommendation 3-3d: Congress should grant DOD limited ânotwithstand- ingâ authority for the CTR programâperhaps a maximum of 10 percent of the overall annual appropriation and subject to congressional notificationâto give the program the additional flexibility it will need in future engagements. CTR 1.0 began as a means of assisting partners in the FSU when there were few other options. The world is unlikely to confront a similar situation again and new challenges will vary regionally and from state to state. The committee believes strongly that CTR 2.0 must be characterized by a spirit of seamless cooperation, both with the U.S. engagement team and, when possible, with the country engaged. White House guidelines for CTR 2.0 will help evaluate the best initial engagement options and the agencies that are most appropriate to the tasks at hand. Under CTR 2.0, less-developed countries may still require financial support, but they may be able to contribute in kind and should still be engaged as partners in program planning, development, and implementa- tion. In other cases, the partners will require technology or expertise, with little cost to the U.S. government. At times the U.S. government may be nei- ther welcome nor able to assist, but can team up with others who do have the ability to respond. This may be particularly true when DODâor other U.S. agenciesÂâare unwelcome, at least initially. Recommendation 4-1: As CTR 2.0 engagement opportunities emerge, the White House should determine the agencies and partners that are best suited to execute them, whether by virtue of expertise, implementation capacity, or funding. DOD understands the history and culture of threat reduction engagement as traditionally defined, but needs to evaluate how to engage in the future. The secretary of defense should take the lead by initiating an in-depth review, evaluation, and reformulation of CTR 1.0 to incorporate all the relevant tools within DOD. This should be done in close collaboration with current and potential CTR 2.0 partners within the U.S. government and with full engage-
OVERVIEW 15 ment of responsible leadership in the White House. The review should seek to better understand historical activities that have limited legislative, operational, or geographic restrictions. The evaluation of current programs and activities viewed through the prism of CTR 2.0, the application of lessons learned to new approaches, and the incorporation of tools and partners not previously considered will demonstrate the value of the departmentâs capabilities to the future of global security engagement. Because the focus of CTR 1.0 was Russia and the former Soviet Union, the Unified Combatant Commands, other than the European Command, have not been involved in programs, are not part of the planning process, and even are unaware of many CTR 1.0 activities in their areas of responsibility. If CTR 2.0 is to operate globally, the Unified Commands logically should contribute to program planning and be aware of implementation. One program that is well suited to the challenges identified to the committee by the Unified Commands is the Defense and Military Contacts Program. The program is currently funded by DOD CTR, but could much better serve global security engagement activi- ties than it does now. Military-to-military activities and the engagements that exist in combatant commands, for example, could be coordinated with the interagency under CTR 2.0, allowing commands to be aware of programs that could support these missions. Military-to-military engagements offer opportu- nities to initiate specific relationships and capacity building that supports the broader goals of CTR 2.0. Recommendation 4-2: The secretary of defense should direct the review and reformulation of the DOD CTR program in support of CTR 2.0 and work with the White House, secretary of state, secretary of energy, and other cabinet and agency officers to ensure full coordination and effective implementation of DOD programs in CTR 2.0. The review should also include broader military components, including the Unified Combatant Commands, the full set of pro- grams in the Defense Threat Reduction Program, DOD health and research programs, and other DOD assets. Existing CTR programs have incrementally evolved toward CTR 2.0 over the years, but a more specific transition plan is needed. As the committee pro- poses some major changes, it applauds the interagency effort led by the NSC and the HSC to develop a bioengagement strategy, which epitomizes the spirit of CTR 2.0. The NSC-HSC team should expand its effort by reaching out to traditional and nontraditional partners, possibly focusing on one country as a test case. Once the system has been established and the mechanisms have been defined, other working groups could develop similar models, working with different challenges in different countries and regions, to create the program we call CTR 2.0.
16 GLOBAL SECURITY ENGAGEMENT Recommendation 4-3: A plan for the evolution of CTR 1.0 to CTR 2.0 should take into account the congressional principles enumerated in the legislation authorizing this report, as well as existing USG CTR initiatives. The White House should review National Security CouncilâHomeland Security Council coordination in bioengagement as a possible model for other programs as it develops a transition plan. BOX O.2 Statement by Senator Richard Lugar We must take every measure possible in addressing threats posed by weapons of mass destruction. We must eliminate those conditions that restrict us or delay our abil- ity to act.Â The United States has the technical expertise and the diplomatic standing to dramatically benefit international security.Â American leaders must ensure that we have the political will and the resources to implement programs devoted to these ends. SOURCE: Richard Lugar. We Must Take Every Measure to Address WMD Threats, Lugar Says. Press Release. December 2, 2008. Accessed at http://lugar.senate.gov/record.cfm?id=305375& on May 4, 2009.