National Academies Press: OpenBook

A Guide to Transportation's Role in Public Health Disasters (2006)

Chapter: Appendix C - Radiological Threat Information

« Previous: Appendix B - Biological Threat Information
Page 87
Suggested Citation:"Appendix C - Radiological Threat Information." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2006. A Guide to Transportation's Role in Public Health Disasters. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/13944.
×
Page 87
Page 88
Suggested Citation:"Appendix C - Radiological Threat Information." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2006. A Guide to Transportation's Role in Public Health Disasters. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/13944.
×
Page 88
Page 89
Suggested Citation:"Appendix C - Radiological Threat Information." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2006. A Guide to Transportation's Role in Public Health Disasters. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/13944.
×
Page 89
Page 90
Suggested Citation:"Appendix C - Radiological Threat Information." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2006. A Guide to Transportation's Role in Public Health Disasters. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/13944.
×
Page 90
Page 91
Suggested Citation:"Appendix C - Radiological Threat Information." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2006. A Guide to Transportation's Role in Public Health Disasters. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/13944.
×
Page 91
Page 92
Suggested Citation:"Appendix C - Radiological Threat Information." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2006. A Guide to Transportation's Role in Public Health Disasters. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/13944.
×
Page 92
Page 93
Suggested Citation:"Appendix C - Radiological Threat Information." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2006. A Guide to Transportation's Role in Public Health Disasters. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/13944.
×
Page 93

Below is the uncorrected machine-read text of this chapter, intended to provide our own search engines and external engines with highly rich, chapter-representative searchable text of each book. Because it is UNCORRECTED material, please consider the following text as a useful but insufficient proxy for the authoritative book pages.

C-1 APPENDIX C Radiological Threat Information C.1 HUMAN HEALTH EFFECTS AND PROTECTION FROM RADIATION Since the discovery and use of radium and radiation around the beginning of the 20th century, many medical studies have been performed to determine the human health effects of radi- ation doses. Radiation exposure is classified as either acute or chronic where acute is a short time frame exposure on the order of seconds to hours whereas chronic exposure is long- term exposure over a period of years. A large acute or chronic dose to the whole body can cause serious health effects in- cluding death whereas smaller chronic doses can cause cancer over periods of 10 to 50 years. Acute whole body radiation dose human health effects are summarized in Table C-1. The health effects of chronic radiation dose over a 50-year time pe- riod, which increase the risk of lifetime latent cancer fatality is presented in Table C-2. It should be noted that radiation doses to just one specific part or organ of the body may have differ- ent and, sometimes, less life-threatening consequences. This table shows that insignificant health effects would be expected for acute doses up to 10 rem and a small percentage of the general population would experience some discom- forting temporary symptoms for doses of 10 to 100 rem. Acute doses over 100 rem require medical intervention and become life threatening with more serious symptoms. Protection from radioactive material involves different strategies for different types of radioactive hazards. External gamma, X-ray, and neutron radiation hazards must be man- aged by using the three basic rules of radiation protection: time, distance, and shielding, which are explained below. In a radiation field of “X” mrem/hour, the total dose one re- ceives is the time of exposure multiplied by the dose rate. Therefore, the shorter the exposure time, the smaller the dose. Since radiation emanates in all directions from radioactive materials, the dose rate from a radiation source decreases as distance from it increases. Placing the right kind of shielding between you and the radiation source will reduce the dose rate and dose since the shielding absorbs or attenuates the radia- tion before it reaches you. The best shielding for gamma and X-ray radiation is heavy, high-density material (iron, steel, lead, high-density concrete) while neutrons are best shielded by materials which contain hydrogen or other light elements in a high density such as concrete, special plastic formula- tions, or water. The simplest of these three rules to follow in an emergency first response situation is to minimize time and maximize distance. Protection from internal radiation hazards such as the in- halation or ingestion of alpha or beta radiation emitting ra- dioisotopes requires a different approach presented below. These hazards are managed or mitigated by the use of respirators or professional air filtration masks along with anti-contamination (Anti-C) suits, which are plastic or other easily washed surface material full body suits that, along with boots and hoods, cover the entire body and pre- vent any deposition or inhalation of radioactive particles. High efficiency air filtration masks or independent air sup- ply masks may already be part of many first responders equipment (i.e., firefighters) or can easily be added to their inventory. Anti-C suits are more complex, expensive, time consuming, and larger pieces of equipment for the trans- portation system first responder. Although important, the Anti-C suits should take a second priority to air filtration or independent air breathing masks. This is because the masks will preclude the introduction of radioactive parti- cles inside the human body whereas the suits prevent the deposition of radioactive particles on the skin and hair of humans. It is much easier to decontaminate skin/hair of ra- dioactive particles than to remove inhaled or ingested ra- dioactive material. INTERNAL RADIATION HAZARD PROTECTION RULES WEAR RESPIRATORY PROTECTION WEAR ANTI-CONTAMINATION SUIT {WITH RESPIRATORY PROTECTION} EXTERNAL RADIATION HAZARD PROTECTION RULES MINIMIZE RADIATION EXPOSURE TIME MAXIMIZE DISTANCE FROM RADIATION SOURCES MAXIMIZE APPROPRIATE RADIATION SHIELDING

C.2 NEAR TERM MEDICAL TREATMENT FOR EXTERNAL RADIATION AND INTERNAL RADIOACTIVE CONTAMINATION Members of the public in proximity to a radiological threat can be treated so as to significantly reduce their individual ra- diation dose. Rapid movement away from the location of ra- dioactive material will reduce doses based on the previously discussed basic rules of thumb regarding minimizing time and maximizing distance. Relocation to a controlled area and subsequent removal of all clothing and washing down all body surfaces will reduce contamination doses and mitigate inhalation or ingestion of radioactive particles. Since radia- tion doses can compromise the immune system, prompt treatment of all cuts and burns and the administration of ap- propriate topical, oral, and injected antibiotics will prevent possibly serious infections. A number of drugs and chemicals have been recognized by medical authorities as being effective in the treatment of spe- cific radioisotope internal contamination by inhalation, inges- tion, or absorption through open wounds. These drugs either saturate an organ of the body to prevent it from absorbing the radioisotope or they rapidly increase the body’s excretion of the radioisotope. One drug can reduce the chance of latent cancer due to radiation exposure only if administered before exposure and would therefore be useful for first responders only. These are summarized in Table C-3. C-2 Although no drugs should be administered to members of the public exposed to a radiological incident until the specific radioisotope(s) involved have been identified, maintaining a stockpile of treatment drugs, which can be quickly accessed, could significantly reduce treatment time and the resulting radiation dose to the public. It should be noted that members of the public removed from the area around an RDD or ATS should be isolated from the general public and uncontaminated areas. Even after skin and hair decontamination by intense washing and removal of all clothing, humans may be secreting radioisotopes in their liquid and solid wastes, which should also be controlled and isolated from the sewage system. C.3 FEDERAL PUBLIC RADIATION STANDARDS, REGULATIONS, AND GUIDANCE Federal government agencies involved with handling, use, and regulation of radioactive material have developed stan- dards, limits, and criteria for allowable public exposure to ra- diation. Separate, and more relaxed, standards exist for work- ers in the nuclear industry. However, transportation system responders to a radiological threat are not considered nuclear workers, but should be treated as the public in terms of radi- ation dose limits. These radiation dose limits were all derived based on normal activities and operations or accidents at Acute Dose to Whole Body (rem) Expected Human Health Effects <1 rem No health effects 1 to 10 rem No discernible health effects except for possible dry mouth, headaches and anxiety; insignificant increase in lifetime cancer risk, full recovery 10-100 Slight (<5%) incidence of nausea, vomiting, headache; temporary drop in white blood cell count; 0.5%-5% increase in lifetime cancer risk; full recovery 100-300 5-50% of population experience nausea and vomiting, long term drop in white blood cell count, fatigue, weakness, infection susceptibility, loss of appetite, skin reddening, hair loss, 5-15% increase in lifetime cancer fatality, some cataract formation, 5-10% population fatality within 30-60 days; significant medical care required for full recovery 300-500 50-100% of population experience nausea and vomiting, 10-50% population fatality within 30-60 days; hemorrhaging, extensive medical care may prevent mortality 500-800 Permanent sterilization, cataracts in 100% of population, 50-90% population fatality within 30-60 days; extreme medical care may prevent mortality 800-3000 Skin blistering, 90-100% population fatality in 2 to 3 weeks; little chance of survival with even most extreme and intensive medical care Total 50-Year Chronic Whole Body Radiation Dose (rem) Expected Public Human Health Effects (Lifetime Probability of Latent Fatal Cancer) 15 (natural background) 0.8% 50 [1 rem/year] 2.5% 100 [2 rem/year] 5% 1000 [20 rem/year] 50% TABLE C-1 Acute Radiation Dose Human Health Effects TABLE C-2 50-Year Chronic Radiation Dose Human Health Effects

nuclear facilities, but not in the context of homeland security or radiological threats to transportation systems. Table C-4 presents public radiation dose limits set forth and treated as law by different federal government agencies. The federal public radiation dose limits in Table A.4 are a small fraction of natural radiation for normal operations of facilities that contain radioactive materials. The only excep- tion is that of a nuclear power plant accident, which allows significant, but non-fatal, public doses. It is also interesting to note that transportation packages containing radioactive material can have a significant dose rate, by DOT regulation. However, even if one were to be in contact with the maxi- mum allowed 200 mrem/hour package, it would take 500 hours (21 days) of continuous contact to receive a 100 rem dose where there is a small probability of death. It is impor- tant to note that none of the dose limits in Table 8.6 were de- signed or intended for an RDD or ATS scenario. The EPA, in 1992, promulgated radiological protection guidance for state and local officials in the case of a non-nuclear weapon nuclear incident. This guidance is in the form of Protective Action Guides (PAGs), which are public doses at which spe- cific actions should be taken during an incident or emer- gency. These EPA PAGs are presented in Table C-5. For this study, only the EPA early incident phase is of in- terest. Therefore, first responders should be able to measure any radiation dose rate such that continued public exposure in the area would result in a dose rate of 1 rem or greater. This is equivalent to a dose rate as low as about 1 mrem/hr. for a 4-day contiguous public presence and as high as 1 rem/hr. for a one-hour contiguous public presence. This requirement is met by the previously discussed radiation detection survey meter specifications of 0.1or 1 mrem/hr. to 100 or 1000 rem/hr. C-3 The PAG for early response to doses greater than 25 rem assumes that this high dose is due to the inhalation and/or in- gestion of radioactive iodine, which naturally concentrates in the body’s thyroid and can cause thyroid cancer at high doses. Under medical supervision, the administration of non- radioactive iodine pills, usually in the form of potassium io- dide will saturate the thyroid with non-radioactive iodine and mitigate any absorption of the radioactive iodine. This action will only be effective if radioactive iodine is involved. The first responder’s radiation detection instrument will not determine specific radioisotopes, only the magnitude of the radiation dose rate field. C.4 RADIOLOGICAL DISPERSAL DEVICE RADIOISOTOPE PROPERTIES Radioactive material, in the form of radioisotopes, are pro- duced and used worldwide for industrial, research and med- ical applications. The control and accounting of devices, which contain radioisotopes, has not been subject to the same level as nuclear weapons and nuclear fuel. Worldwide, thou- sands of radioisotope devices have been unaccounted for and provide an ideal source for radioactive material threats to transportation. Several studies have been performed to de- termine the most likely radioisotopes that could be used in a radiological dispersal device (RDD). These radioisotopes were selected based on their availability, half-life, radiolog- ical hazard, and radiation energy. A list of the most likely RDD radioisotopes was synthesized from several sources and presented in Table C-6 along with some key radiation properties. Inhaled or Ingested Radioisotope or External Radiation Drug or Chemical Treatment Form and Treatment Conditions Iodine-125 Potassium Iodide, Potassium Iodate, or Sodium Iodide1 Pills As soon as possible after exposure and daily for two weeks Cesium-137 Ferric Hexacyanoferrate (II) aka Prussian Blue Solution or pill Three times daily for three weeks Plutonium-238 Americium-241 Curium-244 Californium-252 Calcium or Zinc diethylenetriaminepentaacetate (Ca- DTPA2 or Zn-DTPA) or EDTA Solution intravenous or as an inhaler As soon as possible Daily for up to 5 days Strontium-90 Aluminum phosphate or barium sulfate Oral, as soon as possible Any Uranium isotope Sodium Bicarbonate IV or pills every four hours to protect kidneys Tritium (Hydrogen-3) Water Orally and/or IV forced fluids Gamma and neutron radiation exposure Amifostine (phosphorylated aminothiol) Intravenous at least one hour before exposure High radiation dose to bone marrow Cytokines Pills or injection (up to 11 days) 1 suitable alternative for individuals with potassium allergic reaction 2 preferred over Zn-DTPA and EDTA TABLE C-3 Approved Drugs or Chemicals for Radiation Treatment

C-4 TABLE C-4 Federal Government Agency Public Radiation Dose Limits U.S. Federal Agency Type of Public Radiation Dose Public Limit or Criteria (millirem) Federal Regulation Citation Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Whole body from normal operations of NRC-licensed facilities; Special exemption for individual members of public 100 per year 500 per year 10 CFR 20.1301 10 CFR 20.1301 NRC External dose rate in unrestricted area at NRC-licensed facility 2 per hour 10 CFR 20.1301 NRC Whole body from cleanup and shutdown of NRC-licensed facility 25 per year (/yr.) 10 CFR 20.1403 NRC Accident at nuclear power plant -whole body - thyroid 25,000/yr. 300,000/yr. 10 CFR 100.11 NRC Local skin surface dose 50,000/yr. 10 CFR 20 NRC Due to low level radioactive waste disposal repository -whole body -thyroid -other organs 25/yr. 75/yr. 25/yr. 10 CFR 61.41 Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Breathing air 10/yr. EPA Drinking water 4/yr. 40 CFR 141.66 EPA Normal nuclear power plant operation -whole body -thyroid -other organs 25/yr. 75/yr. 25/yr. 40 CFR 190.10 EPA Spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste storage -whole body -thyroid other organs 25/yr. 75/yr. 25/yr. 40 CFR 191.03 EPA Underground Uranium Mines 10/yr. 40CFR61(Sub B) EPA Department of Energy (DOE) Facilities 10/yr. 40CFR61 (Sub H) EPA National nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada 15/yr. 40 CFR 197 Department of Transportation (DOT) Dose rate at outer surface of vehicle package containing radioactive material 200 per hour 49 CFR 173.441 DOT Dose rate at 6.6 feet from the outer surface of transport vehicle containing radioactive material 10 per hour 49 CFR 173.441 Incident Phase Public Dose (rem) Action Early (first 4 days) 1.0 to 5.0 (whole body) Evacuation or Sheltering Early 25.0 (thyroid) Administer Stable Iodine Intermediate (4 days to one year) ≥ 2.0 (whole body) Relocation Intermediate < 2.0 (whole body) Apply Dose Reduction techniques TABLE C-5 EPA Protective Action Guides (PAGs) for a Radiological Incident As previously discussed, radiation from an RDD can only be detected by specifically designed measurement instru- ments. There is a wide spectrum of radiation detectors avail- able, each of which is designed for a specific function. For the purposes of transportation system emergency response, a general-purpose survey meter would be the most appro- priate instrument. Each radiation-measuring instrument consists of three basic components: the detector, electronic signal processor, and display-controls. The detector, which could be integral to the instrument or connected by wire to be hand held separately, produces an electric signal when ra- diation enters it. No one single detector can measure alpha, beta, gamma, and neutron radiation. The electronic signal processor converts the signal into an electric driver for the display panel. The display-controls allow the user to oper- ate the instrument and visually (also sometimes aurally) be

informed of the magnitude of the radiation dose rate at the detector. A general-purpose survey radiation detection meter, which can detect alpha, beta, and gamma radiation (all the radioiso- topes listed in Table A.3 emit alpha, beta, or gamma radia- tion) over a wide range of dose rates, is rugged, portable, and easy to use is the optimum instrument for first responders to a transportation system threat, which may involve a RDD. This meter is not required to measure dose rates to a high degree of accuracy (± 20–50% is acceptable) and will not identify the individual radioisotope(s), which are the source of radiation. These capabilities require more complex, expen- sive, cumbersome, and heavier instrumentation. Subsequent emergency responders from appropriate nuclear agencies will have this capability. The initial emergency responders only need to identify if radioactive material was released, the gen- eral magnitude of the radiation dose field, and the physical lo- cations of deposited radioactive contamination. Analysis of the most likely RDD radioisotopes and their relevant properties, which are delineated in Table C-3, points to a “pancake-type” Geiger-Muller tube or an ionization chamber detector as the optimum meter to detect each of these C-5 radioisotopes. Good quality radiation detectors using either the ionization chamber or Geiger-Muller tube are estimated to cost between $400 and $1500 each. A number of manufac- turers can offer such detectors including: Ludlums, Canberra, BNFL, Laurus, Atlantic Nuclear, Cardinal Health (used to be Victoreen), and Thermo-Eberline. C.5 EXAMPLES OF ANALYZED RDD INCIDENT EFFECTS Figures C-1 and C-2 illustrate typical dispersion maps showing how the radioisotope concentration, contamination (and radiation dose rate) changes from the point of release out to different distances for an incident in Washington, D.C. and New York City. Figure A-1 shows the plume of radioactive contamination from an RDD incident at the National Gallery of Art with a wind towards the southeast. Figure C-2 shows radioactive contamination plume from an RDD in downtown Manhattan with a wind blowing towards the northeast. The boundary of each constant shade area represents a contour of constant radiation dose rate. Within the shaded area, the dose TABLE C-6 Most Likely RDD Radioisotopes and their Radiation Properties Radioisotope [physical form] {body organ in which it accumulates} Half-Life [Curies per gram]1 Type of Radiation Emitted Maximum Energy of Radiation Emitted (Mev) Cobalt-60 [solid metal] {liver and body tissues} 5.3 years [1,130] Beta, gamma 0.3, 1.3 Iodine-125 [chemically reactive, soluble, low melting and boiling point crystalline solid] {thyroid} 60 days [17,400] Beta, gamma 0.15, 0.04 Cesium-137 [solid soluble salt] {muscles} 30.1 years [87] Beta, gamma 0.5, 0.7 Iridium-192 [solid silvery white metal] 84 days [9,170] Beta, gamma 0.8, 0.5 Strontium-90 [solid silvery metal] {bones and teeth} 29.1 years [141] Beta 0.5 Plutonium-238 [solid heavy metal] [liver and skeleton} 88 years [17] Alpha, beta, gamma 5.5, 0.01, 0.002 Radium-226 [solid heavy metal] {bone and teeth} 1,600 years [0.988] Alpha, beta, gamma 4.8, 3.0, 2.0 Americium-241 [solid heavy metal] {liver and skeleton} 433 years [3.5] Alpha, beta, gamma 5.5, 0.05, 0.06 Curium-244 [solid heavy metal] {liver and skeleton} 18 years [80.9] Alpha, beta, gamma, neutrons 5.8, 0.09, 0.002, 2.5 Californium-252 [solid heavy metal ] {liver and skeleton} 2.6 years [546] Alpha, beta, gamma, neutron 6.0, 0.04, 0.9, 2.0 1 = Indicates how much mass is needed for a given amount of radioactivity, for example one gram of Cobalt-60 has over 1,000 times the radioactivity of one gram of radium-226. [____] = highest radioactivity per unit of mass bold = highest energy gamma or neutron emitter; greatest external radiation hazard

rate and level of radioactive contamination is a value between the two contour boundary lines. In each scenario, the direction of the oval or parabolic distri- bution of radioactive material is following the wind direction and each release includes the energy of a small quantity of TNT with the radioisotope. The rate of dilution and spreading of a plume is controlled by the intensity of turbulence in the atmos- phere. Turbulence increases with wind speed, traffic, and heat emitted from buildings. The turbulence has two different ef- fects on spreading radioactivity. The higher turbulence spreads the contamination over a greater area, but also dilutes the con- C-6 tamination with more air as compared to a lower turbulence. The time for radioactive material to reach a specific distance is directly related to wind speed. Both Figures C-1 and C-2 are examples of dispersion of fine solid particulate radioactive material in an outside and relatively open location. Release in an enclosed space such as a tunnel, subway station, aircraft, or other transportation vehicle would be subject to an entirely different behavior. Radioactive particulate distribution would be more concen- trated within the enclosed space or volume. In a tunnel or un- derground station, airflow and the movement of vehicles and humans would spread contamination. While moving, airflow out of any transportation vehicle (e.g., truck, train car, sub- way car, aircraft, etc.) would carry a stream of radioactive particles to the surrounding environment. C.6 HISTORICAL RADIOLOGICAL INCIDENTS INVOLVING TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS In the approximately 100 years since the discovery and use of radioactivity, numerous radiological incidents have oc- curred that resulted in unintended radiation doses to individu- als and radioactive contamination. During the first 60 years of the twentieth century, most incidents were due to a lack of knowledge of the biological limits of radiation or were associ- ated with the research and development of nuclear technology for military applications. The most commonly known nuclear incidents in the area of civilian nuclear applications are the Chernobyl and Three Mile Island nuclear power plant acci- dents in 1986 and 1979, respectively. These events did not di- rectly involve a transportation system and emergency response was led and controlled by federal government agencies. In the U.S., about three million shipments of radioactive materials by highway, rail, air, and sea are made annually. No deaths or serious injuries have ever been attributed to radia- tion from these shipments. Since 1971, 45 million packages of radioactive material have been shipped and 3,453 have been involved in accidents, but only 197 of these resulted in enough damage to release any radioactivity. No radiation doses to the public or workers were serious enough to require medical care or violated government limits. Evaluation of his- torical data on radiological incidents was focused specifically on transportation related events with representative events presented in Table C-7. This table shows that very little radioactive material release or contamination has ever been released from civilian trans- portation. Most civilian radioactive accidents have had no public or worker health effects. Figure C-1. Washington D.C. hypothetical RDD radiation dose rate and contamination. Figure C-2. New York City hypothetical RDD radiation dose rate and contamination

C-7 Date Transport Mode Incident Description 1954 Sea Experimental navy nuclear submarine Seawolf was scuttled in 9,000 feet of water off the Delaware/Maryland coast with 33,000 Curies of radioactivity released; never recovered 1958 Highway Tank trailer with 1,500 gallons of liquid uranium solution overturned near Hanford, Washington when brakes failed on hill. Contaminated fluid was flushed into ditch and soil was shipped to a radioactive waste storage site. (Washington state) 1960 Truck Spent nuclear fuel cask leak onto trailer floor, contamination confined to vehicle 1963 Rail Spent nuclear fuel cask leak, contamination confined to cask and trailer 1964 Air (Space) U.S. nuclear powered navigation satellite burns in the atmosphere releasing 17,000 Curies of Plutonium-238 1966 Air B-52 bomber crashes with air tanker over Spain, two H-bombs fall near Palomares, their conventional explosive component detonates and spreads radioactive contamination. About ten pounds (about 278 Curies) of plutonium-239 spread over 650 acres. Over three months, 1,500 tons of topsoil and plants shipped to U.S. burial site. 800 U.S. military personnel and 900 Spanish civil guards used in cleanup. Total cleanup cost, not including lost aircraft, was $ 100 million 1971 Sea 500 gallons of radioactive water spilled in Thames River near New London, Connecticut while being transferred from nuclear submarine Dace to sub tender Fulton (Connecticut) 1971 Highway Tractor-trailer with 25-ton cask containing spent nuclear fuel overturned after swerving to avoid head-on collision. The trailer broke away and skidded into water filled ditch. No radioactive material was released. 1978 Air (Space) Russian Cosmos 954 nuclear powered satellite crashes into Canada’s desolate unpopulated Northwest Territories spreading spent nuclear fuel radioactive contamination over 15,000 square miles. Fragment radiation dose from mrem/hr. to 100 rem/hr. Cleanup took three months and about $7Million (Canada) 1978 Sea 500 gallons of radioactive water released to Puget Sound, Washington when nuclear submarine Puffer accidentally opened valve (Washington state) 1987 Sea French Cargo Ship Mont Louis with 350 tons of uranium hexafluoride sunk in a collision with a car ferry 9 miles from the coast of Belgium in 49 feet of water. The 30 casks were recovered and only one was found to be leaking. 1997 Sea MSC Carla split in two in a storm. It carried 3 casks holding a total of 9 Curies of Cesium-137 as Cesium Chloride. It sunk in 9800 feet of water in North Atlantic North of Azores and no recovery was attempted. 1997 Rail Special train car with containers of Iridium-192 and Cobalt-60 collided with bulldozer, containers were broken and spread radioactive contamination (Russia) 1999 Highway Accident between 2 Trucks, both caught fire, one truck was carrying containers and syringes with radioactive material. All radioactive material was contained and accounted for with no highway contamination (Ohio) 2000 Air A package containing two 0.05 mCi Californium-252 sources was damaged by a fork lift truck during cargo handling at an airport terminal. Confinement was not breached. (U.K.) 2003 Rail Rail car carrying radioactive waste struck another rail car in the rail yard loosening cover of car, but no radioactive material was released (Maine) TABLE C-7 Historical Representative Transportation System Radiological Release Incidents

Next: Appendix D - TERET Tool Users Manual »
A Guide to Transportation's Role in Public Health Disasters Get This Book
×
MyNAP members save 10% online.
Login or Register to save!
Download Free PDF

TRB’s National Cooperative Highway Research Program (NCHRP) Report 525: Surface Transportation Security, Volume 10: A Guide to Transportation's Role in Public Health Disasters examines development of transportation response options to an extreme event involving chemical, biological, or radiological agents. The report contains technical information on chemical, biological, and radiological threats, including vulnerabilities of the transportation system to these agents and consequence-minimization actions that may be taken within the transportation system in response to events that involve these agents. The report also includes a spreadsheet tool, called the Tracking Emergency Response Effects on Transportation (TERET), that is designed to assist transportation managers with recognition of mass-care transportation needs and identification and mitigation of potential transportation-related criticalities in essential services during extreme events. The report includes a user’s manual for TERET, as well as a PowerPoint slide introduction to chemical, biological, and radiological threat agents designed as an executive-level communications tool based on summary information from the report..

NCHRP Report 525: Surface Transportation Security is a series in which relevant information is assembled into single, concise volumes—each pertaining to a specific security problem and closely related issues. The volumes focus on the concerns that transportation agencies are addressing when developing programs in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the anthrax attacks that followed. Future volumes of the report will be issued as they are completed.

The National Academies has prepared, in cooperation with the Department of Homeland Security, fact sheets on biological, chemical, nuclear, and radiological terrorist attacks. They were designed primarily for reporters as part of the project News and Terrorism: Communicating in a Crisis, though they will be helpful to anyone looking for a clear explanation of the fundamentals of science, engineering, and health related to such attacks. TRB is a division of the National Academies, which include the National Academy of Sciences, National Academy of Engineering, Institute of Medicine, and National Research Council.

  1. ×

    Welcome to OpenBook!

    You're looking at OpenBook, NAP.edu's online reading room since 1999. Based on feedback from you, our users, we've made some improvements that make it easier than ever to read thousands of publications on our website.

    Do you want to take a quick tour of the OpenBook's features?

    No Thanks Take a Tour »
  2. ×

    Show this book's table of contents, where you can jump to any chapter by name.

    « Back Next »
  3. ×

    ...or use these buttons to go back to the previous chapter or skip to the next one.

    « Back Next »
  4. ×

    Jump up to the previous page or down to the next one. Also, you can type in a page number and press Enter to go directly to that page in the book.

    « Back Next »
  5. ×

    To search the entire text of this book, type in your search term here and press Enter.

    « Back Next »
  6. ×

    Share a link to this book page on your preferred social network or via email.

    « Back Next »
  7. ×

    View our suggested citation for this chapter.

    « Back Next »
  8. ×

    Ready to take your reading offline? Click here to buy this book in print or download it as a free PDF, if available.

    « Back Next »
Stay Connected!