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Suggested Citation:"Appendix D: Speaker Biographies." Institute of Medicine and National Research Council. 2015. Potential Risks and Benefits of Gain-of-Function Research: Summary of a Workshop. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/21666.
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Appendix D


Speaker Biographies

Ronald M. Atlas—please see committee biographies

Ralph Baric—please see committee biographies

Thomas Briese is Associate Professor of Clinical Epidemiology at the Mailman School of Public Health at Columbia University. He obtained his scientific education at the Freie University in Berlin, the Max Planck Institute for Molecular Genetics, and the University of California at Irvine. He pioneered state-of-the-art methods in molecular biology to study the involvement of infectious agents in chronic and neuropsychiatric diseases, as well as in acute diseases. Dr. Briese’s research interests include the molecular epidemiology of emerging viral diseases, virus-host cell interactions, and innovative approaches to pathogen diagnosis and discovery. Dr. Briese was responsible for cloning the genome of Borna disease virus, a novel infectious agent potentially linked to some mental disorders. His achievements have been recognized by receipt of an Albertson Young Investigator Award from the National Alliance for Research on Schizophrenia and Depression. Another successful application of these powerful molecular techniques was the identification of the flavivirus responsible for the New York City encephalitis epidemic in 1999. In 2003, Dr. Briese participated in the investigation of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrom (SARS) epidemic, during which he visited and collaborated with Beijing research institutions by invitation of the Chinese Ministry of Science and Technology. He also served as an adviser to World Health Organization.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix D: Speaker Biographies." Institute of Medicine and National Research Council. 2015. Potential Risks and Benefits of Gain-of-Function Research: Summary of a Workshop. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/21666.
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Current research efforts include the advancement of molecular detection tools for the rapid identification of potential bio-threat agents. In addition, Dr. Briese is involved in multi-center and birth cohort studies using molecular methods to assess the potential role of infection in disorders such as autism and schizophrenia.

R. Alta Charo—please see committee biographies

Ralph J. Cicerone is President of the National Academy of Sciences and Chair of the National Research Council. His research in atmospheric chemistry, climate change, and energy has involved him in shaping science and environmental policy at the highest levels nationally and internationally.

Mark Denison is the Craig-Weaver Professor of Pediatrics, and Professor of Pathology, Microbiology, and Immunology at Vanderbilt University School of Medicine in Nashville, Tennessee. Dr. Denison is a pediatric infectious disease specialist and has directed more than 25 years of National Institutes of Health-funded research on the replication, pathogenesis and evolution of coronaviruses (CoV), including SARS-CoV and Middle East Respiratory Syndrom-CoV. Dr. Denison’s lab team uses targeted reverse genetic mutagenesis and adaptive experimental evolution to define key determinants of coronavirus replication fidelity and its impact on pathogenesis, adaptation, and inhibition. Notably, his lab discovered that coronaviruses encode and utilize a proofreading exonuclease (ExoN) to maintain replication fidelity, a function unprecedented in RNA virus biology. His group determined that genetic inactivation of CoV-ExoN results in a profound mutator virus phenotype (ExoN-) that increases sensitivity of CoVs to mutagens; together with the Baric lab he showed that the SARS-CoV ExoN-mutator phenotype is stable in vivo, and is attenuating and immunogenic in a SARS-CoV lethal infection mouse model. Dr. Denison also collaborated in the first demonstration of the rescue non-cultivatable Bat-CoV using synthetic genomics alone. Dr. Denison served on the steering committee for the Southeast Regional Center of Excellence in Emerging Infections and Biodefense from 2004 to 2014 where he developed teaching modules for dual-use research of concern (DURC). He has served as Chair of the Vanderbilt Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC), and on multiple U.S. government, international panels, and journal editorial boards involved in review or consideration of biodefense, biosecurity, synthetic biology, and DURC. Dr. Denison is an elected fellow of the American Academy of Microbiology and the American Association for the Advancement of Sciences, as well as a member of the American Society for Virology.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix D: Speaker Biographies." Institute of Medicine and National Research Council. 2015. Potential Risks and Benefits of Gain-of-Function Research: Summary of a Workshop. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/21666.
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Philip Dormitzer—please see committee biographies

Victor J. Dzau is President of the Institute of Medicine. He served nearly 10 years as Chancellor for Health Affairs at Duke University and President and CEO for Duke University Health System. Before that, Dzau held influential posts with Harvard Medical School, Brigham and Women’s Hospital, and Stanford University. He is an internationally recognized trailblazer in translational research, health innovation, and global health care strategy and delivery.

Harvey V. Fineberg—please see committee biographies

Baruch Fischhoff—please see committee biographies

Christophe Fraser is currently Chair of Theoretical Epidemiology and Royal Society University Research Fellow at Imperial College London. He trained in theoretical particle physics, obtaining his PhD in 1997, and shifted areas to infectious disease epidemiology in 1998, training under Roy Anderson. He has been based at Imperial College since 2000. Professor Fraser leads the evolutionary epidemiology group, which works on developing theory, integrating data, and developing applications for public health. The evolutionary epidemiology group takes a unified view of the epidemiology and evolution of pathogens, driven by complex underlying patterns of host-host, host-pathogen, and pathogen-pathogen interactions that require careful disentangling. They use a spectrum of tools ranging from simple mathematical models to complex computer simulations, usually interacting with microbiologists, basic medical scientists, and public health professionals. They are affiliated with the Medical Research College Centre for Outbreak Analysis, and in that context work on applied epidemic modelling. Current topics of interest for the research group include HIV virulence and epidemiology, bacterial phylodynamics, influenza epidemiology, and outbreak analysis.

Charles N. Haas—please see committee biographies

Andrew Hebbeler is a former biological research scientist with foreign affairs, national security, science and technology, and nonproliferation program and policy experience. Currently, he is Assistant Director for Biological and Chemical Threats in the National Security and International Affairs division of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy. Prior to his position at the White House, Dr. Hebbeler managed and oversaw the State Department’s Biosecurity Engagement Program (BEP), which is an important component of the broader U.S. Coopera-

Suggested Citation:"Appendix D: Speaker Biographies." Institute of Medicine and National Research Council. 2015. Potential Risks and Benefits of Gain-of-Function Research: Summary of a Workshop. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/21666.
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tive Threat Reduction effort and reduces the threat of bioterrorism by preventing terrorist access to potentially dangerous biological materials, dual-use infrastructure, and expertise, while supporting efforts to combat infectious disease and enhance public and animal health worldwide. Dr. Hebbeler was born in Cincinnati, Ohio, and received his bachelor’s degree in biology and philosophy from Thomas More College in Crestview Hills, Kentucky. He completed his doctoral work in the laboratory of C. David Pauza at the University of Maryland, Baltimore, where he focused on understanding an unconventional lymphocyte population that is important during immune responses to infectious disease and cancer. Before joining the State Department, Dr. Hebbeler was a postdoctoral fellow in the laboratory of Warner C. Greene at The J. David Gladstone Institutes in San Francisco, California.

Gavin Huntley-Fenner is a human factors and safety consultant with a unique problem-solving skill set and communication style developed over more than 15 years as a researcher, author, educator, and business consultant. He regularly provides consumer product hazard analyses and has served as an expert witness for matters relating to risk perception, instruction manuals, warnings, labeling, safety and human development, human reaction time, and decision-making. Dr. Huntley-Fenner is an educator and certified Continuing Legal Education (CLE) provider, as well as a published author.

Michael Imperiale is a Professor in the Department of Microbiology and Immunology at the University of Michigan Medical School. He joined the department in 1984 as the Arthur F. Thurnau Assistant Professor of Microbiology and Immunology and was subsequently promoted to Associate Professor in 1990 and Professor in 1996. He is currently the Arthur F. Thurnau Professor and Associate Chair of Microbiology and Immunology. In 2010 Dr. Imperiale was elected as a fellow of the American Academy of Microbiology and in 2011 he was elected as a fellow of the American Association for the Advancement of Science. Before joining the University of Michigan, Dr. Imperiale carried out research training as a postdoctoral fellow at The Rockefeller University, where he first became interested in DNA tumor viruses, studying gene regulation in the human pathogen, adenovirus. He received his undergraduate and graduate training at Columbia University, receiving a BA in 1976, MA in 1978, and PhD in 1981, all in biological sciences. Currently, Dr. Imperiale’s research interests focus on the study of how DNA tumor viruses interact with the host cell. Dr. Imperiale is a member of the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity, a position he has held since 2005. He also serves as an editor of the Journal of Virology, PLos Pathogens, and mBio.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix D: Speaker Biographies." Institute of Medicine and National Research Council. 2015. Potential Risks and Benefits of Gain-of-Function Research: Summary of a Workshop. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/21666.
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Barbara Johnson is registered biosafety professional and has held positions in U.S. government and in private industry as a biosafety professional and senior scientist for more than 25 years. Currently, she develops site-specific risk assessments and mitigation strategies, assists in developing frameworks internationally to establish Institutional Biosafety Committees and support programs, reviews and develops designs for biocontainment facilities (A/BSL-2 through A/BSL-4 and BSL-3 Ag), certifies and validates containment laboratories, develops and provides biosafety and biosecurity training, and provides strategic and technical assistance in developing national-level and international biosafety, biosecurity, and biorisk management programs for conducting work with high-risk pathogens. Her company, Biosafety Biosecurity International provides technical and policy consultation in the United States and to international organizations (Department of Health and Human Services, Department of Homeland Security, Department of Justice, Department of Defense, Department of State, U.S. Department of Agriculture, United Nations, World Health Organization, and the Food and Agriculture Oranization of the United Nations), industry and universities, as well as international Ministries of Health. Approximately 30 percent of her time is spent consulting with overseas biocontainment entities and ministries. She has served on several committees for the National Academy of Sciences, developed parts of the National Biosecurity Training Program for the USDA and CDC and served as a member of the ANSI/AIHA Z9.14 Committee that developed the U.S. “Standard for Verification of BSL-3 Laboratories.” Dr. Johnson is the Chief Co-Editor of the American Biological Safety Association journal Applied Biosafety, an approved BSL-3 Facility Certifier and Trainer by the Singapore Ministry of Health, and a past President of the American Biological Safety Association.

Yoshihiro Kawaoka was educated in Japan, receiving his DVM in 1978 from the Ministry of Agriculture and Fishery and his PhD in 1983 from Hokkaido University. He then moved from Japan to Memphis, Tennessee, where he began a postdoctoral fellowship in influenza virology under the tutelage of Dr. Robert Webster at St. Jude Children’s Research Hospital. While at St. Jude, Dr. Kawaoka established an independent program to address such fundamental questions in influenza virology as how do influenza viruses cause disease; why are certain types of influenza viruses found in humans while other types are found only in birds; and how do influenza viruses change over time. These studies led Dr. Kawaoka to identify a difference between viruses that kill birds and those that do not. He then demonstrated the significance of this difference by converting deadly bird flu viruses to milder, non-lethal forms. This information is now used by the USDA and Organisation Mondiale de la Santé Animale

Suggested Citation:"Appendix D: Speaker Biographies." Institute of Medicine and National Research Council. 2015. Potential Risks and Benefits of Gain-of-Function Research: Summary of a Workshop. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/21666.
×

(World Organisation for Animal Health) as a criterion for rapidly identifying lethal and nonlethal bird flu viruses and to produce vaccine strains for H5N1 viruses. During his tenure at St. Jude, Dr. Kawaoka ultimately achieved the status of Full Member (professor). He later assumed a professorship at the University of Wisconsin (UW)-Madison. At UW, Dr. Kawaoka continued to study fundamental concepts in influenza virology. He established reverse genetics, which allows the generation of “designer” influenza viruses. This technology—coupled with knowledge established by Dr. Kawaoka regarding the attenuation of deadly influenza viruses—was exploited in the development of candidate H5N1 influenza virus vaccines, which were proven efficacious in clinical trials. Dr. Kawaoka has also employed reverse genetics in basic research. Using this technology, he identified a change in a single gene that is critical for bird flu viruses to cause severe disease in mammals. Dr. Kawaoka has also undertaken the study of the 1918 Spanish flu virus, which killed more than 40 million people around the close of World War I. Information uncovered by Dr. Kawaoka is used globally by public health agencies as they undertake the enormous task of influenza pandemic planning. In addition to his work with influenza virus, Dr. Kawaoka also studies Ebola virus. Because of its extreme virulence, laboratories designated as biosafety level 4 (BSL-4), the highest containment environment possible, were required to carry out experiments with Ebola virus. This requirement severely hampered the progress of research with this virus, as few such facilities exist worldwide. Dr. Kawaoka therefore established several systems that allowed the analyses of Ebola virus under non-BSL-4 conditions. These systems are now widely used in many laboratories, contributing to the recent advances in Ebola virus research. Dr. Kawaoka has made significant scientific contribution to the understanding of two highly lethal pathogens, influenza and Ebola viruses. In recognition of his work, in 2006, Dr. Kawaoka was awarded the prestigious Robert Koch Award for his innovative research in the field of influenza virology.

George Kemble joined 3-V Biosciences in August 2011 as its Chief Scientific Officer. Prior to joining 3-V, Dr. Kemble was with MedImmune, Inc., a subsidiary of Astra-Zeneca PLC, where he served as Senior Vice President of R&D and Head of Research. During his tenure, Dr. Kemble was responsible for the research and development of multiple products, including the successful launch of FluMist®, the first innovation in influenza vaccines in more than 60 years. The research organization for which he was responsible included more than 700 scientists in Maryland, California, and Cambridge, England, with expertise in research biology, lead generation and translational science in the areas of infectious diseases, oncology, inflammatory, respiratory, autoimmune diseases, neuroscience,

Suggested Citation:"Appendix D: Speaker Biographies." Institute of Medicine and National Research Council. 2015. Potential Risks and Benefits of Gain-of-Function Research: Summary of a Workshop. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/21666.
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cardiovascular, and gastrointestinal indications. Dr. Kemble began his research career as a staff scientist at Aviron, which was later acquired by MedImmune. Dr. Kemble received a BS from the University of Santa Clara and a PhD from Stanford University and did his postdoctoral training at the University of California, San Francisco, where he worked on a number of different human viruses.

Gregory Koblentz is an Associate Professor in the School of Policy, Government, and International Affairs and Deputy Director of the Biodefense Graduate Program at George Mason University. He is also a Research Affiliate with the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Associate Faculty at the Center for Global Studies at George Mason, and a member of the Scientist Working Group on Chemical and Biological Weapons at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation in Washington, DC. During 2012-2013, he was a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations where he conducted research on nuclear proliferation. Prior to arriving at George Mason, Dr. Koblentz was a Visiting Assistant Professor in the School of Foreign Service and Department of Government at Georgetown University. He has also worked for the Executive Session on Domestic Preparedness at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Dr. Koblentz is the author of Strategic Stability in the Second Nuclear Age (Council on Foreign Relations, 2014) and Living Weapons: Biological Warfare and International Security (Cornell University Press, 2009) and co-author of Tracking Nuclear Proliferation: A Guide in Maps and Charts (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1998). His research and teaching focus on international security and weapons of mass destruction. He received a PhD in political science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and an MPP from the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University.

Gigi Kwik Gronvall is a Senior Associate at the Center for Biosecurity of University of Pittsburgh Medical Center (UPMC) and Assistant Professor of Medicine at the University of Pittsburgh. An immunologist by training, Dr. Gronvall’s work addresses how scientists can diminish the threat of biological weapons and how they can contribute to an effective response against a biological weapon or a natural epidemic. She is a term member of the Council on Foreign Relations and also serves on the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) Committee on Scientific Freedom and Responsibility. Dr. Gronvall is a founding member of the Center for Biosecurity of UPMC and, prior to joining the faculty in 2003, she worked at the Johns Hopkins University Center for Civilian

Suggested Citation:"Appendix D: Speaker Biographies." Institute of Medicine and National Research Council. 2015. Potential Risks and Benefits of Gain-of-Function Research: Summary of a Workshop. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/21666.
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Biodefense Strategies. From 2000 to 2001 she was a National Research Council Postdoctoral Associate at the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) in Fort Detrick, Maryland. Dr. Gronvall earned a PhD from Johns Hopkins University for her work on T-cell receptor/MHC I interactions.

Robert Lamb is John Evans Professor of Molecular and Cellular Biology in the Department of Molecular Biosciences at Northwestern University, Professor of Microbiology-Immunology at Northwestern University Medical School, and an Investigator of the Howard Hughes Medical Institute. He received his undergraduate degree reading biochemistry at the University of Birmingham, England, and his PhD and ScD degrees from the University of Cambridge. He came to the United States to do postdoctoral work with Purnell Choppin at the Rockefeller University, where he later became a faculty member before joining the faculty of Northwestern University. His honors include consecutive NIH MERIT awards. He is past President of the American Society for Virology. Dr. Lamb is a member of the National Academy of Sciences and a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

Carol Linden currently serves as the Principal Deputy Director of the Office of the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA) in the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response, Department of Health and Human Services. Her duties include oversight of advanced development and acquisition programs for Project BioShield medical countermeasures for chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) threats as well as pandemic influenza vaccines, drugs, diagnostics, and infrastructure. From October 2006 through April 2008 she also served as the Acting Director of BARDA, responsible for a doubling in the size of the office and implementation of the legislation that established the office. Dr. Linden previously served as the Senior Scientist for the Office of Research and Development in the Science and Technology Directorate of the Department of Homeland Security, overseeing treaty and regulatory compliance as well as international collaborations. Immediately prior to this position, she served as Deputy Director of the Office of Research Programs. Prior to joining the Department of Homeland Security, Dr. Linden was the Scientific Director for the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) Chemical and Biological Defense Directorate from mid-2003 until spring of 2004. Before her detail to DTRA, she served as the Director for the Department of Defense Medical Chemical and Biological Defense Research Programs for more than 3 years, managing all aspects of the joint services medical Chemical and Biological Defense Program. Dr. Linden served a critical function in coordinating the work-

Suggested Citation:"Appendix D: Speaker Biographies." Institute of Medicine and National Research Council. 2015. Potential Risks and Benefits of Gain-of-Function Research: Summary of a Workshop. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/21666.
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ing relationship between the technology base and advanced development, facilitating the transition of candidate vaccines, diagnostic technologies, and therapies to the developer. Dr. Linden obtained her bachelor’s degree in biology from Bryn Mawr College and a PhD from the University of California, Los Angeles in molecular biology. She conducted postdoctoral research at the California Institute of Technology and University of Maryland prior to joining the research staff at the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, where she subsequently served as the Chief, Research Plans and Programs.

Marc Lipsitch is Professor of Epidemiology at the Harvard School of Public Health and Director of the Center for Communicable Disease Dynamics (CCDD), an NIH/National Insttute of General Medical Sciences MIDAS Center of Excellence. He is an author of more than 200 peer-reviewed publications on the impact of medical and public health interventions on the spread and evolution of infectious disease agents, and the consequences of these changes for human health. His group produced one of the earliest estimates of transmissibility of the SARS virus in real time in 2003 and provided a key estimate of the transmissibility of 1918 pandemic influenza, which helped to support the possibility of the use of pharmaceutical and nonpharmaceutical interventions to control the spread of future pandemics. His team at CCDD played a leading role in the analysis and response to the 2009 influenza A/H1N1 pandemic, working closely with local, state, national, and international public health agencies. In addition to ongoing studies of pandemic and seasonal influenza burden, preparedness, and response, current research includes the application of population genomics to understand the spread of infections and the changes produced in bacterial population by human immunity, and modeling the effects of pneumococcal vaccination. Experimentally, his laboratory studies the immune response to and antigenic diversity of Streptococcus pneumoniae, combining molecular biology and animal studies with population genomics, epidemiology, and mathematical modeling. Dr. Lipsitch has received several outstanding young investigator awards and has served on the editorial advisory boards/associate editor of PLoS Medicine, Journal of Infectious Diseases, American Journal of Epidemiology, Epidemiology, and Epidemics. He has served on the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology Working Group on H1N1 Influenza, as well as CDC’s Team B for the 2009 H1N1 pandemic. He has provided advice on antimicrobial resistance, SARS, or influenza to the Food and Drug Administration, WHO, CDC, Congressional Budget Office, Defense Science Board, and the governments of Canada and Mexico. He was a member of the winning team in the 2013 CDC “Predict the Flu” Challenge. Dr. Lipsitch received his BA in philosophy from Yale

Suggested Citation:"Appendix D: Speaker Biographies." Institute of Medicine and National Research Council. 2015. Potential Risks and Benefits of Gain-of-Function Research: Summary of a Workshop. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/21666.
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University, completed his doctoral work in zoology at Oxford University as a Rhodes Scholar, and did postdoctoral work at Emory University and at the CDC from 1995 to 1999. He joined the faculty of Harvard School of Public Health in 1999.

Rebecca Moritz is a biosafety and biosecurity expert with a BS in bacteriology and an MS in medical microbiology and immunology from the University of Wisconsin (UW)-Madison. She serves as the Select Agent Program Manager and Alternate Responsible Official for the UW-Madison Select Agent Program. Ms. Moritz is chair of UW-Madison’s Dual Use Research of Concern Subcommittee and an appointed consultant to the UW-Madison Institutional Biosafety Committee. She is also a lead member of the UW-Madison Biosecurity Task Force, consisting of a diverse body of experts from across campus and responsible for regularly reviewing the research programs and practices of its Select Agent researchers. She is a certified biosafety professional with the American Biological Safety Association (ABSA) and member of several ABSA committees, including the Legislative Committee. Additionally, she is a specialist microbiologist with the National Registry of Certified Microbiologists. Ms. Moritz has conducted research in both private-sector and academic laboratories, including in high-containment laboratories.

Amy Patterson is the Associate Director for Biosecurity and Biosafety Policy at the NIH in the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). In this position, she advises the NIH Director and the 27 NIH Institute and Center Directors on a wide spectrum of issues related to the federal framework for biosafety oversight, as well as biosecurity measures to preclude the misuse of the products of life science research. Specifically, she works on such matters as the science, safety, and ethics of recombinant DNA research; mitigating the risks of dual use research of concern; the biosafety and biosecurity dimensions of emerging technologies; and federal policy regarding the funding of gain-of-function research. In addition, she provides leadership in federal efforts to address the global problem of antibiotic resistance bacteria. Dr. Patterson is also a member of the HHS senior leadership team coordinating the Department’s response to the Ebola crisis. In all of these efforts, Dr. Patterson works with senior leadership of other federal agencies and the White House. She also manages and staffs key federal advisory committees, including the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity.

David Relman is the Thomas C. and Joan M. Merigan Professor in the departments of Medicine and of Microbiology and Immunology at Stanford University, and Chief of Infectious Diseases at the Veterans

Suggested Citation:"Appendix D: Speaker Biographies." Institute of Medicine and National Research Council. 2015. Potential Risks and Benefits of Gain-of-Function Research: Summary of a Workshop. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/21666.
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Affairs Palo Alto Health Care System in Palo Alto, California. He is also Co-Director of the Center for International Security and Cooperation and Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. Dr. Relman’s research focus is the human indigenous microbiota, and in particular, the nature and mechanisms of variation in patterns of microbial diversity and function, key features of microbial community assembly, and the basis for community stability and resilience. During the past few decades, he has also spearheaded the development of new strategies for identifying previously unrecognized microbial agents of disease. These efforts have revealed novel pathogens and commensals. Dr. Relman has served as an advisor to a number of agencies and departments within the U.S. government on matters pertaining to emerging infectious diseases, human-microbe interactions, biotechnology, and biosecurity. He currently serves as Chair of the Forum on Microbial Threats at the Institute of Medicine and is Immediate Past-President of the Infectious Diseases Society of America. Dr. Relman received a BS (biology) from MIT and MD from Harvard Medical School, completed his clinical and research postdoctoral training at Massachusetts General Hospital and at Stanford University, and joined the faculty at Stanford in 1994. He received an NIH Pioneer Award in 2006 and an NIH Transformative Research Award in 2011, and he was elected a member of the Institute of Medicine in 2011.

Colin Russell is currently a Royal Society University Research Fellow in the Department of Veterinary Medicine at the University of Cambridge and one of the chief scientists of the Cambridge World Health Organization Collaborating Center for Modelling, Evolution and Control of Emerging Infectious Diseases. He received a BS in biology from Emory University and did his doctoral work at the University of Cambridge as a Gates Scholar. He has been based at the University of Cambridge since 2002. Dr. Russell’s research focuses broadly on the evolution and epidemiology of influenza viruses, and he has published papers on topics ranging from the within-host evolution of avian influenza viruses to the global circulation of seasonal influenza viruses.

Monica Schoch-Spana, a medical anthropologist, is a senior associate with the UPMC Center for Health Security, an Associate Professor of Anthropology at the Texas State University, and a former Associate Professor of Medicine at the University of Pittsburgh. Her research and policy interests include disaster resilience, community engagement, public health emergency preparedness, and nuclear incident preparedness, response, and recovery. Starting in 1998, Dr. Schoch-Spana has briefed federal, state, and local officials, as well as medical, public health, and public safety profes-

Suggested Citation:"Appendix D: Speaker Biographies." Institute of Medicine and National Research Council. 2015. Potential Risks and Benefits of Gain-of-Function Research: Summary of a Workshop. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/21666.
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sionals on critical issues in biosecurity and public health, emergency preparedness. National advisory roles include serving on the Steering Committee of the Disaster Roundtable of the National Research Council (NRC), the Institute of Medicine Standing Committee on Health Threats Resilience, and the NRC Committee on Increasing National Resilience to Hazards and Disasters. Dr. Schoch-Spana has led research, education, and advocacy efforts to encourage authorities to enlist the public’s contributions in managing epidemics, biological attacks, and other health emergencies. She has chaired national working groups to produce peer-reviewed, evidence-based consensus guidance for authorities on how to lead with the public’s trust and help during bioterrorism response (2004), how to engage community partners in preparing for a health emergency such as pandemic flu (2007), and how to design a community-based approach for nuclear incident preparedness (2011). She has organized three national conferences on community resilience and public participation in emergency planning. In 2003, Dr. Schoch-Spana helped establish the Center for Health Security; prior to that she had worked at the Johns Hopkins University Center for Civilian Biodefense Strategies since 1998. She received a PhD in cultural anthropology from Johns Hopkins University (1998) and a BA from Bryn Mawr College (1986).

Stacey Schultz-Cherry’s introduction to influenza pathogenesis began as a postdoctoral fellow with Dr. Virginia Hinshaw at the University of Wisconsin. Given her PhD training as a cellular biochemist with an emphasis on wound healing and extracellular matrix-growth factor interactions in the Department of Pathology at the University of Alabama-Birmingham, her postdoctoral studies focused on understanding the viral and cellular factors involved in influenza virus-induced apoptosis. She was specifically interested in how highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) viruses induced extensive damage. These studies led to a faculty position at the Southeast Poultry Research Lab (USDA-ARS) studying HPAI. The timing of the move corresponded to the 1997 HPAI outbreak in humans in Hong Kong. During her 5 years at the USDA, she was intimately involved in the H5N1 outbreak in terms of diagnostics, epidemiology, surveillance, and pathogenesis and worked closely with the CDC. They were also one of the first laboratories to begin working with turkey pneumovirus, which is closely related to human metapneumovirus. In 2002, she accepted a tenure-track faculty position at the University of Wisconsin School of Medicine and Public Health, where her laboratory continued to focus on pathogenesis. She also identified and characterized a novel antiviral peptide that blocks influenza attachment. The laboratory’s patent was recently licensed by a small influenza company. After receiving tenure at UW, St. Jude offered her a faculty position that she could not refuse. At

Suggested Citation:"Appendix D: Speaker Biographies." Institute of Medicine and National Research Council. 2015. Potential Risks and Benefits of Gain-of-Function Research: Summary of a Workshop. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/21666.
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St. Jude, her laboratory is part of the Center for Excellence in Influenza Research and Surveillance and the World Health Organization Collaborating Center. The Centers are continuing with basic research studies but have also initiated surveillance efforts throughout Latin America.

Samuel L. Stanley, Jr. was appointed as the fifth President of Stony Brook University in May 2009. Since that time he has presided over a tremendous growth of the university, through the implementation of a faculty hiring program that has brought 200 net new faculty to Stony Brook, a five-fold increase in endowed professorships, the largest number of applicants and most accomplished classes in the school’s history, and record fundraising totals, including one of the largest gifts ever to a public university. Before becoming President of Stony Brook University, Dr. Stanley served as Vice Chancellor for Research at Washington University in St. Louis, where he had a distinguished career as a biomedical researcher with a focus on host defense against emerging pathogens. Dr. Stanley currently serves as the Chair of the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB), is a member of the National Security Higher Education Advisory Board (NSHEAB), is the Chair of Brookhaven Science Associates (BSA), which manages Brookhaven National Laboratory, is a member of the Board of Directors of Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory, and is a member of the Board of Directors of the Research Foundation, State University of New York.

Kanta Subbarao received her MBBS in 1982 from the Christian Medical College, Vellore, University of Madras, India, and completed a residency in pediatrics at Cardinal Glennon Memorial Hospital for Children at St. Louis University. She completed a fellowship in pediatric infectious diseases and earned her MPH in epidemiology from the University of Oklahoma Health Sciences Center. After postdoctoral training in the Laboratory of Infectious Diseases (LID) at the National Institutes of Health, she served on the faculty at McGill University, Montreal, Canada, and subsequently served as Chief of the Molecular Genetics Section of the Influenza Branch at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Dr. Subbarao joined LID as a senior investigator in 2002.

Robert G. Webster—please see committee biographies

Jerry Weir is the Director of the Division of Viral Products (DVP), Office of Vaccines Research and Review with the U.S. Food and Drug Administration’s Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research (CBER). He received his PhD in biochemistry from Vanderbilt University and did postdoctoral research in virology at the National Institutes of Health. He joined the Food and Drug Administration in 1994. In his position as Director of DVP,

Suggested Citation:"Appendix D: Speaker Biographies." Institute of Medicine and National Research Council. 2015. Potential Risks and Benefits of Gain-of-Function Research: Summary of a Workshop. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/21666.
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Dr. Weir manages the regulatory activities and research programs of the Division. As a Senior Investigator at CBER, he directs a research program pertaining to diverse viruses, including influenza, herpesviruses, and poxviruses. Dr. Weir frequently serves as an advisor to the World Health Organization on issues relating to influenza virus vaccines activities and vaccine standards.

Rob Weyant currently serves as the Director of the Division of Select Agents and Toxins, Office of Public Health Preparedness and Emergency Response, CDC (DSAT). He holds bachelor’s and master’s degrees from the University of Pittsburgh and a PhD from Emory University. Prior to joining DSAT in 2006 Dr. Weyant had served as Chief of the CDC Special Bacteriology Reference Laboratory (1991-2002) and then as the CDC Biological Safety Officer (2002-2006). Dr. Weyant has authored or coauthored more than 150 scientific publications, and he served on the Steering Committee for the fifth edition of the CDC/NIH Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories manual. In October of 2012 Dr. Weyant published a major update of the HHS Select Agent Regulations, defining the agents of highest risk for misuse and establishing new regulatory requirements for their safe and secure possession.

Suggested Citation:"Appendix D: Speaker Biographies." Institute of Medicine and National Research Council. 2015. Potential Risks and Benefits of Gain-of-Function Research: Summary of a Workshop. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/21666.
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix D: Speaker Biographies." Institute of Medicine and National Research Council. 2015. Potential Risks and Benefits of Gain-of-Function Research: Summary of a Workshop. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/21666.
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix D: Speaker Biographies." Institute of Medicine and National Research Council. 2015. Potential Risks and Benefits of Gain-of-Function Research: Summary of a Workshop. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/21666.
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix D: Speaker Biographies." Institute of Medicine and National Research Council. 2015. Potential Risks and Benefits of Gain-of-Function Research: Summary of a Workshop. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/21666.
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix D: Speaker Biographies." Institute of Medicine and National Research Council. 2015. Potential Risks and Benefits of Gain-of-Function Research: Summary of a Workshop. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/21666.
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix D: Speaker Biographies." Institute of Medicine and National Research Council. 2015. Potential Risks and Benefits of Gain-of-Function Research: Summary of a Workshop. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/21666.
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix D: Speaker Biographies." Institute of Medicine and National Research Council. 2015. Potential Risks and Benefits of Gain-of-Function Research: Summary of a Workshop. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/21666.
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix D: Speaker Biographies." Institute of Medicine and National Research Council. 2015. Potential Risks and Benefits of Gain-of-Function Research: Summary of a Workshop. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/21666.
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix D: Speaker Biographies." Institute of Medicine and National Research Council. 2015. Potential Risks and Benefits of Gain-of-Function Research: Summary of a Workshop. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/21666.
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix D: Speaker Biographies." Institute of Medicine and National Research Council. 2015. Potential Risks and Benefits of Gain-of-Function Research: Summary of a Workshop. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/21666.
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix D: Speaker Biographies." Institute of Medicine and National Research Council. 2015. Potential Risks and Benefits of Gain-of-Function Research: Summary of a Workshop. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/21666.
×
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix D: Speaker Biographies." Institute of Medicine and National Research Council. 2015. Potential Risks and Benefits of Gain-of-Function Research: Summary of a Workshop. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/21666.
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix D: Speaker Biographies." Institute of Medicine and National Research Council. 2015. Potential Risks and Benefits of Gain-of-Function Research: Summary of a Workshop. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/21666.
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Suggested Citation:"Appendix D: Speaker Biographies." Institute of Medicine and National Research Council. 2015. Potential Risks and Benefits of Gain-of-Function Research: Summary of a Workshop. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/21666.
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Next: Appendix E: List of Attendees »
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On October 17, 2014, spurred by incidents at U.S. government laboratories that raised serious biosafety concerns, the United States government launched a one-year deliberative process to address the continuing controversy surrounding so-called "gain-of-function" (GOF) research on respiratory pathogens with pandemic potential. The gain of function controversy began in late 2011 with the question of whether to publish the results of two experiments involving H5N1 avian influenza and continued to focus on certain research with highly pathogenic avian influenza over the next three years. The heart of the U.S. process is an evaluation of the potential risks and benefits of certain types of GOF experiments with influenza, SARS, and MERS viruses that would inform the development and adoption of a new U.S. Government policy governing the funding and conduct of GOF research.

Potential Risks and Benefits of Gain-of-Function Research is the summary of a two-day public symposia on GOF research. Convened in December 2014 by the Institute of Medicine and the National Research Council, the main focus of this event was to discuss principles important for, and key considerations in, the design of risk and benefit assessments of GOF research. Participants examined the underlying scientific and technical questions that are the source of current discussion and debate over GOF research involving pathogens with pandemic potential. This report is a record of the presentations and discussion of the meeting.

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