Integrating MTS Commerce Data with Multimodal Freight Transportation Performance Measures to Support MTS Maintenance Investment Decision Making (2014)

Below is the uncorrected machine-read text of this chapter, intended to provide our own search engines and external engines with highly rich, chapter-representative searchable text of each book. Because it is UNCORRECTED material, please consider the following text as a useful but insufficient proxy for the authoritative book pages.

68 Notes on Rail Capacity Approach As explained in the section “Utilization Metrics/Indicators” in the main body of NCFRP Report 32, the rail capacity analy- sis was based on work done by Cambridge Systematics for the American Association of Railroads (AAR) (2). The analy- sis essentially makes capacity a function of the traffic man- agement system and the number of tracks. The types of traffic management system are the following: • Centralized Traffic Control (CTC). This system consists of a centralized train dispatcher’s office that controls rail- road interlockings and traffic flows in portions of the rail system designated as CTC territory. A train may occupy a main track in CTC territory if it has been permitted to do so by signal indication. This means that a train may enter a CTC track from another track, or move within the CTC territory, on signal indication alone. A signal indicating it is safe to proceed is also the authority to proceed. A CTC track can be used for traffic in both directions, although one direction may be preferred in daily operations. There is a set of rules governing train entry into CTC territory where a signal is not provided (say, from a spur) and to get trains moving in case of signal failure. • Automatic Block Signaling (ABS). This system consists of a series of signals that divide a railway line into a series of sec- tions, or blocks. The system controls the movement of trains between the blocks using automatic signals. ABS operation is designed to allow trains operating in the same direction to follow each other in a safe manner without risk of rear end collision. • Track Warrant Control (TWC). Track warrants are system- atized permissions used on some railroad lines to autho- rize a train’s use of the main line. Dispatchers issue these permissions to train crews instead of using signals. The crews receive track warrants by radio, phone, or electronic transmission from a dispatcher. Each system has a unique set of operating characteris- tics that defines the maximum number of trains that can be expected to operate over a given track segment. For this study, the maximum number of trains for a given segment was set as shown in Table E-1. Notes on Highway Capacity Approach Consultation with TTI’s Urban Mobility Program person- nel revealed that even very large increases in truck traffic from port-related activity would only be statistically noticeable within a few miles of the port. Once the truck traffic leaves the port area, it disperses rapidly, and it is such a small percent- age of the overall vehicle count that it has almost no effect on average delays. In the case of Portland (the only case study in which highways were a significant issue), the worst-case sce- nario indicates a possible 1.7 percent increase in delay times on the network of principal roadways in the metro area. Any highway analysis taken at any of the case study ports only focused on the immediate vicinity of the port. Duluth Duluth waterborne shipments tend to use the maximum water depth available. An increase of 30 percent of the tonnage that has historically moved in the deepest 3 ft would amount to an increase of 27.5 percent of total tonnage. Since coal and taconite are not the only commodities moved at these depths (although they certainly dominate the flows), the 27.5 percent increase is used as the projected increase in flows based on total tonnage handled at the port. Landside, all of the potential project depth tonnage increases would be carried by rail. There are two major rail corridors that are relevant to the analysis. One runs from the iron ore (taconite) mines north of the Duluth-Superior metropolitan area to the port. This rail corridor is operated by the Duluth, A P P E N D I X E Analysis of Constraints

69 Missabe and Iron Range Railway (DM&IR). The other car- ries coal from the Powder River Basin to the port. That line is owned and operated by BNSF. A standard taconite unit train is defined as a 100-car train with 110 tons per car, for a total of 11,000 tons per shipment. The most constrained point for the DM&IR is at the Shelton, Minnesota, stop. This is a single TWC track. Since TWC seg- ments with one track have a capacity of 16 trains per day, the theoretical capacity is 16 × 11,000 tons × 365 days or 64,240,000 tons per year. This corridor currently experiences volumes of approximately 38,000,000 per year. This means the current tonnage could increase by 69 percent before reaching the theoretical limit. This corridor is not considered to be constrained in the model. A standard coal train is defined as 110 cars at 111 tons per car. The most constricted point on the BNSF line is at the Beach, North Dakota, stop. This is a CTC segment with one track and two sidings, which means it should be able to han- dle a maximum of 32 trains per day (30 on the track and 2 on sidings). This stop is currently experiencing 27 trains per day; the unused capacity is 5 trains per day. This is a poten- tial increase of 18.5 percent in volume before the theoretical capacity is reached and could constrain potential increases in cargo volumes. For the purposes of this study, researchers also assumed that Burns Harbor, Indiana, and St. Clair, Michigan, would need to be dredged 3 ft. This loss of depth would affect the amount of coal and iron ore that has historically been destined for these two ports, as it would if Duluth (the origination point) lost depth. It was assumed that no other destination port would present a constraint. Hampton Roads The only commodity that would be affected by mainte- nance dredging at Hampton Roads is export coal. No other commodity has historically used the deepest 3 ft of water. Since this is the only commodity affected by maintenance dredging, a 30 percent increase in project depth tonnage would be reflected by a 30 percent increase in coal tonnage. Since this is moved entirely by rail, rail is the only potential landside constraint. There are essentially two major coal exporting facilities at Hampton Roads: one at Newport News and the other on the Norfolk Channel. Norfolk handles about 60 percent of the total coal tonnage, and Newport News 40 percent. CSX is the primary railroad into Newport News and Norfolk Southern (NS) is the primary railroad into Norfolk. These coal trains are assumed to consist of 100 cars at 100 tons per car, or 10,000 tons per train. For CSX, the most likely constrained point is Richmond, Virginia. This is a CTC segment with two tracks, which indi- cates a theoretical capacity of 75 trains per day. This would equate to 75 × 10,000 × 365, or 273,750,000 tons per year. Currently, 26 trains a day use this segment. This indicates an unused capacity of 178,850,000 tons per year. Since this is several multiples of annual coal traffic through Hampton Roads, a 30 percent increase would not result in constraint on this segment. For NS, the most likely constrained point is Pamplin, Virginia. This segment is a CTC segment with one track, which would indicate a capacity of 30 trains per day. This equates to 30 × 10,000 × 365, or 109,500,000 tons per year. Currently, 18 trains a day are transiting this segment, leaving a capacity of 12 additional trains per day. This amounts to unused capacity of 43,800,000 tons. A 30 percent increase in coal tonnage (30 percent of 35.5 million tons) would not con- sume more than approximately 24 percent of this capacity, so this rail line is also unlikely to constrain traffic. Huntington Based on FAF3 data and the information the Corps pro- vided, there was no indication of any significant rail or high- way flows linked to the cargo movements associated with Huntington. The only potential constraint on Huntington is found at Emsworth Lock and Dam and Lock and Dam 52. A potential increase of 30 percent in project depth cargo for Huntington would not cause either one of these structures to experience a substantial increase in capacity utilization. How- ever, these structures were included in the model as potential constraints. Plaquemines Plaquemines has insignificant interfaces with the highway or rail modes, and there are no locks that would constrain traf- fic to the port. Therefore, landside and lock constraints were not considered in the analysis of Plaquemines traffic. A 30 per- cent increase in project depth tonnage for Plaquemines would only result in a 3.1 percent increase in total tonnage. This indi- cates that only a small fraction of shipments at Plaquemines actually rely on the full depth for their movements. System 1 Track 2 Tracks CTC 30 75 ABS 18 53 TWC 16 N/A Table E-1. Maximum number of trains per day by traffic control system.

70 Portland-Coastal There are significant interfaces with both the rail and high- way systems at Portland. The vessel fleet calling at Portland does not rely heavily on the availability of maximum project depth. An increase of 30 percent of project depth cargo would equate to a 10.8 percent increase in overall tonnage. The cor- ridor analysis for Portland had to be based on overall tonnage due to a lack of available granularity in the data. Therefore, all flows were projected to increase by 10.8 percent based on current traffic figures. There are two major railroads serving Portland: UP and BNSF. BNSF tends to carry freight to the north and east, while UP tends to operate to the south and southeast of Portland. The assignment of tonnages to the two railroads was explained in Appendix C. BNSF is currently operating at the theoretical capacity of their line out of Portland. Therefore, the model shows zero unused capacity for this railroad. Trains serving Portland tend to carry a mix of commodi- ties and empty cars. The theoretical capacity for UP is based on CTC with two tracks available, for a total of 75 trains per day. A fully loaded 110-car train with 100 tons per car could carry 11,000 tons. This would yield an annual capacity of 75 × 11,000 × 365, or 301,125,000 tons. However, trains in the northwest area tend to have 40.8 percent empty cars, and the average car load is only 65 tons (2). This would mean that a standard train would be carrying ((1-0.408) × 100) × 65, or 3,848 tons per train. The most likely constraint on the UP line occurs at Rock Springs, Wyoming. This is a CTC segment with two tracks, which would indicate a capacity of 75 trains per day. There are currently 70 trains per day on this segment, so the remaining capacity is 5 trains per day. A 30 percent increase in project depth traffic for Portland would only result in an increase of less than 700,000 tons on this line, so it appears that it is not a significant constraint for Portland. There are no data concerning truck freight shipments in the vicinity of the Port of Portland. Researchers identified four major highway routes into and out of the port: Lombard Street, Marine Drive, I-5, and I-84. TTI’s Urban Mobility Pro- gram was able to make data available on daily truck counts for these roadways. These truck counts were assumed to con- sist of port-related freight traffic. Using earlier-cited statistics, a 30 percent increase in project depth cargo would result in an increase of 10.8 percent in truck-related traffic. The truck counts were inflated by 10.8 percent to reflect the potential increase in project depth cargo. These inflated truck counts were then fed into the delay model. In order to calculate the congestion associated with additional truck traffic on area roadways, researchers used the road net- work to produce the Urban Mobility Report (9), which matches traffic volumes from the FHWA’s Highway Performance Moni- toring System with speed data from INRIX™ to generate traf- fic congestion statistics for over 100 urban areas across the United States. This roadway network has traffic conditions for the average week of the year for each stretch of roadway within urban areas. Researchers added the 10.8 percent additional trucks between 6:00 a.m. and 7:00 p.m. (the time when the port facilities or supporting operations are open for business) onto the roadway network. The additional traffic volumes would cause deterioration in the speeds when traffic condi- tions were already in congested conditions and would send conditions closer to congested operations if the current situa- tion was uncongested. This deterioration function is based on a relationship between traffic volume per lane and speed that has been used for years in the Urban Mobility Report. Several assumptions were made to perform the calculations: • Each additional truck uses the roadway capacity of three passenger cars (passenger car equivalent, or PCE = 3). • Existing traffic volumes (excluding the additional truck traffic) on the road network continue to travel at the same time and on the same facility regardless of the new truck traffic. • The additional truck traffic uses the entire length of the identified affected corridors within the urban area as if the new traffic is using these corridors to exit the urban area. One would expect that if traffic volumes are expected to push congestion toward an intolerable situation, that increases in delay would show an exponential increase as the volume approaches the congestion barrier. However, even with a 200 percent increase in port-related truck traffic (as opposed to 10.8 percent), the model shows no significant increase in the rate of growth in delays. This would indicate that trucking is not a constraint for the movement of additional tonnage for Portland.