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APPENDIX A: SCENARIO OUTLINES Flood with Hazardous Material Spill (Prototype) Casualties 50 fatalities, 100 injured, 30 require hospitalization Infrastructure Damage Thousands of residential homes, a chemical plant, a nursing home Evacuations / Displaced Persons 75,000 people Contamination Various hazardous materials including ammonia, synthesis gas, potassium amide, hexane, and potassium metal. Economic Impact Hundreds of millions of dollars Potential for Multiple Events Hazardous Contamination Recovery Time Months to years DETAILS A winter with heavy snowfalls has begun to melt and heavy rains are predicted for the next several days which have the potential to cause major flooding. Minor flooding has already been occurring in the region. Twenty-four hours after the initial flooding concerns, a levee is breached upstream releasing millions of gallons of water. A few hours after the levee breech, a chemical plant downstream is flooded releasing various hazardous materials including ammonia, synthesis gas, potassium amide, hexane, and potassium metal into the water. To complicate matters, the contaminated flood waters begin to approach a senior citizens home a mile away. Emergency responders call the location transit authority for additional resources to evacuate. TRANSIT AUTHORITY TASKS ⢠Preservation of the lives of employees and passengers ⢠Asset preservation ⢠Sorting through confusing and conflicting reports ⢠Assessing damage to facilities ⢠Providing higher levels of security ⢠Preparing a long-term plan for replacing subway service during repairs ⢠Providing psychological support to employees Page A-1 (DCN 11-7301/9999-v1.0)
Subway Bombing/Active Shooter Outline Casualties 6 fatalities, 150 injured, 20 require hospitalization Infrastructure Damage 1 subway line and 2 subway stations damaged Evacuations / Displaced Persons None Contamination None Economic Impact Minor Potential for Multiple Events None Recovery Time 1 to 2 Months DETAILS A man enters a central subway station, boards a train, and exits at the next station. He leaves explosives on the train, which detonates within 10 minutes of his exiting the subway system. The man fires upon emergency responders when they attempt to enter the second station until he is eliminated 30 minutes later. Local law enforcement initially closes the area within a mile of the bombed stations to all street traffic. SERVICE DISRUPTION Transportation: All subway service must be shut down. Bus service will also cease until the following day. The decision of how soon to offer subway service remains open. Downtown streets are closed to all traffic for the first day. Most streets reopen on the second day, except those within a block of the damaged stations (in central locations). Emergency Medical Services: Emergency responders are unable to reach the people injured by the bomb at the second station until protective shielding arrives, delaying response by 10 to 15 minutes. This affects thirty people. TRANSIT AUTHORITY TASKS ⢠Preservation of the lives of employees and passengers ⢠Asset preservation ⢠Sorting through confusing and conflicting reports ⢠Initiating a system-wide shutdown ⢠Assessing damage to facilities ⢠Providing higher levels of security ⢠Preparing a long-term plan for replacing subway service during repairs ⢠Providing psychological support to employees Page A-2 (DCN 11-7301/9999-v1.0)
Hurricane Casualties 62 fatalities, 10,000 injured (1,500 requiring hospitalization) Infrastructure Damage 600 buildings destroyed (many by associated flooding), 10,000 buildings damaged, two bridges destroyed, airport runway temporarily unusable, almost no electrical power without generators Evacuations/Displaced Persons 100,000 people evacuate before landfall Contamination No potable water for 7 days Economic Impact Estimated $10 billion Potential for Multiple Events Public unrest, waterborne illness, lack of hospital bed availability Recovery Time Months to years DETAILS A hurricane is expected to hit the city. It is predicted to be of Category 4 strength. There is widespread flooding and wind damage. SERVICE DISRUPTION Medical Services: One hospital unusable, other hospitals running on generators. Fire and Emergency Medical Services: Most stations are operational with at least 50 percent of staff, but roads are frequently impassable. Response times are greatly increased. Transportation: Two bridges have been destroyed. Train tracks withstand the hurricane but need to be inspected before they can be used. Flooding restricts travel through some areas, and there is widespread debris on the streets. Traffic lights and street lights are not operational. Energy: Almost all buildings without generators are without power. Power is expected to be restored to 80% of buildings within 7 days after landfall. Water: Residents are advised to avoid using any tap water, and to boil it if it is absolutely necessary to use some. Water treatment facilities are essentially non-operational. Homelessness: 30,000 people need shelter pre-landfall and for the first few days after. One thousand people need long-term shelter. Communication: Cellular phones do not work for the most part until power is restored. Local television and radio stations cease operations, but national television news is highly effective. TRANSIT AUTHORITY TASKS Page A-3 (DCN 11-7301/9999-v1.0)
⢠Help in evacuation ⢠Asset preservation ⢠Providing transit routes to and from shelters ⢠Possibly providing temporary shelter to employees so that they are available to work ⢠Restoring service as much as possible under the conditions ⢠Preparing a long-term plan for offering transit service during recovery efforts ⢠Facility restoration ⢠Keeping track of expenditures Page A-4 (DCN 11-7301/9999-v1.0)
Earthquake Casualties 650 fatalities, 15,000 injuries (4,000 requiring hospitalization) Infrastructure Damage 35,000 buildings destroyed, 180,000 damaged, widespread power outage, breaks in water and gas lines, bridges collapse, airport runway unusable, many streets impassable Evacuations/Displaced Persons 215,000 people Contamination Various hazardous materials Economic Impact Hundreds of millions of dollars Potential for Multiple Events Aftershocks, fires, people trapped Recovery Time Months to years DETAILS An earthquake of magnitude 7.4 hits suddenly, with its epicenter very near the city. Damage is most severe within a five-mile radius. A bus yard and a fuel yard become inaccessible. Relief shift workers are unable to reach the new transit EOC location for 2 days. A significant aftershock occurs early on the second day. SERVICE DISRUPTIONS Medical Services: Only two hospitals remain open; one at less than 50% capacity. Both are running on generators, and there is a desperate need for more hospital beds. Fire and Emergency Medial Services: Only 16% of the stations are operating at greater than 50%. Dozens of trucks were damaged to the point of no longer being functional. Transportation: Bridges have collapsed and there are significant obstructions on major highways. Damages to several major freeways are hampering incoming assistance. Railways and airport runways have buckled and sustained moderate to severe damage. All airports in the region are closed due to the communication disruptions, damaged runways, and instrument landing system failures. Energy: Large scale power outages. There are numerous ruptures to underground fuel lines, oil lines, and natural gas lines. Water: Most people are without water due to ruptured water mains and power outages. Wastewater primary interceptors were broken in the vicinity of the epicenter. Homelessness: 150,000 people need temporary housing. Half of the existing pre-designed shelters have been damaged and cannot be used. Page A-5 (DCN 11-7301/9999-v1.0)
Communication: Damage to microwave dishes and other vital parts of the communications infrastructure have resulted in limited communications capabilities. Cellular towers have also been damage and the high cellular traffic after the earthquake has saturated the system. TRANSIT AUTHORITY TASKS ⢠Preservation of the lives of employees and passengers ⢠Preservation of assets ⢠Evacuating people to shelters and temporary medical facilities ⢠Cleaning and certifying any vehicles used for transporting the injured afterwards ⢠Credentialing employees for activity past curfew ⢠Informing employees of the need to return to work ⢠Restoring service as far as possible ⢠Establishing long-term routes to and from shelters ⢠Provide psychological support to employees ⢠Securing fuel for buses and generators Page A-6 (DCN 11-7301/9999-v1.0)
Cyber Attack on the Power Grid Casualties No direct casualties, eight injuries from a secondary emergency Infrastructure Damage Minor Evacuations/Displaced Persons 10,000 special needs persons require cooling centers Contamination None relevant to this scenario Economic Impact None relevant to this scenario Potential for Multiple Events Traffic problems (no lights), oppressive heat Recovery Time 30 hours for power restoration, variable for secondary damage DETAILS A denial-of-service attack overloads and shuts down the power grid, affecting a large region including all adjacent states. The lack of functional traffic lights brings street traffic to a crawl. Exceptionally hot weather has descended upon the region, and only locations with generators have functional air conditioning. The demand for fuel for generators over the whole region makes it incredibly difficult to acquire. SERVICE DISRUPTION Medical Services: All hospitals are functioning on generator power, but all of them will need more fuel soon. Fire and Emergency Medical Services: Response times are highly increased due to the street traffic during the first several hours. Transportation: Street traffic becomes very congested and slow-moving within cities, though highway traffic is mostly unaffected. Law enforcement officials direct traffic at some intersections, private citizens take it upon themselves to direct traffic at others, and many other intersections have no direction. Energy: Electrical power is cut off for 30 hours. Water: Treatment plants are either shut down or running at minimal operational levels, but a shortage of clean drinking water is not anticipated during the short term. Communication: Cellular phones and Internet communications are shaky at best. Local television and radio stations are able to produce limited broadcasts as long as their generators are operational, but most televisions and radios are without the power to receive these broadcasts, so they are ineffective for large-scale communication. The majority of the population attempts to receive information via their car radios. TRANSIT AUTHORITY TASKS Page A-7 (DCN 11-7301/9999-v1.0)
⢠Transporting people to shelters ⢠Providing buses as cooling centers ⢠Responding to confusing and relatively uncontrolled street traffic ⢠Keeping track of buses which can not be safely returned to bus yards ⢠Notifying employees of operational status . Page A-8 (DCN 11-7301/9999-v1.0)
Hazmat Casualties Zero deaths, one injury Infrastructure Damage Bus Station windows broken, fire damage Evacuations/Displaced Persons 600 people evacuated from nearby office buildings Contamination Ammonia spill, Bleach Spill Economic Impact Minimal Potential for Multiple Events None Recovery Time Hours for the initial danger to pass, 1 to 2 days for cleanup DETAILS A bus station employee accidentally knocks over a barrel of hazardous materials in an attempt to remove the barrels from a storage closet after a small fire breaks out. HAZMAT Teams are immediately dispatched and develop a Hot, Warm, and Cold Zone. Nearby buildings and residences must be evacuated, and all persons who were located in the Bus Station when the evacuation was ordered must be checked for contamination. SERVICE DISRUPTIONS Train Service: Not effected. Air Travel: Not effected. Roads: The call for residents of nearby buildings to evacuate and the shutdown of the city streets cause traffic delays, which make it more difficult for emergency responders to reach their destinations during the first hour. TRANSIT AUTHORITY TASKS ⢠Preservation of the lives of drivers and passengers who may be exposed ⢠Decontamination of people and station ⢠Certification of decontamination of station ⢠Help in evacuation of the residential area ⢠Help in relocation of bus station commuters ⢠Planning temporary routes during the cleanup effort Page A-9 (DCN 11-7301/9999-v1.0)
