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Appendix E Summary of Concerns About the Air Force S&T Program The concerns that have been raised by Congress and others about the Air Force S&T program are summa- rized in the sections that follow. CONGRESSIONAL CONCERNS During the early to mid-199Os, total annual Depart- ment of Defense (DoD) funding declined. Total annual Air Force funding declined as well, as did total annual Air Force science and technology (S&T) funding. Along with funding declines, personnel levels also de- clined. During the mid- to late l990s, Congress became in- creasingly concerned about the Air Force S&T pro- gram. Congress expressed these concerns in a series of annual defense authorization acts starting with the fis- cal year (FY) 1999 National Defense Authorization Act Public Law (P.L.) 105-262, Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 (U.S. Congress, 1998~. Section 214 of the FY 1999 National Defense Au- thorization Act expressed the sense of Congress regard- ing aspects of the defense S&T program. Some of the concerns expressed were about the DoD S&T program as a whole, including the Air Force S&T program. and some were specifically about the Air Force program. Included were the following: Congress maintained that the Secretary of Defense should have as an objective to increase the defense S&T budget in real terms by at least 2 percent per year for each of the fiscal years 2000 through 2008; Congress said that the Secretary of each military department should ensure that a senior official in the department holds an appropriate title and respon- 57 sibility for S&T and that S&T receives priority and leadership attention equal to that received by systems acquisition; and Congress stated that the Secretary of each military department should take appropriate steps to ensure that sufficient numbers of officers and civil- ian employees in the department possess advanced technical degrees. In particular, Congress was con- cerned that the Secretary of the Air Force take appro- pr~ate measures to ensure that sufficient numbers of scientists and engineers (S&Es) were maintained to address the technological challenges faced in the areas of air, space, and supporting information technology. Regarding the areas of air, space, and supporting information technology, Section 214 required the Sec- retary of Defense to conduct a study on the minimum requirements for maintaining a sufficient technology - OF base and on the required S&E workforce. This study was aimed at the Air Force S&T program as the pri- mary component of the DoD program in the three tech- nology areas (U.S. Congress, 1998~. A year later, Section 212 of the FY 2000 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 106-65) again ex- pressed the sense of Congress regarding the defense S&T program. Congress believed that the Secretary of Defense had failed to comply with the 2 percent real growth objective of Section 214 in the FY 1999 act, especially the Air Force S&T program, thus jeopardiz- ing the stability of the defense technology base and increasing the risk of failure to maintain technological superiority in future weapon systems. Section 212 re- peated Congress' s belief that the Secretary of Defense should have 2 percent annual S&T funding real growth as an objective, this time for each of the fiscal years
58 2001 through 2009. For each fiscal year for which the objective was not met, Section 212 required the Secre- tary of Defense to explain why the objective was not met and to certify that failure to meet the objective would not jeopardize the stability of the defense tech- nology base or increase the risk of failure to maintain technological superiority in future weapon systems. Finally, Section 212 required the Defense Science Board to assess the effect of failure to comply (U.S. Congress, 1999~. In Section 252 of the FY 2001 National Defense Authorization Act, Congress required the Secretary of the Air Force to conduct a review of the long-term chal- lenges and short-term objectives of the Air Force S&T program (see Appendix B in this report). In addition to requiring the Air Force to identify the long-term chal- lenges and short-term objectives for its S&T program, Section 252 required the Air Force to assess the nuci- getary resources necessary to adequately address those challenges and objectives (U.S. Congress, 2000~. Sec- tion 252 reflected Congress's continuing concern about the level of funding for the Air Force S&T program and its concern about the planning of the Air Force S&T program. The S&T planning review required by Section 252, one of the specific items that the committee was asked to assess, is discussed in the chapters of this report. Sections 251 through 253 of the FY 2002 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 107-107) were en- titled the "Air Force Science and Technology for the 21st Century Act." In this act, Congress stated that the Secretary of the Air Force should continue to improve efforts to ensure that Air Force S&T is represented and considered at all levels of Air Force program planning and budgetary decision making, that S&T advocacy is institutionalized across all levels of Air Force manage- ment in a manner that is not person dependent, and that the value of S&T is made apparent to warfiphters by linking warfighter needs to S&T decisions. Congress stated that every 5 years the Secretary of the Air Force should conduct a review of long-term challenges and short-term objectives consistent with the Section 252 review described previously. Congress stated that the Secretary of the Air Force should elevate the position within the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force that has primary responsibility for S&T program budget and policy decisions. Finally, Congress directed the Secre- tary of the Air Force to reinstate and implement a re- vised development planning process (U.S. Congress, 2001~. As stated previously, Section 253 of this act (see APPENDIX E Appendix A in this report) requested that the National Research Council (NRC) conduct a study of changes that the Air Force has made to its S&T program during recent years. DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD The Defense Science Board (DSB) advises Depart- ment of Defense (DoD) leaders on S&T and other tech- nical issues (see Box E-1~. In this role, the DSB has conducted numerous studies and has issued reports that deal with or involve the DoD S&T program. Most DSB studies and reports deal with or involve DoD-level or DoD-wide S&T program issues; however, as part of the larger DoD program, the Air Force S&T program is often included in the scope of these reports or is af- fected by their recommendations. In a briefing to the Committee on Review of the Effectiveness of Air Force Science and Technology Program Changes, the Air Force identified nine recent DSB reports containing recommendations relevant to this study (Schneider, 2002a). Several of these reports were focused on spe- cific technology or mission areas. Two recent DSB re- norts however, were particularly pertinent to Air Force ~~ ~ program-wide issues.
APPENDIX E The first of these was a DSB letter report on the adequacy of the DoD S&T program (DSB, 2000). This report was required by Section 212 of the FY 2000 National Defense Authorization Act, which required the Defense Science Board to assess the effect of the Secretary of Defense's failure to comply with Congress's 2 percent real-growth objective for defense S&T in the FY 2001 budget request. In its response in the letter report, the DSB stated that DoD S&T should be funded at $8.7 billion (3 percent of the total budget request) rather than at the $7.5 billion requested for FY 2001. The DSB noted that DoD S&T budget requests for FY 1997 through 2001 did not keep up with infla- tion and dropped from 3 percent to less than 2.6 per- cent of the total DoD budget request. The DSB believed that DoD must pursue a strong, forward-looking S&T program and not depend on civil sector research for all DoD needs. The DSB recommended that, to address civil service system problems, the DoD use the private sector, universities, and industry to provide the major- ity of personnel for DoD and service laboratories. The DSB recommended that the DoD place greater empha- sis on innovative technology initiatives leading to entirely new military capabilities and that DoD and the services should consolidate and modernize their research and development (R&D) facilities (DSB, 2000~. The second recent DSB report that was particularly pertinent to Air Force S&T program-wide issues was entitled Defense Science and Technology, and was pub- lished in May 2002 (DSB, 2002~. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology had asked the 2001 summer study task force that wrote this report to examine three areas: how DoD S&T investment should be spent, the level of investment in S&T, and how the military can realize the most value from S&T investment. In its response, the DSB task force made the following recommendations: Invest in new S&T initiatives in support of four transformational challenges: defending against biological warfare defense [sic], finding difficult targets, making timely and accurate decisions, and enabling high-risk operations. Expand and provide more fo- cused management for ongoing related S&T programs. . 59 · Foster operational experimentation as an integral element of a new S&T enterprise through assigned experimental units and sus- tained senior attention. · Establish a new technology transition process with wide use of spiral development, routine inclusion of independent red teams, and acceleration of the acquisition cycle. Vest responsibility for joint operational experimentation, ACTDs, and transition with the Director of Transformation. · Enable development and acquisition of joint R&D by establish- ing points of clear responsibility in joint C4ISR and biological warfare defense. · Restructure the DoD laboratories and rebuild the scientific and engineering workforce based on a major review of the function and workforce in each laboratory (DSB, 2002). AIR FORCE SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY BOARD Like the DSB does for DoD leaders, the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board (AF SAB) provides advice on S&T and other technical issues to Air Force leaders (see Box E-2. The SAB has conducted numerous stud- ies and issued reports dealing with or involving the Air Force S&T program. The Air Force identified five re- cent SAB reports containing recommendations relevant Maintain the level of S&T investment at 3 percent of the overall DoD budget as currently planned by the Department. Provide ad- ditional funds for new S&T priorities by reprioritizing current programs. Exploit commercial technology through expanded use of com- mercial products and processes; elimination of barriers for com- mercial firms to do business with the DoD; and new initiatives to forge relationships with commercial industry.
60 to this study (Schneider, 2002a). Several of these re- ports were focused on specific technology or mission areas. One recent SAB report, however, specifically focused on Air Force S&T program-wide issues. In its Report on Science and Technology and the Air Force Vision: Achieving a More Elective S&T Pro- gram, the SAB (2001) addressed several concerns, in- cluding pressure on the Air Force top line budget, lack of an effective methodology for valuing and prioritiz- ing S&T investments in warfighter terms, lack of vis- ibility into the program, the extent to which external S&T sources (defense, industry, academia) offset the need for Air Force S&T investment, and efficiency of S&T program execution. In its report, the SAB made several recommenda- tions. They included the following: . Summary recommendations for the Secretary of the Air Force (SECAF) and Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF) Set specific Critical Future Goals (CFGs) that provide a basis for key system/operational concepts and S&T planning. Hold the Air Force Research Laboratory commander (AFRL/ CC) accountable for formulating and executing an S&T plan that achieves the CFGs and other warfighter requirements. Create a program element to reenergize development planning. Direct increased emphasis on the accession, retention, and development of S&E officers. · Summary recommendation for the Air Force Service Acquisition Executive (AF SAE) Hold AFRL/CC accountable for executing the S&T plans to provide the needed technical performance on the agreed sched- ule for the agreed cost. · Summary recommendations for the Air Force Materiel Command commander (AFMC/CC) Lead implementation of revitalized development planning, in- tegrating across product centers, and use to establish priorities for the S&T plan. Advocate the S&T program and budget as represented in the S&T plan into the new Air Force Resource Allocation Process (AF RAP). Chair Applied Technology Council (ATC) meetings when competing concepts involve multiple product centers. Play an increased role in S&E officer development and retention. . Summary recommendations for AFRL/CC Use trade studies from development planning to focus and pri- oritize S&T investments to achieve CFGs and meet other warfighter requirements. Characterize the value of the entire S&T program in warfighter terms and present the characterization to Air Force leadership annually. Hold program managers accountable for cost, schedule, and performance for each of the CFGs and other key projects. Increase emphasis on tracking and acquiring commercial tech- nology incentivize "buy before make" behavior (SAB, 2001). Although in its terms of reference for the study cited above, the SAB was requested to recommend a top line APPENDIX E for Air Force S&T (an investment level for total Air Force S&T), none of the recommendations above calls for a specific top line. Instead, the SAB concluded that there was no unassailable way to establish a top line. The SAB noted the previous DSB report, which rec- ommended that DoD invest 3 percent of DoD total ob- ligational authority (TOA) in S&T. The DSB had made its recommendation after considering average R&D investment levels (as a percentage of annual revenues) of several industrial sectors. The SAB, however, did not find the industrial sectors that the DSB had exam- ined to be easily associated with the Air Force S&T investment level. Instead of recommending that the Air Force S&T top line be based on some percentage of Air Force TOA, similar to what the DSB had recom- mended for DoD S&T, the SAB believed that the Air Force S&T top line should be determined on the basis of the cost of the S&T program needed to satisfy the Air Force' s critical future capabilities (CFCs) and criti- cal future goals (CFGs). The SAB said that the result- ing S&T percentage of Air Force TOA could then be compared to historical averages (1.8 to 2.2 percent) for reasonableness, stating, "if the S&T investment is out of this range, the rationale should be explainable based on special circumstances or needs" (SAB, 2001~. AIR FORCE ASSOCIATION The Air Force Association (AFA) is an independent organization that advocates on behalf of the Air Force and Air Force issues (see Box E-3. In January 2000, the S&T committee of the AFA released a special re- port (AFA, 2000) expressing the committee's concerns about the Air Force S&T program. Included were its concern about the decline in Air Force S&T funding since the end of the Cold War in constant dollars and as a percentage of Air Force TOA, concern about the lack of Air Force research and development (R&D) advo- cacy and institutional planning, and concern about the diminishing number of highly qualified Air Force ac- . . . ,~,~. qu~s~t~on officers. To address those concerns, the AFA S&T commit- tee made several recommendations: that the Air Force create a high-level annual review of Air Force R&D programs; that the Air Force reverse the decline in S&T funding and invest in a stable, robust, balanced R&D base not necessarily tied to emerging weapon systems programs and that it include long-term S&T invest- ment; and that the Air Force protect technology base funding from arbitrary budget cuts. Also recommended
APPENDIX E were that the Air Force tolerate failure as an integral part of the technology development process, strengthen institutionally the role of technology advocacy within the Air Force, and, in the AFRL strategic plan, balance Major Command (MAJCOM) interests and promising technology not directly tied to current weapon systems (AFA, 2000). OTHER RECENT STUDIES In addition to the studies and reports described above, three other recent reports have addressed issues and concerns particularly pertinent to the Air Force S&T program. These are described below. The first was the National Research Council report Review of the U.S. Department of Defense Air, Space, and Supporting Information Systems Science and Tech- nology Program (NRC, 2001a). This was the study and report required by Congress in Section 214 of FY 1999 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 105-262, described earlier). Congress was concerned about the adequacy of the DoD air, space, and supporting infor- mation systems technology base; the declining DoD S&T investments in these areas; and reductions in the number of S&T personnel. The focus of concern was the Air Force S&T program. 61 The NRC study committee presented the following conclusions in its 2001 report (NRC, 2001a, pp. 5-7~: · Air Force investments in air, space, arid supporting information systems S&T were too low to meet the challenges that the Air Force faced. · Authontative, S&T-focused and -dedicated representation arid ad- vocacy were needed at the corporate policy- and decision-making level of the Air Force. Reductions in the Air Force S&T workforce arid rules governing S&T worker hinng, firing, arid management had helped under- mine the Air Force S&T program. · Personnel management rules threatened the quality of the Air Force S&T program. · The talents of the Air Force's technically educated officer corps were not being fully exploited, the benefits of locating uniformed personnel close to S&T performers were being lost, and the num- ber of Air Force officers understanding the importance of S&T was decreasing. To address these problems, the NRC made the fol- lowing six overarching recommendations (NRC 2001a, pp 5-7~: 1. The Air Force should increase its S&T investment 11/2 to 2 times the FY 2001 level. 2. The Air Force should take actions to further strengthen S&T rep- resentation and advocacy at Air Force corporate policy- and deci- sion-making levels. 3. The Air Force should take maximum advantage of the flexibility offered by section 246 of FY 1999 national defense authorization act to manage its S&T workforce. 4. The Air Force should improve development and use of its military S&T workforce. 5. The Air Force should implement remedial actions proposed by previous reports. 6. The Air Force should work with Congress to modify Civil Service rules. The second report referred to above was also pub- lished by the NRC in 2001; it is entitled Review of the Future of the U.S. Aerospace Infrastructure and Aero- space Disciplines to Meet the Needs of the Air Force and Department of Defense (NRC, 2001b). This study and report were requested by the Principal Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition to address the Air Force's concerns about the contin- ued ability of the aerospace industry to produce cut- ting-edge products and attract highly skilled technical people, the Air Force's ability to attract similar person- nel, the adequacy of the level of R&D and S&T fund- ing provided by the government and the commercial sector, the future of research and test facilities, and
62 maintenance of U.S. superiority and leadership in aero- space. This NRC committee made several recommenda- tions, including the following (NRC, 2001b): The Air Force should establish a deputy chief of staff position within Air Force headquarters with primary responsibility for oversight of all Air Force scientific and technical resources. The Air Force should regularly assess the quality and quantity of Air Force technical personnel; use assessments to define types and numbers of personnel necessary; and use as basis for making policy decisions. · The Air Force should balance current expenditures and invest- ments in future technologies and insulate latter from vagaries of near-term fiscal pressures. · The Air Force should take into consideration the effects of the Air Force budget and management policies on industry. The Air Force should reduce acquisition cycle times. · The Air Force should reform Civil Service rules for scientific and technical personnel. The Air Force should establish long-term, stable partnerships with supporting universities and faculty. The Air Force should communicate and broadly distribute a strong, positive message describing Air Force technical plans and opportunities. Lastly, the third recent study that addressed issues and concerns pertinent to the Air Force S&T program was entitled "Science and Technology Community in Crisis," sponsored by the Director Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E) (Lackie,2002~. During the fall of 2001 and winter of 2002, this study was con- ducted under the auspices of the Naval Research and Advisory Committee (NRAC); however, the study panel included members of each of the three military departments' scientific advisory boards, and the study included on-site visits to each of the three service cor- porate research laboratories. The study panel was asked to examine the role of the laboratories in the 21 st cen- tury; the characteristics of a world-class S&T labora- tory; recommendations from past studies of DoD labo- APPENDIX E ratories, including the benefits derived from those implemented, the continuing value of those not imple- mented, and recommendations for gaining approval in the future; recent legislative initiatives; and near- and long-term strategies for laboratory excellence. The terms of reference for this study recognized that this area had been studied many times before, so it focused on reviewing the conclusions of past studies and updat- ing their recommendations to accommodate 21st-cen- tury conditions and challenges. The study panel (Lackie, 2002) found that the labo- ratories continued to be essential and critical, that the primary characteristic exhibited and needed by world- class laboratories was possession of the highest-quality scientists and engineers, that there had been many past studies that were mostly well done but that few of their recommendations had been implemented, that Con- gress had recognized the problems and tried to help, and that the fundamental strategy needed for near- and far-term laboratory excellence was to act and sustain commitment, now and in the future. The panel made three summary recommendations (Lackie, 2002~: (1) DDR&E should obtain the Secre- tary of Defense's and the service secretaries' commit- ment to the need, importance, and value of the corpo- rate research laboratories by demonstrating continuing support for the implementation of the following two recommendations; (2) the Secretary of Defense should use the authority granted by Section 1114 of the FY 2001 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 106- 398) and any other necessary authorities granted by Congress, to establish a separate personnel system for scientists and engineers in the three corporate research laboratories; and (3) DDR&E should develop and pro- pose additional legislation to enable the services to ex- periment with alternative governance structures that would address additional laboratory issues such as sal- ary caps, facility and equipment renewal, and labora- tory director authority.
