Airport Emergency Post-Event Recovery Practices (2015)

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11 While the 37 interviews clearly indicated the most informative case examples were the Asiana crash at San Francisco International (SFO), the ice storm at Dallas–Fort Worth (DFW), the shooting at Los Angeles International (LAX), and the electrical outages at Newark Liberty (EWR), that does not mean that other airports offered less compelling examples. For example, the two crashes at Memphis International Airport, the bomb threat at Jacksonville International and the shooting at George Bush Intercontinental Airport in Houston, the tornado at Lambert–St. Louis, and the baggage system failure at Orlando International, all posed different issues while offering similar insights. Those results, as well as information from incidents at 26 other airports, appear in chapter three, where they are combined with the analytical results from the four case examples. As will be seen in the case examples, especially in the timeline graphics (see Figures 7, 10, 14, and 18), recovery has slightly different meanings at different airports. In the context of this report, “full recovery” occurs when the prescribed safety and security standards have been regained and the airport’s capacity for aircraft operations is restored to the level that existed before the incident. How- ever, the complexity of the range of activities at an airport means that various functions or parts of the airport may recover at different times. In the timeline graphics, “recovery” means full recovery of aircraft operations: Investigations, administrative functions, and procurement may continue past that point. As seen in the Newark Liberty example, major repairs may extend for months or years beyond full recovery of aircraft operations. CASE EXAMPLE 1: AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT San Francisco International Airport (SFO): Asiana 214 Crash of July 6, 2013 The primary source for this case example was the group interview conducted on July 24, 2014, with SFO Acting Associate Deputy Director for Safety and Security Services Ralf Ruckelshausen, Assistant Deputy Director for Safety and Security Services Rob Forester, ARFF Chief Dale C. Carnes, Emergency Planning Coordinator Toshia Shavies Marshall, Director of Guest Experience Christopher Birch, and Risk Management Auditor Antonio Eshabarr, along with primary documents provided by SFO or found in the literature review. Incident and Response On July 6, 2013, at about 11:27 a.m. PDT, Asiana Airlines flight 214, a Boeing 777-200ER, on approach to SFO Runway 10R/28L, struck a seawall and sustained a crash landing (Figure 4). Three hundred and seven (307) persons were aboard: 291 passengers, 12 flight attendants, and four crewmembers. Three passengers were killed and 49 persons were seriously injured—40 passengers, eight flight attendants, and one crewmember. The other 255 persons aboard received minor injuries or were not injured (NTSB 2014, p. 1; ICF 2013). After striking the seawall, the plane skidded down the runway. A fire started in the right engine, which had separated and come to rest next to the fuselage. A flight attendant noticed the fire and initi- ated evacuation. Nearly all the passengers, 98%, successfully self-evacuated. When the fire spread to the fuselage, firefighters entered the plane and extricated five passengers, one of whom subsequently died. Six persons were ejected from the plane during the crash, two passengers who were not wearing seatbelts, and four cabin attendants thrown from the plane still strapped in their seats when the aft chapter two CASE EXAMPLES

12 galley was ripped open. The two ejected passengers died of injuries from the crash. The third fatality occurred when an ejected passenger was run over by two firefighting vehicles (NTSB 2014, p. 1). Fire rescue vehicles arrived within three minutes, and the fire was extinguished within 19 min- utes, by which time all passengers had evacuated. The wreckage remained immediately adjacent to Runway 10R/28L, and debris was scattered on and around it. Injured survivors, escorted by SFO employees, were transported to nine area hospitals in ambulances. The uninjured survivors were taken to SFO’s International Terminal, pre-empting use of critical gates and customs spaces (ICF 2013, p. 57). Mass care was complicated by the small number of Asiana employees at SFO, so care for both injured and uninjured passengers was managed by airport and fire department responders. The airport set up a family reception center and a media center in separate parts of the International Terminal. Figures 5 and 6 show the location of key elements of the response. People and media outlets around the world became almost instantly aware of the crash and the situation of the survivors through social media message posted within minutes of evacuation (e.g., Eun 2013). FIGURE 4 San Francisco International Airport (SFO) Asiana 214 crash of July 6, 2013. FIGURE 5 Satellite image of SFO.

13 The on-scene commander at the Incident Command Post (ICP) was in place and operating within three minutes. SFO activated its EOC within three minutes, and normal NIMS and ICS procedures were used. The EOC was active until full operations were restored and stood down at 5:15 p.m. on the sixth day after the crash; altogether it was active for seven days. The Unified Command (UC) initially consisted of ARFF, Airfield Operations, and law enforcement during the response phase, but transitioned to include customer care and maintenance upon for the recovery phase. SFO and the FAA stopped all landings and takeoffs immediately upon the crash, causing the can- cellation of 433 flights the first day. The two perpendicular runways (01L/19R and 01R/19L) reopened at 3:38 p.m., about four hours after the crash, marking the beginning of the transition into recovery mode (ICF 2013, pp. 8–9). Flight cancellations continued for six more days but in much lower num- bers (55, 100, 140, 119, 114, and 96 flights cancelled per day July 7th through 12th, respectively). Recovery The recovery process for the crash was straightforward and typical. SFO had an exemplary recovery plan in place and executed it within the constraints of the NTSB investigation and the imperative to preserve forensic evidence (ICF International 2013). Parallel runway 10L/28R reopened at 12:53 p.m. on the next day, about 28 hours after the crash. Normal flight schedules resumed on July 12, 2013, after the accident runway (10R/28L) was repaired, repaved, and repainted, with electrical systems and lighting systems repaired and the FAA final inspec- tion completed. SFO resumed full normal operations and the use of all runways, including 28L, at 5:50 p.m. on July 12th. Figure 7 shows the major milestones in the recovery at SFO from the Asiana crash. Common Incident Objectives SFO’s overriding objectives in the response were to protect life and property and to preserve evidence for the NTSB investigation. FIGURE 6 SFO airport diagram.

14 SFO used seven of the National Preparedness Goal (NPG) mission areas to organize the detailed objectives of recovery (ICF 2013, pp. 14–15; FEMA 2011): • Economics • Health and social services • Infrastructure systems • Natural and cultural resources • Operational coordination • Planning • Public information and warning. Focusing on these seven mission areas not only improved recovery outcomes, but also led to revised procedures and policies that “result[ed] in a more resilient [airport] with an improved abil- ity to withstand, respond to, and recover from disasters, with an associated reduction in loss of life, recovery time, and cost” (ICF 2013, p. 14). SFO and its mutual aid partners, tenants, and contractors worked together to identify lessons learned and apply them to improve overall response capabilities in each of these seven mission areas. Among the mission areas, public health and healthcare preparedness were prioritized, with actions taken in nine capabilities most relevant to a mass casualty incident such as Asiana 214 (ICF 2013, p. 15): • Emergency public information and warning • Fatality management • Healthcare system and community recovery; i.e. the ability of the airport and airline to collaborate with community partners including public health, medical, and mental/behavioral health systems • Emergency operations coordination—universal use of NIMS by all parties involved in the response and recovery • Information sharing • Mass care • Medical surge • Responder health and safety • Volunteer management. FIGURE 7 Timeline for SFO recovery.

15 SFO managers pointed out that emergency public information and warning, emergency opera- tions coordination, and information sharing will all be elements of the airport’s comprehensive crisis communications plan (CCCP) which is under development. This plan, which is essential for all phases of emergency management including recovery, outlines protocols and systems for internal and external communications, including robust alternative systems for connectivity; policy guidance for maintaining message discipline; reinforcement of the importance of the role of the Public Information Officer (PIO); and policies and procedures for the use of social media and other systems for communicating to the public during response and recovery. Lessons Learned SFO’s AAR and its recommendations, developed by ICF International, a management, technology, and policy consulting firm based in Fairfax, Virginia, are divided into observations related to the response and observations related to recovery (ICF 2013). Any observations applying to both response and recovery and appearing in the response section are included in the present study. Safety and Health Recovery operations create unique or intensified safety and health risks. SFO sets operational safety as a priority as it updates safety plans and procedures for recovery operations (ICF 2013, p. 54) and incorporates effective practices for Critical Incident Stress Management (CISM) (ACRP Report 22— Kenville et al. 2009). Communication Solid, straightforward, and reliable communication is essential to effective recovery management. Information must be accurate and timely. Ideally, the information is in a highly integrated yet quickly understandable form, most often a graphic depiction or series of graphics. A common operating picture (COP) is an online graphic representation of an event, scene, loca- tion, or situation that can enhance coordination and collaboration and increase efficiency among all stakeholders during emergency responses (and recovery operations) as well as day-to-day operations. Geographic information system (GIS), sensors, cameras, and wireless devices can be integrated into a COP. Web-based tools that are already in use and interoperable with internal and external agencies can be employed (ACRP Report 94—IEM et al. 2013). Having a good COP allows stakeholders to update and understand the incident in real time. Infor- mation on different systems and from different actors can be merged to “identify issues and require- ments, establish priorities and decide the allocation of resources, and better manage the overall emergency to achieve operational objectives” (ICF 2013, p. 21). Figure 8 shows a typical COP (not at SFO or for the Asiana incident). Crisis management systems can be very useful for resource mobi- lization and interagency coordination, not just for coordination within the airport (ICF 2013, p. 31; ACRP Report 94—IEM. et al. 2013). Emergency communications must be fully interoperable and sustainable despite disruptions from the incident. To effect a smooth recovery, all airport staff, airlines, agencies, and mutual aid partners would benefit from a communications infrastructure that provides easy connectivity as well as train- ing on plans, command systems, and communications tools to remove barriers to communication (ICF 2013, p. 32). Clear and timely communication with the public is critical. SFO’s successes in the Asiana 214 incident during response and recovery are currently being captured as lessons learned. These include stronger integration of the PIO and expanded use of the joint information center (JIC) as part of the incident command (ICF 2013, p. 41). SFO is also optimistic of working more closely with San Fran- cisco and Mateo county emergency management agency PIOs to create advance coordination of

16 public information planning, which includes implementation of the Bay Area Emergency Public Information and Warning Strategic Plan (ICF 2013, p. 42). Clearly, a CCCP is a vital element of recovery following an emergency. SFO has updated its AEP as a result of the real-time lessons learned. Command and Control The ICS was not fully implemented in the Asiana 214 response. The main deficiency was that an opera- tions section chief had not been established; in addition, some civilian partners had not been incorporated into the ICS structure. As it stood at that time, the ICS structure at SFO would probably have been inad- equate in a more severe crisis, for example, an earthquake. Incident Commanders, other leaders, and mutual aid partners would benefit from training in the full implementation of ICS, including the delegation of key roles emphasizing the inclusion of civil- ian partners such as airlines, utilities, and nongovernmental organizations in the ICS structure, and possibly in the EOC; and to direct the proper transfer of command as the incident evolves, including the transition to recovery and the recovery itself. Following the Asiana incident, the ICF analysis suggested that SFO’s EOC plans could be revised to better organize and monitor recovery activities. Clearer definitions of roles, responsibilities, and procedures are called for, especially those dealing with resource management. SFO’s EOC plans worked well for the actual response, but were less effective during the transition to recovery and the recovery process (ICF 2013, pp. 46–47). During the incident and its recovery, the airport EOC functioned smoothly largely because personnel had established good working relationships and were familiar with the airport’s facilities and operations. However, the SFO EOC’s lack of adequate struc- ture limited its effectiveness in dealing with the on-scene response and recovery operations (ICF 2013, p. 30). ICF found that the Policy Group could have been more effective had its composition been more appropriate and its members trained more thoroughly in NIMS and ICS procedures. SFO is committed to identifying and adopting the principles and structure of the ICS and to sus- taining the strong training program for designees assigned to manage response and recovery efforts from the various internal and external divisions, agencies, and organizations. FIGURE 8 Typical common operating picture display during emergency operations.

17 Logistics and Resource Management Standardization of resource management, asset tracking and control, and resource typing benefits recovery as well as response. Timely, precise records support incident management and evaluation, and costs may be reimbursable through FEMA, insurance, or litigation, depending on the case. SFO is developing a systematic project management approach for future EOC-coordinated efforts. Procedures for urgent repair and construction during recovery from the Asiana 214 incident worked fairly well; to improve future recovery efforts, effective practices would be identified and incorporated into SFO’s existing plans. Procedures for managing projects, including those in the planning section of the EOC, require focused revision to speed decision-making and efficiency (ICF 2013, p. 47). Some aspects of the Asiana 214 recovery—for example, repaving Runway 10R/28L, lighting systems, and the seawall—involved major construction projects that would have run more smoothly with applica- tion of effective practices. Planning The after-action review at SFO led to a thorough review and critique of the airport’s Emergency Procedures Manual and AEP by a joint agency planning group that included airlines, tenants, conces- sionaires, and mutual aid partners. This revision brought SFO’s plans into closer alignment with FAA and FEMA guidance. Such joint efforts generate long-lasting, ongoing benefits, building relation- ships and facilitating integration with other local and regional emergency management plans (ICF 2013, p. 39). (Note: SFO no longer uses the term “emergency management plan” and has consoli- dated its contents in a revised AEP. For the rest of this section, “AEP” will be used.) An effective business continuity program is “based on risk and business process analyses, coor- dinated plans and procedures, anticipated resource requirements, and organizational systems for implementation and management” (ICF 2013, pp. 43–44). ACRP Report 93: Operational and Busi- ness Continuity Planning for Prolonged Airport Disruptions, provides useful guidance for integrat- ing BCPs with AEPs (Corzine 2013). As with the AEP and mutual aid agreements, regular review and updating of the BCP ensures that airport recovery is optimal after an emergency. Coordinating with Investigators The scale of the Asiana 214 incident required coordination with NTSB and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The NTSB played the lead role in investigating the crash, as it does for all civil aviation incidents. The FBI was involved until it was determined that no criminal act was involved. The FBI cleared the reopening of runways 01L/19R and 01R/19L at SFO’s request after the airport reported the negative impact that the total closure of SFO was having on other airports (ICF 2013, p. 49). NTSB began its investigation while response was still underway, but most of the investiga- tion transpired during recovery. At their peak, some of the investigation teams totaled 100 members. Airports may be challenged to understand and anticipate the needs of investigators; for example, evidence collection, witness interviews, and site documentation. To support such efforts, airports can be prepared to provide clear, accurate information regarding its capabilities and the urgency of recovery. Cooperation facil- itates the smoothest possible investigation and recovery and is essential for the safety of all parties (ICF 2013, p. 50). Customer Service As an organization, SFO places a priority on customer service second only to its commitment to safety. Even following a major accident such as Asiana 214, the airport hopes that customer care will be disrupted for only the minimum amount of time necessary to facilitate response and recovery. Analysis of the incident revealed a possible need for an Airport Community Emergency Response

18 Team (A-CERT) in which trained volunteers could supplement customer service airport staff (ICF 2013, p. 53; IEM Inc. et al. 2014a). Such incidents may require special types of customer care, such as counseling for victims and protection from the media. Following the Asiana 214 incident at SFO, passengers needed informa- tion, translation services, and medical services, along with assistance rebooking flights, contacting families, and finding local accommodations. These special services will be a consideration in SFO’s future plans, with an emphasis on keeping customers informed through public engagement and timely communication (ICF 2013, p. 52). Leadership Strong leadership drove SFO’s successful recovery. Application of lessons learned and effective changes in the AAR provided even greater support for future response and recovery leadership efforts. Other Topics SFO and its partners in the AAR identified a number of other lessons learned and areas for improve- ment that pertain overwhelmingly to the response phase but may continue to be a concern during recovery and even beyond full resumption of normal operations: • Medical operations coordination with regional providers • Patient tracking • Family reunification and privacy laws—sharing of patient status information • Mass care at the airport • Family Assistance Center • Demobilization and stand-down notification • Coordination of Immigration and Customs for victims • Caring for unaccompanied and separated minors (ICF 2013, pp. 56–71). The interview and literature review showed these issues and delays in addressing related prob- lems were clearly seen to affect the overall public opinion of SFO. SFO is upgrading its plans and procedures to address these topics. Summary For the most part, the recovery of San Francisco International Airport in the six days following the crash of Asiana 214 went very well. However, in a facilitated AAR, SFO and its partners identi- fied 27 lessons learned (“Observations” in the AAR) and made more than 40 recommendations for improvement, change, and reform (ICF 2013). The most important needs identified involved: • Improvements to the structure, inclusiveness, and training of the airport’s EOC; • Better working, communicating, and planning relationships with emergency management part- ners in San Francisco and San Mateo counties; and • The creation of a comprehensive crisis communications plan. CASE EXAMPLE 2: NATURAL DISASTER Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport (DFW): Ice Storm of December 5–7, 2013 The primary source for this case example was a group interview conducted on August 1, 2014, with DFW Emergency Management Coordinator David M. McCurdy and Craig Mammel, AAE, Interim Assistant Vice President for Operations. Investigators also relied on primary documents provided by DFW or found in the literature review, especially “December Ice Storm Cost DFW $2 Million,” by Andrea Ahles and Caty Hirst for the Fort Worth Star-Telegram.

19 Incident and Response On Thursday, December 5, 2013, an ice storm hit the Dallas/Fort Worth area, causing the cancellation of more than 2,100 flights at the airport and stranding more than 9,500 passengers in the terminals. Freezing rain began falling Thursday evening, earlier than forecast, and persisted for the next three days. This storm, with temperatures remaining at or below freezing, was unprecedented for the region. The airport’s EOC stayed open from Thursday evening until Monday afternoon. Runway icing was the main issue at DFW because the deicing agent used to pretreat the surfaces was washed away by rain. The rain subsequently froze, rendering runways unusable. Despite deicing efforts that started early and continued virtually around the clock, only one of seven runways remained operational. The runway maintenance issue significantly reduced airport capacity, causing the airlines to can- cel flights. Stranded passengers quickly caused congestion issues in the terminals, aggravated when “cobblestone ice” on the roadways into and out of DFW contributed to travel disruption, and at sev- eral points literally cut the airport off from any access via roads (Figure 9). Passengers who wanted to spend the night at a hotel could not find rooms, or transportation to a hotel, and had no choice but to stay in the terminal. On Thursday night, approximately 4,000 people spent the night at the airport; by Friday evening, that number was down to 2,400. Recovery The DFW airport emergency plan identifies the first arriving unit in the field as the IC for most site- specific events. The IC develops the overall incident action plan, which is then communicated to and carried out by the supporting sections and agencies. For this event, however, because it was “an airport-wide event,” the airport’s EOC served as both the EOC and the Incident Command Center, with the EOC manager assuming a combined role as EOC coordinator and IC. In this mode, the EOC provided both tactical direction and communication to field responders as well as the tradi- tional communication, coordination, and resource management support to the IC and field units. The EOC/ICC developed the incident action plan (IAP) that established priorities and objectives for the overall management of the event. The main recovery effort at the airport first involved the deicing of runways, taxiways, and road- ways. Runways opened and closed continuously throughout the event as staff worked around the clock to keep runway friction within standards on at least two runways. During the first two days of the storm (December 6–7), DFW was only able to keep one or two of their seven runways (Figure 10) opera- tional. By December 8, four runways were operational, and by December 9, six of the seven runways were open. Throughout the airfield deicing effort, the EOC/Command Center coordinated with critical airport departments to ensure that necessary logistical and administrative support was provided. Once airlines started canceling flights and roadway icing began to affect airport access, the response evolved into a customer service and care operation. The EOC quickly deployed the “stranded FIGURE 9 Cobblestone ice in Dallas area.

20 passenger” section of the airport’s IROPS, which had been tested a number of times over the years and worked well because most staff knew their roles and responsibilities. By all accounts, the IROPS passenger care plan effectively addressed the needs of those stranded in the terminals. Terminal care teams distributed customer care kits with personal hygiene items such as toothpaste, toothbrushes, and hand sanitizer, as well as more than 6,700 cups of coffee, bottles of water, and snacks. All of these support services were managed under the direction of the customer service branch within the EOC’s Operations Section, while an airfield branch managed airfield snow and ice removal. Once the roadway access issues were resolved, the airport’s EOC helped book more than 450 hotel rooms for passengers at discounted rates. DFW used an internally developed technology tool called the “C-3 Portal” to communicate with both internal and external customers. This tool builds a COP of the event that helps maintain situational awareness. The C-3 Portal sends e-mail and text notifications to critical players and can be viewed by multiple groups in different areas, providing a user-friendly, frequently updated dashboard. Radios and telephones were also used for internal communications. During this challenging event, the city of Fort Worth, Tarrant County, and the state of Texas pro- vided exceptional support, especially with regard to logistical issues. Mutual aid support was timely and effective. DFW has a formal agreement with the American Red Cross for sheltering support, and bedding and cots are normally provided through the combined mutual aid effort of the county and the Red Cross. However, due to the weather and road conditions, DFW had to look to the city, county, and state to fulfill that need. The wide impact of the storm in the region initially delayed the state Department of Transportation’s ability to provide immediate support to clear the airport roadways. After communication among DFW and city and county officials, road access to the airport was given high priority, thus expediting the recovery. Figure 11 shows the milestones in the recovery from the ice storm at DFW. Common Incident Objectives • Safety is top priority. • Keep runways open. • Keep roadways open. • Provide care for affected customers. • Restore normal airport operations. FIGURE 10 DFW airport diagram.

21 Lessons Learned Customer and Employee Care The airport tested its IROPS a number of times over the years. In actual practice, this plan worked well, effectively addressing the needs of people stranded in the terminals. The airport implemented terminal customer service procedures that allowed stranded passengers access to cots, bedding, care kits, coffee, bottled water, snacks, etc. The EOC also monitored social media to help assess the demands. Employees faced a number of issues during this storm. The operation of heavy equipment in and around an active runway and taxiway environment requires specifically trained and certified staff. Like many other airports, DFW has only a limited number of qualified personnel to perform these functions. Long hours spent continually deicing the runways required effective schedule manage- ment for critical staff. It was necessary to develop a staff rotation strategy that ensured both ade- quate employee rest and continual maintenance of runways and taxiways. The DFW EOC directed the affected work groups to develop and implement their own interim schedules until recovery was complete and normal schedules resumed. Interim scheduling was complicated by regional travel issues that hampered employees trying to get to and from work; for example, some employees could not even get their cars out of their drive- ways. The EOC group managed its own staffing well and clearly communicated the need for field groups to proactively manage their human resources. EOC Support Before the ice storm, DFW included only NIMS-trained section chiefs from law enforcement and fire staff within its EOC. In practice, the airport realized that this EOC structure fell short, especially in the recovery phase. As a result, during the ice storm, DFW implemented a newly restructured EOC that included the branch directors from key departments such as customer service, parking and busing, and airfield and asset management. In its post-event evaluation, DFW found that this new FIGURE 11 Timeline for DFW recovery.

22 structure generated positive change; to take that improvement to the next level, it identified a need for additional EOC training and quarterly exercise involvement for branch-level representatives. DFW reports that recent involvement of department representatives within its EOC is supporting more effective collaboration and coordination across the airport. Documentation of Asset and Resource Management DFW identified resource management as an area requiring improvement. A major issue during the incident was the limited amount of deicing agent on hand, with no plan in place for emergency replenishment. In hindsight, the airport realized it could have managed resources more effectively from the beginning to ensure that the deicing agent would last throughout the expected duration of the incident. Using too much solution too early unnecessarily compounded the runway deicing issue. In extreme events, supplies run out more quickly; a major ice storm in a warm climate can reach a scope beyond ordinary expectation, affecting any consumable supply or resource. DFW identified the need to quickly assess supplies and resources being used and, if necessary, implement a conser- vation plan. It is important that conservation of critical materials such as deicing agents, fuels, and manpower be understood fully and addressed early. If DFW’s supply of deicing agent had run out before the storm subsided, the situation could have closed down the airport. Including critical work groups such as Airfield and Environmental Affairs in the EOC can help airports address these types of issues before they arise. The financial burden of emergency response, especially in extreme events, can be considerable. The estimated total direct financial impact from this storm for DFW was about $2 million. It follows that management and documentation of resource expenditure is a critical aspect of any emergency management event. Detailed real-time documentation of expended resources is critical for post- event tracking and reimbursement; state and federal funding is often available to help local jurisdic- tions recover from emergencies. According to emergency coordination McCurdy, “We struggled to gather good numbers at the onset of the event. However, tracking of resources and expenditures was identified as a priority for the EOC during the event. It is imperative to incorporate this tracking from the beginning of the operations to ensure resources and expenditures are tracked accurately.” Post-Event Exercises DFW has a longstanding practice of using recent events as topics for exercises to leverage lessons learned directly into subsequent training. McCurdy observed, “The airport is always recovering from some kind of infrastructure or weather-related event. These events allow us many opportuni- ties to gather a wealth of lessons learned” (interview, August 12, 2014). Quarterly multi-agency EOC tabletop exercises (TTX) typically focus on past events and involve all available responders and stakeholders. For example, the airport’s September 2014 quarterly tabletop exercise employed a scenario similar to the December 2013 ice storm and provided a review and sharing of lessons learned from incident. Summary The 2013 ice storm caused unprecedented disruption to airport operations. Passengers were seriously inconvenienced, but DFW staff minimized passenger frustration by providing comfort, necessities, and accurate information. DFW activated its EOC and effectively managed the event by using ICS and NIMS practices and by collaborating with city, county, and state EOCs. DFW developed an appropri- ate action plan that it then effectively communicated and executed, greatly minimizing the potential impacts of the storm. After the event, DFW gathered lessons learned and identified corrective actions which it continues to review and share through exercises. The DFW ice storm drives home the point that airports need to train employees not only to respond to probable local disasters but also to prepare for rarer occurrences or unprecedented disasters.

23 CASE EXAMPLE 3: CRIMINAL ACT Los Angeles International Airport (LAX): Active Shooter Incident of November 1, 2013 The primary source for this case example was an interview conducted on August 15, 2014, with Los Angeles World Airports (LAWA) and LAX Director of Emergency Management John Kinney, along with primary documents provided by LAWA and LAX or found in the literature review, espe- cially the LAX-LAWA “Review of Airport Response Operations: LAX Active Shooter Event: Lessons Learned” (Kinney 2014). Additional information was provided by Jacqueline Yaft, Deputy Executive Director for Operations, Maintenance and Emergency Preparedness. Incident and Response At 09:19 a.m. on Friday morning of November 1, 2013, a man armed with a semi-automatic high- powered weapon walked into LAX’s Terminal 3 and approached the TSA checkpoint. He shot and killed one TSA agent and wounded two other agents and one passenger. People in the terminal immediately self-evacuated or sheltered in place (Figure 12). Many on the secure side (airside) evacuated by means of stairs onto the apron. In response to the initial emergency notifications, staff quickly halted airport operations, including a ground stop, issuance of a Notice to Airmen (NOTAM), and lockdown of the airport perimeter. Initial command and control centered exclusively on law enforcement but also included non-law enforcement airport responders. In the initial stages, one single tactical objective prevailed: Secure the shooter or shooters immediately. Employees, tenants, passengers, and other members of the general public in terminals 1 and 2 also self-evacuated or sheltered in place (Figure 13). The LAWA AAR estimates that approximately 4,500 individuals self-evacuated and approximately 20,000 sheltered in place either on an aircraft or in a terminal. Passengers who self-evacuated were directed to transport staging areas by police and operations personnel, whence they were subsequently bused to the Tom Bradley International Terminal in accordance with the airport’s Terminal Evacuation Plan. No formal evacuation notification was ever issued for this incident; the only immediate notifica- tion was from employees and passengers who grasped the situation communicating through gesture, action, and word. First responders issued simple, clear verbal orders to passengers; that is, “Show your hands;” and, as soon as they were cleared, “Take shelter.” Throughout the incident, law enforce- ment used bullhorns and vehicle PA systems to inform evacuated passengers about the status of the airport recovery efforts. Airlines used the PA systems in each terminal to communicate with sheltered passengers within their respective areas. The lack of a functional airport-wide emergency PA system severely hampered the airport’s abil- ity to communicate with and direct evacuating and sheltered people. While the airport’s evacuation and repopulation plan provided guidance for the airport on the handling and management of a mass FIGURE 12 Terminal evacuees.

24 self-evacuation event, the simultaneous evacuation of multiple terminals quickly overwhelmed avail- able field staff as well as those in the Airport Response Coordination Center (ARCC). (Note: Under California law, a subunit of local government cannot call something an EOC; only the main unit of local government can have an EOC.) The sheer scale of the event resulted in the airport’s having little to no control of the evacuating or sheltering public. LAWA’s AAR stated that after the initial reaction to the incident, most passengers simply loitered in the main terminal core and waited for the situation to be resolved. As the incident evolved and law enforcement personnel secured the suspect, the airport’s oper- ational managers gradually allowed uninvolved areas to return to operational status. The partial reopening of the airport at 4 p.m., less than five hours after the initial incident marked the beginning of the transition from response to recovery. After that, response activities and recovery activities occurred in tandem. Recovery After the safety of passengers and employees, the immediate objectives for airport personnel were communication and notification regarding the incident. LAX used the airport radio system and its critical communication system technology to notify pre-identified key personnel. These notifications triggered the immediate initiation of protocols identified within the AEP, quickly and effectively shut- ting down at-risk areas of airport operations. AEP-triggered actions included the following: • LAX Movement Area closure, resulting in the FAA issuing a “Tier 1 Ground Stop” for all aircraft inbound to LAX; • Closure of all north complex terminals; • Closure of Central Terminal Area (CTA) roadways including upper and lower levels; • Establishment of a Unified Command (UC); • Activation of the Airport Department Operations Center (DOC); • Activation of the City EOC by the City of Los Angeles Emergency Management Department. The airport also utilized the emergency notification function of the terminals’ PA systems. How- ever, these systems had limited effect because many employees and passengers took refuge in areas beyond their reach. In other areas, modifications made over the years to accommodate airline day- to-day operations had inadvertently impaired emergency notification capabilities. Once airport responders reached the field command post, they quickly developed two major objectives: to support police and fire efforts to the fullest extent possible, and to begin planning for the phased recovery of normal airport operations. LAX ARCC and Department Operations Center (DOC) FIGURE 13 LAX Airport diagram.

25 staff focused on supporting responders and communicating the big picture to airport senior manag- ers, the mayor, the city EOC, and state and federal agencies; for example, “The airport is not closed,” “Aircraft are still arriving and departing,” “The airport is still operating on the south side,” and “The airport is trying to minimize negative impacts to the aviation system and the community.” As soon as the police IC team became assured that the situation was no longer critical, it shrank the incident perimeter and returned portions of the airport to operational status. The nature of the situation facilitated a “warm start.” While the police and fire departments con- ducted tactical operations and investigations and cleared the crime scene, airport staff at the field com- mand post concentrated on resuming normal operations. This provided the airport time to develop and communicate an effective action plan for the recovery of impacted areas once given the green light. During the planning process, airport staff had to anticipate which areas would be returned to them for recovery in which sequence. Once an area was determined to be outside of the incident perimeter, resumption of normal operations in that area could begin. In this event, LAX underwent three separate phases of recovery, each phase effectively requiring its own recovery plan. The International Terminal and terminals 4 through 8 were reopened for normal operations as soon as the retracted incident perimeter was determined. Fortuitously, no international flights were delayed because of the time of day and existing flight schedules. Terminals 1 and 2, as well as their associated roadway systems, resumed operations around 6:30 p.m. the day of the shooting, just over nine hours after the incident began. The Terminal 3 crime scene was reopened the next day (November 2, 2013) around 6:00 p.m., almost 33 hours after the initial incident. Figure 14 shows the timeline for recovery at LAX. FIGURE 14 Timeline for LAX recovery.

26 The UC worked well to execute an efficient recovery. The IC role was transferred to airport staff at the beginning of the official recovery phase. LAX staff attributed their effective command and control during recovery to well-established working relationships built long before the incident. Key personnel clearly understood expected roles and responsibilities and were familiar with the recovery plan, allowing them to anticipate next steps. Overall, the incident at LAX resulted in 252 cancelled flights, 86 diversions, and 74 delayed flights; these numbers were kept to a minimum as a result of the warm start and the phased reopening of the airport’s terminals and aircraft movement areas. Common Incident Objectives • Stop the shooter. • Address immediate life and safety issues. • Establish and maintain a perimeter (shrink it down when possible). • Communicate effectively both internally and externally. • Care for customers. • Restore normal operations as soon as possible. • Communicate with the policy groups through their on-site representatives. • Monitor and prioritize social media and respond as appropriate. Even though the response and recovery went as smoothly as could be anticipated, LAX elected to conduct a thorough post-incident evaluation, resulting in two key documents: “Active Shooter Incident and Resulting Airport Disruption” (LAWA 2014a) and “After Action Report and Implemen- tation Plan” (LAWA 2014b). These reports encompass a comprehensive review of the incident and document several post-incident action items as well as a number of lessons learned. LAWA knows the aviation industry is keenly interested in lessons learned from this incident, and has shared them widely both in the United States and worldwide. Lessons learned and post-action items shared in these LAX reports are incorporated into the findings of this report. Lessons Learned Public Emergency Notification System The PA systems within the terminals performed poorly during the incident. LAX determined that over time, these systems had been modified to meet the day-to-day needs of airlines. In many cases, the airport had delegated maintenance and control of PA systems to the airlines. As a result, some areas were without emergency communication capability. The airport is now working on recovering these systems. LAWA and LAX Emergency Management director Kinney observed, “Hopefully, other airports can learn from this and evaluate their systems. It’s too painful to wait until you have an incident to discover that you have issues.” The airport also realized during the incident that it had no effective way to communicate with people who self-evacuated or sheltered in place. The AAR report stated, “While major efforts were made to utilize social networks and commercial media to communicate with the general public, pub- lic mass notification capabilities within the airport were lacking and must be addressed.” This reality led to investigating effective methods of communication with all affected individuals, including with people sheltering in areas outside the core facilities. Following the incident, LAX worked through local emergency management groups to access FEMA’s Wireless Emergency Alert (WEA) system. This system sends alerts through cell phones and mobile devices to inform the public of an emergency. This is the same system used for Amber and Silver alerts, and does not require downloading an application or subscribing to a service. Staffing Bench Strength Command and Control worked very well despite some notable issues regarding the support function of the ARCC and DOC. During the early critical phase of the incident, ARCC/DOC attempted to

27 transition from day-to-day ARCC systems to DOC systems kept in a “cold state,” but insufficient quali- fied staff were available at the time the transition was necessary; this situation quickly led to a gap in the expected support from both the ARCC and DOC and in effective use of available technologies to create a COP during emergency incidents. Some communications failures resulted in dropped notifications. LAX’s post-action report states that “During LAWA’s response to the incident on November 1, 2013, gaps in DOC/ARCC procedures and staffing inhibited it from reaching its full potential as an information and coordination clearinghouse.” By most accounts, the DOC/ARCC played a minimal role in support of the ICP ICP, and the ARCC never produced a common operational picture (LAWA, 2014a, b). Mutual Aid Coordination Mutual aid for law enforcement worked very well during the incident. Multiple police departments responded, and the airport had plenty of help with good coordination and distribution of duties. Mutual aid response is managed through the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Office. Although the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) Incident Command made no formal request for mutual aid, the sheriff’s department coordinated a multi-agency response when the LAWA Police requested assistance. Access and Credentialing During the incident, a problem developed when police officers, responding under mutual aid, were given perimeter security duties and did not understand the airport’s credentialing system. This diffi- culty greatly delayed delivery of some essentials resources and also impeded the work of certain air- port officials and employees. For example, aircraft were loaded and ready to go but could not take off because their crews were blocked from entering the airport. Similarly, delivery of supplies requested by command, for example, bottled water, was delayed as a result of this access control issue. It is important that airports have a focused plan for providing and maintaining essential access during emergencies. LAX is investigating effective emergency response credentialing systems and is considering the use of incident-specific passwords. Interoperability Interoperability worked relatively well for this active shooter incident, but there is always room for improvement. The lack of interoperable radio communications between LAPD and Los Angeles Fire Department (LAFD) personnel, combined with the struggles in the ARCC and the DOC, caused problems early on because key LAFD command personnel were not aware of the field command post established by LAPD, thus delaying response of LAFD command personnel to the UC. Once face- to-face command post communications were established, interoperability was in place and sustained throughout the incident. Employee Care Within the first hour of the incident at LAX, mental health and disabilities aid departments from mutual aid partners responded. Care was available to all airport and tenant employees and contin- ued for nine days. LAWA’s Human Resources Department conducted one large meeting designed to communicate the availability of these services. All other counseling was provided either one-on-one or in small groups. Summary The LAX active shooter incident had sudden and significant impacts on the airport. First responders quickly resolved the threat. While the airport encountered significant difficulties regarding the ARCC and DOC, the field command team was able to work around these shortcomings and effectively manage

28 the life safety aspects of the incident. Airport staff working through the field command post developed an action plan for recovery which they deployed effectively. After the incident, LAX conducted a com- prehensive review which identified lessons learned and necessary corrective actions, and made these available to the aviation industry in the hope that they will benefit future response and recovery efforts. The major issue LAX faced was the lack of a method for communicating quickly and efficiently with the public in the areas affected by the incident. As a result of the LAX incident, airports industry- wide are analyzing their own systems, with the expectation that airports worldwide will be better prepared to communicate during response and recovery efforts for future incidents. CASE EXAMPLE 4: SYSTEMS FAILURE Newark Liberty International Airport (EWR): Electrical Outage from Hurricane Sandy on Octo- ber 29, 2012 The primary source for this case example is a group interview conducted on August 19, 2014, with EWR Manager of Airport Maintenance Sarah McKeon and Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (PANY&NJ) Assistant Chief, Resilience and Sustainability, Susanne DesRoches. Secondary sources include primary documents provided by PANY&NJ or found in the literature review, espe- cially “Hurricane Sandy: The Port Authority Airports’ Story” (PANY&NJ 2013), which focused on the recovery of the five PANY&NJ airports—Newark Liberty, John F. Kennedy International, LaGuardia International, Teterboro Airport in Bergen County, New Jersey, and Stewart International Airport in Newburgh, New York—from the effects of Hurricane Sandy. This case illustrates the point that most natural disasters generate at least one and perhaps more systems failures. Many of the lessons learned by EWR apply to both systems failure recovery and recovery from the general effects of a storm. Incident and Response Hurricane Sandy made landfall in southern New Jersey on the evening of October 29, 2012, battering the New Jersey and New York coasts with heavy rain, strong winds, and record-breaking storm surges of up to 14 feet above normal high tide. More than 8.5 million people lost electrical power. Commu- nities, roads, and other transportation facilities, including the three major PANY&NJ airports, were flooded (FEMA 2012; PANY&NJ 2013). At EWR, the airport lost electrical power as well as functionality of the city-owned pump station that drains the airport of water collected behind the airport’s tide gate (Figure 15). The pump station FIGURE 15 EWR at height of flooding.

29 has just one feed and no backup generator. EWR’s weather response plans and procedures had been modified after Hurricane Irene in 2011, which was a severe rain event (approximately 12 inches of rain in less than half a day) with extensive freshwater flooding. However, Sandy was a storm surge event, which put different demands on the tide gate and pump station and created saltwater flooding at the airport. Figures 16 and 17 show EWR’s layout. The air traffic control (ATC) tower was not available as a result of high winds and a loss of power to EWR. This loss of air traffic control, not flooding, was the factor that closed the airport. The high- est priorities during response were the restoration of power to essential systems including the pump station, ATC tower, the airfield lighting systems, and terminal operation systems. In preparation for the storm, and to address emergencies that might arise as a result, EWR staff began rotating in 12-hour shifts the day before landfall was forecast. EWR provided at-airport berthing and messing for essential staff. Recovery Lessons learned from Hurricane Irene just a year earlier provided a strong advantage in prepared- ness for response and recovery following Hurricane Sandy. Hurricane Irene made it clear which areas of EWR were prone to flooding, and engineers had completed a topographic and water infil- tration study. At the time Sandy occurred, EWR had already initiated purchasing procedures for an emergency power generator for the city-owned pump station, topographically mapped the airport to identify flood-prone areas, developed a plan for targeting sandbagging to protect critical facilities, and developed a relocation plan for vehicles and other movable equipment to more secure areas on airport property, preventing damage and protecting many of the airport’s capabilities for response and recovery. Lessons learned about coordination in response and recovery during Irene were tested in the snowstorm of October 29–30, 2011, nicknamed “Snowtober,” but other practices either did not apply or had yet to be fully implemented. Both Irene and Snowtober allowed EWR and PANY&NJ to gain experience in recovery, and the planning, physical, and operational improvements made in the year following Irene facilitated and perhaps speeded up recovery after Sandy. Following both hurricanes Irene and Sandy, EWR lost electrical power caused by events that happened off airport property and outside EWR’s control. Although the loss of power affected every function at the airport including air traffic control, terminal operation systems including mechanized FIGURE 16 Google Earth view of EWR.

30 people movers, and baggage handling systems, the largest and potentially longest lasting impacts originated from flooding of the airport operations area and its lighting and electrical systems. After Irene, EWR purchased sufficient emergency generators to facilitate partial terminal operation, airfield lighting, and operation of an on-site EOC. In addition, the airport began upgrading the base electrical systems throughout the passenger terminals. Perhaps the most significant change that made a major difference in the recovery after Sandy when compared with the recovery after Irene was the addition of a representative from Public Service Electric & Gas to the EWR EOC, who was able to provide real-time utility recovery information to on-site staff so that airport electricians could focus local recovery practices in a systematic manner. Flood control and drainage at EWR are complicated by several factors: low elevation, close prox- imity to tidally influenced waterways, a high proportion of paved surfaces at the airport and in areas adjacent to the airport, and the dependence on a pump station and a tide gate to remove or keep water out of the airport. The tide gate is owned and managed by PANY&NJ. The pump station is in position to remove water from a peripheral ditch whose banks touch approximately half of the airport’s overall perimeter. In addition to the peripheral ditch receiving stormwater runoff from the airport property, it also receives runoff from approximately 14 square miles of urban communities adjacent to the airport. The pump station is owned, operated, and managed by the city of Newark. The EWR EOC coordinated all preparations starting 12 hours before the forecast landfall and continuing through recovery until all electrical systems and terminals were fully operational, a total of about 60 hours. Gridlock on highways, disruption of mass transit, and a lack of fuel for private vehicles throughout the region impeded the airport’s recovery by making it impossible or difficult FIGURE 17 EWR Airport diagram.

31 for employees to report to work even after the physical issues at EWR were all addressed. Although EWR was able to resume a normal flight schedule within less than 48 hours, it was another 120 hours before all employees were able to work on a regular basis. EWR and the PANY&NJ paid close atten- tion to human factors and the needs of their employees throughout the recovery from Sandy, which paid off in both the short and long term. EWR, as part of PANY&NJ, has an unusual EOC arrangement. The airport EOC handles nearly all the typical EOC functions during response and recovery under the direction of the manager of Physical Plant and Redevelopment or the manager of Operations, who work on opposing shifts throughout the life of the emergency. The main PANY&NJ EOC serves to coordinate support, com- munications, logistics, and other functions, therefore serving almost as a multi-agency coordination center. The EWR EOC does not handle public information duties. The PIO at the main PANY&NJ EOC handles all outgoing public information, and EWR refers all public and media inquiries to the main EOC. EWR found this an effective and productive strategy for decreasing demand on airport staff while implementing recovery. A major complication in the early stages of the recovery for PANY&NJ staff departments arose from a jammed e-mail system. EWR did not have this problem since the airport had access to network computers that were on emergency power. One of the adjustments made to accommodate transporta- tion problems owing to gridlock and a lack of mass transit was to encourage non-essential PANY&NJ employees to work from home. The e-mail system did not allow remote purging, so employees at home could not clear their inboxes. This high volume of e-mail traffic jammed the system, causing miscommunication and delays until the system was reprogrammed. Although recovery activities were terminated with the restoration of normal flight operations about 48 hours after landfall, some recovery activities continue at EWR more than two years after Hurricane Sandy. Saltwater flooding of electrical and lighting systems created latent damage from corrosion; inspection, testing, and replacement of cables and connectors were still continuing in late 2014. Fresh- water flooding from Hurricane Irene did not have this effect. Figure 18 shows the milestones in the recovery at EWR. FIGURE 18 Timeline for EWR recovery.

32 Common Incident Objectives • Protect life and safety of passengers and employees. • Care for customers. • Protect property. • Coordinate effectively with PANY&NJ senior managers and EOC. • Coordinate with electric utility. • Coordinate effectively with city of Newark for pump station operation. • Communicate effectively both internally and externally. • Restore normal operations as soon as possible. Lessons Learned Command and Control At both the airport level and at the corporate level, the Port Authority found it highly effective to have the right people at the table. For example, EWR included electric utilities representatives in the airport EOC and in planning for forecast disasters. In the future, EWR would consider including an electrical utility representative in the UC. NIMS and ICS were found to be effective for guiding recovery operations. In Sandy, the Port Authority found that its on-airport EOCs worked well not only to coordinate response but also to coordinate recovery. The airport EOC will be kept active to manage and direct recovery as long as recovery activities are multidimensional and complex. In the case of a multi-airport system with airport EOCs and a central corporate EOC, appropriate staff in the central EOC can assist, advise, facilitate, coordinate, mobilize resources, and prioritize, thereby helping the airport EOCs and recovery. Communications Communicating clearly, simply, and accurately is essential for effective recovery operations, which highlights the importance of a comprehensive crisis communications plan (CCCP). In the particular case of EWR and the Port Authority, well-developed and practiced procedures for communications between the airport EOC and the corporate EOC was key. Redirecting political callers are to the corporate EOC’s PIO is also important. A contingency telecommuting plan, which can be part of the CCCP, is essential to ensuring that normal administration and planning continue during airport recovery. Making sure that employees working at home have full access to their e-mail inboxes, including the ability to clear them remotely, will avoid disruption of essential communications. Logistics and Resource Management It is important to ensure that enough auxiliary power can be generated to provide for the operation of people movers, escalators, elevators, and baggage handling systems if the airport is to be able to handle at least some terminal operations in the earliest stages of recovery. Documentation of the sys- tem’s capabilities and what it means to each phase of the airport’s recovery should be accessible by the entire airport community. Also with regard to electrical power, the airport should be established as a Tier 1 priority for electric service and service restoration (the same level as hospitals). As soon as extreme weather is forecast, maintenance and operations staff members should begin to check equipment and prepare emergency generators. Preparatory actions include fueling vehicles and performing preventive maintenance and relocating vehicles to high ground or higher levels of

33 parking structures to avoid their being flooded. A sufficient stock of consumable resources should be on hand, and with adequate backup. Each airport in a multi-airport system can request an inventory of assets the other airports have, and the system can have a plan for sharing assets during recovery. Highway and mass transit disruptions and gridlock (hampering transportation of employees, pas- senger access, logistics, etc.) can affect the airport’s ability to recover. It is important that the airport anticipate and plan for such surface disruptions. During recovery from a major regional disaster, the airport should anticipate competition for critical services and delays in getting contractors. The airport can benefit by pre-arranging (pre-contracting) for debris removal and disposal services and by planning escort procedures and assignments for the contractors. The airport can establish contingency contracts for elec- trical inspectors and electrical contractors including airfield lighting and ATC systems. Airport- qualified electrical inspectors and contractors can be hard to find, so they need to be identified, contacted, and contracted with as part of preparedness. The airport can anticipate the discovery of delayed latent damage to electrical and lighting sys- tems from saltwater flooding. This means that recovery may last as long as one or two years as the latent problems become acute, so the airport should be prepared to replace all cables, connectors, and controls that have been exposed to salt. Advance coordination with the FAA can ensure that sufficient repair parts are on hand for naviga- tional aids (NAVAIDS). Response and recovery plans should include an alternative aircraft fueling plan using auxiliary power and tanker trucks. A review of the airport’s fuel capacity and storage needs will reveal if expansion is needed in case airport operations resume before it gets access to fuel resupply. Contin- gency contracts for fuel supplies can be arranged as part of preparedness. Planning Nothing trumps great preparation, and great preparation means having invited the right people to participate. This includes stakeholders, vendors, outside experts, and mutual aid partners among others. A pre-landfall meeting with the airport’s construction, facilities, maintenance, mechani- cal, and electrical staff to discuss preparation for and recovery from severe weather incidents was highly productive. Lessons learned from other types of disruptive events can be applied to the current incident. How- ever, even similar events (e.g., flooding from Hurricanes Irene and Sandy) can unfold very differently with different consequences. Since flood control pumps are so critical at EWR, a recovery plan including detailed instructions and sequences for reenergizing pumps will optimize protection of the airport’s infrastructure and speed the recovery. EWR needs to work closely with the city, if city-owned flood control devices (gates, pumps) are essential to protect the airport; or an outside agency such as the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers for flood control. A plan to shut down airfield lighting in advance of flooding can avoid short-circuiting, protecting lighting speeds recovery. To minimize the possibility of dangerous projectiles during high winds, the AEP needs to have explicit instructions with priorities for tying down or securing loose debris and equipment in order to limit damage. The sooner equipment and infrastructure can be secured, the better.

34 Designating in-house staff as go teams for various specific damage or risk scenarios, or assisting during an emergency with customer or employee care, etc., can speed both response and recovery. It is not adequate only to evaluate the best sheltering-in-place locations for various scenarios; it is essential to have a workable plan for relocating passengers and employees (airport and TSA) to those locations. It is absolutely key to keep contact lists updated. As part of the planning process, the airport should consider the need for formal agreements with business partners and whether those agreements include specific roles and responsibilities in the recovery phase. Customer Service In addition to providing secure locations for sheltering in place and the means to move passengers to them, the airport needs to provide cots and supplies for stranded passengers. Care for Employees From the recovery from Sandy, EWR learned important lessons for employee care: • Provide fuel for employees to commute. • Be sensitive to personal losses of employees and give them time to deal with family matters by rotating schedules wisely. • Institute 12-hour shifts with at-airport berthing and messing for duration of response and recovery. Anticipate effects of gridlock and fuel issues. • Coordinate with airport hotel for housing for essential managers and employees during recovery; make sure hotel has adequate emergency generator capacity to stay open. Leadership Airport recovery is an important symbol of return to normalcy for the community. Effective and prompt recovery builds goodwill and community support. Effective airport leadership includes encouraging ingenuity, resourcefulness, and creativity. Fostering such traits pays great dividends when novel situ- ations arise that are not covered by plans or prior arrangements. As already noted, it is essential to have the right people sitting at the table. Political and economic issues can delay application of lessons learned, especially if non-airport owners or agencies are involved. Overtime Overtime typically becomes a major issue after recovery or even during it, so an airport should have an overtime budget (“discretionary overtime budget” at the Port Authority) in reserve for emergency management. Overtime charged to separate codes and identified as an emergency expense allows precise and complete documentation in case FEMA or insurance reimbursement is available. The Airport as Refuge and Aid Station The airport needs to be prepared for citizens (non-employees, non-passengers, non-tenants) to come to the airport to request aid, fuel, or shelter, and have plans and policies in place for crowd control and provision of assistance.

35 Evaluation—Closing the Loop After dealing with two hurricanes in two years, EWR made changes to its after-action review process and how it uses the results from it. Its recommendations include: • Focus priorities in the AAR to protect assets and prevent damage. • Allow time for applying lessons learned for needs assessment, design, and procurement. • Revise risk and hazard assessments as part of the AAR. • Use training, drills, exercises, and events of the same type or other types to test revisions to the AEP, the CCCP, and other policies and procedures. Summary Lessons learned from Hurricane Irene in 2011 aided in Newark Liberty International Airport’s recovery from Hurricane Sandy, although not all revised procedures had been fully implemented. Recovery at the airport was complicated by external factors, for example, gridlock and fuel shortages that compli- cated workers’ commutes to work. Focused contingency planning and workarounds allowed flights to resume fewer than 48 hours after Sandy’s landfall. EWR’s EOC coordinated recovery efforts with PANY&NJ’s central EOC, and the consistent application of NIMS and ICS worked well. The single most important element of recovery was restoration of electrical power and provision of emergency power from generators. The ATC tower operations, evacuation of the terminals, and operation of the tied gate and pump station all depended on the availability of sufficient emergency power.