A Compendium of Best Practices and Lessons Learned for Improving Local Community Recovery from Disastrous Hazardous Materials Transportation Incidents (2012)

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B-1 B1.1 Hazardous Materials Transportation Incident/Exercise Documentation 1. Document Reference Source: Incident Specific Preparedness Review (ISPR) M/V Cosco Busan Oil Spill in San Francisco Bay Part II and Final Report; multiple federal, state, and local agencies, May 7, 2008 (http://www.uscg.mil/foia/CoscoBuscan/part2.pdf) Recovery Component(s): Environmental and Economic Document Type: After-Action Report Document Summary: On November 7, 2007, the M/V Cosco Busan departed the Port of Oakland located on the Oakland Estuary in San Francisco Bay. With visibility in the estuary limited by dense fog, the San Francisco Bar Pilot and the assist tug Revolution moved the ship into the channel and headed for the Golden Gate Bridge and the open sea. As the Cosco Busan passed the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge, there was a collision with the Delta Tower Pier, damaging the port side of the ship and the pier’s fendering. Three port wing tanks were dam- aged, two of which contained fuel oil, spilling 53,269 gallons of fuel oil into San Francisco Bay. Document Significance: This document relates to a hazardous materials transportation inci- dent and presents lessons learned relating to environmental restoration and impacts to local businesses. These lessons learned could be of assistance in future similar incidents. 2. Document Reference Source: After-Action Report Graniteville Train Wreck – January 2005, Aiken County Government; and After-Action Report – Graniteville Train Wreck – January 2005, Aiken County Sheriff ’s Office (South Carolina) (www.llis.gov) Recovery Component(s): General Document Type: After-Action Report Document Summary: This document presents lessons learned, strengths, and areas for improvement from the Aiken County response to the Graniteville Train derailment of Janu- ary 6, 2005. This derailment was caused by a Norfolk Southern train hitting a parked train at the Avondale Mills Textile Plant. The result of the incident was the release of approximately 90 tons of chlorine gas, the evacuation of 5,500 citizens, medical assistance for 529 people, and the deaths of 10 people. (Note: The numbers noted in the Document Summary are those reported in the After-Action Report. However, more recent information from the Aiken County HazMat Team that responded to the incident shows that there were 9 deaths and 80 tons of chlorine released from a 90-ton capacity rail car.) Document Significance: Much of the information contained in the lessons learned and the improvement areas for public information is response related. However, the topics can A p p e n d i x B Reference Documents

B-2 A Compendium of Best practices and Lessons Learned be extrapolated to apply to recovery operations as well. This incident is an excellent example of the types of situations that can arise in recovery operations for hazardous materials trans- portation incidents. 3. Document Reference Source: Chemical Incident Response: Assigning Staff to Greet and Instruct Patients at a Hospital Decontamination Area, Lessons Learned Information Sharing (www.llis.gov) Recovery Component(s): Mass Care; Decontamination Document Type: Lessons Learned Document Summary: The lessons learned presented in this document were derived from a Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program (CSEPP) exercise to test a hospital’s capabilities for decontamination operations. The important lesson learned from this incident was the need to maintain the presence of properly protected hospital staff within the decon- tamination area to ensure that potential patients do not wander into the hospital, increasing the spread of the contamination. Citation: Federal Emergency Management Agency, U.S. Army. Umatilla Community CSEPP Exercise 2007. 16 Jul 2007. https://www.llis.dhs.gov/docdetails/details.do?contentID=26423 Document Significance: Whether the incident is an accidental release of hazardous materials from a stockpile or the result of a transportation accident, hospital and decon- tamination staff need to ensure that patients are provided with the appropriate guidance at the decontamination center so as not to further contaminate otherwise clean areas. This is another example of an incident that is not transportation related, but which results in the same type of operation that might be required following a transportation incident involving hazardous materials. 4. Document Reference Source: Hazardous Materials Response: Communicating an Alternate Decontamination Plan to Responders in the Hot Zone, Lessons Learned Information Sharing (www.llis.gov) Recovery Component(s): Mass Care; Decontamination Document Type: Lessons Learned Document Summary: Directing victims to the appropriate safe areas is one of the key func- tions of all emergency responders. In most cases, as was shown in this full-scale exercise, the need for alternate plans is not always considered. In this case, victims began showing up for decontamination before the formal decontamination area had been established. This docu- ment refers to an alternate decontamination plan as being the plan for where to send victims before the formal decontamination area has been established and communicating that infor- mation to the hazardous materials personnel within the hot zone. Citation: Orange County (CA) Transit Police Services. Orange Shield 2006 Full-Scale Exercise After Action Report. 3 May 2006. https://www.llis.dhs.gov/docdetails/details.do?contentID=25285 Document Significance: Any incident involving hazardous materials can require that vic- tims be decontaminated. The process and procedures for accomplishing the identification of a site, set up, and completing the decontamination operations is the same for any incident involving hazardous materials. Consequently, the information presented herein as les-

Reference documents B-3 sons learned will apply to the case of decontamination following a transportation incident involving hazardous materials. 5. Document Reference Source: Mass Evacuation: Planning for the Evacuation of Special Needs Populations, Lessons Learned Information Sharing (www.llis.gov) Recovery Component(s): Recovery Planning; Mass Care Document Type: Lessons Learned Document Summary: In many cases, identifying the resources available to help with the evac- uation of special needs populations can be a challenge. Preplanning can help to ensure that these potential victims are moved to safe areas in a timely fashion. This document is based on the Apex Fire Department’s (AFD) response to a report of a chlorine odor at a street intersec- tion in Apex, North Carolina. Citation: Department of Homeland Security, United States Fire Administration. Technical Report Series: Chemical Fire in Apex, North Carolina. April 2008. https://www.llis.gov/docdetails/ details.do?contentID=32996 Document Significance: This event dealt with a structure fire resulting in the release of chlo- rine. A hazardous materials transportation incident could result in the release of chlorine or any other type of chemical resulting in the need to evacuate individuals once the plume has dissipated. The lesson learned from this incident applies to transportation incidents as well as other types of hazardous materials incidents. 6. Document Reference Source: Mass Decontamination: Assigning Personnel to Monitor Access to Control Zones and Mass Decontamination: Clearly Demarcating Boundaries of the Control Zones, Lessons Learned Information Sharing (www.llis.gov) Recovery Component(s): Mass Care; Decontamination Document Type: Lessons Learned Document Summary: This functional exercise pointed out two critical areas that need to be incorporated into decontamination operations—access control and clearly marking the bound- aries of the hot zone. In this exercise, many responders and victims were wandering in and out of the hot zone. This activity can lead to an increased area of contamination and the repeated contamination of individuals. The document is based on an exercise conducted by Hood River County, Oregon. Citation: Department of Homeland Security. State of Oregon Hood River County Functional Exer- cise After-Action Report. 17 Sep 2005. https://www.llis.dhs.gov/member/secure/detail.cfm? content_id=23536 Document Significance: The concepts of access control apply not only to radiological inci- dents, but to any incident that involves some level of contamination within a defined area. Establishing a hot zone defines the area of contamination and is intended to keep people out of that area so they do not become contaminated and spread the contamination to non- contaminated areas. This document is relevant to this project, as it shows the need for access control and monitoring, a function that is not dependent on the causative incident. 7. Document Reference Source: State Response to the Graniteville Train Derailment: Lessons Learned, Team Visionary Collective under the Mentorship of Ron Fisher, 27 May 2006 (www. llis.gov)

B-4 A Compendium of Best practices and Lessons Learned Recovery Component(s): Mass Care; Evacuation Document Type: Lessons Learned Document Summary: This document presents lessons learned by the State of South Carolina from their response to the Graniteville Train Derailment on January 6, 2005. This derailment was caused by a Norfolk Southern train hitting a parked train at the Avondale Mills Textile Plant. The result of the incident was the release of approximately 90 tons of chlorine gas, the evacuation of 5,500 citizens, medical assistance for 529 people, and the deaths of 10 people. “The collision occurred in an area known as ‘dark territory’ where electronic control and track signals are not used (The State, 2005). Human error and outdated equipment are believed to have contributed to this incident . . . .” (Note: The numbers noted in the Document Summary are those reported in the After-Action Report. However, more recent information from the Aiken County HazMat Team that responded to the incident shows that there were 9 deaths and 80 tons of chlorine released from a 90-ton capacity rail car.) References: Population Finder: Aiken County, South Carolina. U.S. Census Bureau. http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/SAFFPopulation?_event=ChangeGeoContext& geo_id=05000US45003&_geoContext=&_street=&_county=Aiken&_cityTown=Aiken&_ state=&_zip=&_lang=en&_sse=on&ActiveGeoDiv=&_useEV=&pctxt=fph&pgsl=010&_ submenuId=population_0&ds_name=null&_ci_nbr=null&qr_name=null&reg=null% 3Anull&_keyword=&_industry= Fact Sheet: Aiken County, South Carolina. Census 2000, U.S. Census Bureau. http://factfinder. census.gov/servlet/SAFFFacts?_event=Search&geo_id=05000US45003&_geoContext= 01000US%7C04000US45%7C05000US45003&_street=&_county=Graniteville&_city Town=Graniteville&_state=04000US45&_zip=&_lang=en&_sse=on&ActiveGeo Div=geoSelect&_useEV=&pctxt= fph&pgsl=050&_submenuId=populat ion_ 0&ds_name=DEC_2000_SAFF&_ci_nbr=null&qr_name=null&reg=null%3Anull&_ keyword=&_industry= Graniteville, South Carolina. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Graniteville%2C_South_Carolina Graniteville South Carolina Department of Parks, Recreation, and Tourism. http://www.scheritagecorridor. org/html/popups_dis/dis13.html About Midland Valley: Midland Valley High School. http://www.midlandvalleyhs.org/website/aboutmv/aboutmv.htm 133 Marshall Street (Avondale Mills) to 227 Mustang Drive (Midland Valley HS) Mapquest.http:// www.mapquest.com/directions/main.adp?go=1&do=nw&rmm=1&pn1x=&a1x=&c1x= &s1x=&z1x=&un=m&cl=EN&qq=hltF3hzNT9tNhURP0HLlhh9UYBmHRqyBceg4Gkon14 D8uewLk7pjHQ%253d%253d&ct=NA&rsres=1&1y=US&1ffi=&1l=&1g=&1pl=&1v=&1n= &1pn=&1a=133+Marshall+Street&1c=Graniteville&1s=SC&1z=&2y=US&2ffi=&2l=&2g=& 2pl=&2v=&2n=&2pn=&2a=227+Mustang+Drive+&2c=Graniteville&2s=SC&2z=&r=f Environmental Protection Agency Region IV Norfolk Southern Graniteville Derailment Final Pollution Report #2. http://www.epaosc.org/polrep_profile.asp?site_id=A4GY. Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry September 2004 Toxicological Profile for Chlorine Dioxide and Chlorite. http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/toxprofiles/tp160.pdf. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Emergency Preparedness& Response - Facts about Chlorine. http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/chlorine/basics/facts.asp.

Reference documents B-5 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. MMWR, Public Health Consequences from Haz- ardous Substances Acutely Released During Rail Transit—South Carolina, 2005; Selected States, 1999—2004. 28 Jan 2005. 54(03);64-67. http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5403a2.htm South Carolina State Emergency Operations Center Situation Report #3. 1/7/2005 15:00. http:// www.scemd.org/News/sitreps/graniteville-05/Graniteville%20train%20wreck3-1-07-05.pdf South Carolina State Emergency Operations Center Situation Report #5. 1/8/2005 14:00. http:// www.scemd.org/News/sitreps/graniteville-05/Aiken-Graniteville%20Sitrep-5%2001-8-05.pdf South Carolina State Emergency Operations Center Situation Report #7. 1/10/2005 17:30. http:// www.scemd.org/News/sitreps/graniteville-05/Graniteville%20train%20wreck7-1-10-05.pdf South Carolina State Emergency Operations Center Situation Report #10. 1/12/2005 9:00. http:// www.scemd.org/News/sitreps/graniteville-05/Graniteville%20train%20wreck10-1-12-05.pdf South Carolina State Emergency Operations Center Situation Report #12. 1/13/2005 9:30. http://www.scemd.org/News/sitreps/graniteville-05/Graniteville%20train%20wreck 12-01-13-05.pdf Document Significance: This document addresses the problems attendant with evacua- tion following a hazardous materials transportation incident. The information and recom- mendations presented in this document can provide valuable operational insight to others experiencing a similar situation. 8. Document Reference Source: Shelter Operations: Working with Property Managers to Identify Temporary Replacement Housing, Lessons Learned Information Sharing (www.llis.gov) Recovery Component(s): Recovery Planning; Temporary Housing Document Type: Lessons Learned Document Summary: Finding adequate temporary housing within the impacted community is a major challenge to planners. This document is based on a tabletop exercise in North Caro- lina that looked at many of the issues in long-term temporary housing. The suggestion that planners should work with property management and rental associations to identify available rental units to use as temporary replacement housing is a solid lesson learned and identifies a valuable resource to local government planners and the community as a whole. Citation: Faltinowski, Gary. Information and Planning Section Chief, North Carolina Division of Emergency Management. Interview with Lessons Learned Information Sharing, 12 Dec 2006. Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region IV. After Action Report: Hurricane Prepared- ness Tabletop Exercise—Region IV, May 31-June 2. 1 Oct 2006, p 34. https://www.llis.dhs.gov/ member/secure/detail.cfm?content_id=20873 Document Significance: This tabletop exercise addresses temporary housing issues related to the aftermath of a Category 3 hurricane in North Carolina. Certainly, hurricane disasters point out the significant need for temporary housing both for the short and long term. Fol- lowing a hazardous materials transportation incident where a defined area may need decon- tamination, and potentially repairs, there may be a need to house displaced victims that live in the area. Typically, shelter operations are very temporary and the desire is to move individuals into short-term housing until their properties are ready to be reoccupied. The principles of that operation are the same whether the causative event is a hurricane or a hazardous materials incident.

B-6 A Compendium of Best practices and Lessons Learned B1.2 Non-Hazardous Materials Transportation Incident/Exercise Documentation 1. Document Reference Source: Wide Vigilance III-SNS Component Full Scale Exercise – After Action Report & Improvement Plan. Cocciardi and Associates, Inc. September 25, 2010. (www.llis.gov) Recovery Component(s): Mass Care – SNS-Point of Distribution Document Type: After-Action Report Document Summary: Wide Vigilance III – SNS Component Full Scale Exercise – After Action Report & Improvement Plan describes the outputs of a full-scale exercise (FSE) sponsored by the South Central Task Force (SCTF) National Stockpile Working Group in support of planning and training for response and recovery. Primary focal points of the FSE included planning, communications, and mass prophylaxis within the context of a severe weather incident. Document Significance: In terms of regional and local planning, FSEs such as Wide Vigilance III, along with subsequent reports and improvement plans, not only represent a means of identifying best practices and areas for improvement, but also build cohesion among the participating orga- nizations. This FSE involved more than 100 individuals from key response and recovery entities at the state, county, and local levels, including the Pennsylvania Department of Health—Office of Public Health Preparedness, local emergency management agencies, local police officials, EMS representatives, fire department officials, and school district representatives. Although the scenario posed in the FSE is a natural disaster, the focus on the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) makes this exercise particularly relevant to hazardous materials transportation incidents that could result in medical supply needs that exceed local capacity. 2. Document Reference Source: Mortuary Services: Victim Identification and Record Creation during a Mass Casualty Incident, Lessons Learned Information Sharing (www.llis.gov) Recovery Component(s): Mass Care; Mortuary Operations Document Type: Best Practice Document Summary: During a mass casualty incident, rapid identification and record cre- ation for those victims that have died as a result of the event is of critical importance. This best practice recommends that chief medical examiners consider using the Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Team’s (DMORT’s) Victim Information Profile (VIP) to assist in the identification and record creation for victims. This document is based on a fire that destroyed the Station Club in Warwick, Rhode Island, on February 20, 2003. Reference: Titan Systems Corporation. Rhode Island: The Station Club Fire After-Action Report: State, Local, and Federal Government and the Private Sector. 13 Jul 2004. https://www.llis.dhs.gov/member/secure/detail.cfm?content_id=10806 Document Significance: Victim identification and records creation applies to any incident that involves mass casualties. This particular best practice results from a structure fire with a large number of victims who burned to death. The principles and concepts addressed by this best practice apply to a mass casualty incident involving a transportation incident, as well as any mass casualty incident.

Reference documents B-7 B1.3 Federal-Level Recovery Planning Documentation 1. Document Reference Source: Long-Term Community Recovery Planning Process – A Self Help Guide, FEMA, December 2005 (http://www.fema.gov/library/viewRecord.do?id=2151) Recovery Component(s): Long-Term Recovery Planning Document Type: FEMA Self-Help Guide for LTCR Document Summary: Produced by FEMA, this self-help guide for communities provides a step-by-step approach to developing, implementing, and updating Long-Term Community Recovery (LTCR) Plans in an easy-to-digest format that supplements guidance with real-world case studies. The step-by-step approach detailed in this document includes the following 13 steps: • Assess the need for LTCR; • Select a leader and outline the LTCR program; • Secure outside support; • Establish a public information campaign; • Build consensus; • Identify LTCR issues and opportunities; • Articulate vision and set goals; • Identify, evaluate, and prioritize LTCR projects; • Develop a community recovery plan; • Choose project champions; • Prepare an LTCR funding strategy; • Implement the plan; and • Update the plan. In addition, this document provides a user-friendly LTCR planning process checklist and detailed information about additional resources for information related to community recovery. Document Significance: Prepared in coordination with ESF #14 partners and the Florida Long-Term Recovery Office (LTRO), FEMA’s self-help guide builds upon best practices and case studies to provide informed guidance that is tailored to local communities. 2. Document Reference Source: Disaster Recovery – FEMA’s Long-Term Assistance was Helpful to State and Local Governments but had Some Limitations (GAO-10-404), Government Accounting Office, March 2010 (http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-404) Recovery Component(s): General/Long-Term Recovery Document Type: GAO Report on FEMA LTCR Document Summary: GAO reports on the roles that FEMA’s Long-Term Community Recov- ery (LTCR) played following recent disasters including the (1) 2007 Greensburg tornado, (2) 2008 Iowa floods, and (3) Hurricane Ike in 2008. The report involved primary and secondary research that entailed reviewing agency documents and policy, along with interviews of rele- vant federal, state, and local officials. The report highlights broad criteria and timing challenges related to assistance, the effectiveness of specific coordination efforts, and the effectiveness of specific planning assistance practices. Based on the report’s findings, GAO recommended that FEMA increase the effectiveness of the timing and level of recovery assistance to meet local and state-level capacity and needs. Additionally, GAO recommended FEMA evaluate the level of authority necessary for coordi- nating federal agencies with a role in the recovery process.

B-8 A Compendium of Best practices and Lessons Learned Document Significance: GAO’s assessment of FEMA’s LTCR provides valuable guidance on lessons learned from three natural disaster case studies. B1.4 State and Regional Recovery Planning Documentation 1. Document Reference Source: Iowa Disaster Recovery Tabletop Exercise After Action Report/ Improvement Plan, Rebuild Iowa & Iowa Homeland Security & Emergency Management Di- vision, August 2010 (www.llis.gov) Recovery Component(s): Recovery Planning Document Type: After-Action Report Document Summary: This exercise is based on scenarios covering the progression of a flood disaster well into long-term recovery. The scenario begins on April 8, 2022, with 2 weeks of rain and flooding throughout central Iowa. Twenty-five counties are named in a presidential Declaration of Major Disaster. The second scenario occurs 3 days later, with 67 counties now named in the disaster. In addition, the flooding has impacted two urban centers and destroyed many acres of cropland. Fifty people have been killed and/or injured, and another 60,000 have been displaced from their homes. A special meeting has been called by the Governor to discuss the status of the storms and on-going response efforts and to assess the state’s capacity to address long-term recovery. Following the meeting, the Governor announces that the state Disas- ter Recovery Framework has been put into effect and a few high-level goals, including returning displaced residents to their homes quickly or providing suitable temporary housing, reopening businesses in a timely fashion, and repairing critical infrastructure as soon as possible, have been put into place. Scenario three takes place 4 months later. Congress has just appropriated $500 million in recovery funds to the State of Iowa. This amount is less than was requested and it will take some time for this to become available to the state. Considerable additional funding will be needed to fully recover, but for the time being, priorities need to be set for this funding and programs established. The final scenario is 2 years later and many displaced residents are now in permanent housing. New housing construction is still underway. Infrastructure repair and rebuilding continues. Eighty percent of businesses have reopened, but some still struggle. Pro- grams are ongoing and additional funding requests are still pending. The Governor has asked for a transition plan over the next year from recovery back to normal operations. Document Significance: This tabletop exercise addressed recovery operations following dev- astating floods and involved 46 participants from multiple state agencies, local governments, and public-private partnerships that all have a role in recovery. Although the scenario covered is a flood disaster, the actions identified within the recommendations of the exercise are appli- cable to any type of disaster or incident. From a recovery planning standpoint, these recom- mendations are applicable to the recovery operations following a transportation incident. 2. Document Reference Source: California Disaster Medical Operations Manual, California Emergency Medical Services Agency, Global Vision Consortium, December 3, 2008 (www. llis.gov) Recovery Component(s): Recovery Planning; Mass Care Document Type: Guidance Document Document Summary: This document is a planning guideline for medical operations in Cali- fornia. Although the information is California-specific, many of the concepts can be used by other jurisdictions. The purpose of the document is to define and standardize disaster

Reference documents B-9 medical response operational procedures and set performance guidelines to ensure that Cali- fornians are effectively served by the system’s capabilities. Document Significance: While the specifics of this document may not be universally appli- cable, the concepts presented could be of value in increasing the efficiency of the medical elements of any recovery operation, including those involving hazardous materials transpor- tation incidents. 3. Document Reference Source: Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Restoration Plan, Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council, November 1994 (http://www.fakr.noaa.gov/oil/eis/1994RestorationPlan.pdf) Recovery Component(s): Recovery Planning; Environmental Restoration & Economic Recovery Document Type: Plans Document Summary: Not long after midnight on March 24, 1989, the oil tanker T/V Exxon Val- dez ran aground in Prince William Sound, Alaska, and spilled almost 11 million gallons of crude oil being transported from the North Slope area of Alaska. This plan provides long-term guid- ance for restoring the resources and services damaged by the oil spill that contaminated nearly 600 miles of Alaska’s shoreline. This plan was employed to guide the use of the remaining settle- ment funds after restitution was paid by Exxon to the federal government and the State of Alaska. Document Significance: This is a hazardous materials transportation incident with an economic component to the restoration planning process and, as such, is significant to this project. 4. Document Reference Source: Annex 14 (ESF-14) Recovery and Mitigation, State of South Carolina, February 2010 (www.llis.gov) Recovery Component(s): Recovery Planning Document Type: Plan Document Summary: This document provides a sound outline for recovery operations as they relate to natural disasters. Document Significance: This plan from South Carolina primarily addresses natural haz- ards. However, it provides sound background information into what is required to manage a recovery operation. For this project, the study team extrapolated information as it could apply to a hazardous materials transportation incident. B1.5 Local-Level Recovery Planning Documentation 1. Document Reference Source: Emergency Management Programs for Healthcare Facilities: The Four Phases of Emergency Management, Lessons Learned Information Sharing (www.llis.gov) Recovery Component(s): Recovery Planning Document Type: Best Practice Document Summary: The best practice presented here relates to the four phases of emer- gency management (also known as integrated emergency management) as they apply to hos- pitals. The phases are preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery. Under this concept, emergency management is a cycle that begins before the incident starts. Emergency Managers have learned over many decades that this approach leads to a balanced approach to disaster operations. For the purposes of this project, the study team excerpted only the portion of the document related to recovery.

B-10 A Compendium of Best practices and Lessons Learned References: Barbera, Joseph and Anthony Macintyre. Mass Casualty Handbook: Hospital. Jane’s information Group. 2003. http://catalog.janes.com/catalog/public/index.cfm?fuseaction=home.ProductInfoBrief &product_id=84838 Ennis, Steve. Emergency Management Plan. Reciprocal Group/SME Consulting. Jun 2003. https:// www.llis.dhs.gov/member/secure/detail.cfm?content_id=6776 Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations. Guide to Emergency Management Planning in Health Care. Joint Commission Resources. 2002. http://www.jcrinc.com/publications.asp?durki=1022 Joint Commission for the Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations. Hospital Accreditation Standards. Joint Commission Resource. 2006. http://www.jcrinc.com/publications.asp?durki=8141&site=4&return=77 Joint Commission for the Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations. “Using JCAHO Stan- dards as a Starting Point to Prepare for an Emergency,” Joint Commission Perspectives. Vol. 21, No. 12, Dec 2001. http://www.jcrinc.com/subscribers/perspectives.asp?durki=1004 McLaughlin, Susan. Emergency Management Handbook. American Society for Healthcare Engineering. 2003. https://www.associationstores.org/OA_HTML/ibeCCtpItmDspRte.jsp?section=10141 &item=100 National Fire Protection Agency. NFPA 99 Health Care Facilities. Prepared by the Technical Committees on Administration, Electrical Equipment, Electrical Systems, Gas Delivery Equip- ment, Health Care Emergency Preparedness and Disaster Planning, Hyperbaric and Hypobaric Facilities, and Piping Systems. 2002. http://www.nfpa.org/catalog/product.asp?pid=9902 Document Significance: Key to the success of a recovery effort are the planning and prepared- ness efforts undertaken prior to the incident, which lay the groundwork for implementing recovery operations in a timely and effective fashion. Typically, we think of recovery planning as it relates to a jurisdiction. This best practice document is focused on hospitals and their recovery planning. In a transportation incident involving hazardous materials, there may be a significant role for hospitals in mass care (both short and long term). The better prepared the hospital is to address recovery issues within their own facility, the better they will be able to assist in the overall recovery of the jurisdiction. 2. Document Reference Source: Strategic National Stockpile Distribution Planning: Using Staging Sites to Segment Dispensing Processes, Lessons Learned Information Sharing (www.llis.gov) Recovery Component(s): Recovery Planning; Mass Care Document Type: Best Practice Document Summary: This best practice provides recommendations on the use of segmented dispensing sites aimed at better controlling the flow of patients and vehicles. The concept involves splitting dispensing site functions into multiple and distinct physical locations. References: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. “Receiving, Distributing, and Dispensing Strategic National Stockpile Assets: A Guide for Preparedness.” Version 10, June 2005 (LLIS.gov ID #14197)

Reference documents B-11 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Strategic National Stockpile Preparedness Course. 12-16 Jan 2004. Michael Montello. Lessons Learned from Fall 2001 Capital Region Anthrax Response. National Institutes for Health (NIH). Document Significance: Planning for a strategic national stockpile distribution does not relate to any particular incident beyond the need for dispensing some form of medication. This best practice fits with other planning considerations that need to be addressed regarding the recov- ery from hazardous materials transportation incidents. The strategic national stockpile has a significant potential for use following a hazardous materials transportation incident. 3. Document Reference Source: Howard Street Tunnel Fire, Baltimore City, Maryland, July 18, 2001, U.S. Department of Transportation ITS Joint Program Office, prepared by SAIC, July 2002 (www.llis.gov) Recovery Component(s): Planning; Economic Recovery Document Type: Incident Report Document Summary: On July 18, 2001, a 60-car CSX freight train derailed inside the Howard Street Tunnel. The train contained several tank cars carrying tripropylene, hydrochloric acid, and ethyl hexylphthalate. In addition to these hazardous materials, the train was carrying paper, pulpwood, and plywood, as well as other cargo. The derailment resulted in the derailed car carrying tripropylene catching fire and one car with hydrochloric acid to leak; another tank car carrying hydrochloric acid derailed but did not leak. The situation was compounded by the break of a 40-inch water main located under the intersection of Howard and Lombard Streets – almost directly above the site of the derailment – spilling water into the tunnel and onto the street. As it turned out, the break was located near the tank car carrying the tripropylene. Four days later, the fire department was able to move the box cars carrying paper and plywood and extinguish the fire completely. On July 24, the tunnel was cleared for traffic and the first post-fire train passed through the tunnel. The incident occurred as the City of Baltimore was preparing for both the evening rush hour and the second game of a baseball doubleheader at Oriole Park at Camden Yards. The result was a potentially catastrophic situation at peak demand hours for transportation services. This incident also seriously impacted the local business community. Document Significance: This document highlights the economic impact on a local community as a result of both the transportation incident and the secondary issue of the broken water main. In this case, the businesses were compensated for their losses resulting from the incident itself; however, the lost business that resulted from a lack of foot traffic and transportation in the area, and the rescheduling of the second baseball game, resulted in extreme hardship and loss of significant revenues. The lessons learned from this incident are directly applicable to this report. 4. Document Reference Source: Radiological Incident Response: Decontamination of Buildings and Public Sites, Lessons Learned Information Sharing (www.llis.gov) Recovery Component(s): Planning; Economic Recovery and Decontamination Document Type: Best Practice Document Summary: On September 13, 1987, two men stole a radiotherapy unit from an abandoned clinic in downtown Goiania, Brazil. The unit contained approximately 20 grams (1,375 curies) of Cesium-137 (Cs-137) in the form of cesium chloride salt. The men did not know that the source was radioactive and dismantled the unit, subsequently selling it to a junk- yard as scrap metal. In the process, they ruptured the container and released the cesium,

B-12 A Compendium of Best practices and Lessons Learned contaminating themselves, family members, and the environment. During the process, other people became fascinated by the radioactive powder that glowed blue and rubbed it on their skin. A couple of weeks later, the junkyard owner’s wife took a bag of the powder to the local hospital by bus after her family had become sick. This then contaminated more people and locations. At the hospital, a physician recognized the symptoms of acute radiation syndrome and alerted the Comissão Nacional de Energia Nuclear (National Nuclear Energy Commission [CNEN]). After realizing the severity of the incident, CNEN requested help from the Interna- tional Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). References: Articles and Reports Army Health Center for Promotion and Preventive Medicine. Medical NBC Battlebook. USACHPPM Tech Guide 244. Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD. 2000. https://www.llis.dhs.gov/member/secure/detail.cfm?content_id=13055 Department of Energy. Radiological Control Manual. DOE/EH-0256T. Washington, D.C. Apr 1994 https://www.llis.dhs.gov/member/secure/detail.cfm?content_id=13060 Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration. Municipal Radiological/ Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Plan. Washington, D.C. 2003. Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Center for Environmental Health, Division of Environmental Hazards and Health Effects, Radiation Studies Branch. Roundtable on Population Monitoring Following a Nuclear/Radio- logical Incident. Atlanta, GA. Jan 2005. https://www.llis.dhs.gov/member/secure/detail.cfm? content_id=23282 Department of Health and Human Services, Food and Drug Administration, Center for Devices and Radiological Health. Accidental Radioactive Contamination of Human Food and Animal Feeds: Recommendations for State and Local Agencies. Rockville, MD. 13 Aug 1998. https://www.llis.dhs.gov/member/secure/detail.cfm?content_id=23275 Department of Homeland Security. National Response Plan. Washington, D.C. Dec 2004. https:// www.llis.dhs.gov/member/secure/detail.cfm?content_id=11904 Department of Homeland Security, Preparedness Directorate. “Protective Action Guides for Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) and Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) Incidents, Draft Guidance.” Federal Register. Vol. 71, no.1, 3 Jan 2006. https://www.llis.dhs.gov/member/secure/detail.cfm?content_id=15909 Department of Homeland Security, Working Group on Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) Preparedness: Medical Preparedness and Response Sub-Group. Report. Washington, D.C. May 2003. https://www.llis.dhs.gov/member/secure/detail.cfm?content_id=6603 Elcock, Deborah, Gladys A. Klemic, and A.L. Taboas. “Establishing Remediation Levels in Response to a Radiological Dispersal Event (or ‘Dirty Bomb’).” Environmental Science and Technology. Vol. 38, no. 9, 2004, pp 2505-2512. Environmental Protection Agency. Decontamination, Cleanup, and Associated Issues for Sites Contaminated with Chemical, Biological, or Radiological Materials. Washington, D.C. Oct 2005. https://www.llis.dhs.gov/member/secure/detail.cfm?content_id=23274 Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Air and Radiation, Office of Radiation and Indoor Air, Radiation Protection Division, Center for Remediation Technology and Tools, and Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response. Technology Screening Guide for Radio-

Reference documents B-13 actively Contaminated Sites. EPA 402-R-96-017. Washington, D.C. Nov 1996. https://www. llis.dhs.gov/member/ secure/detail.cfm?content_id=12877 Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Radiation Programs. Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents. Washington, D.C. May 1992. https://www. llis.dhs.gov/member/secure/detail.cfm?content_id=12494 Eraker, Elizabeth. “Cleanup after a Radiological Attack: US Prepares Guidance.” The Non- Proliferation Review. Vol. XI, no. 3, Nov 2004, pp 167-185. https://www.llis.dhs.gov/member/secure/detail.cfm?content_id=23283 Federation of American Scientists. “Dirty Bombs: Response to a Threat.” Public Interest Report. Vol. 55, no. 2, Apr 2002. https://www.llis.dhs.gov/member/secure/detail.cfm?content_ id=23285 Headquarters, Department of the Army. Health Service Support in a Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Environment: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures. Field Manual 4-02.7 (8-10-7). Wash- ington, D.C. Oct 2002. https://www.llis.dhs.gov/member/secure/detail.cfm?content_id=13671 Headquarters, Department of the Army and Commandant, US Marine Corps. NBC Decon- tamination Operations. Field Manual No. 3-5. Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-37.3. Falls Church, VA. 2002. https://www.llis.dhs.gov/member/secure/detail.cfm?content_id=13670 Headquarters, Departments of Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, and Commandant, Marine Corps. Treatment of Nuclear and Radiological Casualties. Falls Church, VA. 20 Dec 2001. https://www.llis.dhs.gov/member/secure/detail.cfm?content_id=12359 Health Physics Society. Background on Guidance for Protective Actions Following a Radiological Terrorist Event. McLean, VA. Jan 2004. https://www.llis.dhs.gov/member/secure/detail.cfm?content_id=13059 Lawson, J. Randall, and Theodore L. Jarboe. Aid for Decontamination of Fire and Rescue Ser- vice Protective Clothing and Equipment after Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Exposures. NIST Special Publication 981. Rockville, MD. National Institute of Standards and Technol- ogy. May 2002. https://www.llis.dhs.gov/member/secure/detail.cfm?content_id=168 Lessons Learned Information Sharing. Radiological Dispersal Device Incident Response Planning: Public Information. 4 May 2007. https://www.llis.dhs.gov/member/secure/detail.cfm?content_id=24057 Lessons Learned Information Sharing. Radiological Incident Response: Decontamination of Buildings and Public Sites. 24 Mar 2006. https://www.llis.dhs.gov/member/secure/detail.cfm?content_id=15754 Lessons Learned Information Sharing. Radiological Incident Response: Establishing a Temporary Storage Site for Contaminated Material. 27 Mar 2006. https://www.llis.dhs.gov/member/secure/detail.cfm?content_id=15755 Lessons Learned Information Sharing. Public-Private Partnerships for Emergency Preparedness. 24 Feb 2006. https://www.llis.dhs.gov/member/secure/detail.cfm?content_id=15633 National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements. Management of Terrorist Events Involving Radiological Material. NCR Report No. 138. Bethesda, MD. National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements. 2001.

B-14 A Compendium of Best practices and Lessons Learned Steinhausler, Friedrich. “Chernobyl and Goiânia Lessons for Responding to Radiological Ter- rorism.” Health Physics. Vol. 89, no. 5, Nov 2005, pp 566-575. United Nations Development Programme and United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF). The Human Consequences of the Chernobyl Nuclear Accident: A Strategy for Recovery. Kiev. 25 Jan 2002. https://www.llis.dhs.gov/member/secure/detail.cfm?content_id=13607 Citation: International Atomic Energy Agency. The Radiological Accident in Goiânia. 16 Sep 1988. https://www.llis.gov/member/secure/detail.cfm?content_id=12310 Links: Department of Energy. RESRAD. http://web.ead.anl.gov/resrad/home2/ Document Significance: This document addresses planning concerns in relation to a radio- logical dispersion device or improvised nuclear device. Although not transportation related, the information is valid at a potentially reduced level to transportation incidents that may require decontamination operations. This document presents planning concepts that will assist in the implementation of decontamination operations. 5. Document Reference Source: Contra Costa County Hazardous Materials Area Plan, County of Contra Costa, CA, William Walker, MD Health Services Director, Randall L. Sawyer, Haz- ardous Materials Division Director, and Michael P. Wedl, Hazardous Materials Specialist, December 2005 (www.llis.gov) Recovery Component(s): Recovery Planning; Shelter-in-Place; and Evacuation Document Type: Plan Document Summary: Many areas throughout the country have requirements for the devel- opment of hazardous materials plans. In some cases, these plans become an annex to the jurisdiction’s emergency plan, while in others, they are stand-alone documents. The need to plan for a hazardous materials incident response and recovery is essential to timely and effective operations. This plan contains good information relating to shelter in place, evacua- tion, clean-up, and financing. Under federal law, the responsible party is required to fund the clean-up operations of a hazardous materials incident. However, this level of funding is often insufficient to meet the community’s needs. In this plan, Contra Costa County has developed county funding that will assist in covering the costs of clean-up. Document Significance: The excerpts from the Contra Costa County Hazardous Materials Plan are directly related to the work under this project. The plan addresses three of the planning areas that are of interest to this project. The information included provides an example for other communities on how to incorporate the information into their hazardous materials plans. 6. Document Reference Source: Annex Q – Hazardous Materials & Oil Spill Response, City of Houston, October 2006 (www.llis.gov) Recovery Component(s): Recovery Planning Document Type: Plan Document Summary: This element of planning looks at the protection of citizens and could provide the basis of an education campaign aimed at helping the public be more prepared for hazardous materials incidents. The City of Houston, Texas, has developed a sound approach to addressing the critical issues important to protecting citizens, including guidance on when to initiate shelter-in-place or evacuation procedures. This plan also provides some basic information to protect drinking water and to address issues related to waste water.

Reference documents B-15 Document Significance: These are all important planning issues for many hazardous materi- als incidents. 7. Document Reference Source: Unified San Diego County Emergency Services Organization Operational Area Emergency Plan – Annex Q – Evacuation, San Diego County, CA, URS Corporation, April 2007 (www.llis.gov) Recovery Component(s): Recovery Planning; Evacuation Document Type: Plan Document Summary: This evacuation annex to the San Diego County, California, emer- gency plan is representative of good planning practice and provides a significant amount of detail that can be used as sound guidance to those who must implement the plan. What should be pointed out is the discussion on the legal authorities for evacuation and how emer- gency personnel should address the situation. This annex covers evacuation procedures that are independent of the cause for the evacuation. Document Significance: This document reflects good planning practices in relation to evacuations. The plan is not specific as to what incident might initiate an evacuation. Since evacuation is a potential requirement in a hazardous materials transportation incident, this document is a relevant tool for this type of planning. 8. Document Reference Source: San Diego County Emergency Services Organization and County of San Diego – Recovery Plan, County of San Diego, CA, URS Corporation, April 2007 (www. llis.gov) Recovery Component(s): Recovery Planning Document Type: Plan Document Summary: This plan created for San Diego County, California, provides good information on recovery. The discussion of short-term and long-term recovery provides a clear distinction between the objectives of each phase. Debris operations are a key element of the infrastructure component of recovery. The information contained in this plan is good back- ground information for a recovery plan. Many of the organizations noted are San Diego spe- cific; however, there may be similar types of organizations within a specific jurisdiction that can provide similar information. Document Significance: Although not hazardous materials transportation incident specific, the information presented provides sound guidance for other jurisdictions creating recov- ery plans. Of particular interest is the discussion of short- and long-term recovery and debris operations. 9. Document Reference Source: Countywide Post Disaster Redevelopment Plan – Palm Beach County, Florida, Palm Beach County Division of Emergency Management, August 2006. (http://www.co.palm-beach.fl.us/publicsafety/emergencymanagement/programs/planning/ postdisredev.htm Recovery Component(s): Planning Document Type: Plan Document Summary: Regulations in the State of Florida require that all coastal jurisdictions include the intent to prepare a Post Disaster Redevelopment Plan (PDRP) “which will reduce or eliminate exposure of human life and public and private property to natural hazards.” The Palm Beach PDRP was developed in accordance with state law and the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000. This document details redevelopment goals and issues within the context of four categories: (1) local government recovery issues; (2) economic and private-sector issues; (3) social and

B-16 A Compendium of Best practices and Lessons Learned environmental issues; and (4) redevelopment and mitigation issues. Within each category, countywide actions are discussed, and ultimately a public workshop was held to prioritize these actions. The prioritization listed the 10 most important post-disaster recovery areas as follows: 1. Availability of temporary housing/long-term sheltering; 2. Rapid restoration of power and other private utilities; 3. Adequate health and mental health services available during recovery; 4. Including affordable housing in redevelopment projects; 5. Debris management and disposal; 6. Critical infrastructure and facility repair; 7. Sustaining essential government services; 8. Ability to rebuild with stronger structures; 9. Water pollution from sewer system failures; 10. Shortage of contractors/supplies slows repairing of homes and businesses. Each of these recovery areas is discussed in greater detail, followed by guidance for local offi- cials on implementing and maintaining short- and long-term recovery plans and redevelop- ment actions. A detailed matrix organized by the 10 specified topics provides action periods and approximate timeframes, actions, jurisdiction(s) involved, disaster level (as applicable), and funding considerations. Document Significance: Although the Florida requirement for coastal communities to develop PDRPs is related to the annual threat of hurricanes, the valuable recovery planning lessons can be applied to hazardous materials transportation incidents. The detailed matrix is particularly useful to this research, as it supplies actionable recovery information to local officials. B1.6 Academic/Institutional Research 1. Document Reference Source: OSHA Best Practices for Hospital-Based First Receivers of Vic- tims from Mass Casualty Incidents Involving the Release of Hazardous Substances, United States Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration, January 2005 (http://63.234.227.130/dts/osta/bestpractices/html/hospital_firstreceivers.html#appa31) Recovery Component(s): Mass Care, Decontamination Document Type: Guidance Document Document Summary: This document, prepared by OSHA, outlines best practices for hospi- tals in dealing with patients exposed to hazardous materials. Document Significance: This document provides best practices relating to decontami- nation operations within a hospital. Decisions will be made at the incident site or by the emergency operations center as to where the best location is for potential decontamination operations. These best practices relate to operations within a hospital without regard to the causative event that resulted in contaminated victims. 2. Document Reference Source: Strategic National Stockpile Distribution Planning: Information Requirements of Patients at Dispensing Sites, Lessons Learned Information Sharing (www. llis.gov) Recovery Component(s): Mass Care; Prophylaxis Document Type: Best Practice Document Summary: Efficient dispensing operations require providing the public with clear information to keep the process moving in an orderly fashion. This best practice

Reference documents B-17 looks at information requirements, mechanisms, languages, and special needs, as well as follow-up information. References: American Society of Health-System Pharmacists. Local Emergency Preparedness and Response: On the Road to Best Practices. Midyear Clinical Meeting 2002. Georgia World Con- gress Center, Atlanta, Georgia. 10 Dec 2002. http://www.ashp.org/emergency/educsessions2002mcm.cfm?cfid=24049094&CFTo ken=58780389 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Receiving, Distributing, and Dispensing Strategic National Stockpile Assets: A Guide for Preparedness, Version 10 (Draft), June 2005. (LLIS.gov ID #14197) Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Strategic National Stockpile Preparedness Course. 12-16 Jan 2004. Jefferson County Department of Health and Environment. Incident Communication Plan. [Confidential] 4 May 2004. Missouri Department of Health and Senior Services. Missouri’s Plan for Receiving, Distributing, and Dispensing the Strategic National Stockpile. Version 2 – Draft, Oct 2003. (LLIS.gov ID #8046) San Juan Basin Health Department. Crisis and Risk Communications Plan. 25 May 2004. Patricia Coomber, PhD, and Robert Armstrong, PhD. Coping with an Attack. A Quick Guide to Dealing with Biological, Chemical, and “Dirty Bomb” Attacks. Center for Technology and National Security Policy. National Defense University. (LLIS.gov ID #14188) Document Significance: The strategic national stockpile will be used during any kind of incident wherein mass prophylaxis is required. Following a hazardous materials transpor- tation incident, the potential exists for mass prophylaxis operations to be implemented. The development of information before the incident will simplify the dissemination of the information during the event. Most of the information included in this best practice can be developed before the event and will assist in the actual operations during the event. 3. Document Reference Source: “Economic Recovery from the 9/11 Disaster: Lessons From New York State’s Response in Lower Manhattan,” Karl Seidman, Massachusetts Institute of Technol- ogy and Beth Siegel, Mt. Auburn Associates, Applied Research in Economic Development, vol. 5, issue 2, October 2008 (www.usm.edu/aredjourna) Recovery Component(s): Recovery; Economic Document Type: Case Study Document Summary: This study outlines the activities of the New York State Empire State Development Corporation (ESD) and the city’s Economic Development Corporation (EDC) following the terrorist attack of 9/11 on the World Trade Center. Estimates of the economic loss using different methodologies and time periods range between $33 billion and $98 billion. The challenges involved included such actions as assisting businesses to relocate to vacant space elsewhere in the city and assisting in the restoration of utilities. The complete text version of this article is available online at www.usm.edu/aredjournal. Document Significance: Though many small communities are not able to finance programs on the scale of New York City, the applicable information is that government and finan- cial institutions can work together to develop inventive programs that can be implemented quickly to assist the local business community. For transportation incidents involving

B-18 A Compendium of Best practices and Lessons Learned hazardous materials, the scope of the potential programs most likely would be reduced, but the concept behind these programs can be applied as appropriate. 4. Document Reference Source: “Defining Disaster: Local Constructions for Recovery in the Aftermath of Chemical Contamination.” Social Problems (39)4:345-365 Aronoff and Gunter (1992). http://www.jstor.org/pss/3097015 (abstract only). Recovery Component(s): Recovery; Mass Care Document Type: Study Document Summary: This study examines local efforts in St. Louis, Michigan, and the sur- rounding area of Gratiot County in the aftermath of toxic chemical contamination result- ing from accidental addition of polybrominated biphenyl to cattle feed that subsequently impacted human populations through contaminated meats. Collaboration among residents and local authorities marked the 6-year span of local recovery efforts. Document Significance: The importance of local efforts in collaborating following this type of chemical accident provides useful insights regarding local recovery from hazardous materials incidents in that human health impacts are intermingled with social issues, public perception, and local government effectiveness. Lessons learned may be applicable for com- parable communities; however, it is notable that actions geared toward public involvement in the 1970s tend to be different due to technological advancements. 5. Document Reference Source: “Modeling dispersion from toxic gas released after a train collision in Graniteville, SC.” Buckley, Hunter, Addis, and Parker (2007). Journal of the Air & Waste Management Association. (57):268-278. http://www.environmental-expert.com/Files%5C6477%5Carticles%5C11898%5Cbuckley.pdf Recovery Component(s): Recovery Document Type: Case Study Document Summary: Written 2 years after the Graniteville, South Carolina, train accident and toxic chlorine release, this document provides a technical review of meterological con- ditions during immediate response and initial recovery highlighting the roles of federal, state, and local entities including the Savannah River Site (SRS) Emergency Operations Cen- ter, Department of Energy HQ, South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control, and the Savannah River National Laboratory. Document Significance: This document provides valuable information and validation regarding the need for technical expertise along with in-place mutual aid agreements in response and early recovery. In the case of Aiken County, mutual aid agreements with the Atmospheric Technology Group (ATG) of the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) facilitated informed decisionmaking over the 2-day response period via hazard consequence modeling and meteorological assessments. These assessments changed the course of initial plans to remove damaged tankers by modeling potential impacts to surrounding areas due to downwind consequences and, as a result, teams redirected efforts toward siphoning remaining chlorine onto intact tankers. 6. Document Reference Source: Transportation Performance, Disaster Vulnerability, and Long- Term Effects of Earthquakes. Chang (2000). Second Euroconference on Global Change and Catastrophic Risk Management, Luxembourg, Austria, July 6-7, 2000. www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/RMS/july2000/Papers/chang3006.doc

Reference documents B-19 Recovery Component(s): Recovery; Infrastructure Document Type: Case Study Document Summary: This presentation discusses long-term impacts of catastrophic disasters, in particular, as it relates to transportation loss. Notably, the author highlights (1) business loss at the Port of Kobe and (2) differences in economic recovery based on transportation accessi- bility in the aftermath of the 1995 Hyogoken Nambu earthquake in Kobe, Japan. Furthermore, the comparison is made between the lengthy restoration period required for transportation infrastructure as opposed to other critical infrastructure (e.g., power). For example, the author observes bridge repair on a major transportation corridor following the 1994 Northridge earth- quake in California lasted nearly 1 year while power was restored in days. Also, the authors high- light the long-term economic impact potential following disasters at ports noting that marine traffic shifts may have serious economic consequences to the vitality of ports. Document Significance: Post-disaster transportation corridor loss and restoration times impact long-term economic recovery. While this document provides earthquakes as case studies, analogous damages could result from massive explosions in a hazardous materials catastrophe at a port or major transportation route causing significant infrastructure dam- age. As such, the importance of economic recovery at ports and economic impacts of inaccessible transportation routes should be recognized among stakeholders involved in improving local community recovery. 7. Document Reference Source: Winners and Losers: Predicting Business Disaster Recovery Out- comes Following the Northridge Earthquake. Dahlhmaer and Tierney (1996). University of Del- aware Disaster Research Center (Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association, Toronto, Ontario, Canada, August 9-13, 1997). http://dspace.udel.edu:8080/dspace/bitstream/handle/19716/651/PP243.pdf?sequence=1 Recovery Component(s): Recovery; Long-Term Recovery Document Type: Case Study Document Summary: This paper presents discussion on the post disaster recovery of local private-sector firms vis-à-vis long-term community recovery. The authors posit that recov- ery research overlooks “micro-level” recovery impacts and processes while highlighting find- ings from examining recovery among local private firms following the 1994 Northridge earthquake. Findings indicate that while pre-disaster financial condition is the key factor in post-disaster successful recovery, there are a variety of mitigating factors that led to unsuccess- ful recovery including business size, financial condition, disruption of services, and receipt of disaster assistance. Document Significance: • Gap: More studies on micro-level recovery necessary. This research suggests that more focus is needed on micro-level long-term economic recovery and observes that much of current literature is overly broad and too optimistic with regard to local-level, long-term community recovery. • Gap: Long-term disaster impacts on lower income groups more severe. This conclu- sion is particularly relevant to hazardous materials transportation due to the nature of proximity of lower income residences to major transportation corridors. While dispro- portionate losses may be experienced by lower income groups, it is also noted that certain individuals and businesses, in fact, benefit financially from disasters. This observation is also true for hazardous materials incident recovery, in that individuals and businesses with unique technical and/or restoration expertise (e.g., chemical experts, environmental firms, and construction contractors) may experience an influx of work.

B-20 A Compendium of Best practices and Lessons Learned • Lesson Learned: Businesses that acquire state or federal post-disaster assistance report greater challenges with recovery. This recovery lesson is valuable within the context of hazardous materials transportation incident recovery. The three reasons that the authors attribute are not disaster specific and are notable to consider. These are (1) businesses that seek disaster aid following a disaster experienced serious impacts in order to seek aid in the first place; (2) few businesses have disaster insurance and those that seek government or bank loans to cover losses suffer from financial debts; and (3) assistance is insufficient and/ or cannot compensate for lost customers and loss of surrounding business environment. 8. Document Reference Source: “Train Wreck and Chlorine Spill in Graniteville, South Caro- lina: Transportation Effects and Lessons in Small Town Capacity for No-Notice Evacuation.” Dunning and Oswalt (2007). Transportation Research Record 2009, pp 130-135. http://www. dot.gov/disaster_recovery/resources/TrainWreckChlorineSpillGranitevilleSC.pdf Recovery Component(s): Recovery; Mass Care; Evacuation Document Type: Case Study Document Summary: Using the 2005 Graniteville railroad chlorine spill as a case study, the authors highlight the need for increased evacuation preparedness and transportation recov- ery communication and collaboration as challenges to successful response and recovery. Furthermore, public information and technical expertise are also addressed as issues faced by communities in the aftermath of a hazardous materials incident. Document Significance: As acknowledged by the authors, although the death toll (nine people) of the Graniteville accident was low, the 2005 accident provides a critical case study regarding hazardous materials incident response and recovery efforts, issues, and gaps. Fur- thermore, the observation that the accident “permanently changed a community” highlights a critical psychosocial aspect of hazardous materials (and other types of) incidents: • Disagreement, lack of information and lack of clear decision-making authority impacts short- and long-term recovery. In the case of Graniteville, lack of information led to disagreement related to evacuation that resulted in inaction and may have caused increased exposure. According to the authors, the need for accurate and timely technical information during response, stabilization, and recovery “cannot be overstated.” • Responsible parties face financial challenges and stigmatization. The financial burden for responsible parties is significant. According to the authors, the total cost to Norfolk Southern was in excess of $30 million. Furthermore, the incident not only impacts the responsible party but also increased public fears regarding the potential threat that haz- ardous materials rail cargoes pose to communities. • Challenges exist between rail safety and profitability. This document highlights NTSB conclusions that suggest (1) increased usage of electronic signals to indicate misaligned switches; (2) placement of hazardous materials in rear quarter of trains; (3) speed reduc- tion for hazardous materials cargoes; and (4) reduction of train length for hazardous materials transport. However, the rail freight industry is highly competitive and these recommendations have economic impacts that are unfavorable to industry. The federal government, namely the FRA and FRA standards, seek to balance safety and economic considerations for industry; however, in the case of Graniteville, in compliance with fed- eral standards, existing safeguards proved to be insufficient. • Documenting infrastructure recovery may facilitate recovery processes. Extensive recordkeeping and documentation, lacking in the case of Graniteville, are suggested as ways of increasing successful claims, facilitating grant processes, and aiding long-term recovery planning. • Reentry logistics can hinder recovery. Returning to work in the initial recovery period was deterred by reentry logistics in the case of Graniteville.

Reference documents B-21 9. Document Reference Source: “From 9/11 to 8/29: Post Disaster Recovery and Rebuilding in New York and New Orleans.” Gotham and Greenberg (2008). Social Forces (87) 2: 1039-1062. http://www.tulane.edu/~kgotham/Papers/Gotham&GreenbergSocialForces2008.pdf Recovery Component(s): Recovery; Economic Document Type: Case Study Document Summary: Focusing on recovery and reconstruction processes in New York and New Orleans since 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina, this article presents analysis of various prob- lems associated with financing and implementing recovery, reconstruction, and reinvest- ment following disasters. While the experiences in New York and New Orleans have served as case studies in numerous recovery studies, the authors suggest that more effort is needed to examine negative impacts of “market-centered” and “neo-liberal” approaches employed by city and state officials and fostered by large private-sector firms. According to the perspec- tive and research presented, market-centered approaches intended to aid recovery, in fact, increase a wide range of problems in communities. Document Significance: • After disasters, the public is less likely to scrutinize or challenge government actions. This conclusion presented by the authors is significant in that public involvement and support following hazardous materials incidents supports local recovery and enforces collaborative action. The purported tendency of the public to be less likely to question post-disaster decision- making can lead to decisions that may not be in the best interest of local individuals. • Social and economic inequalities may be exacerbated by market-centered recovery programs. Authors highlight the Lower Manhattan Development Corporation (LMDC) as well as the Louisiana Recovery Administration (modeled after the LMDC) as examples of a big-business focus that neglected low and moderate income groups as well as small business. Concerns that tax incentives, subsidies, and waivers on grant-making processes favor large firms and high-income residents, presents a recovery challenge that may result following various types of disasters. Ultimately, various studies highlight that disasters may produce “winners” and “losers” (Dylan and Tierney, 1997). 10. Document Reference Source: Disaster Recovery as a Social Process (Nigg 1995). Univer- sity of Delaware Disaster Research Center. http://dspace.udel.edu:8080/dspace/bitstream/ handle/19716/625/PP219.pdf?sequence=1 Recovery Component(s): Recovery; Social Document Type: Case Study Document Summary: This document reviews various research endeavors and case studies in terms of assessing impacts to the social fiber of a community and emphasizes the “social pro- cesses” that are a fundamental aspect of disaster recovery and encompassing various phases of emergency management decisionmaking. While recognizing the importance of restoring the built environment and planning for infrastructure recovery (both short-term methods and long-term recovery planning), the author suggests that the focus on infrastructure and the environment overlooks the sociological significance of post-disaster community recovery. Document Significance: Perspectives based on research and disaster recovery that relate to sociological issues and challenges can be used to leverage community social services as well as the myriad NGOs that provide support in the short- and long-term recovery timeframe. It is important for community stakeholders to recognize that communities consist of a broad range of demographics and, as such, different social groups experience recovery differently. Significantly, the author touches upon the challenges of family recovery following events

B-22 A Compendium of Best practices and Lessons Learned that may have led to the death and injury of family members, damage to a family’s homes, businesses, and/or livelihood, and the abilities and challenges families face. Community stakeholders may recognize reliance on family members and/or extended family members for shelter, food, financial support, and emotional support; however, tracking this type of “family” support and/or planning that leverages this type of support may be overlooked. 11. Document Reference Source: A Review of the Literature and Programs on Local Recov- ery from Disaster (Petterson 1999). Public Entity Risk Institute, Fairfax, VA. http://www. wildfirelessons.net/documents/LitReviewLocalRecovery.pdf Recovery Component(s): Recovery Document Type: Literature Review Document Summary: This document provides a comprehensive literature review, address- ing each phase of emergency management in terms of its relation to the recovery process. Document Significance: This document (developed in 1998-1999) provides analysis of various findings in recovery literature and summarizes the programs that are available for providing post-disaster technical assistance. 12. Document Reference Source: “GRACE: Public Health Recovery Methods Following an En- vironmental Disaster” (Svendsen, Whittle, Sanders, McKeown, Sprayberry, Heim, Caldwell, Gibson, and Vena, 2010). Archives of Environmental and Occupational Health. (65) 2: 77-85. http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/20439226 (abstract only). Recovery Component(s): Recovery; Public Health Document Type: Case Study Document Summary: The abstract for this research discusses the authors’ approach to community-based participatory research with regard to extensive recovery work following the chlorine gas disaster in Graniteville. While the authors recognize the value of epidemio- logical studies in the aftermath of environmental disasters, they suggest that a balance must be achieved when integrating public health services, scientific research, and community engagement/empowerment. Document Significance: It is significant in pre-planning or post-disaster planning follow- ing hazardous materials transportation incidents to recognize the value in scientific and/ or epidemiological studies focused on public health. However, it is important to consider lessons learned from previous scientific studies of impacted individuals undertaken over the course of recovery. B1.7 Domestic and International Media Reports 1. Document Reference Source: “U.S. Military Purchases Gulf of Mexico Seafood, Boosting an Industry Battered by Oil Spill,” Mary Foster, the Washington Post, February 6, 2011 (http:// www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/06/AR2011020603941.html) Recovery Component(s): Economic Recovery & Public Information Document Type: Media Report Document Summary: This article looks at the consequences of the 2010 British Petroleum well explosion and accompanying oil spill. As a result of that spill, the fishing industry along the Gulf Coast was negatively impacted, resulting in both a significant loss of revenue and

Reference documents B-23 jobs. Military Solutions Inc., has begun buying up the catches and selling it to the Army for resale in their commissaries. As of the date of this article, 72 commissaries along the East Coast are participating in this effort. The Defense Commissary Agency (DeCa) sells groceries to military personnel, reservists, retirees, and their families at cost plus a 5 percent surcharge. The article further notes that DeCa is not receiving any special federal funds to participate in this program, but has re-designed their purchasing procedures to take advantage of this opportunity. Document Significance: This best practice provides an example of the type of creative solutions that are often essential to economic recovery following a disaster. 2. Document Reference Source: “Census Data Shows Less Populace New Orleans,” David Mildenberg, the Washington Post, February 5, 2011 Recovery Component(s): Background Document Type: Media Report Document Summary: This article discusses the population of Louisiana (specifically New Orleans) and Mississippi in the years following Hurricane Katrina. The net result will be a loss of some Congressional representation for Louisiana and a gain for Mississippi. When look- ing at Mississippi, the author states “Mississippi has rebounded more quickly. Its population grew over the decade by 4.3 percent to 2.97 million in 2010, the census data said. Louisiana gained 1.4 percent to 4.53 million. Mississippi’s per capita income grew 1.7 percent between 2006 and 2008 compared with 0.3 percent in Louisiana, according to the Census Bureau. Since 2003, PACCAR, Nissan Motor, and GE Aviation have expanded production and jobs in Mississippi.” Document Significance: This document reinforces that communities need to be prepared for a reduction in population, to some extent, along with the attendant ramifications, following disastrous incidents. 3. Document Reference Source: FEMA: Hurricane Katrina Mississippi Recovery Update, Release Number: 1604-714, Release Date: May 7, 2009. http://www.fema.gov/news/newsrelease.fema?id=48257 Recovery Component(s): Temporary Housing Document Type: Media Report Document Summary: This article provides summaries of the monies FEMA obligated in Mississippi between August 29, 2005, and May 1, 2009. These funds reflect the federal assistance under the Stafford Act’s Public Assistance, Individual Assistance, and Hazard Mitigation Grant Programs. The article notes that FEMA’s temporary housing program in Mississippi for Hurricane Katrina ended on May 1, 2009. During its nearly 4 years of operation, FEMA’s program provided temporary housing to more than 41,000 families. Now that the program has ended, the article notes that nearly 2,800 families are moving to Mississippi Cottages as part of the Mississippi Alternative Housing Program, which is administered by the Mississippi Emergency Management Agency (MEMA). This program is funded by a $281 million grant from FEMA. Document Significance: The need for long-term housing is a potential for any type of disaster or incident. In this case, the situation relates to a catastrophic hurricane event, and the numbers involved would need to be significantly reduced for a hazardous materi- als transportation incident. However, it certainly qualifies as a best practice to follow in providing long-term temporary housing, no matter the causative incident that leads to the need for housing.

B-24 A Compendium of Best practices and Lessons Learned B1.8 International Recovery Documentation 1. Document Reference Source: The Radiological Accident in Goiania, International Atomic Agency, Vienna, 1988 www.llis.gov Recovery Component(s): Infrastructure Document Type: Incident Report Document Summary: Near the end of 1985, the Institute Goiano de Radioterapia in Goiania, Brazil moved to new premises, leaving behind a caesium-137 teletherapy unit without notify- ing the licensing authority. Following the move, the original facility was partially demolished, leaving the caesium-137 teletherapy unit unsecured. Two people entered the premises and, not knowing what the unit was, removed the source assembly from the machine thinking it had scrap value. They tried to dismantle it and ruptured the capsule – contaminating the sur- rounding environment and two individuals. The remnants of the source assembly were sold for scrap to a junkyard owner who noticed that the source material glowed blue in the dark. Over a period of days, friends and relatives came and saw the phenomenon. Fragments of the source the size of rice grains were distributed to several families over a period of 5 days, with a number of people showing gastrointestinal symptoms from their exposure. One of the people irradiated connected the illnesses with the source capsule and took the rem- nants to the public health department in the city. Thus began a chain of events that led to the discovery of the accident. A local physicist was the first to assess the scale of the accident and took actions on his own initiative to evacuate two areas. When the authorities were informed, the speed and scale of their response were impressive. Several other sites of significant contamination were quickly identified and residents evacuated. Areas of concern included the yards where the source assembly was ruptured, the residences of the people most affected, and an area of about 1 km2 in the Aeroporto, Central, and Ferrovianos districts of Goiania. It took approximately 11 weeks of intensive work to survey and decontaminate the highly affected sites in this area, and a further 3 months to deal with residual low levels of contamination. Document Significance: Although not a transportation incident, medical equipment is transported by truck and other means of transportation. An accident could result in the release of radioactive source materials that could produce significant contamination. This incident report is used to extrapolate significant recovery components that will apply to a transportation incident resulting in contamination to the environment and people. 2. Document Reference Source: The Decontamination of People Exposed to Chemical, Bio- logical, Radiological or Nuclear (CBRN) Substances or Material - Strategic National Guidance 2nd Edition, Minister of State for Counter-Terrorism & Resilience, Home Office, United Kingdom, Hazel Blears, May, 2004 www.llis.gov Recovery Component(s): Mass Care; Decontamination Document Type: Guidance Document Document Summary: This is a planning guidance document from the United Kingdom relating to decontamination operations involving people exposed to chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) materials. The purpose of the document is to “ . . . provide strategic guidance on the decontamination of people upon which all responding agencies can base plans and Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) for on-site management of CBRN incidents.” Additionally, the decontamination information included is based on lessons learned from previous incidents and exercises, as well as ongoing research projects.

Reference documents B-25 Document Significance: The process of decontaminating people in the wake of a terrorist attack or hazardous materials incident follows the same basic concepts. This document provides a concise view of the basic decontamination procedures that can be implemented at a reception and decontamination center in the area of the incident. 3. Document Reference Source: The Mississauga Evacuation Final Report to the Ministry of Solicitor General, the Institute for Environmental Studies, University of Toronto, June 1981 www.llis.gov Recovery Component(s): Recovery Planning; Mass Care Document Type: Incident Report and Study Document Summary: On November 10, 1979, shortly before midnight, a Canadian Pacific Rail- ways (CPR) freight train derailed outside the community of Mississauga. The train consisted of 3 locomotives, 106 freight cars, and 1 caboose. During the derailment, 24 cars left the track, consisting of 22 tank cars and 2 boxcars. Of the 22 tank cars, 11 carried propane, 1 chlorine, 3 tolulene, 3 styrene, and 4 caustic soda. Several of the propane cars were punctured and ignited; the cars carrying styrene and tolulene were also punctured and spilled their contents; the vapors from the styrene and tolulene ignited and a massive explosion of one of the cars resulted. During the following minutes there were two more explosions, the last one was a full propane car which was hurled approximately 2,214 feet. Three more propane cars ruptured, adding fuel to the blaze. Of the 11 propane cars, 3 exploded, 6 were either punctured or ruptured, and 1 released a small portion of its contents from a valve during pressure buildup. The three cars carrying styrene were crushed by the propane explosions. The four cars carrying caustic soda were damaged and spilled their contents. Sometime during this process, the car carrying chlorine ruptured, releasing a chlorine vapor cloud. Close to 2 hours following the derailment the local police, under the direction of the Control Group, ordered an evacuation of Mississauga because of the concentrations of chlorine that were blowing toward the city from the accident. The evacuation was conducted in 15 stages between 01:47 hours and 22:55 hours on November 11, and targeted those areas most at risk. In less than 24 hours, 216,935 individuals were evacuated. This included three hospitals and six extended care facilities. Approximately 40,000 evacuees reported to 19 evacuation centers. The remaining population made their own arrangements for short-term sheltering with fam- ily, friends, or at hotels. Approximately 95 percent of the evacuees remained within a 100 KM radius of the City of Mississauga. Two and a half days after the derailment, local officials addressed the issue of pets left behind during the initial evacuation. Police officers and Humane Society Officers donned protective breathing apparatus and entered 1,861 homes to rescue 2,500 animals. Document Significance: This document was based on a hazardous materials transportation incident resulting in a fire generated by propane, tolulene, and styrene, plus the release of chlorine. As such this document is directly related to this project. 4. Document Reference Source: USAID/India Strategic Objective Close-Out Report, USAID, point of contact Ms. Nina Minka (nminka@usaid.gov) Recovery Component(s): Recovery Planning Document Type: Incident Report Document Summary: On January 26, 2001, the Gujarat region of India was hit with a 7.6 mag- nitude earthquake that impacted 7,633 villages and towns in 21 districts. The human toll of the earthquake was almost 20,000 killed and 600,000 left homeless. The USAID assistance operation

B-26 A Compendium of Best practices and Lessons Learned was known as the Gujarat Earthquake Recovery Initiative (GERI). USAID provided assistance through four organizations: (1) CARE; (2) Catholic Relief Services (CRS); (3) United Nations Development Program (UNDP); and (4) World Vision (WV). Document Significance: This document relates valuable lessons learned by USAID and its part- ner organizations from their assistance to Gujarat, India, following a devastating earthquake. The magnitude of this disaster surpasses what would be likely from a hazardous materials trans- portation incident, but the principles involved in the lessons learned provide sound guidance in the development of recovery plans for any kind of event. 5. Document Reference Source: TransAPELL Guidance for Dangerous Goods Transport Emergency Planning in a Local Community; United Nations Environment Programme; 2000 http://www.unep.fr/shared/publications/pdf/2679-TransApellEN.PDF Recovery Component(s): General Planning Document Type: Guidance Document Document Summary: TransAPELL Guidance for Dangerous Goods Transport Emergency Planning in a Local Community provides information based upon the United Nations Envi- ronmental Programme’s (UNEP) Awareness and Preparedness for Emergencies at Local Level (APELL) approach to planning and mitigating disaster response and recovery in the event of a hazardous materials transportation incident. Based upon TransAPELL pilot projects, this document outlines steps local communities can take to set up a planning workshop. The guidance described is applicable to all land transport of dangerous goods, as well as handling of goods in other modes, including ports and airports. Document Significance: The focus of this document is local planning specific to hazardous materials transportation incidents, particularly as it relates to response with application for recovery. This document is significant to this research due to specific recommendations that involve the cooperation of key response and recovery entities at the local level, along with step-by-step discussion of how to plan and execute a best-practices-based workshop specific to hazardous materials transportation incidents. B1.9 Background Documents 1. Document Reference Source: FAQ - HAZMAT Endorsement Threat Assessment Program, Transportation Security Agency http://www.tsa.gov/what_we_do/layers/hazmat/faq.shtm#nav Recovery Component(s): General Background Document Type: Guidance Document Document Summary: The Department of Homeland Security, Transportation Security Agency, is responsible for ensuring the security of hazardous materials transportation. As such, they have created a set of frequently asked questions related to the HazMat Endorsement Threat Assessment Program. Document Significance: This information is presented as background for the transportation of hazardous materials. This hazardous materials endorsement is required of all commercial drivers who transport hazardous materials. Though not directly related to recovery opera- tions, this is one federal program aimed at minimizing the potential for incidents involving hazardous materials.

Reference documents B-27 2. Document Reference Source: Traffic Incident Management in Hazardous Materials Spills in Incident Clearance. Federal Highway Administration. October 2008 http://www.ops.fhwa.dot.gov/publications/fhwahop08058/60.htm Recovery Component(s): General Background Document Type: Guidance Document Document Summary: FHWA’s 2008 technical report on traffic incident management (TIM) for HAZMAT spills is geared for transportation officials, DOT operations personnel, first responders, and secondary responder agencies, including the Environmental Protection Agency and the United States Coast Guard. The express purpose of this document is to report practices regarding the clean-up of incidental spills highlighting selected states’ best manage- ment practices in spill removal to improve incident clearance, reduce environmental impacts, and improve responder safety. The six highlighted states and focal areas are 1. Florida – Site clean-up recommendations for early responders as well as longer term clean-up implications. 2. Colorado – Practices related to reporting vis-à-vis surface and downstream water, sewer systems; practices for remediation personnel; remediation requirements, excavation, and off-site disposal; and closure reports following clean-up completion. 3. Texas – Practices delineating responsibilities of TxDOT personnel; details on Texas Water Code and interagency contracts (IAC) between TxDOT and the Texas Commis- sion on Environmental Quality (TCEQ); personnel requirements related to containment, clean-up, and hazardous materials neutralization; and practices for contracting clean- up, testing, and disposal. 4. Ohio – Practices for responders (transportation agencies, law enforcement, firefighters/ EMS, and towing); pre-incident planning; and incident review. 5. Virginia – Practices related to discharge and containment; clean-up and disposal; and equipment resupply necessary for economic recovery of response entities. 6. California – Practices delineating Caltrans workers’ responsibilities and principal response and recovery tasks (1-safe approach, 2-isolation and containment, 3-notifications, 4-identi- fication and hazard assessment, 5-clean-up and disposal); training guidelines and clean-up responsibilities (primarily specialty contractor through the spiller or through Caltrans). The report also maps applicable federal legislation to the hazardous materials transportation incident environment. Document Significance: As it pertains to planning, various best practices that are highlighted in this report are valuable not only for response, but also for recovery (in particular as it relates to longer term clean-up). Additionally, discussion about relevant legislation (includ- ing the National Contingency Plan and the Emergency Planning and Right-to-Know Act) is salient to this research. 3. Document Reference Source: Disaster Response and Recovery Resource for Transit Agencies. Federal Transit Administration, August 21, 2006 http://transit-safety.fta.dot.gov/publications/safety/DisasterResponse/HTML/Disaster Response.htm Recovery Component(s): General Background Document Type: Guidance Document Document Summary: The Federal Transit Administration’s 2006 report was developed based on lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina and other events and divides information into

B-28 A Compendium of Best practices and Lessons Learned four sections: (1) background; (2) FAQs; (3) the role of federal agencies in emergency pre- paredness, disaster response, and disaster recovery; and (4) local resources for emergency preparedness, disaster response, and disaster recovery. Among the specific topics addressed are • Suggested coordination between transit agencies and evacuation shelters, human service agen- cies, state emergency management office, and the FEMA regional office to (1) ensure that ongoing transportation needs are met and (2) take a leadership role in convening meetings among the aforementioned groups to address various community transportation needs. • Recommendations on planning and preparedness vis-à-vis communicating public transit needs and services. • Discussion on the applicability of the Stafford Act to transit recovery following a disaster including the availability of FEMA assistance to help replace or rebuild transit vehicles, equipment, and facilities. • Overview of FTA’s Connecting Communities emergency preparedness workshops • Best practices in (1) emergency management planning, (2) serving special needs persons, (3) communications, (4) staffing and training, and (5) facilities, equipment, and supplies. Document Significance: Although this document is geared toward transit and transit offi- cials, the best practices and planning guidelines specific to recovery are often valuable to local transit; however, these also provide insights that are useful for other areas of local disaster recovery planning and mitigation. 4. Document Reference Source: “Chapter 11: Community disaster recovery” (Lindell, Prater, Perry, and Nicholson 2006) in Fundamentals of Emergency Management. Federal Emergency Management Agency http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/edu/fem.asp Recovery Component(s): Recovery Document Type: Case Study Document Summary: This chapter from 2006 FEMA training materials provides highlights of community disaster recovery factors and challenges. Recovery is presented as distinct from the other phases of emergency management. The authors focus on addressing housing, economic, and psychological components of recovery. Additionally, this document also discusses business recovery and financial resources (e.g., state, federal, and insurance) available for local community recovery. Document Significance: Although not specific to hazardous materials incident recovery, the extensive information provided in this document provides a valuable framework of key issues and challenges that have occurred following a wide variety of disasters. Highlights that could be applied relative to improving local community recovery from hazardous materials inci- dents include but are not limited to • Recovery should involve rebuilding disaster-resilient communities versus “restoring the community to its previous status”; • Pre-disaster planning and pre-impact plans for recovery enable local input on mitigation and sustainable development that facilitates “holistic recovery”; • Children should not be overlooked in recovery planning, in terms of mental and physical health; • NGOs and community-based organizations must be leveraged to supplement social services to aid community recovery; • “Unmet Needs Committees” should be developed in advance of disaster to support recovery;

Reference documents B-29 • Historic preservation should be addressed prior to recovery in order to address potential demolition concerns; and • Donations management should be considered in recovery planning. 5. Document Reference Source: “Recovery after Disaster: Achieving Sustainable Development, Mitigation, and Equity” (Berke, Kartez, and Wenger 1993) Disasters (17)2:93. http://www.crid.or.cr/digitalizacion/pdf/eng/doc4333/doc4333-b.pdf Recovery Component(s): Recovery Document Type: Case Study Document Summary: This document discusses local recovery in terms of sustainability based upon community type (e.g., communities with ties to external resources and programs versus isolated communities with limited and/or no collaborative arrangements) through examina- tion of case study examples. Given the variety of communities across the United States, it is valuable to consider a range of budgetary, technological, and human resources available for short- and long-term recovery. Document Significance: • Collaboration among local and non-local NGOs supports recovery by interlinking individuals with local knowledge with organizations with more resources. Although the example provided of an autonomous community (Montserrat, West Indies) had fewer resources available than isolated communities in the United States, the collaborative pro- cess utilized among several local (with limited resources and significant local knowledge) and non-local (with greater resources and limited local knowledge) non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to support recovery and revitalization is a lesson learned from the aftermath of the Hurricane Hugo disaster that struck the island and is valuable to consider. • Local government and citizens should collaborate to effectively communicate with non- local and/or state and federal recovery officials. Similarly, the example of collaborative com- munity partnerships between the local government and citizens of Santa Cruz, California, following the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake offers insights into the ability of local organiza- tions, individuals, and officials to work together to support both ongoing recovery as well as integration with non-local/federal efforts to improve local recovery effectiveness and federal relief efforts. • Lack of local and non-local collaboration increases possibilities for local resistance to recovery efforts. The Saragosa, Texas, case study provides constructive insights with regard to potential recovery gaps in small towns with limited resources. The fact that Saragosa’s county seat, representing the official government, is 20 miles from the town and only one NGO, a church, could provide supplemental local recovery resources in the aftermath of a disastrous tornado in 1987, exacerbated the recovery process. Furthermore, limited involvement and/or outreach to locals was politically controversial and led to commu- nity resistance to recovery efforts with post-recovery surveys indicating that residents not only felt strong dissatisfaction with housing and rebuilt neighborhoods but also perceived themselves as “much worse off 2 years after the disaster.” 6. Document Reference Source: “Sheltering and Housing Recovery Following Disaster” (Peacock, Dash, and Zhang, NNNN) in Handbooks of Disaster Research, 258-274. http://books.google.com/books?id=_LjS_lS2hQEC&lpg=PA258&ots=oxALtXkIgx&dq=han dbook%20of%20disaster%20research%20peacock%20dash%20zhang%20housing%20reco very&pg=PA275#v=onepage&q&f=false

B-30 A Compendium of Best practices and Lessons Learned Recovery Component(s): Recovery; Housing Document Type: Case Study Document Summary: This research focuses on short- and long-term recovery challenges regarding housing in a post-disaster environment including issues related to displacement of renters/rental properties, low-income housing, inequities in accessing insurance and public recovery funding, and the reestablishment of permanent housing and the feeling of “home” among disaster victims. Document Significance: Among the salient recovery issues highlighted is the recurring chal- lenge in a post-disaster environment that vulnerable populations suffer greater inequities. Authors suggest a variety of potential research endeavors that could help define and address recovery challenges specific to housing. Stakeholders involved in hazardous materials trans- portation incident recovery planning can learn from various research endeavors that have cited such issues related to housing recovery.