A Compendium of Best Practices and Lessons Learned for Improving Local Community Recovery from Disastrous Hazardous Materials Transportation Incidents (2012)

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73 5.1 Overview Recovery from a disastrous hazardous materials transportation incident presents a number of challenges that need to be addressed in a timely fashion. The response to the incident, mitiga- tion of the causative spill, and cleanup—including decontamination of the environment and infrastructure (if required), falls under the authority of Unified Command, which consists of the FOSC and state/local officials. Recovery from the consequences of the incident includes the following: • Short- and long-term care for individuals, pets, and livestock; • Repair of physical damages; and • Revitalization of the community, as well as its economy. These activities fall under the authority of the local community with assistance from state and federal officials and programs. However, close coordination and communication between these groups is necessary to ensure the overall recovery progress is efficient and effective. The following findings from a recent GAO study on recovery assistance provided by FEMA apply to recovery operations in general. Although not all-inclusive, these points are proven con- siderations for long-term assistance planning. C H A P T E R 5 Best Practices for Community Recovery Operations Findings Disaster Recovery—FEMA’s Long-Term Assistance was Helpful to State and Local Governments but had Some Limitations (GAO-10-404), GAO, March 2010. (http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-404) The summary presented here is taken from the referenced document. After analysis of after-action reports for the 2007 Greensburg tornado, 2008 Iowa floods, and Hurricane Ike in 2008, GAO recommended that FEMA should increase the effectiveness of the timing and level-of- recovery assistance to meet local and state-level capacity and needs. Additionally, GAO recommended that FEMA should evaluate the level of authority necessary for coordinating federal agencies with a role in the recovery process. General discussion regarding the DHS role in recovery highlights the fact that the three broad DHS capabilities in the recovery mission area are all-hazards. Specifically, these are 1. Conduct damage and safety assessments in public and private structures; 2. Restore transportation, communication, utilities, and other essential services; and 3. Implement short-term and long-term economic and community recovery practices. The report also sought perspectives from responders and recovery personnel to determine perspectives about the extent to which recovery differs between terrorist events and natural or accidental disasters.

74 A Compendium of Best Practices and Lessons Learned The following case study further highlights the importance of communication and coordi- nation and presents some of the lessons learned from Aiken County’s recovery operations fol- lowing the 2005 Graniteville, South Carolina, train derailment. This derailment was caused by a Norfolk Southern train hitting a parked train at the Avondale Mills Textile Plant. The result of the incident was the release of approximately 80 tons of chlorine gas, the evacuation of 5,500 citizens, medical assistance for 529 people, and the deaths of 9 people. Case Study After-Action Report Graniteville Train Wreck – January 2005, Aiken County Government (www.llis.gov) The information presented in this case study is taken directly from the referenced document. OBJECTIVE: RECOVERY Perform recovery activities. 1: Develop a recovery plan outline that identifies appropriate recovery strategies. STRENGTH • EPA led recovery effort to re-open schools and area businesses. Coordination occurred through UCP [Unified Command Post]. A school rep was onsite for all entries. • County finance office implemented [an] hour code to assist in tracking costs. IMPROVEMENT ITEM • Not all agencies attended Critical Incident Stress Debriefings (CISD). This needs to be added to recovery plan checklist. • EOC [Emergency Operations Center] had some difficulty obtaining some resources due to weekend hours. Commercial disaster recovery resource books may be useful in the EOC, as well as emergency contacts for local suppliers. • County Damage Assessment Official was initially left out of planning loop for re-entry. • All support agencies (Salvation Army, Red Cross, DSS, etc.) were not kept informed of recovery status. Although daily status meetings were held at the UCP, the information was not communicated with the EOC. LESSONS LEARNED • Joint training between EOC personnel and CP [Command Post] responders is needed. Agencies need to understand each other’s roles and capabilities. • Hurricane responders are excellent at communicating during crises, and that may be a good benchmark. • SCEMD [South Carolina Emergency Management Department] is developing the concept of a County EOC team (comprised of multiple county personnel) as well as an “Incident Response Support Team” to assist CP personnel with various activities (facility needs, communication needs, etc.). • Reverse 911 may be useful for personnel recall (predesignated call groups) and training on the Reverse 911 process is needed. • 211 being added to phone priority list should be considered. Lessons Learned from other 211s is that some local governments release non-essential personnel to support 211 calls during times of crisis. • EOC PIO [Public Information Officer] suggests meetings with local agency PIOs to discuss lessons learned and preparedness for future incidents. 5.2 Recovery Operations for Mass Care Mass care is the element of recovery that focuses on the needs of the victims, including domes- tic pets and livestock. There are five components to mass care, as follows: 1. Decontamination; 2. Evacuation;

Best Practices for Community Recovery Operations 75 3. Sheltering; 4. Medical care; and 5. Temporary housing. Of these, medical care and temporary housing are the only two operations that continue through long-term recovery. As noted previously, past hazardous materials transportation incidents have not required as great a focus on all of these issues as in some other types of disasters; however, each incident is unique and the needs for each component will be determined at the time, based on the specific incident. 5.2.1 Decontamination, Evacuation, and Sheltering Early in the recovery process, and before the end of the response phase, critical decisions will often need to be made about public safety requirements like the efficacy of evacuation vs. shel- tering in place; the ability of all residents to evacuate; and addressing those individuals who are sheltering in place regardless of a determination to evacuate. Many kinds of hazardous materials may require some level of personal decontamination; if decontamination is warranted, then evac- uation will likely be required. However, even if decontamination of individuals is not required, decontamination of the area may be required and evacuation may still be in order. Decontami- nation, evacuation, and sheltering operations will all occur within the stabilization (short-term) recovery phase of the operation. Figure 5-1 shows the decision points in this process, including which positions have the authority to make sheltering/evacuation decisions and which positions have input into the decision-making process. Decontamination of Individuals. The decision whether decontamination of individuals will be required and what decontamination method to use can be a difficult one. Ultimately, the Unified Command will be responsible for the decision with input from others such as the policy group, chief health/medical officer, and legal counsel. Technical assistance should be available locally from the community’s hazardous materials team. If additional assistance is required, or the community does not have a hazardous materials team, assistance can often also be obtained Figure 5-1. Decision points for decontamination, evacuation, and sheltering.

76 A Compendium of Best Practices and Lessons Learned from sources like the state National Guard, or through a request to the FOSC. Technical assis- tance can also come from the EPA’s National Decontamination Team, Occupational Safety Health Administration (OSHA), or the military. During the response phase of the operation, the boundaries of the “hot zone” (the area of contamination) and the “cold zone” (area that is free of contamination) are identified. The delin- eation of these zones is intended to limit the spread of contamination by containing the hazard- ous material(s) and to assist in identifying who—and what—needs to be decontaminated (see Figure 5-2). At this point, the Public Works Department can mark the cold zone with barricades or some other method that clearly identifies the boundaries of the safe and contaminated areas. To ensure that individuals do not cross this boundary and potentially spread contamination (and increase the size of the hot zone), security will need to be established along the perimeter, and the security personnel need to be provided with the appropriate level of personal protective equipment. With security in place, the location for the reception and decontamination center can then be determined. Basically, there are two choices for this: • Outside the hot zone at a convenient location; or • At a local hospital. If the decontamination procedures are simple, such as receiving a thorough wash down, the best location for the reception and decontamination area will usually be within the cold zone at a location easily accessible to affected individuals. For decontamination activities that will be using other chemicals or those that will require prophylaxis, the reception and decontamination area could be established at the closest hospital. If this is the case, the community will need to provide transportation to minimize the potential for spreading the contamination. A transpor- tation staging area will need to be established and announcements made to the individuals in the hot zone telling them where the staging area is located. If such a transportation program is implemented, the local community will also need to be prepared for the equipment being used to become contaminated. Following the operation, such equipment may be able to be decon- taminated or may have to be considered a loss. A decision will also need to be made regarding personal vehicles. If space is available, those leaving the hot zone could drive along a pre-designated route to the reception and decontami- Figure 5-2. Decontamination procedures in New Orleans, Louisiana. (SOURCE: http://www.fema.gov/photolibrary; Photo credit: FEMA/Bob McMillan: FEMA News Photo)

Best Practices for Community Recovery Operations 77 nation area where they would leave their vehicles to be decontaminated once the people and animals have exited them. Another issue in this process will be the decontamination of domes- tic pets and livestock. The pet and livestock decontamination processes are usually similar to human decontamination; however, additional personnel comfortable working with animals will be required to ensure animal welfare and use of the proper procedures. If the operation occurs in the cold zone, domestic pets can often stay with their owners, who may be encouraged to partici- pate in their pets’ decontamination. Livestock will have to be penned once they have been decon- taminated. These types of considerations will often be factors in determining the location of the reception and decontamination center. Again, the potential exists that transportation will be needed to move the individuals, pets, and livestock to an appropriate area for decontamination. Decontamination area layouts vary from simply using an elevated ladder on a fire engine with a hose and large nozzle, to systems that feature portable showers and multiple stations for the decon- tamination process. The type of system used will depend on the type of decontamination procedures required. If additional equipment beyond what the community has available is required, it can often be obtained from the state National Guard or the military. Requests for military assistance will need to be coordinated through the FOSC. Additional considerations that will affect where decontamina- tion occurs include weather conditions, the need for collection and disposal of contaminated gar- ments and provision of replacement clothing. This is addressed more fully in Section 5.3.1. Finally, consideration should be given to establishing a reception center at the decontamina- tion site. The primary purpose of the reception center is to register and track those individuals who must be decontaminated. This tracking process can assist the community later as part of the process for locating missing family members, itemizing costs that may be reimbursable, and tracking patients within the hospital and the care they receive. To increase the efficiency of the center, directional signs and data collection forms should be translated into all of the languages spoken within the community and, if possible, translators should be available on site. Evacuation. Once the decision to evacuate has been made, the community can follow their existing procedures to announce and implement the process. There are several automated sys- tems available to get the evacuation information to individuals in the affected area. The most common is the reverse 9-1-1 system, which uses a database of phone numbers and addresses in combination with a Geographic Information System (GIS) system to automatically dial certain numbers based on selected addresses to deliver a pre-recorded message. When announcing the evacuation order, it is critical to ensure that clear directions are provided so there is no confu- sion in the recipient’s mind as to what actions to take. If additional resources are required, a request can be made for the activation of ESF #6 – Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Housing, and Human Services. In areas of ethnic diversity, these messages may also need to be available in languages other than English. The following case study highlights additional lessons learned from the Graniteville, South Carolina, train accident, which presents an example of evacuation versus shelter in place. Case Study State Response to the Graniteville Train Derailment: Lessons Learned, Team Visionary Collective under the Mentorship of Ron Fisher, May 27, 2006 (www.llis.gov) The information presented in this case study is taken directly from the referenced document. Representatives from fire, law enforcement, and emergency services met and actively discussed evacuation versus shelter in place. The decision was made that residents within a 1-mile radius to the crash should (continued on next page)

78 A Compendium of Best Practices and Lessons Learned Assistance may need to be provided to the individuals that are being evacuated. This assistance includes, but is not limited to, door-to-door announcement of the evacuation; security staff to provide direction as people are evacuating and to ensure they follow the identified route out of the affected area; staff to assist the elderly, children, or the infirm in departing the impacted area; and reminders to evacuees to take pets with them as they leave. If individuals are allowed to take their personal vehicles, appropriate directions out of the area can be provided by traffic con- trol officers stationed at main intersections. In areas of dangerous contamination, community- provided transportation may be the best way to ensure the safety of the evacuees and reduce the potential for spreading the contamination. An additional concern to be addressed is providing security for the evacuated area. Case Study (Continued). State Response to the Graniteville Train Derailment: Lessons Learned, Team Visionary Collective under the Mentorship of Ron Fisher, May 27, 2006 (www.llis.gov) evacuate, while those within the 1- to 2-mile zone should shelter in place or stay in whatever building or home in which they were located. Compounding the situation, considerable confusion existed regarding one’s location in respect to the 1-mile radius zone. According to Mitchell et al., residents did not know if the evacuation message was applicable to them personally, and many suggested that street names and other local sites should be given as reference points in the future as opposed to a vague 1-mile radius. As a result, 59 [percent] of residents living in the 1- to 2-mile zone evacuated as opposed to staying home and maintaining the curfew. This resulted in an “evacuation shadow,” where more people than necessary were on the roads, which not only affected traffic congestion but also availability of hotels and shelters. Lesson Learned: Resident evacuation within limited distances should require identification of affected areas by street name, zip code, and geographic markers. Recommendation: To prevent future confusion about residents who should evacuate or shelter in place, city officials will not refer to the area as 1 mile or 2 miles from the hazardous site. Many people did not know where their homes fell in relation to the site. Thus, we recommend that all instructions will be more specific and reference by street name. For example, “all people living north of 10th Street should evacuate their homes and head south down Main Street.” Giving more specific instructions should minimize confusion and reduce risk. To implement this recommendation, it is necessary to look at potential barriers and how those barriers might be overcome. Barriers to Implementation 1. Lack of readily available maps to be used by the command post and the Emergency Operations Center to specifically define the area to be evacuated and the route out of the area. 2. Advance preparation of public announcements cannot include unknown directional specifics. Depending on the geographic size of a jurisdiction, pre-identifying appropriate evacuation routes and safe areas may be too complex. Possible Resolution to Implementation Barriers 1. With the widespread use of GIS in most communities, maps of the impacted area are readily available to officials in the Emergency Operations Center or at the command post. These maps can be created to show the area requiring evacuation and the routes out of the area. The maps can then be used to make the appropriate announcements and can even be provided to the media for their use in reporting the information. 2. Public service announcements can be pre-scripted to include basic evacuation information (when to go, what to take, how to secure a residence, preparing pets, requesting additional assistance for seniors, disabled, etc.) with blanks to be filled in as incident specifics become known. Pre-scripted public service announcements may be compiled according to incident type and information to be disseminated, providing a library of resources to be used as required.

Best Practices for Community Recovery Operations 79 Case Study State Response to the Graniteville Train Derailment: Lessons Learned, Team Visionary Collective under the Mentorship of Ron Fisher, May 27, 2006 (www.llis.gov) The information presented in this case study is taken directly from the referenced document. . . . the problem the Sheriff’s Office faced was to protect the surrounding areas. The [Sheriff’s] Office was able to control access to the crash quickly and early through traffic control points based on major intersections and information received from 911 distress calls within the first 15 minutes. The placement of roadblocks was reevaluated within the first 30 minutes and determined to be adequate based on wind direction and hazmat input. However, while the Sheriff’s Office was able to prevent more residents from entering the crash area, those already nearby were not as lucky. According to a report by the Aiken Department of Public Safety, as the first responders rushed to the scene they quickly realized that some of the residents fleeing the gas in the dark were actually blindly running into the contaminated area instead of away from it. An ongoing assessment is examining the public health impact associated with exposure to chlorine gas. Those exposed are being interviewed about their symptoms, the location and duration of the exposures, and demographic information necessary for monitoring any long-term health effects and psychosocial consequences (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2005). Lesson Learned: In the event of natural or other disasters in residential areas, door-to-door evacuation campaigns should be enacted immediately to guarantee that all residents are informed and are safe— especially when events occur after nightfall. Communication via mass media about the areas of immediate threat should be clear and concise. Recommendation: The Sheriff’s Department was able to quickly place roadblocks that prevented people from entering the hazardous area. People within the roadblock vicinity were not properly ushered to safety. Many people accidentally went toward the crash scene as they tried to escape the area. Thus, we recommend that all future accidents involving hazardous materials should have reflective arrows pointing toward the direction of safety so that people do not travel toward the scene of the accident. To implement this recommendation, it is necessary to look at potential barriers and how those barriers might be overcome. Barriers to Implementation 1. Having sufficient officers available to provide the necessary security and direct traffic flow. Possible Resolution to Implementation Barriers 1. Additional resources may be available locally from security contractors, mutual aid agreements with neighboring jurisdictions, and the state National Guard. Tracking of evacuees is also vital to the family locator process. The tracking systems used for evacuees, hospitals, and temporary housing need to be compatible so that the data can be merged to provide a summary report tracking everyone from evacuation until they can return to their homes. For evacuees who leave the area to stay with family or friends, it will be imperative to track their whereabouts so that accurate information is available to the family locator process and to provide evacuees notice when housing is available within the community. Sheltering. Sheltering operations will follow, for the most part, the process implemented for other types of disaster situations. Local communities need to ensure that • Adequate facilities (with food service and sanitation) are provided; • The facility can handle the needs of service animals; The following case study, also from the Graniteville, South Carolina, incident, provides useful information addressing this concern.

80 A Compendium of Best Practices and Lessons Learned • A process is established to handle domestic pets; and • A screening process for possible contamination is implemented. This screening process is an important element, especially if decontamination of individuals is required. Screening individuals as they enter the shelter ensures that no contamination is brought in and can also help to identify those individuals who still need to be decontaminated. Tracking of evacuees is an important operation at the shelter. When individuals sign in at a shelter, they will also need to sign out when leaving, indicating where they are seeking other shelter (i.e., with family, friends, or a hotel). This sign-out process should include collecting the address where they will be staying along with a phone number so that local officials can keep in touch to inform them when it is safe to return to their homes and businesses. 5.2.2 Medical Needs Medical services may need to be provided very early in the response. Casualty collection points may need to be identified and set up in safe areas to provide immediate treatment for victims and responders. Adequate transportation to hospitals will be needed, and decisions will need to be made regarding the need for mass prophylaxis. Local hospitals may be overwhelmed and surrounding communities may be asked to provide assistance. Figure 5-3 shows the decision points, including which positions have the authority to make medical decisions, and which positions have input into the decision-making process. Figure 5-3. Decision points for medical treatment.

Best Practices for Community Recovery Operations 81 In the short term, the medical treatment component will likely be an intense operation, especially if it is determined that the event is a mass casualty and/or mass fatality event. Available resources will often be significantly taxed, and many communities will need addi- tional assistance. Such resources are available through ESF #8 – Health and Medical Services. Through ESF #8, DHHS can activate the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS). The com- ponents of NDMS that apply to a hazardous materials transportation incident could include the following:89 • Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (DMATs): DMATs provide primary and acute care, tri- age of mass casualties, initial resuscitation and stabilization, advanced life support and prepa- ration of the sick or injured for evacuation. The basic deployment configuration of a DMAT consists of 35 persons, including physicians, nurses, medical technicians, and ancillary sup- port personnel. They can be mobilized within 6 hours of notification and are capable of arriving at a disaster site within 48 hours. They are designed to sustain operations for 72 hours without external support. DMATs are also responsible for establishing an initial (electronic) medical record for each patient, including assigning patient-unique identifiers to facilitate tracking throughout the NDMS. • Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Team (DMORT): DMORTs work under the guid- ance of local authorities by providing technical assistance and personnel to recover, identify, and process deceased victims. Teams are composed of funeral directors, medical examiners, coroners, pathologists, forensic anthropologists, medical records technicians and transcribers, fingerprint specialists, forensic odontologists, dental assistants, X-ray technicians, and other personnel. DHHS also maintains Disaster Portable Morgue Units (DPMUs) that can be used by DMORTs to establish a stand-alone morgue operation if necessary. The following case study highlights further lessons learned from the Graniteville, South Carolina, train accident on the medical operations associated with a transportation incident involving hazardous materials. Case Study After-Action Report Graniteville Train Wreck – January 2005, Aiken County Government (www.llis.gov) The information presented in this case study is taken directly from the referenced document. OBJECTIVE: MEDICAL Demonstrate the ability to provide appropriate medical care for injured personnel. 1: First responders provide proper first aid care for injured personnel. STRENGTH • ACEMS [Aiken County Emergency Medical Services] utilized PPE [personal protective equipment] from Aiken County COBRA [Chemical, Ordinance, Biological, Radiological] team, which allowed EMS personnel to re-enter scene for rapid rescue. 2: Demonstrate command and control of the medical emergency. IMPROVEMENT ITEM • ACEMS attempted to medically monitor other responders, but they were entering incident area without EMS coordination. • Triage tags were not utilized, although they were available. • The on-duty EMS supervisor must relinquish control of outside incidents and focus on major incident being responded to. (continued on next page)

82 A Compendium of Best Practices and Lessons Learned Events involving mass fatalities present unique issues, such as identification of bodies, decon- tamination of remains and family notification. Through ESF #8, assistance can be provided by the DMORTs. While not a hazardous materials transportation incident, the following case study highlights useful best practices from the Station Club fire in Warwick, Rhode Island, (2003) that could be applied to victim identification in any type of incident. Case Study (Continued). After-Action Report Graniteville Train Wreck – January 2005, Aiken County Government (www.llis.gov) 3: EMS personnel provide proper emergency medical care for injured and/or contaminated personnel. STRENGTH • ACEMS supported three separate decon sites with medical monitoring. • Due to overwhelming number of calls for assistance being received from Graniteville area, decision was made to enter with Level-B suits by Hazmat technician-level EMS personnel. • Decision to not transport patients prior to decon was made by ACEMS Shift Supervisor. IMPROVEMENT ITEM • EMS entry into the hot zone was coordinated through ACSO [Aiken County Sheriff’s Office] Dispatch who contacted the EMS supervisor at USCA [University of South Carolina—Aiken]. No coordination with GVWFD [Graniteville-Vaucluse-Warrenville Fire Department]. 4: Demonstrate effective communications. STRENGTH • Local hospitals were contacted early on by EMS supervisor informing them of patient potential. IMPROVEMENT ITEM • Mass casualty plan not implemented initially due to communications difficulties. • Communication of patient status at decon was not well coordinated with Red Cross shelter representatives. Persons at shelters were registered, but if they were sent to the hospital or left with friends/family, their status was unknown. To implement these improvement items it is necessary to look at potential barriers and how those barriers might be overcome. Barriers to Implementation 1. Lack of funds for planning, training, and exercises to address the specific needs of a mass casualty incident. 2. Lack of experienced personnel to develop mass casualty plans including procedures for controlling and coordinating access of responders and medical personnel. Possible Resolution to Implementation Barriers 1. Some grant funding is available to LEPCs for planning, training, and exercises through the HMEP grant program and various other federal grant programs (see Appendix E for more detailed information on this issue). 2. Technical assistance for developing mass casualty plans and procedures is available to local communities through the FEMA regional offices. This technical assistance can include representatives from other federal agencies, such as HHS, with experience in mass casualty operations.

Best Practices for Community Recovery Operations 83 As soon as medical personnel can determine the needs for long-term medical and behav- ioral care for victims and responders, the programs and mutual aid assistance identified in pre- incident planning for long-term care can be implemented. Grant applications to support clinical long-term care can be submitted to appropriate agencies for funds to sustain the long-term care operations. The costs to the community for long-term care will need to be considered in the negotiated settlement with the potential responsible parties. 5.2.3 Interim Housing Problems with interim housing following Hurricane Katrina (2005) led to the development of the National Disaster Housing Strategy (NDHS). The Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 (PKEMRA – Public Law 109-295) established the requirement for FEMA to Case Study Mortuary Services: Victim Identification and Record Creation During a Mass Casualty Incident, Lessons Learned Information Sharing (www.llis.gov) The information presented in this case study is taken directly from the referenced document. The fire that destroyed the Station Club in Warwick, Rhode Island, on February 20, 2003, resulted in the death of 100 individuals. Most of the victims were burned beyond recognition. As part of the recovery process, personnel from the Office of the Medical Examiner (OME) were in charge of victim identification and record creation. Because of the insufficient numbers of OME personnel qualified for this task, DMORT [Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Team] personnel deployed at the Rhode Island State Morgue offered to assist with the process. OME personnel relied on information given in the missing person reports to facilitate the victim identification process. Information recorded on the missing person report was not as complete or germane as that needed to identify the badly disfigured victims. As a result, some families had to be asked on three or four separate occasions for additional personal information. DMORT personnel relied on information given in the DMORT VIP [Victim Identification Process] form. The VIP form requested information that was often not requested on the missing persons form. The VIP form proved much more helpful in expediting the victim identification process. The Rhode Island Station Club Fire After-Action Report recommends that medical examiners should consider using the DMORT VIP form from the outset of a mass casualty incident in order to expedite the victim identification and record creation process. To implement this best practice it is necessary to look at potential barriers and how those barriers might be overcome. Barriers to Implementation 1. Lack of trained local resource. Possible Resolution to Implementation Barriers 1. Some grant funding is available to LEPCs for planning, training, and exercises through the HMEP grant program and various other federal grant programs (see Appendix E for more detailed information on this issue). 2. Technical assistance for developing mass casualty plans and procedures is available to local communities through the FEMA regional offices. This technical assistance can include representatives from other federal agencies, such as HHS, with experience in mass casualty operations.

84 A Compendium of Best Practices and Lessons Learned develop the NDHS, and also assigned new authorities for the agency to offer disaster case man- agement services, established a Disabilities Coordinator position at FEMA, authorized a rental repair program, and expanded the authority for permanent construction.90 Interim housing encompasses sheltering, temporary housing, and permanent housing. Shel- ters will remain open long enough for local officials to assist evacuees in finding interim hous- ing. Typically, interim housing is available for approximately 18 months. During that time, the evacuees will either work to repair their damaged homes or find other permanent housing. One of the more challenging decisions that will need to be made by the Unified Command in this area will be in relation to the decontamination of housing. Depending on the nature of the materials involved in the incident, the decontamination process may simply require washing down of the home’s exterior, which means the evacuee might be able to return directly from the shelter. However, the decontamination process may also need to be more invasive and employ other types of chemicals or solvents. For the more invasive operations, consideration needs to be given to the cost-effectiveness of decontaminating residences. It may be more effective to demol- ish the structure, clean the surrounding grounds to remove contaminants, and then rebuild the home. This decision will need to be made in consultation with the homeowner and in accor- dance with the community’s condemnation procedures. If the event were to receive a major disaster declaration from the President, housing assistance could become available through the Individual Assistance Program. In this situation, after insur- ance, one of the major sources of assistance would be the FEMA Individuals and Household Program (IHP). This program provides temporary help in the form of alternative housing and financial assistance for other needs. Under IHP, individuals and families might be eligible for the following:91 • Temporary Housing: Assistance to rent a different temporary home for up to 18 months. If rental properties are not available, the government may provide a housing unit. • Repair: Assistance to homeowners to repair disaster-related damage that is not covered by insurance for a primary residence. • Replacement: Assistance to homeowners to replace a home destroyed in the disaster that is not covered by insurance. If the applicant is eligible for one of these programs, they may also be eligible for additional assistance in the form of • Lodging Expense Reimbursement (Transitional Sheltering Assistance): Lodging Expense Reimbursement is an extension of sheltering, but it does not include meals. • Rental Assistance: Homeowners or renters will receive a check for short-term rental assis- tance based on the fair market rates in their area. Rental assistance provides homeowners with an initial 3 months’ rent; renters may receive funds for 2 months. • Government-Provided Direct Housing (Manufactured Housing): Direct housing in the form of mobile homes, travel trailers, and park model units can be used to augment temporary housing needs. • Mortgage Assistance: Applicants are eligible if they are not able to make their mortgage pay- ments as a result of disaster-related financial hardship (e.g., loss of income) and have received a written foreclosure notice or notice of intent to foreclose from a mortgage lender. The Mort- gage Assistance Program is intended to provide emergency assistance to survivors who, without such assistance, would be dispossessed from a primary residence. 5.2.4 Re-Entry to Homes and Businesses During pre-incident, as well as post-incident, planning operations, procedures related to issues such as transportation for individuals without vehicles and how individuals will retrieve their

Best Practices for Community Recovery Operations 85 vehicles after decontamination will have been addressed and appropriate resources identified. However, there are still several operations that should take place prior to allowing individuals back into their homes and businesses within the impacted area. If decontamination of the area is required, those operations need to be completed before re-entry can be allowed (see Section 5.3 for infrastructure decontamination). When the area is considered decontaminated, local communities need to look to basic health and safety issues (e.g., is there working sanitation, is potable water available, and are utilities— power, gas, etc.—operational?). Another step is to determine if the structures are safe enough for continued occupancy. This step is designed to ensure there has been no damage to structures by the incident or the materials involved that would impact the safety of the structure. Typically, these types of evaluations are performed by local building inspectors. In some cases, structures may not be safe enough for continued occupancy or there may be issues around the provisions for basic health and safety. In these cases, consideration might be given to allowing individuals, business owners, and employees short periods of time to re-enter the area to retrieve personal and business possessions. In relation to business possessions, there will also need to be a process to ensure that those possessions are not contaminated. The final step in the process is to determine whether re-entry will be controlled, or whether the individuals will be allowed to freely re-enter the impacted area. This decision will be based on the size and magnitude of the incident. 5.2.5 Summary of Mass Care Recovery Operations Table 5-1 summarizes the components and actions addressed in mass care recovery opera- tions. Local planners can use this type of matrix to identify their own barriers to implementation and possible resolutions. 5.3 Operations for Infrastructure Recovery As previously discussed, infrastructure refers to the built environment and includes roads, bridges, rail lines, utilities, buildings, etc., as well as the systems that utilize them, like mass transportation. There are three basic components to this recovery element as follows: • Debris operations; • Infrastructure decontamination; and • Repair. The FOSC will typically be actively involved throughout the operation, and the federal resources available to the FOSC will be deployed as needed. As with the decision regarding decontamination of victims, similar decisions will need to be made regarding infrastructure. Decontamination operations for infrastructure can be highly complex. In worst-case scenarios, this operation can take a year or more to complete. One of the federal resources available to provide technical assistance during this time will be the EPA’s National Decontamination Team. Their expertise could be quite helpful in developing the necessary decontamination plan (see Section 4.5.2, Post-Incident Planning for Mass Care). In most situations, repairs to infrastructure (see Figure 5-4) will be limited to the incident site. However, depending on the material(s) released, they may have a significant harmful impact on construction materials in the surrounding area. In this case, the repair work will have to wait until decontamination operations are complete so engineers can have access to the roads and buildings to perform required evaluations and determine how best to repair the infrastructure.

86 A Compendium of Best Practices and Lessons Learned Short-Term Recovery Component Action Resources Barriers Barrier Resolution Determine if evacuation and decontamination of evacuees will be necessary Incident Commander, EOC Manager, Legal Counsel Lack of legal authority Develop ordinance establishing authority to order evacuation Establish hot zone and cold zone and clearly mark the perimeter of the hot zone Fire, Law Enforcement, Public Works Identification of lead agency Pre-incident planning to include identification of lead agency Monitoring hot zone for potential spread of contamination Monitoring equipment; computer models Evacuation Provide security around the hot zone with checkpoints and provide them with location of the reception and decontamination area Law Enforcement, Local Security Contractors, National Guard Lack of adequate staffing Develop mutual aid agreements with surrounding jurisdictions, develop contracts with private security firms, recruit volunteers, and provide appropriate training Need for Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) Provide pre-incident training for all levels of PPE Public resistance Public Information campaign to explain the process Announce evacuation order Incident Commander, EOC Manager, Law Enforcement; Fire, EAS, Reverse 9-1-1 Lack of legal authority Develop ordinance establishing authority to order evacuation Public resistance Public Information campaign pre-incident to explain authorities Provide security at the shelters Law Enforcement, Local Security Contractors, National Guard Public resistance Public Information campaign pre-incident to explain authorities Provide security at the shelters Law Enforcement, Local Security Contractors, National Guard adequate staffing Lack of Develop mutual aid agreements with surrounding jurisdictions, develop contracts with private security firms, recruit volunteers and provide appropriate training Track evacuees System for tracking especially those who leave the area Lack of adequate staffing Develop mutual aid agreements with surrounding jurisdictions, recruit volunteers, and provide appropriate training Table 5-1. Summary of mass care recovery operations.

Best Practices for Community Recovery Operations 87 Short-Term Recovery Component Action Resources Barriers Barrier Resolution Open shelters Red Cross, Emergency Management, Faith- Based Organizations, Community-Based Organizations, Local/State Dept. of Social Services, Federal ESF #6 Lack of available locations Survey jurisdiction and locate facilities that could be used for shelter locations Develop MOU(s) with facility owners to allow the jurisdiction to use the facility as a potential shelter Shelters Lack of adequate staffing Develop mutual aid agreements with surrounding jurisdictions, recruit volunteers, and provide appropriate training Decontamination of Evacuees Establish reception area and set up decontamination station in cold zone or at local hospital and announce location Fire, EMS, Law Enforcement, Dept. of Transportation, Public Works, Emergency Management, State/local EMS, State/Local Social Services Lack of adequate equipment Secure needed equipment from mutual aid sources Lack of public information Prepare public information materials during pre-incident planning If at the local hospital, provide transportation Local Transit District, Local Dept. of Transportation Provide security around the reception and decontamination area Local Law Enforcement, Local Security Contractors Implement decontamination operations Hospital Staff, Local Fire, State EMS, National Guard Interim Housing Identify available short-term housing Local Housing Authority, Property Management Companies, Property Owners Lack of available properties Develop MOU(s) with neighboring jurisdictions to increase the number of available properties Funding for reimbursement Develop and implement program requirements Local Housing Authority, State/Local Dept. of Social Services Medical Treatment Establish triage area at decontamination center and announce Fire, EMS, Law Enforcement, Dept. of Transportation, Public Works, EAS, Reverse 9-1-1 Appropriate level of training Work with CDC or local university to implement appropriate training Order drugs from Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) Local/County Public Health, CDC Lack of an SNS plan and protocols Pre-incident planning in conjunction with Local/County Health Department Establish dispensing site and implement mass prophylaxis Local/County Public Health, Local Law Enforcement, State EMS, Federal ESF #8 Public Information Develop public information materials during pre-incident planning Table 5-1. (Continued). (continued on next page)

88 A Compendium of Best Practices and Lessons Learned Intermediate Recovery Component Action Resources Barriers Barrier Resolution Evacuation Demobilize established hot zone and remove perimeter marking Fire, Law Enforcement, Public Works Demobilize security staff and provide debriefing Law Enforcement,Shelter Manager Transfer tracking records to established office and continue tracking of evacuees Emergency Management, Local/State Dept. of Social Services Long-Term Recovery Component Action Resources Barriers Barrier Resolution Evacuation Close out tracking records as evacuees transition from long- term housing to return to their homes Emergency Management, Local/State Dept. of Social Services Long-Term Housing Demobilize long-term housing program and debrief staff Local Housing Authority, State/Local Dept. of Social Services Medical Treatment Identify patients for long-term monitoring for physical and mental health problems Hospital Staff, State EMS, Local Health Dept., Private Non-Profit Health Organizations Lack of programs Develop mutual aid agreements with surrounding communities Secure grant funding to develop monitoring program Demobilize long-term monitoring and debrief staff Program Manager Table 5-1. (Continued). Figure 5-4. Rail bridge repairs near New Orleans, Louisiana. (SOURCE: http://www.fema.gov/photolibrary/; Photo credit: FEMA/Marvin Nauman: FEMA News Photo)

Best Practices for Community Recovery Operations 89 As in other previously discussed aspects of recovery, opportunities for innovative solutions may become evident as recovery operations progress. For example, following a disastrous snow- storm in Velva, North Dakota, in 2010,92 power was knocked out to numerous remote locations. The Verendrye Electric Cooperative (Verendrye) came up with a solution that consisted of using solar cells to power two livestock wells in the affected areas. This repair saved Verendrye the cost of repairing the damaged electrical infrastructure, and Verendrye now operates approximately 220 solar sites serving livestock wells in other isolated areas. Following a hazardous materials transportation incident, innovative solutions to problems have the potential to aid recovery operations and minimize the impact on the community. Figure 5-5 depicts the decision points related to infrastructure recovery, including which posi- tions have the authority to make decontamination and permitting decisions and which positions have input into the decision-making process. 5.3.1 Debris Operations The complexity of debris operations associated with a hazardous materials transportation incident will be dependent on the impact of the incident and, more specifically, the material(s) involved. Operations could be as simple as removing the debris generated at the incident site, which can usually be accomplished in several days, to the intricacy of debris removal that would Figure 5-5. Decision points for infrastructure recovery.

90 A Compendium of Best Practices and Lessons Learned be required for a full-scale decontamination operation for the built environment, an operation that can often take more than a year. Shortly after the occurrence of the event, the community would either activate their pre-bid debris operations contracts or develop the necessary bidding documentation to bid debris opera- tions under standing procurement policies. For small incidents, it is possible that debris operations could be completed using the community’s public works/sanitation department personnel, assum- ing these individuals are trained and have the appropriate level of personal protective equipment. In accordance with the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), a temporary debris storage and reduction site will need to be established (see Figure 5-6). The location for this site needs to be chosen such that it does not present a hazard to the public or the environment in the event that storage containers leak. Initial steps include identifying areas within the site for debris to be stored and installing impermeable barriers to ensure that leaks do not infiltrate the ground water. Berms or dikes will also need to be constructed to contain any materials that leak from their containers. Depending on the nature of the material(s) involved in the incident, consideration may also need to be given to maintaining equipment available on-site to continuously decontaminate vehicles after they deliver debris. Additionally, all materials used for decontamination opera- tions will need to be collected, packaged in safe containers and transported to this site for future delivery to an established hazardous waste material site for final disposal. Staff working at the site will also need to be provided with the appropriate level of personal protective equipment. The jurisdiction needs to be prepared to implement and provide training to the staff at the site. Such training should cover personal safety, personal protective equipment, and handling of the debris materials. If the decision is made to require decontamination of individuals caught in the hot zone by the incident, all materials associated with the decontamination operation need to be considered contaminated debris. According to the RCRA (see Section 2.3.7), the materials associated with decontamination will need to be collected, packaged in sealed containers, and disposed of in an established hazardous materials disposal site. All manner of contaminated items will need to be Figure 5-6. Temporary debris storage and reduction area. (SOURCE: http://www.epa.gov/hurricane/hur_photos.html; Photo credit: EPA)

Best Practices for Community Recovery Operations 91 considered as debris, including decontamination materials (chemicals or water); clothing (both victims’ and decontamination specialists’); equipment used in the decontamination operation; and, potentially, vehicles used for the transport of victims. Once the decontamination opera- tion is completed, the entire area will need to be cleaned and the materials used (water, solvents, chemicals, etc.) will need to be collected, packaged, and added to the rest of the debris for appro- priate disposal. If roads, bridges, buildings, etc., require decontamination, every action that was taken at the decontamination centers for people in relation to the decontamination process will need to be repeated within the area that is to be decontaminated. This could generate considerable amounts of additional debris, and the contractors involved will need to ensure that they have a sufficient number of appropriate containers available for the storage of materials. In an extreme case, the infrastructure may require decontamination with other chemicals. This could include road sur- faces, exterior building surfaces, interior building surfaces, the insides of air handling duct work within buildings, etc. In such extreme cases, decisions will need to be made regarding what is economically reasonable to decontaminate and what should be discarded. Even if decontamination is not necessary, there may still be a large quantity of debris depend- ing on the material(s) involved. For example, if there is a retail and/or manufacturing area within the impacted zone, it may not be economically feasible to clean store inventories. In this case, all or part of the inventory could be contaminated and would need to be handled accordingly. To minimize the impact on the public, routes would need to be established for moving debris from the impacted area to the debris disposal and reduction site. A route should be selected that minimizes the time that trucks are on the road with the contaminated debris, while also decreas- ing the potential for spreading contamination. States are required to regulate the management of solid and hazardous waste in accordance with provisions of the RCRA (see Section 2.3.7). Solid waste is defined broadly under the law as “any garbage, refuse . . . and other discarded material” (42 U.S.C. § 6903). Hazardous waste, a subset of solid waste, is defined as a solid waste that is either specifically listed in the regulations (40 C.F.R. §§ 261.31-261.33), or meets specific criteria that make it toxic, ignitable (i.e., burns readily), corrosive, or reactive (e.g., explosive) (40 C.F.R. § 261.3). In an ideal setting, debris removal crews would first segregate the waste. The waste that can be removed using heavy equipment (e.g., a front loader) would then be loaded onto trucks. Remaining waste would be removed by hand by a right-of-entry crew (i.e., a crew that has received permission from the property owner to enter the site).93 Following Hurricane Katrina, residents were asked to separate waste into general categories to assist this process. Post-incident analysis shows this did not typically happen, a problem that was compounded by the fact that so many residents were not present to collect and separate their debris. For a hazardous materials transportation incident, many of the same requirements as noted above could exist (i.e., the need to segregate debris that is moved to the temporary debris reduction and storage area, etc.). An additional challenge would be that all of this debris could potentially be contaminated and would most likely have to be packaged and moved to a hazardous materi- als waste site. The amount of time required for debris removal, and the associated costs, would be further increased if there was a significant volume of contaminated inventory, equipment, and household furnishings to deal with. For example, following a typical flood disaster, debris removal can usually be completed with three passes through affected neighborhoods. During Hurricane Katrina, it took more than 20 passes in some neighborhoods, and in some cases, the debris removal was still not complete.94

92 A Compendium of Best Practices and Lessons Learned 5.3.2 Infrastructure Decontamination There are numerous hazardous materials that require some form of decontamination in order to render an area safe for human occupancy. This can be compounded in a hazardous materials transportation incident through the involuntary mixing of hazardous materials as a result of the incident. Such operations can be extremely time-consuming, labor-intensive, and costly. Environmental regulations will have a significant impact on the operation and on debris removal activities. However, while such operations can be expensive and time- consuming, they may be vital to the community’s well being and for assuring the public that the streets and buildings are safe and free from contamination. This, in turn, can have a sig- nificant impact on the restoration of business and tourism activities within the community. The decision to decontaminate immediately triggers the need to prepare a comprehensive site decontamination plan (the contents of this plan and the planning process to create the plan were discussed in Section 4.6.2). Once the plan is complete and has been accepted by community leaders and the Unified Command, implementation will typically begin immedi- ately. Rarely will a community have the resources in house to perform large-scale infrastructure decontamination operations. The FOSC and the National Decontamination Team will thus be valuable resources in helping to clearly define the process, what needs to be included in the bidding documents, and identification of potential bidders. The affected community may also wish to consider a sole-source contract which, if allowed under the community’s procure- ment procedures, permits the community to negotiate with a single contractor without going through a bidding process. An important part of this process is the implementation of federal standards on the level of decontamination required to render the infrastructure clean. This also necessitates that the cri- teria be clearly communicated to the public in non-technical language so they understand the concept of “how clean is clean.” These criteria will be a central element of the decontamination site plan and will set the parameters for the entire operation. It is also vital that this information be completely and accurately conveyed to the public. As has been shown by past cleanup opera- tions, unless the public understands the level to which infrastructure is being cleaned, there will often be lingering concerns about the potential for ongoing and future contamination. Such concerns often manifest themselves in how fast the community can restore its economic base, as has been the case with the Gulf Coast fishing industry following British Petroleum’s Deepwater Horizon oil spill in 2010. The decontamination site plan will be the guiding document and set the metrics for a suc- cessful decontamination operation. It also establishes goals and benchmarks that make it easy to convey the progress being made to the public. Providing the public with regular progress reports has been shown to significantly increase confidence in the effectiveness of the recovery operations. Utility Restoration. Utility (water, sewer, electric, gas, communications) restoration will need to be coordinated between the community and the utility providers. Once the impact of the event on the utilities has been fully assessed, priorities will need to be established to ensure that restoration occurs as quickly as possible. Since in most cases utilities are privately owned and not a part of the local jurisdiction (i.e., special districts), the community may be at the mercy of the provider(s). Further, even though governments may try to work with utility provider(s) to restore services, unless a pre-disaster working relationship exists, local government may still not be able to implement identified restoration priorities. Underground utilities, such as gas, electric, water, and communications, are less likely to be impacted by the presence of a plume than those above ground (electric and communications).

Best Practices for Community Recovery Operations 93 Conversely, the underground utilities are more likely to be impacted by a pooling spill than those above ground. The most difficult of all the spills to mitigate are those involving radio active materials. The following provides some general information on the expected impacts from each scenario. • Plumes – Caustic and flammable materials will have the greatest impact on the above ground utilities. When the released material has a density less than that of the surrounding air, a plume will form and be directed by the wind. Not much can be done regarding evaluation and restoration of aboveground utilities until the concentration of the material reduces to a point where no further damage is occurring to materials and/or the potential for an explosion and fire is eliminated. For caustic materials, the impact on aboveground utilities will be to the poles, wires, and cables, with an “eating away” of the materials in contact with the caustic material. For flammable materials, the biggest threat will come from damaged electrical lines that can spark and cause an explosion or otherwise ignite the materials. If the plume passes over open reservoirs used to store potable water, the water utility will need to implement an immediate testing program to determine what actions are needed to ensure that the water being delivered to the public is potable. • Pooled liquids – The biggest potential threat to utilities from pooled liquids is having such liquids enter the storm sewers. In cases where these sewers empty directly into a waterway, actions will need to be taken to stop the flow before it can enter the waterway, either by blocking entrance to the sewers or blocking the outflow locations. For sewer systems that flow into treatment plants, there is less of a hazard to the environment. However, the treat- ment facilities will most likely have to modify their processes to account for the introduction of the hazardous material. Should the spill occur in a stream or river feeding a reservoir used for potable water, the water utility will need to increase testing and treatment of the water entering the service lines and, depending on the material involved, may have to implement cleanup activities within the reservoir. • Radiological materials – A radiological release will produce less impact (damage) to util- ity systems than the other types of releases. However, the cleanup operations will be signifi- cantly more difficult. This is especially true if there is inclement weather associated with the release. Rain will wash the radioactive materials into the storm sewers, increasing the size of the impacted area. The restoration of these utilities to service will depend on the priorities established by the com- munity in collaboration with the provider(s). These priorities are typically based on community need, available resources, and the time required to bring the specific utility back into service. 5.3.3 Repair of Infrastructure The likelihood of significant physical damages to infrastructure beyond the incident site is typically small in a hazardous materials transportation incident (see Figure 5-7). However, many hazardous materials can have a deleterious impact on construction materials. In such cases, a community may need to implement a building evaluation process to determine the level of repairs necessary to restore facilities to their pre-incident condition. Because it is very difficult to completely seal a building, the impact of the hazardous materials involved in the incident could also extend to the interior, as well as the mechanical and electrical systems within a building. This same concept applies to other forms of infrastructure such as roads, bridges, utilities, etc. These systems will require evaluation and, potentially, testing to deter- mine the extent of damages. If damage to building materials is widespread, the community may consider creating an accelerated permitting process that will allow a more rapid plan review, expedited issuance of

94 A Compendium of Best Practices and Lessons Learned necessary building permits, and follow-on building inspections for the repair work. To expedite the process further, it may also make sense to consider either a reduced building permit fee or even the elimination of all, or part, of the fee. This is a process that has been used after other types of disasters to speed up the repair process and get people back into their homes and businesses more rapidly. The decision to implement accelerated programs will typically be made by the commu- nity’s elected officials, the recovery manager, and the public works department/department of building safety. Here again, the FOSC and representatives from the National Decontamina- tion Team should be able to provide valuable information relative to the impacts of hazardous materials on construction materials; however, this is ultimately a local government decision. If necessary, additional technical assistance will often be available through the FOSC to assist in this process. The recovery of systems that utilize the infrastructure, such as mass transportation, freight rail, etc., will depend on the overall impact to the area. For example, the restoration of rail service may be delayed if the incident involved a derailment. Likewise, bus service may be impacted if a tunnel or bridge were involved in the incident. These systems are vital to getting the commuting public moving and minimizing delays that can have a significant impact on businesses that were not directly affected by the incident. Early definition of alternate routes or alternate means of transportation can be highly effective in minimizing the economic impacts of the incident. If the event were to receive a declaration of major disaster from the President, assistance to the community and its infrastructure could be available through FEMA’s Public Assistance Program. If this program were activated, there are various activities in which the community will need to participate. These typically include the following: • Preparing a list of all damaged sites with a brief description of the damages; • Attending the applicant’s briefing conducted by FEMA and the state (a general briefing to all potential applicants on the parameters of the Public Assistance Program); Figure 5-7. Rail repairs on Galveston Island, Texas. (SOURCE: http://www.fema.gov/photolibrary/; Photo credit: FEMA/Mike Moore: FEMA News Photo)

Best Practices for Community Recovery Operations 95 • Attending the kickoff meeting, at which time the list of damaged sites will be provided to FEMA and appropriate schedules and programmatic timelines will be established and dis- cussed (meeting with the FEMA Public Assistance Coordinator Crew Leader, state representa- tive, and FEMA and state Project and Technical Specialists); • Working with FEMA and State Project Specialists at each site to develop the required project worksheets, which provide a description of the damages, an eligible scope of work for repair, and a cost estimate; • Completing the eligible work to restore the facility to pre-incident condition; and • Upon completion of all public assistance projects, attending the close-out briefing with FEMA and state representatives. 5.3.4 Summary of Infrastructure Recovery Operations Table 5-2 summarizes the components and actions addressed in the section on infrastructure recovery operations and can be adapted for local planning. 5.4 Operations for Environmental Recovery This report focuses on the sudden onset of hazardous materials contamination caused by a transportation incident. Long-term pollution clean-up is addressed in EPA’s Brownfield Pro- gram as well as other federal and non-federal programs and is not discussed in this report. Additional information on the Brownfield Program is available from the EPA at www.epa.gov/ brownfields. To date, most hazardous materials clean-up (see Figure 5-8) has consisted of washing down contaminants (dilution), attempting to contain foreign (toxic) substances to prevent spread and further contamination (removal and disposal), and attempting to restore the environment to pre-event conditions. Clean-up usually consists of calculated and intentional actions to rapidly rehabilitate damaged areas. The extent of clean-up activities can range from extensive operations like those on the Gulf Coast following the British Petroleum Deepwater Horizon oil spill in 2010, to simply restoring some productivity to degraded lands. Hazardous materials transportation incidents are handled on a case-by-case basis and remediation methods are based on the type and severity of the contaminants involved. Reme- diation in such cases is further complicated by the environment itself. Besides surface con- tamination, air, water, flora, fauna, and below ground ecosystems must also be considered. Additionally, the culture, economics, psychology, and ecology of the impacted area need to be addressed. Public information and media reinforcement often play key roles in allaying the commu- nity’s concerns. The role of media should not be overlooked or minimized, as there are numer- ous examples of how the media can shape public perceptions. Indeed, media “spin” may be more instrumental in public assurance than any accurate, documented facts regarding “safe” and “clean.” This is demonstrated in the following case study of lessons learned from the Cosco Busan oil spill (2007) in San Francisco Bay. On November 7, 2007, the M/V Cosco Busan departed the Port of Oakland located on the Oakland Estuary in San Francisco Bay. With visibility in the estuary limited by dense fog, the San Francisco Bar Pilot and the assist tug Revolution moved the ship into the channel and headed for the Golden Gate Bridge and the open sea. As the Cosco Busan passed the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge, there was a collision with the Delta Tower Pier, damaging the port side of the ship and the pier’s fendering. Three port wing tanks were

Short-Term Recovery Component Action Resources Barriers Barrier Resolution Debris Management Establish temporary debris storage and reduction site Local Public Works, Local Sanitation Dept., Local Planning Dept. No pre-defined storage and reduction areas Work with Local/State Resources Dept., Local Planning Department, and Public Works to identify potential sites Implement pre-approved debris contract for clearance from critical roads and highways Local Public Works, Local Sanitation Dept., Debris Contractor(s) No debris management plan Develop a debris management plan No pre-existing contracts Develop contracts with debris contractors (pre-incident bids) to provide debris removal and management services post-incident Develop/implement hold harmless agreements & right to entry for debris removal from private property, if required Local Legal Counsel, Local Public Works Implement pre-approved debris removal/disposal contract Local Public Works, Local Sanitation Dept., Debris Contractor(s) No pre-existing contracts Develop contracts with debris contractors (pre-incident bids) to provide debris removal and management services post-incident If the incident occurred in a shipping channel or other waterway, implement salvage contracts Local Public Works, Local Planning Dept., Local/State Office of Natural Resources, U.S. Coast Guard, Salvage Contractors No pre-existing contracts Develop contracts with debris/salvage contractors (pre- incident bids) to provide debris removal/salvage and management services post-incident Determine level of decontamination that will be required (how clean is clean?) using federal standards Local Public Works, Decontamination Contractors, Local/State Office of Natural Resources, Federal ESF #3 and #10 Lack of local resources Request assistance of National Decontamination Team Announce to the public the level of decontamination to be accomplished Public Information Officer (Fire, Law Enforcement, Public Works, Emergency Management, Sanitation) Decontaminate infrastructure within the "hot zone" if required Local Public Works, Decontamination Contractors, Local/State Office of Natural Resources, Federal ESF #3 Lack of local resources Request assistance of National Decontamination Team Repair/Restore Infrastructure Perform initial evaluation of damages to determine repair/restoration approach Local Public Works, Utility Providers, Contract Engineers, Contractors Develop an expedited permitting process for infrastructure damaged by the incident Local Building Department, Local Planning Dept., Public Works Restore essential infrastructure Local Public Works, Utility Providers, Contract Engineers, Contractors Table 5-2. Summary of infrastructure recovery operations.

Best Practices for Community Recovery Operations 97 Table 5-2. (Continued). Short-Term Recovery Component Action Resources Barriers Barrier Resolution Perform initial evaluation of damages to utilities and prioritize Local Planning Dept., Local Public Works, Utility Providers, Contract Engineers, Contractors Restore utilities Local Public Works, Utility Providers, Contract Engineers, Contractors Begin restoring transportation routes and mass transportation Local Planning Dept., Local Public Works, Transportation Providers, Contract Engineers, Contractors Intermediate Recovery Component Action Resources Barriers Barrier Resolution Debris Management Demobilize the temporary debris storage and reduction site and restore/decontaminate the site as required Local Public Works, Local Sanitation Dept., Site Management Contractor Decontamination Following decontamination, restore hot zone and properly dispose of decontamination solutions Local Public Works, Decontamination Contractors, Local/State Office of Natural Resources, Federal ESF #3 Announce to the public that decontamination operations are complete and reinforce the level of "clean" that was accomplished Public Information Officer (Fire, Law Enforcement, Public Works, Emergency Management, Sanitation) Demobilize decontamination operations Local Public Works, Decontamination Contractors, Local/State Office of Natural Resources, Federal ESF #3 Repair/Restore Infrastructure Restore high-priority infrastructure Local Public Works, Contract Engineers, Contractors Long-Term Recovery Component Action Resources Barriers Barrier Resolution Repair/Restore Infrastructure Restore remaining infrastructure Local Public Works, Contract Engineers, Contractors damaged, two of which contained fuel oil, and spilled 53,269 gallons of fuel oil into San Francisco Bay. 5.4.1 Summary of Environmental Recovery Operations Table 5-3 summarizes the components and actions addressed in the section on environmental recovery operations and can be adapted for local planning.

98 A Compendium of Best Practices and Lessons Learned (SOURCE: http://www.fema.gov/photolibrary; Photo credit: FEMA/Leif Skoogfors: FEMA News Photo) Figure 5-8. Oil spill cleanup, Coffeyville, Kansas. Case Study Incident Specific Preparedness Review (ISPR) M/V Cosco Busan Oil Spill in San Francisco Bay, Part II and Final Report, Multiple Federal, State, and Local Agencies, May 7, 2008 (http://www.uscg.mil/foia/CoscoBuscan/ part2.pdf) The information presented in this case study is taken directly from the referenced document. Shoreline Treatment Termination Endpoints The process of developing a shoreline cleanup termination endpoints document, while difficult and often painful, is critical to the end result. Termination endpoints can assist the UC [Unified Command] in logistical decisions about shoreline treatment technology, manpower requirements, and treatment aggressiveness. While the cleanup or treatment termination endpoints agreement is by no means a legal contract, it should be approached as one. It should be expected that, in particular, stakeholders who are inexperienced in the variability of oil spill responses will consider this a binding and inviolate document. Therefore, the agreement should be specific and should provide for a consensual process by which conditions in the agreement can be changed, even to the extent that it involves an arbitrator of some kind (often the FOSC [Federal On-Scene Coordinator]). Establishing one or several inspection spokespersons to represent the land managers and/or the communities can alleviate many of the scheduling concerns. This person(s) could be a trusted consultant paid for by the response or an experienced NGO [Non-Governmental Organization] representative or a state agency. Reducing the number of different individuals who must participate on the sign-off inspections will greatly increase scheduling flexibility and reduce delays in sign-off. It is important, however, that the individual chosen or hired to represent the stakeholder(s) is fully empowered to speak for the stakeholder(s) and runs no risk of being second-guessed. Closure and Reopening of Beaches It is critical to ensure that correct, timely information reaches local decisionmakers, particularly in the San Francisco Bay Area, where local, state and federal beaches and parks were affected. Failure to effectively close beaches to the public may adversely impact wildlife protection, oiled wildlife recovery, and public safety.

Best Practices for Community Recovery Operations 99 Information from the UC is essential for local land managers to make the most appropriate closure decisions. Such information should include current and predicted status of oiled beaches and response activities scheduled for those beaches. Without clear signage and prompt closures as needed, the public may assume the beach is safe and use it at potential risk to their health. The UC has no authority over closures but has an important role to play in communicating information to the myriad entities that do have that authority. This makes beach status communication extremely important. Land managers may look to the UC for information relative to beach management. Closure of Commercial Fisheries DFG [Department of Fish and Game], the Governor’s Office and federal trustees responsible for the regulation of fisheries must look to the UC, particularly the State Incident Commander, for information on oil spill amounts and trajectories, which they then will use in determining when, and if, fisheries should be closed. The recognized oil spill experts should be prepared to provide necessary data and guidance to fisheries decisionmakers in the event of a spill. Expeditious tests and information are needed on assessing the human health impacts of spills on fish and fisheries, particularly with respect to making a decision to reopen a fishery. NMFS [National Marine Fisheries Service], the State Incident Commander, and health officials were in consultation with the scientists in the UC as to fisheries management prior to the closure. The Governor’s Office, making the decision to close the crab fishery, may not have directly benefited from those discussions. Fisheries closures or restrictions during an oil spill for purposes of “market confidence” or potential for taint are appropriate, but require concerted communication efforts on the part of fisheries’ regulating agencies. While the full UC does not have authority to manage fisheries impacted by an oil spill, expertise and data within the UC should be expressly and readily provided to fishery management decisionmakers in a timely manner. Fishery resource managers and health officials should aggressively seek input from the expertise within the UC in order to take advantage of all science generated during a spill. This will ensure that any closures are science-based, data-rich, and well considered. To implement these recommendations it is necessary to look at potential barriers and how those barriers might be overcome. Barriers to Implementation 1. Adequate public participation. 2. Lack of Public Relations staff with needed technical expertise in relation to cleanup operations and the types of contaminant(s). Possible Resolution to Implementation Barriers: 1. The local community can encourage more public participation in establishing the parameters of the cleanup through their access to non-governmental organizations, business groups, and individuals within the community. 2. State and federal officials must bring Public Information Officers into the operation who have the experience necessary to adequately communicate the parameters of the operation with the general public.

Short-Term Recovery Component Action Resources Barriers Barrier Resolution Restore Environment Perform assessment to identify impacts on environment Local/State Office of Natural Resources, Local Planning Dept., EPA, Responsible Party Determine level of decontamination/restoration that will be required (how clean is clean?) using federal standards Responsible Party, Local Businesses, Public, Local/State Office of Natural Resources, Federal ESF #10 Develop restoration plan to include infrastructure and environment Responsible Party, Local Businesses, Community- Based Organizations, Public, Local Planning Dept., Local/State Office of Natural Resources, Federal ESF #10 Lack of adequate public participation Encourage more public participation through non-governmental organizations, business groups, and individuals within the community Lack of public relations staff with technical expertise in cleanup operations and types of contaminant(s) State and federal officials must bring Public Information Officers with experience to communicate the parameters of the operation Develop volunteer pool, Initiate contracts for cleanup Local Organizations, Legal Counsel, Responsible Party Train volunteers who will assist with the cleanup and restoration Responsible Party, Local Businesses, Public Works, Public, Local/State Office of Natural Resources, Federal ESF #10 Lack of trained personnel Assistance from EPA through ESF #10 to provide training to volunteer pool Announce beginning of environmental restoration reinforcing "how clean is clean?" Public Information Officer (Fire, Law Enforcement, Public Works, Emergency Management, Sanitation) relations staff with technical expertise Lack of public in cleanup operations and types of contaminant(s) State and federal officials must bring Public Information Officers with experience to communicate the parameters of the operation Restore critical elements of the environment per restoration plan Local Organizations, Local Public Works, Utility Providers, Public, Responsible Party Intermediate Recovery Component Action Resources Barriers Barrier Resolution Restore Environment Restore high-priority environmental elements, including wildlife, per restoration plan Local Organizations, Local Public Works, Utility Providers, Public, Responsible Party, EPA or USCG Long-Term Recovery Component Action Resources Barriers Barrier Resolution Restore Environment Restore remaining environmental elements Local Organizations, Local Public Works, Utility Providers, Public, Responsible Party, EPA or USCG Complete the cleanup and certify infrastructure as "clean and safe" Local Organizations, Local Public Works, Utility Providers, Public, Responsible Party, EPA or USCG Provide formal announcement to public Public Information Officer (Fire, Law Enforcement, Public Works, Emergency Management, Sanitation) Table 5-3. Summary of environmental recovery operations.

Best Practices for Community Recovery Operations 101 5.5 Operations for Economic Recovery Perhaps the greatest underlying challenges associated with long-term recovery from cata- strophic events stem from psychological and cultural issues. Americans tend to be steeped in nostalgia regardless of their experience, education, economic status, or professional level. After a major event, citizens typically yearn for a return to normal. However, normal is not necessarily an accurate representation of pre-disaster conditions. Further, there is an entrenched perception of “the way things should be,” including ideas of where and how commercial districts fit into an area’s physical layout. Historically, commercial districts were created to be easily accessible to the general public: stores and services were located adjacent to other business and public concerns, such as banks, libraries, theaters, etc., to facilitate patronage. Before the advent, and later dependency, on per- sonal transportation, these commercial areas were mostly within walking distance of residences, then as communities expanded into suburbs, by various modes of public transportation. As the country has grown, the concept of a central business district has also changed. Thus, the concept that applies in an urban community, such as Chicago, Illinois, is significantly different than the concept in a rural area such as Rochester, Washington. As a result, economic recovery approaches implemented in Chicago would likely not be very effective in Rochester, and vice versa. Conse- quently, each community has to assess its needs and develop its own approaches. This is most effectively accomplished through clear and continuing communication among community lead- ers, the public, and local businesses. 5.5.1 Short-Term Economic Revitalization Although there is considerable knowledge and experience on how to deal with common haz- ardous materials incidents, there is very little documented experience with situations where major decontamination operations are required and businesses lose their inventory, equipment, etc. In such cases, simply relocating to an available building doesn’t solve problems associated with restocking (retail and manufacturing) and obtaining replacement equipment (offices and industrial/manufacturing). In Section 4.4.2, this report addresses response actions that can affect recovery. Research performed by the Georgia Technology Research Institute (GTRI) and the Georgia Institute of Technology on the impacts of the Graniteville, South Carolina, train accident highlights the concept of response actions impacting recovery. Decisions made by the Unified Command during the response phase restricted the entry of crews to cleanup and repair the Avondale Textile Mill for some 17 days. During that time, the chlorine gas had mixed with the moisture in the air and particulates within the mill to create acidic conditions that corroded metal and other surfaces to a point where, after 18 months of attempting to repair and restore the equipment, the Avondale Textile Mill was forced to close permanently and 4,000 workers across four states lost their jobs.95 This situation highlights the precarious balance that exists between the Unified Command’s objective of providing for public health and welfare versus the business owner’s need to re-enter their facility to perform the cleanup and repairs neces- sary to resume operations. The short-term economic consequences of the Graniteville incident included the following:96 • Cost to the Norfolk Southern railroad company of approximately $40 million, including the corporation’s self-insurance retention (but no fines or penalties); • Additional payments from Norfolk Southern to individual area residents who were evacuated, but did not seek medical attention within 72 hours of the accident (over 5,400 residents were evacuated – additional settlement amounts are not available due to confidentiality require- ments associated with the settlements);

102 A Compendium of Best Practices and Lessons Learned • Separate property damage settlements (amount unknown); and • Claims for injuries or death (amount unknown). The following long-term consequences to date (cases are still being tried) include: • Closure of the Avondale Textile Mill, which put over 4,000 workers across four states out of work; • According to Avondale Textile Mill, more than $140 million was spent on the failed effort to cleanup and repair their facility prior to its closure; and • Norfolk Southern, through adjudicated court settlements to Avondale Textile Mill and its sur- viving entities, plus penalties levied through violations of the Clean Water Act (approximately $4 million), being ordered to pay a fine of $32,500 to the Superfund, purchase at least 3,000 fish to restock nearby Langley Pond, and contribute about $100,000 for a supplemental environ- mental project to plant vegetation along Horse Creek to improve water quality by decreasing erosion and sedimentation.97 Transportation Incidents Related to Hazardous Materials. Where decontamination is not required, or what is required is a simple process, local businesses will often be able to re-open within a matter of a few days to several weeks. Assistance to local businesses can include pro- grams like those discussed in Section 4.8.1. If the incident receives a declaration of major disaster from the President that activates the Individual Assistance Program, businesses may be eligible for SBA loans to supplement insurance settlements that will help them with lost revenue and repairing their facilities. Individual work- ers may also qualify for disaster-related unemployment benefits, housing assistance (including rental and mortgage assistance), as well as some relief from taxes. If the presidential declaration includes public assistance, economic loss to the community is not an eligible cost. Consequently, it is important for local communities to take a very pro- active approach to minimizing the impacts to business and the public in general. This will entail close coordination and communication with the local Chamber of Commerce, other business- related organizations, and the Unified Command managing the cleanup operations. Innovative solutions to the problems encountered will be necessary to effectively help local businesses, as presented in the following section. Disastrous Hazardous Materials Transportation Incidents. For disastrous hazardous materials transportation incidents where major decontamination operations will require busi- nesses within the impacted area (hot zone) to remain closed for a much longer period of time, there are limited solutions. It is quite likely that such an incident will change the complexion of a community’s business district significantly. When dealing with lost inventory and/or equipment, the task of re-ordering can be daunting, especially if the business will need to remain closed for a lengthy period of time. One possibility is that a business’ insurance may cover loss of inventory. However, in a widespread event, pro- cessing insurance claims can be a time-consuming process. In an evacuation/relocation scenario, this process may be further complicated by competing claims, loss of records, and inability of insurance companies to meet their financial obligations. A primary consideration here for the local community is relocating the business district to an area that is outside the impacted area. This will include answering questions such as • Is the area properly zoned for retail, commercial, manufacturing, or industrial uses? • Are suitable buildings readily available to move into, or does the area need to be built up? • Is the infrastructure available to support a relocation of the business district?

Best Practices for Community Recovery Operations 103 When faced with a disastrous hazardous materials incident, the community’s and even the county’s budget process may be severely challenged. Hard decisions will need to be made on priorities for spending. In such cases, city councils and county executive boards may also want to consider providing some form of assistance to the business community outside what those businesses might be eligible for through insurance and under federally sponsored recovery pro- grams. Such assistance may be easier to provide for small businesses, as their financial resources are typically more limited than larger businesses. Some possible assistance concepts include the following: • For small commercial and retail businesses, consideration could be given to providing the businesses with trailers or pre-built module(s) and entering into a landlord/renter arrange- ment with the business. These temporary structures could be co-located within a community- owned park or other large parcel of land owned by the community. • For moderately sized commercial and retail businesses, the community could help find space in existing business parks or even large shopping malls. Providing some form of rental subsi- dies would help defray their costs of getting back into business. Options for large businesses, manufacturing, or other industrial types of business are more limited. At the same time, these businesses typically have better financial resources that provide them with more options. However, incentives could be provided to those businesses to ensure they remain in the community. Examples include • Reduced property tax; • Reduction in business license costs; and • Reduced building permit fees for repairs associated with the incident. 5.5.2 Long-Term Economic Development Even without the motivation and impact of a disastrous event, communities, especially in a downturn economy, are looking for ways to improve their economic base and enhance fiscal health for residents. A presidentially declared event may provide additional opportunities for a community by making available resources that are only accessible during disaster response/ recovery periods. Hurricane Katrina (2005) has been the most extensive and costly domestic event to date. Many of the short- and long-term recovery operations have been documented through websites for the Louisiana Recovery Authority and the long-term community recovery program (initiated by FEMA), Louisiana Speaks. Planning points, goals, and implementation strategies can be used as a starting point and adapted to suit other community requirements. The following is the outline for “Economic and Workforce Goals” from Louisiana Speaks (http:// www.louisianaspeaks-parishplans.org/IndSectorHomepage_RecoveryGoals.cfm?SectorID=2). • Provide financial assistance for small businesses; • Ensure that companies have access to qualified workers; • Revamp the state’s tax structure and economy; • Develop a strategy for providing assistance to rural areas to help them increase wealth and create quality jobs; • Develop a strategy to facilitate entrepreneurship and small business development; • Develop new industries that take advantage of rebuilding efforts and/or regional resources and create high-quality jobs; • Provide technical assistance for small businesses and assistance for the proven/dominant industries; and • Improve business/investor confidence.

104 A Compendium of Best Practices and Lessons Learned Strategies for economic growth in the post-disaster environment incorporate economic diver- sification, expanding and enhancing innovation clusters, supporting new business growth, and mitigating disaster impacts on existing businesses. When disaster strikes, these strategies can help lead to the rapid deployment of economic resources for recovery. A critical component of economic development in disaster recovery is planning and tak- ing appropriate action to mitigate the economic impact. Successful operations usually require that the community employ a comprehensive approach, encourage collaboration between and among diverse groups, and develop agreement on the community’s long-term economic goals.98 Economic development is driven from within a community by its needs and efforts. Marketing strategies are vital to economic growth, as are available materials, resources, and a trained work- force. In this regard, experience shows the following: • The power of the press can make or break recovery efforts; • Communities need to be proactive in their own rehabilitation; • Communities outside an impacted area have little to no stake in redevelopment; • The impetus and incentives to keep dollars within the community need to be created; and • Outside assistance can be very helpful, but ultimately recovery happens from within. The reality is that some businesses faced with the need to relocate will either relocate to the area provided by the community; choose to leave the community, or even the state, for another location; or choose to permanently close their doors. These issues are all economically based and determined by the business owner and their shareholders or other controlling bodies. The community will have little or no impact on this decision. In the aftermath of the Graniteville, South Carolina, incident, an economic development partnership was formed by Aiken and Edgefield Counties to help address the long-term eco- nomic recovery issues. Their efforts to revitalize the Savannah River Basin were supported by the South Carolina Department of Commerce, along with other regional entities, and funded through the provisions of the U.S. Department of Commerce Economic Development Admin- istration’s investment program for “Suddenly and Severely Impacted Areas.” The Savannah River Basin Textile Recovery Plan and Graniteville Redevelopment Plan was published on Janu- ary 7, 2009.99 The closing paragraph of the Graniteville redevelopment section (pages 24–25) reinforces that re-establishing a community’s economy to pre-incident conditions may take years following the event. The overall redevelopment initiatives for the Graniteville/Vaucluse/Warrenville area are estimated to cost approximately $368 million and are expected to generate almost 3,600 new employment opportunities and an annual payroll of more than $118 million upon complete build out, which is expected to take 5 to 10 years. 5.5.3 Additional Economic Development Funding Resources A major funding source for local communities is the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) provided by HUD, a flexible program that provides communities with resources to address a wide range of community development needs, such as economic redevelopment of affected areas. For activities in a disaster area, communities may request modification of some of the CDBG program requirements to facilitate disaster assistance. Communities may then use their CDBG funds for short-term assistance if such activities are not funded by FEMA or the SBA. These activities include the following:100 • Clearance of debris; • Provision of extra security patrols; • Demolition, clearance and/or reconstruction of damaged property posing an immediate threat to public safety;

Best Practices for Community Recovery Operations 105 • Emergency reconstruction of essential water, sewer, electrical, and telephone facilities; • Provision of a variety of relief services to individuals and businesses; and • Matching FEMA or other aid programs. Table 5-4 presents several examples of innovative ways of using CDBG funds for disaster recovery. The examples are from the State of Louisiana, through the Louisiana Recovery Author- ity following Hurricanes Katrina (2005) and Rita (2005); Hancock County, Mississippi, through the Mississippi Development Authority following Hurricane Katrina (2005); and the State of Iowa through the Iowa Department of Economic Development following the 2008 floods. Program Description State of Louisiana SOURCE: Action Plan Amendment Number 2 for Disaster Recovery Funds, Louisiana Recovery Authority, August 18, 2006, http://www.doa.la.gov/cdbg/dr/plans/Amend2_ED-Infra_Approved_06-09-13.pdf and Action Plan Amendment Number 3 for Disaster Recovery Funds, Louisiana Recovery Authority, http://www.doa.la.gov/cdbg/dr/plans/Amend3-WorkforceDev-Approved_06-08-10.pdf Small Firm Recovery Loan and Grant Program Provides assistance to small firms that are deemed to have a chance to survive, contribute to the economy, and maintain and create jobs. Funds consist of small grants to reimburse for tangible losses and technical assistance to support the firms. Firms assisted would be those expected to survive and pay back the funds if given a loan. Technical Assistance to Small Firms Contracts with community-based organizations and other service providers allowing them to provide technical assistance to small firms, including nonprofits that have been adversely affected by the hurricanes and/or provide assistance to entrepreneurs or individuals seeking to start a new firm that would be located in the impacted area. Long-Term Recovery Loan Guarantee Program The goal of creating a longer-term loan program is to motivate banks to provide loans to viable small firms who may have experienced difficulty receiving loans from conventional lenders or the SBA because of complications following the hurricanes. Louisiana instituted a Disaster Bridge Loan Program to bridge the gap that exists from the time that insurance pays off losses or an SBA disaster loan is funded. These local and regional banks have now identified the need for longer-term capital to continue the recovery started with the bridge loans. Louisiana Tourism Marketing Program Prior to the storms, the tourism and cultural industries combined sustained 260,000 jobs for Louisiana residents. The significant loss of tourists means that thousands of small businesses that make up the character of south Louisiana are at serious risk of closing very soon. Even the most viable and successful of these companies have been hanging on, waiting for their customer base to return. However, their tourism customers have not yet returned, and many local customers do not yet have the ability and/or confidence to spend money. This fund will support a national campaign and other initiatives designed to bring out-of-state travelers back to the New Orleans region, Southeast Louisiana, and Southwest Louisiana. Recovery Workforce Training Program The loss of jobs from the hurricanes impacted every sector from healthcare and construction to retail and tourism. The Recovery Workforce Training Program addresses the loss of jobs and the re- employment of our workforce as a top priority in the recovery of the impacted areas and the long-term recovery of the state’s overall economy. The program is centered on three interrelated factors critical to the recovery of Louisiana’s economy: the return of the displaced workforce; the retention of the existing workforce; and a concerted effort to increase skills development for new jobs in sectors related to the immediate and long-term recovery and rebuilding efforts and the future of our economy. The RWTP will develop a highly skilled and well-trained workforce to meet the immediate and long-term needs of the six identified recovery sectors: Construction, Healthcare, Transportation, Advanced Manufacturing, Oil & Gas, and Cultural Sector. Table 5-4. Innovative assistance programs for economic recovery. (continued on next page)

106 A Compendium of Best Practices and Lessons Learned If the incident receives a declaration of major disaster from the President of the United States, there are several other federal programs that can also be employed to assist communities. One of these programs is the Community Disaster Loan Program. This is a loan to the local community to “ . . . maintain existing governmental functions or to expand such functions to meet disaster- related needs.”101 The amount of the loan, as noted in Section 206.361b of Subpart K, 44 CFR, is Program Description Hancock County Community Revitalization Program Projects may include more than one activity and include • The acquisition of real property (including air rights, water rights, and other interest therein); • The acquisition, construction, reconstruction, or installation of public works, facilities (except for buildings for the general conduct of government), and site or other improvements; • Special projects directed to the removal of material and architectural barriers which restrict the mobility and accessibility of elderly and handicapped persons; • Clearance, demolition, removal of buildings and improvements, and movement of structures and other sites; • Projects that rehabilitate, preserve, and restore historic properties; and • Projects that rehabilitate commercial or industrial buildings. State of Iowa SOURCE: Disaster Recovery Business Assistance Programs, Iowa Department of Economic Development http://www.iowalifechanging.com/jumpstart/business_rental.aspx Expanded Business Rental Assistance Program Provides financial assistance to a business located in, or planning to locate in, a business rental space that was physically damaged by the 2008 natural disaster(s). Assistance will be in the form of rental assistance to help offset building rental lease payments for a maximum of 6 months. This program also provides assistance in the form of reimbursement for up to 75 percent of business expenses associated with the purchase of machinery and equipment, office equipment, furniture, supplies, and inventory. Loan Interest Supplement Program Provides assistance in the form of interest supplements to businesses who have obtained physical disaster loans or economic injury disaster loans from an eligible lender. Commercial Rental Revenue Program Assists with cash flow for commercial building owners to offset the loss of revenue from rental space that was physically damaged by the disaster. Residential Landlord Business Support Program Compensates landlords for lost residential rental revenue for providing affordable housing, whose rental units were physically damaged by the disaster. Hancock County, Mississippi SOURCE: Economic Development Program Amendment 4 Modification 3, Mississippi Development Authority, February 2, 2009, http://www.msdisasterrecovery.com/documents/ED_Amendment_4_Modification_3_Final_2-24-09.pdf and Hancock County Long Term Recovery CDBG Disaster Recovery Program Amendment 7 Modification 1, Mississippi Development Authority, March 30, 2009, http://www.msdisasterrecovery.com/documents/Hancock_County_AP_Amendment_7_Mod_1_Final_Version_Public_Comments20090429.p df Hancock County Job Generation Fund The primary objective of this loan program is to provide capital to small businesses most in need for the intended purposes of stimulating job growth and rebuilding in slum and blighted areas. Loan proceeds may be used • To repair or replace machinery; • To purchase inventory, furnishings, and fixtures; • For working capital/operating expenses (including rent, utilities, and payroll); and • For the rehabilitation of a building. Table 5-4. (Continued).

Best Practices for Community Recovery Operations 107 based on need and shall not exceed 25 percent of the local government’s annual operating budget for the fiscal year in which the disaster occurs or $5 million.102 5.5.4 Summary of Economic Recovery Operations Table 5-5 summarizes the components and actions addressed in the section on economic recovery operations and can be adapted for local planning. Short-Term Recovery Component Action Resources Barriers Barrier Resolution Long-Term Recovery Planning Hold community meeting(s) to determine vision and direction for revitalizing the communit y Local Disaster Recovery Manager, Local Economic Development Dept., Local Planning Dept., Local Chamber of Commerce, Other Community-Based Organizations, Public Develop long-term recovery plan bas ed on direct and indirect damages identifying potential projects, funding sources, and priorities aimed at revitalizing the community in line with community vision Recovery Coordinator, Local Economic Development Dept., Local Planning Dept., Local Chamber of Commerce, Other Community-Based Organizations Assistance to Impacted Businesses Implement programs for business reimbursements developed in negotiations with Responsible Party and EPA Local Government Elected Officials, Legal Counsel, Financial Institutions, Chamber of Commerce, Community-Based Organizations Lack of authorities of local government Develop ordinance or resolutions to provide authorities Identify available space within the community to which businesses can relocate Local Planning Dept., Local Government Economic Development, Real Estate Businesses, Chamber of Commerce, Community- Based Organizations Develop a program to assist local business to relocate to new/temporary facilities Local Government Elected Officials, Legal Counsel, Financial Institutions, Chamber of Commerce, Community-Based Organizations Lack of authorities of local government Develop ordinance or resolutions to provide authorities Develop programs for local business to address economic losses not covered by negotiated settlement with Responsible Party Local Government Elected Officials, Legal Counsel, Financial Institutions, Chamber of Commerce, Community-Based Organizations Economic Base If community vision includes growth of the economic base, identify types of businesses desired and locations and identify modifications to infrastructure required Local Government Economic Development, Legal Counsel, Local Planning Dept., Financial Institutions, Chamber of Commerce, Community-Based Organizations, State and Local Economic Development Zoning Requirements may restrict the community’s ability to re-establish and/or expand the economic base Review and update/modify Comprehensive Plans; development regulations Table 5-5. Summary of economic recovery operations. (continued on next page)

108 A Compendium of Best Practices and Lessons Learned Intermediate Recovery Component Action Resources Barriers Barrier Resolution Working with the identified funding sources, begin development of grant applications Local Economic Development Dept., Local Chamber of Commerce, Other Community-Based Organizations, Public Funding source for local match on grants Develop public-private partnerships Assistance to Impacted Businesses Implement program to assist local business to relocate Chamber of Commerce, Community-Based Organizations, Real Estate Agents Implement programs for local business to address economic losses not covered by negotiated settlement with Responsible Party Financial Institutions, Chamber of Commerce, Community-Based Organizations Lack of funds Develop and submit Community Development Block Grant applications Economic Base Implement public relations campaigns State and Local Economic Development, Public Information Officers Lack of funds Apply for and secure Economic Development Grants Perform initial environmental studies to identify what the community needs to do to bring in more business and industry Local Planning Department, State and Local Economic Development, Local Chamber of Commerce Long-Term Recovery Component Action Resources Barriers Barrier Resolution Long-Term Recovery Planning Implement the Long-Term Recovery Plan Local Economic Development Dept., Local Chamber of Commerce, Other Community-Based Organizations, Public Economic Base Negotiate agreements with new business and industry Elected Officials, State and Local Economic Development Implement infrastructure improvements for new business and industry Public Works, New Businesses or Industry, Contractors Long-Term Recovery Planning Identify lead agencies and organizations for potential projects Local Disaster Recovery Manager, Community Based- Organizations, Public Develop schedule for implementation of Long- Term Recovery Plan Local Planning Dept., Local Economic Development Dept., Local Chamber of Commerce, Other Community-Based Organizations, Public 5.6 Summary of Case Studies Table 5-6 provides a summary of the recovery operations case studies presented in order of appearance in this section. Table 5-5. (Continued).

Best Practices for Community Recovery Operations 109 Lessons Learned/Best Practices Summary Findings: Disaster Recovery—FEMA’s Long-Term Assistance was Helpful to State and Local Governments but had Some Limitations (GAO-10-404), GAO, March 2010 (http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-404) • Conduct damage and safety assessments in public and private structures; • Restore transportation, communication, utilities, and other essential services; and • Implement short-term and long-term economic and community recovery practices. Case Study: After Action Report Graniteville Train Wreck – January 2005, Aiken County Government (www.llis.gov) • Joint training between EOC personnel and CP responders is needed. • South Carolina Emergency Management Department is developing the concept of a County EOC team (comprised of multiple county personnel) as well as an Incident Response Support Team to assist CP personnel with various activities (facility needs, communication needs, etc.). • Reverse 911 may be useful for personnel recall (pre- designated call groups) and training on the reverse 911 process is needed. • EOC PIO [Public Information Officer] suggests meetings with local agency PIOs to discuss lessons learned and preparedness for future incidents. Case Study: State Response to the Graniteville Train Derailment: Lessons Learned, Team Visionary Collective under the Mentorship of Ron Fisher, May 27, 2006 (www.llis.gov) Recommendation: To prevent future confusion about residents who should evacuate or shelter-in-place, city officials will not refer to the area as 1 mile or 2 miles from the hazardous site. All instructions will be more specific and referenced by street name. Giving more specific instructions should minimize confusion and reduce risk. Recommendation: All future accidents involving hazardous materials should have reflective arrows pointing toward the direction of safety so that people do not travel toward the scene of the accident. Case Study: After Action Report Graniteville Train Wreck – January 2005, Aiken County Government (www.llis.gov) Improvement Items • ACEMS attempted to medically monitor other responders, but they were entering incident area without EMS coordination. • Triage tags were not utilized, although they were available. • The on-duty EMS supervisor must relinquish control of outside incidents and focus on major incident being responded to. • Mass casualty plan not implemented initially due to communications difficulties. • Communication of patient status at decon was not well- coordinated with Red Cross shelter representatives. Persons at shelters were registered, but if they were sent to the hospital or left with friends/family, their status was unknown. Case Study: Mortuary Services: Victim Identification and Record Creation During a Mass Casualty Incident, Lessons Learned Information Sharing (www.llis.gov) The Rhode Island Station Club Fire After-Action Report recommends that medical examiners should consider using the DMORT VIP form from the outset of a mass casualty incident in order to expedite the victim identification and record creation process. Case Study: Incident Specific Preparedness Review (ISPR) M/V Cosco Busan Oil Spill in San Francisco Bay Part II and Final Report, multiple federal, state, and local agencies, May 7, 2008 (http://www.uscg.mil/foia/CoscoBuscan/ part2.pdf) • Shoreline treatment termination endpoints • Closure and reopening of beaches • Closure of commercial fisheries Table 5-6. Summary of recovery operations case studies. (continued on next page)

110 A Compendium of Best Practices and Lessons Learned Lessons Learned/Best Practices Summary Case Study: State Response to the Graniteville Train Derailment: Lessons Learned, Team Visionary Collective under the Mentorship of Ron Fisher, May 27, 2006 (www.llis.gov) Recommendation: An organizational structure should be established between agencies as soon as the different agencies begin working together so that there is no confusion with the order of hierarchy. Case Study: After Action Report Graniteville Train Wreck – January 2005, Aiken County Government (www.llis.gov) Improvement Items • EOC did not have press releases prior to distribution at CP. Hard copies of press releases were not initially distributed at press conferences. • Unmanned radio stations limited ability for local alerts to be made. • Initial notification did not go out through NOAA Weather Radio, although it was utilized later in the day. • EOC PIO could not get response from PIOs at CP to coordinate messages for media at EOC. • Citizens in shelters had no official information source. • Aiken County Help Line (211) received calls immediately but had no info to provide initially. The 211 line received updated information via television news report. As a result, 211 personnel did not learn key information such as the shelter-in-place message that had been transmitted to residents. • The 211 line is not accessible via cell phone. Additional number needs to be provided. • EOC was receiving updated information via television news reports. • Media staging area was located too close to CP. Table 5-6. (Continued).