A Compendium of Best Practices and Lessons Learned for Improving Local Community Recovery from Disastrous Hazardous Materials Transportation Incidents (2012)

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D-1 The following best practice relates specifically to an attack using a radiological dispersion device (RDD); however, the concepts presented relating to the development of a decontamina- tion plan are applicable for any incident that requires decontamination. The information pre- sented in this appendix is taken directly from the referenced document. Sample Decontamination Plan “Radiological Incident Response: Decontamination of Buildings and Public Sites,” Lessons Learned Information Sharing (www.llis.gov) DEVELOPING A SITE DECONTAMINATION PLAN FOR AN URBAN AREA An RDD attack would likely occur in an urban area. Emergency managers should consider developing site decontamination plans specifically tailored to metropolitan areas within their jurisdictions. Planners must be aware that decontamination activities following an RDD incident will be extremely complex and require a coordinated federal, state, and local effort. Planners should take into consideration the sociopolitical, geographical, geological, and architectural characteristics of possible target areas when planning for cleanup and site restoration activities. Experts believe that recovery planners will necessitate extensive radiological data to successfully perform site decontamination after an RDD incident. Planners should establish mechanisms to coordinate recovery managers’ requirements with organizations that will likely perform radiological data collection after an RDD incident. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Preparedness Directorate’s draft guidance, Protective Action Guides for Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) and Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) Incidents, advises planners to adopt a site-specific approach to RDD contamination. It might not always be possible to reduce the level of contamination to pre-incident levels. Jurisdictions may expect to return contaminated areas to normal conditions if the RDD impacted area is relatively small. However, “if the impacted area is very large, then achieving even very low criteria for remediation of the entire area and/or maintaining existing land uses may not be practicable.” PUBLICLY ACCEPTED LEVEL OF CONTAMINATION The success of cleanup operations could depend on several factors, including the level of residual radioactivity deemed acceptable by the public. Emergency planners should be aware that many people could interpret “decontamination” to mean the lack of any radioactivity. Jurisdictions should take into account public perception and expectations when planning for site decontamination after an RDD event. Clear public communication is essential for jurisdictions to effectively manage perception and expectations of the population. For more information on public information, please refer to the lessons learned information sharing best practice document, Radiological Dispersal Device Incident Response Planning: Public Information. A P P E n D I x D Sample Decontamination Plan (continued on next page)

D-2 A Compendium of Best Practices and Lessons Learned Sample Decontamination Plan (Continued). “Radiological Incident Response: Decontamination of Buildings and Public Sites,” Lessons Learned Information Sharing (www.llis.gov) Example: Following the 1987 cesium-137 release in Goiânia, Brazil, the local population insisted that exposure levels had to be returned to pre-incident levels. Many residents of contaminated houses did not understand the concept of an acceptable level of contamination. They insisted that their homes be entirely free of cesium-137 after decontamination and refused to use clothes, furniture, and cooking supplies if they showed any radioactivity. Scientists who took part in the cleanup process testified, “This implied that the levels of intervention as defined, for example, in the Basic Standards for Radiological Protection (IAEA 1996) became no more than reference values. Due to the extensive public pressure, the cleanup and site restoration resulted in an excessive amount of radioactive waste (total amount: 3,500 m3 [cubic meters], stored in over 6,000 containers, weighing some 6,000 T [tons]) as compared with the amount that should have been removed on the basis of solely preventing an unacceptable radiological risk to the population.” DECONTAMINATION PLANS Experts believe that radiological decontamination of metropolitan areas following an RDD event could be a lengthy and costly process. Decontamination in an urban setting could close off an incident area for months. It could require cleanup workers to remove radioactive particles from the cracks of buildings, streets, parks, sewage systems, buses, cars, and infrastructure. In some cases, sidewalks, asphalt, and the top layer of soil may have to be removed. The vegetation also may have to be cut down and disposed of. Sandblasting or chemical agents such as acids might have to be used to dissolve rust and mineral deposits in which radioactive contamination is trapped. For more information on decontamination issues in an urban setting, please also refer to the lessons learned information sharing, lesson learned document, Radiological Incident Response: Decontamination of Buildings and Public Sites. The national Council on Radiation Protection and Measurement report, Management of Terrorist Events Involving Radioactive Material, encourages emergency planers to tailor site remediation procedures to both the RDD’s effects and the unique needs of local residents. The length of the cleanup effort should be balanced, for example, with the needs of residents and businesses to access hospitals, bridges, utility plants, and other essential infrastructures as quickly as possible. Emergency managers should consider the following aspects when establishing site decontamination plans specifically tailored to metropolitan areas: • Contamination distribution: The distribution of radioactive material can be non-homogeneous or homogeneous. Experts believe that following an RDD event, the dispersal of radiological material would likely be uneven and the radiation level in different areas would vary depending on meteorological factors, such as wind speed and precipitation. Plans should include provisions for the cleanup of hot spots as well as moderately contaminated areas. • Contamination location: Part of the radioactive material will deposit on buildings’ external surfaces. However, some of the release may contaminate buildings’ interiors through ventilation systems, cracks, and open doors and windows. Plans should detail provisions for decontamination of building exteriors, sidewalks, streets, parks, and sewage as well as building interiors, including walls and floors, carpeting, ventilation ducts, etc. Transport systems and water supplies may also need to be decontaminated. • Contamination type: Radioactive material may be released as a liquid spill or in solid form. Contaminated dust that has settled on the external surfaces of buildings may be common. Some radionuclides also may be absorbed by porous materials, such as concrete or wood, or become embedded in soil and plants. Plans should include provisions for cases when the only disposal method for contaminated soil is large-scale removal of contaminated dirt.

Sample Decontamination Plan D-3 • Decontamination or demolition: Decontamination of some structures could be impractical or impossible in some cases. The decision to decontaminate or to demolish a structure should be made on a case-by-case basis. Planners should take into account several elements when deciding between these two options, including operation costs; labor, equipment, and material needed; liquid and solid waste processing and disposal capabilities; overall level of contamination; and rebuilding costs. Planners should also take into account the social, historical, or religious significance of buildings. RECOVERY MANAGER AND TECHNICAL WORKING GROUPS Jurisdictions should identify a recovery manager and subject-matter experts who could help plan cleanup activities prior to an RDD event. The Department of Homeland Security Preparedness Directorate’s draft guidance, Protective Action Guides for Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) and Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) Incidents, advises that long-term decisions should be made with the involvement of stakeholders and incident-specific technical groups of subject matter experts. This guidance includes a list of technical working groups to which planners can refer. The national nuclear Security Administration’s Municipal Radiological/nuclear Emergency Preparedness Plan states that municipal, state, and federal authorities should appoint a recovery manager at the end of the radiological emergency phase. The recovery manager will be charged with assessing incident conditions, evaluating alternative decontamination options, and formulating and implementing the recovery plan. The recovery manager should also designate a recovery team with representatives from federal, state, and local organizations. RESPONSIBILITIES DURING CLEANUP AND SITE RESTORATION Decontamination in a metropolitan area after an RDD event will likely be extensive and require a large amount of resources and specialized technical expertise. Decontamination will probably be a collaborative effort involving local, state, and federal organizations. In extreme cases, international assistance may become necessary: • The decontamination of radioactive foci in Goiânia, Brazil, in 1987 took 6 months and involved 550 cleanup workers and experts from 10 countries. Brazilian authorities informed the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) soon after the accident was discovered. They requested IAEA’s assistance under the terms of the international Convention on Assistance in the Case of a nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency. • On April 26, 1986, the Chernobyl-4 reactor in Ukraine exploded, releasing an estimated 100- 150 million curies of radioactivity into the atmosphere. The incident killed 30 people, including 28 from radiation exposure. According to the United nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, 237 power plant workers and emergency responders exhibited signs and symptoms of acute radiation syndrome with 134 of these cases confirmed by clinical diagnosis. The Soviet government acknowledged the incident only after the drifting plume had set off radiation alarms in a nuclear plant in Sweden nearly 3 days after the event. From 1986 to 1988, the Soviet leadership coordinated decontamination in the region. In 1989, the United nations (Un), other international organizations, and all member states started providing assistance to Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine. In 1990, the Un Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs established an Inter-agency Task Force on Chernobyl to supervise long-term management activities. The Un shifted its strategy on Chernobyl from emergency relief to long-term recovery and development in 2002. PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS DURING CLEANUP AND SITE RESTORATION Experts advise jurisdictions to establish partnerships with private-sector groups to coordinate cleanup and site restoration. Many private-sector groups are likely to play a critical role during cleanup and site restoration. An RDD incident could quickly deplete public resources available in many jurisdictions. Private-sector groups can be called to fill critical gaps in personnel, equipment, and expertise during the recovery process. Sharing scarce resources can enhance both the public and private sectors’ recovery capabilities following such an incident. (continued on next page)

D-4 A Compendium of Best Practices and Lessons Learned Sample Decontamination Plan (Continued). “Radiological Incident Response: Decontamination of Buildings and Public Sites,” Lessons Learned Information Sharing (www.llis.gov) DECONTAMINATION TECHNIQUES A number of decontamination techniques may be available for jurisdictions following an RDD event. Emergency response organizations should establish plans including pre-selected techniques based on local requirements, needs, and achievable goals. Several resources are available to help recovery planners select decontamination techniques following an RDD event, including the following: • Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Cleanup: Technologies, and Tools, which lists various resources, publications, and programs; • EPA, Workshop on Decontamination, Cleanup, and Associated Issues for Sites Contaminated with Chemical, Biological, or Radiological Materials report; • EPA, Office of Air and Radiation, Radiation Protection Division’s Center for Remediation Technology and Tools, Technology Screening Guide for Radioactively Contaminated Sites; and • Headquarters, Department of the Army, Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps, nBC Decontamination Operations, field manual no. 3-5, Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-37.3. DECONTAMINATION OF FOOD AND WATER An RDD attack could cause contamination of consumer goods such as water, food, and other commodities. Emergency response organizations need to prepare for the decontamination of food and water supplies. Resources available to help emergency planners select food and water decontamination techniques include • Department of Health and Human Services, Food and Drug Administration, Center for Devices and Radiological Health’s Accidental Radioactive Contamination of Human Food and Animal Feeds: Recommendations for State and Local Agencies; and • Headquarters, Department of the Army’s Health Service Support in a nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Environment: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures field manual. The Advisory Team for Environment, Food, and Health is a federal asset available upon request to provide recommendations on protective actions to prevent or minimize exposure from contaminated milk, food, and water; to dispose of contaminated food and livestock; etc. After an RDD event, the only feasible option may be the disposal of contaminated food and water supplies. Indeed, the public may be reluctant to purchase and consume decontaminated goods from an incident area, fearing health consequences. IDENTIFICATION OF A SHORT-TERM STORAGE SITE FOR CONTAMINATED WASTE An RDD event could create a large amount of contaminated debris. The decontamination process itself can also generate contaminated materials, such as equipment and protective gear, which need to be discarded instead of decontaminated. Jurisdictions are advised to identify a suitable site that could be used for the short-term storage of contaminated waste materials following an RDD event. Planners should consider the following elements when planning to establish a short-term waste storage site: • Site geography and structure: Experts generally agree that the temporary storage site should be located in an isolated area. The site should be large enough to house a considerable amount of waste materials and covered to withstand adverse meteorological conditions. The storage site also could have platforms to accommodate the waste containers as well as barriers, embankments, and ditches to retain contamination spills. • Transportation: Plans could include provisions for transporting contaminated waste from the incident site to the short-term waste storage site. Plans also should establish mechanisms to monitor and, when necessary, to decontaminate personnel and vehicles after each trip. A police escort and personnel who are trained and equipped to manage radiological emergencies should accompany each shipment.

Sample Decontamination Plan D-5 • Security and safety: Jurisdictions should have provisions in place to supply and secure the short- term storage site. These provisions could include guards patrolling the site, a clearly demarcated perimeter enclosed with fences or walls, and signs that identify the site as radioactive. Plans also could include monitoring and sampling systems to track radiation buildup at the security fences and inside the site. LONG-TERM MONITORING An RDD event will have consequences that will last months or years afterwards. Jurisdictions should consider planning for long-term monitoring of the incident site, the population, and the food and water supply for years after the event. Issues that jurisdictions might need to consider when planning for long- term management of an RDD event can include • Establishing, maintaining, and regularly updating a register for long-term monitoring of victims and onsite emergency response personnel: Health departments are advised to plan to establish a registry of victims and onsite emergency response personnel at the onset of an RDD emergency response operation. The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) can assist local and state health departments in establishing a registry of potentially exposed individuals. HHS is responsible for long-term public monitoring and supports follow on personal data collection. HHS also can track victim treatment and long-term health effects. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has developed several resources for population monitoring following a nuclear or radiological event. These resources may help federal, state, and local public health officials; first responders; emergency management service managers; and other officials planning for initial and long-term monitoring of the population following an RDD event. CDC, Public Health Training network Satellite Broadcast and Webcast, Preparing for Radiological Population Monitoring and Decontamination: This broadcast helps public health workers prepare to conduct short- and long-term monitoring of people affected by a nuclear or radiological terrorist incident or by an accidental release of radioactive materials into the environment. CDC, national Center for Environmental Health, Division of Environmental Hazards and Health Effects, Radiation Studies Branch, Roundtable on Population Monitoring Following a nuclear/ Radiological Incident: The report includes sections on population identification, training, logistics, equipment, etc. • Establishing mechanisms for long-term monitoring of soil, food, water, and livestock: Monitoring soil, food, water, and livestock may also be necessary to validate the efficacy of the restoration efforts and to help people near the incident site cope with the long-term consequences of an RDD event. Jurisdictions are advised to establish programs for the long-term monitoring of soil, food, water sources, and livestock. Long-term monitoring also may help people feel more comfortable about consuming food and water from the incident area, curbing economic losses. The national Response Framework’s nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex states that federal resources are provided at the request of, and in support of, the affected state. HHS is charged with coordinating federal support for monitoring people and decontamination in consultation with the coordinating agency.