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Context of the Study

While there are examples of successful weapon systems acquisition programs within the U.S. Air Force (USAF), many of the programs are still incurring cost growth, schedule delays, and performance problems. The USAF now faces serious challenges in acquiring and maintaining its weapons systems as it strives to maintain its current programs; add new capabilities to counter evolving threats; and reduce its overall program expenditures. The federal budget cycle, characterized by short and volatile planning horizons, also places serious hurdles in the path of effective planning and execution of acquisition programs and inventory maintenance.

In 2009, in response to several events, including contract protests and budget overruns, and the subsequent reports issued by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the Secretary of the Air Force (SecAF) and the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition (SAF/AQ) met with GAO leadership to discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the Air Force acquisition process.¹ At that time, the Air Force leaders also requested that the Center for Naval Analyses conduct an independent assessment of Air Force acquisition. These assessments concluded with a summary of concerns in five critical areas:²

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¹ Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition), “Acquisition Improvement Plan,” May 4, 2009, p. 1, http://www.dodbuzz.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/05/acquisition-improvement-plan-4-may-09.pdf.

² Ibid, p. 2.

1. Degraded training, experience, and quantity of the acquisition workforce;
2. Overstated and unstable requirements that are difficult to evaluate during source selection;
3. Under-budgeted programs, changing of budgets without acknowledging impacts on program execution, and inadequate contractor cost discipline;
4. Incomplete source selection training that has lacked “lessons learned” from the current acquisition environment, and delegation of decisions on leadership and team assignments for major defense acquisition programs (MDAPs) source selections too low; and
5. Unclear and cumbersome internal Air Force organization for acquisition and program executive officer (PEO) oversight.

Numerous studies, papers, and public commentary have repeatedly raised similar concerns over the last two decades. Additionally, the committee found throughout the study process that many of these concerns appear to continue to plague Air Force acquisition programs today. The need to reduce cost overruns and schedule delays and to remedy performance issues has helped push the discussion in the Air Force acquisition community toward the need to “own the technical baseline,” a concept that, in combination with corrections to the five critical areas above, is well aligned with the USAF desire to reacquire its lost acquisition excellence.

OVERVIEW OF THE WORKSHOP ON OWNING THE TECHNICAL BASELINE

In October 2014, under the auspices of the Air Force Studies Board, the National Research Council (NRC)³ appointed the Committee on Owning the Technical Baseline in the U.S. Air Force: A Workshop. The committee planned and participated in the workshop and prepared the report Owning the Technical Baseline for Acquisition Programs in the U.S. Air Force: A Workshop Report. The workshop was conducted at the request of the SAF/AQ, and the workshop committee was asked to address the following statement of task:⁴

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³ Effective July 1, 2015, the institution is called the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. References in this report to the National Research Council (NRC) are used in a historical context to refer to activities before July 1.

⁴ National Research Council (NRC), Owning the Technical Baseline for Acquisition Programs in the U.S. Air Force: A Workshop Report, The National Academies Press, Washington, D.C., 2015, p. 2.

The context for the workshop, as best described by the report itself, was as follows:

The workshop report summarized individual committee members’ observations, based on presentations received from 35 Department of Defense (DoD) program managers (PMs) and current and senior leaders. The purpose and charge of such workshop committees is not, however, to reach consensus on conclusions, findings, or recommendations.

KEY OBSERVATIONS FROM THE WORKSHOP

The Owning the Technical Baseline Workshop consisted of three 2-day sessions. Throughout those sessions the workshop committee heard from numerous experts, and several recurring topics emerged from those discussions. Those recurring topics, contained in Box 1.1, created a basis for this committee’s approach to further investigating a construct for the USAF to own its technical baseline.⁶

CURRENT ENVIRONMENT FOR ACQUISITION PROGRAMS IN THE U.S. AIR FORCE

The current environment for USAF acquisition programs is strongly influenced by the overall USAF budget environment, which is complex and challenging. The combination of a decrease in funding and the drawdown of forces at home and abroad has placed greater demand on Air Force assets. This greater demand has created obstacles and dilemmas with regard to trade-offs between meeting the

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⁵ Ibid., p. 1.

⁶ Ibid., pp. 3 and 4.

needs of current warfighting commitments and satisfying long-term U.S. national security requirements.⁷

Aging aircraft, the increasing costs of operation and maintenance, and the growing cost of personnel—all of which are occurring in an era of rapid force buildup of fifth-generation systems by potential adversaries—amplify and underscore the need for capable and efficient acquisition of technically superior systems by the Air Force acquisition team. Based on the many studies and subsequent

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⁷ U.S. Air Force, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Budget (SAF/FMB), United States Air Force Fiscal Year 2016 Budget Overview, 2015, Foreword.

reports,⁸ the Air Force has invested much time and funding to understand the current condition of its acquisition workforce. It is generally recognized that the end of the Cold War caused a rapid decline in the number of staff and the level of expertise possessed by the Air Force at its centers for research, development, acquisition, and maintenance. Nevertheless, the Air Force acquisition workforce has eagerly accepted major acquisition challenges. In some cases, the cost and schedule overruns incurred by these acquisition programs showed that the USAF was not adequately prepared and resourced to take on these challenges.⁹ This lack of preparation has led to the creation of an increasing number of oversight panels and committees that demand the time and attention of the same workforce that is expected to execute already understaffed and overworked program organizations.

Subsequent directives from the Secretary of the Air Force and the Air Force chief of staff gave very specific instructions for upgrading and managing the acquisition workforce.¹⁰ However, the combination of budget and hiring constraints; attrition through retirements; the competition from private industry and the speed at which they can hire technical and business graduates; the immediate need to retain an existing workforce to meet current demands; and the absence of confidence in acquiring stable and satisfying career advances and career development assignments—all appear to have had a negative impact on the cost, schedule, and performance issues documented in Air Force acquisition.

A recent report from the Defense Business Board¹¹ outlines an aggressive program to address the main factors that inhibit bringing highly qualified personnel into Pentagon leadership positions. After years of studies that repeatedly identify the same problems in the Air Force acquisition workforce, it is evident that more steps could be taken to restore acquisition excellence in the Air Force. The current incremental steps are not achieving the necessary results. The recommendations in this report identify some of the most important steps.

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⁸ Examples include the following: Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition), Acquisition Improvement Plan, May 4, 2009, http://www.dodbuzz.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/05/acquisition-improvement-plan-4-may-09.pdf; G.E. Christle, D. Davis, and G. Porter, CNA Independent Assessment: Air Force Acquisition, Center for Naval Analyses, Alexandria, Va., 2009; G. Vernez and H.G. Massey, The Acquisition Cost-Estimating Workforce: Census and Characteristics, TR-708-AF, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Cal., 2009; J.A. Ausink, L.H. Baldwin, and C. Paul, 2004, Air Force Procurement Workforce Transformation, RAND Corporation, MG-214-AF Santa Monica, Calif.

⁹ G.E. Christle, D. Davis, and G. Porter, CNA Independent Assessment: Air Force Acquisition, Center for Naval Analyses, Alexandria, Va., 2009, p. 3.

¹⁰ Examples include the following: U.S. Air Force, Air Force Instruction 63-501, Air Force Acquisition Quality Program, May 31, 1994, Certified Current November 4, 2009, http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/;U.S. Air Force, Air Force Instruction 36-2835, Annual Acquisition Awards Programs, August 17, 2011, http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/; U.S. Air Force, Air Force Instruction 63-138, Acquisition of Services, May 21, 2013, http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/.

¹¹ Defense Business Board, Selecting Senior Acquisition Officials, April 21, 2016, http://dbb.defense.gov/Portals/35/Documents/Meetings/2016/20164/Sr%20Acquisition%20Officials%20Presentation%20-%20Approved%2021%20APR%202016.pdf, accessed August 17, 2016.