A Pre-Event Recovery Planning Guide for Transportation (2013)

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B-1 APPENDIX B: NCHRP PROJECT 20-59(33) CASE STUDIES TABLE OF CONTENTS Summary: Lessons from In-Depth Case Studies, B-2 9/11, New York City, New York, 2001, B-5 Event and Recovery Summary, B-5 Pre-Event Planning for Recovery, B-9 Lessons for Recovery, B-10 Processes and Tools, B-12 References, B-14 London Transit Bombing, London, UK, 2005, B-16 Event and Recovery Summary, B-16 Pre-Event Planning for Recovery, B-20 Lessons for Recovery, B-22 Processes and Tools, B-23 References, B-24 Howard Street Tunnel Fire, Baltimore, Maryland, 2001, B-26 Event and Recovery Summary, B-26 Lessons for Recovery, B-29 Processes and Tools, B-33 References, B-34 2009 California Wildfire, Los Angeles, CA, B-35 Event and Recovery Summary, B-35 Pre-Event Planning for Recovery, B-36 Lessons for Recovery, B-37 Processes and Tools, B-38 References, B-39 Midwest Flooding, 2008, B-40 Event and Recovery Summary, B-40 Pre-Event Planning for Recovery, B-41 Lessons for Recovery, B-42 Processes and Tools, B-43 References, B-44 Asset Management Systems, B-46 What Are Transportation Asset Management Systems?, B-46 How Are Asset Management Systems Currently Deployed by State DOTs?, B-47 Could Asset Management Systems Be Used for Pre-Event Recovery Planning?, B-52 Conclusions, B-53 References, B-54

B-2 A Pre-Event Recovery Planning Guide for Transportation The limited guidance on pre-event planning for recovery of transportation systems required a compilation of lessons from case studies of infrastructure recovery. Five in- depth case studies were done that represent a cross-section of infrastructure owners and operators. Also completed was a case study based on a few forward-looking jurisdictions that have instituted policies, programs, and tools that can assist in recovery. The states of Michigan, Vermont, and Montana were selected because these states represent examples of the importance of driving asset management with a well-defined strategic planning process that incorporates recovery planning. Lessons and processes/tools for recovery were identified for each case study. SUMMARY: LESSONS FROM IN-DEPTH CASE STUDIES Formal/informal relationships and networks were keys to successful recovery. Based on experiences from previous significant disaster events, Iowa DOT now works closely with multiple federal agencies as a part of the recovery process. For instance, Iowa DOT functions as the coordinator for the FHWA emergency relief program and takes on the responsibility to process the Detailed Damage Inspection Report (DDIR). Recovery from the 9/11 incident in New York City was made possible by using pre-existing relationships, including those of retired personnel and volunteers. In the London 7/7 bombings, the fact that personnel knew each other played a very important role in coordination. In California, a multi-agency working group composed of key asset owners and stakeholders coordinates planning and implementation. Simplified designs can expedite reconstruction. After 9/11, lack of architectural detail in the temporary PATH stations allowed bidding on the necessary steel on a per-pound basis before the design was even finished. The conduit carrying the utilities and cabling was left exposed, eliminating the design time needed to artfully bury it. These strategies shaved 1 year off the construction schedule. Make infrastructure improvements where possible. Bench walls, lighting and communication enhancements in PATH tunnels after 9/11 in NYC were added during recovery construction. The Baltimore tunnel case study noted the need for upgrading aging infrastructure as part of the rehabilitation of critical infrastructure. Take a phased approach to recovery. After 9/11, PATH service to lower Manhattan was provided through a series of temporary transit stations and entrances.

Appendix B: NCHRP Project 20-59(33) Case Studies B-3 Use existing plans and footprints where possible. To restore train service to the World Trade Center (WTC) site as quickly as possible, a temporary PATH terminal was built at the same location as the destroyed facility, enabling engineers to utilize previous alignments and reduce additional excavation /foundation work. Have expedited processes in place for emergencies. The California Governor’s declaration of disaster can ease environmental requirements and other contracting requirements. Emergency contracts can then be rapidly implemented using a ready list of pre-identified and pre-qualified contractors, even before federal funding is available. Take a collaborative approach to recovery. After 9/11, collaboration with contractors and designers was part of design and construction. For example, the sequence of construction inside the tunnels was done differently, in a process developed in conjunction with the contractor, who wanted to use rubber-tired equipment to bring in materials. The contractor’s desired approach required locating everything first and then laying the track last. To accommodate this, a high level of survey control was developed along with a “clearance jig” to make sure the trains had enough clearance. Use innovation in project development, oversight, and environmental management. After 9/11, the FTA Lower Manhattan Recovery Office (LMRO) was created to work on innovative, streamlined project delivery processes with consensus among federal and local partners. Some of these approaches included using one grant for the entire project, developing a Master Agreement for both FTA and FEMA requirements, creating an MOU among federal agencies for environmental oversight, and creating a Federal Interagency Review Team. Understand interdependency of critical infrastructure as part of the hazard and risk assessment. The Baltimore tunnel case study illustrated the interdependencies of transportation, communications, and other critical infrastructure. Asset management systems, as discussed in the cases of Michigan, Montana, Ohio, and Vermont can address the issue by helping in maintenance of statewide transportation assets and eliminating system deficiencies.

B-4 A Pre-Event Recovery Planning Guide for Transportation Maintain and provide access to designs, plans, and other key data. After 9/11, availability of information on designs, plans and other key data became an issue because key plans and documents were stored in the WTC. For the Howard Tunnel in Baltimore, key tunnel documents were not found until days after the incident. Many roadway and bridge design plans, shop drawings, and other infrastructure record documents are available electronically on a 24-hour basis in Iowa DOT’s electronic record management system (ERMS). Plan for the unexpected by learning from previous experiences. After the 1993 WTC bombing, every agency and facility put emergency plans in place, but no one had conceived of an event of the enormity and scale of 9/11. Similarly, after the London bombings, planning has been expanded to cover multisite scenarios. For tunnels, water intrusion is a critical issue and infrastructure interdependencies can be identified. Integrate recovery with existing planning. Iowa has a State Recovery Plan that includes a Transportation Appendix that details the roles, responsibilities, and framework for post-disaster transportation recovery. In California, the State Emergency Plan includes a Recovery section that Caltrans helped to develop, and recovery is integrated into hazard mitigation planning and COOP efforts.

Appendix B: NCHRP Project 20-59(33) Case Studies B-5 9/11, NEW YORK CITY, NEW YORK, 2001 EVENT AND RECOVERY SUMMARY Synopsis of Event On the morning of September 11, 2001, hijackers flew two 767 jets into the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center complex in a coordinated attack. After burning for 56 minutes, the South Tower collapsed, followed 30 minutes later by the North Tower. 7 World Trade Center collapsed later in the day. An NY/NJ Port Authority Trans-Hudson (PATH) station was connected to the World Trade Center towers via an underground concourse and shopping center. The station also connected to several New York City Subway services, specifically the Number 1 and Number 9 lines. By autumn of 2001, the volume of passengers using the WTC PATH station was approximately 25,000 daily. Impact of Event on Critical Infrastructure When the World Trade Center (WTC) towers collapsed, the WTC PATH station was destroyed, and debris was sent with great force into the tunnels. In several places, individual beams from the WTC weighing several tons punched through the street, into about 7 feet of earth, through the concrete-and-brick tunnel ceiling, and then into the tunnel floor, where they remained lodged like spears. In addition, the tunnels suffered extensive flood damage from broken water and sewer lines and the vast amounts of water used to fight the fires at the World Trade Center. The flooding damaged tracks, cables, electrical components, and concrete from the PATH World Trade Center Station to Exchange Place in New Jersey. NYC Transit also suffered extensive damage. Four subway corridors were affected, with 1,400 feet of tunnel in Manhattan destroyed. Six miles of water mains were broken, and the 7th Avenue tunnel was flooded in the immediate area. The Cortlandt Street station was completely destroyed. There were problems with power and signals, and continuing fires and collapsing buildings added safety concerns. Physical damage from the collapse and vibrations, and flooding of some track, put the N and R trains and the Interborough Rapid Transit (IRT) trains out of service, with partial closings on the Lexington Avenue line. September 11, 2001 Event Timeline 8:46 a.m. Plane hits North Tower 9:03 a.m. Plane hits South Tower 9:17 a.m. FAA shuts down NYC airports 9:17 a.m. Amtrak suspends all service 9:17 a.m. NY DOT shuts down highways 9:21 a.m. Port Authority closes bridges and tunnels 9:40 a.m. FAA grounds all flights 9:43 a.m. Plane hits Pentagon 9:59 a.m. South Tower collapses 10:00 a.m. Armed forces put on high alert 10:20 a.m. NYC Transit shuts down 10:29 a.m. North Tower collapses 10:30 a.m. NJ Transit stops rail service to Penn Station 10:37 a.m. Fourth plane crashes in Pennsylvania 10:45 a.m. All PATH operations stop 10:50 a.m. All remaining bridges and tunnels close

B-6 A Pre-Event Recovery Planning Guide for Transportation The potential for the Hudson River to create extensive system flooding due to the collapse of the “bathtub” surrounding the WTC site was not anticipated. Concrete tunnel plugs had to be put in place quickly and then removed when the recovery projects were underway. Two 19-foot thick concrete plugs had to be installed at the New Jersey end-of-the-century PATH tubes to contain the water if catastrophic flooding occurred. Two steel-and-concrete plugs, 3 feet thick, were built in the 1 and 9 tunnels near Chambers Street and Cedar Street to prevent water from flowing into the rest of the subway. The plugs were installed because the 1 and 9 tunnels run right up against the western wall of what is called the bathtub wall, the waterproof barrier that rings the World Trade Center basement to keep Hudson River water out and which was threatened by the extensive damage. The figure on the left illustrates the risk of flooding. With the WTC PATH station destroyed, PATH service to Manhattan was suspended for more than 2 years. The Exchange Place station also had to be closed because it could not operate as a terminus or "terminal" station since it had no capability for allowing trains to change direction. Restoration of Service Other transportation operators raced to restore service or develop alternatives for transportation to lower Manhattan. By September 16, New Jersey Transit had designed, taken out permits for, constructed, and begun operations on a new ferry service across the Hudson River. Ferry service provided the flexibility to move people rapidly away from the site on September 11th and provided ongoing transportation in the months that followed. Ferry service was critical to the movement of New Jersey residents to New York City and back after September 11th. According to the study Public Infrastructure Service Flexibility for Response and Recovery in the Attacks at the World Trade Center (Zimmerman, 2003), four factors contributed to the ability of the NYC Transit system and surrounding commuter and long-distance rail lines to recover so quickly in the near term, given the scale and unexpectedness of the disaster: 1. Flexibility in routing, such as re-routing of trains away from the area after the destruction.

Appendix B: NCHRP Project 20-59(33) Case Studies B-7 2. Ability to access and use alternative transportation modes such as ferries and buses. 3. Implementation of mechanisms to reduce consequences of disruption by removing passengers rapidly from stopped trains. 4. Ability to draw substantial new resources to rehabilitate the system quickly. Recovery of Critical Infrastructure To reestablish service at the former Port Authority Trans-Hudson (PATH) World Trade Center (WTC) Station meant upgrading the Exchange Place Station to accommodate “terminal” rail services, repairing the flooded twin Hudson River tunnels, and constructing a new, temporary WTC station. The new transportation hub was paid for through insurance settlements relating to the events of September 11th and through funds from the states of New York and New Jersey. The recovery and rebuilding of the World Trade Center transportation facilities had to be coordinated with multiple transportation entities that shared the WTC site. For example, MTA/NYC transit could not design and start rebuilding the destroyed Cortlandt Street Station until the integration with the new PATH transit hub was determined. The station has still not been replaced. Restoration of Exchange Place The Exchange Place project included 1,500 feet of new cross-over tunnel construction to allow trains from Newark to reach the Hoboken-bound tunnel and vice versa. Modifications were made to a stub end tunnel, known as the Penn Pocket, which was originally built for short-term runs between the World Trade Center and Exchange Place for Pennsylvania Railroad commuters from Harborside Terminal. The modifications required PATH to bore through the bedrock dividing the stub tunnel and the tunnels to and from Newark. The excavation required removal of 10,000 cubic yards of rock 100 feet below street level, which proved to be a challenge. The contractors originally intended to blast and drill their way through the rock, as that was the most familiar method to them. However, the Port Authority, which owns PATH and was closely monitoring the production rate, determined that the work was moving too slowly, so they decided to use "road headers"—unique mining equipment resembling a tank, outfitted with a massive rotating grinding ball at the end of a long arm. "We burned a lot of time getting the road headers up and running," concedes Jim Palmer, PE, lead

B-8 A Pre-Event Recovery Planning Guide for Transportation Transportation WTC Hub technical advisor on the restoration of PATH service between the sites. "That was a real lesson we learned. Next time, I'd have my options laid out in advance." The Exchange Place station re-opened in June 2003. Repairing the Tunnels The PATH trains into lower Manhattan utilized two existing railway tunnels from when the system was established. The incident did not destroy the tunnels but the damage done required stripping the tunnels down to the cast iron tunnel ring liners—the “Hudson tubes”—and rebuilding from there. The nature of the tunnels put constraints on what could and couldn’t be done and what needed to be done. Space limitations and other extreme conditions restricted the methods that could be used for recovery. Equipment options were limited due to confined spaces, ventilation, and maneuverability. Because of new technologies in track design, the system could not simply be replaced. The new tracks changed the profile of the trains inside the tunnel, where the clearances were already very tight. The change in profile necessitated modifications of the interface points between the tunnels and the stations at either end. Reconstruction of WTC PATH Station PATH service to lower Manhattan was restored when a $323 million temporary WTC station opened on November 23, 2003. The temporary station had a utilitarian design that contained portions of the original station and did not have heating or air conditioning systems installed to expedite construction. When the Church Street entrance opened, the temporary station entrance was closed on July 1, 2007, and demolished to make way for the permanent station. A new entrance to the World Trade Center PATH station on Vesey Street opened in March 2008, and the entrance on Church Street has since been demolished. The permanent World Trade Center PATH station is being completed. Temporary PATH station Church Street Station Vesey Street Station

Appendix B: NCHRP Project 20-59(33) Case Studies B-9 MTA/NYC Transit Reconstruction The removal of all debris from the collapsed World Trade Center buildings and an open cut excavation including the demolition of the remaining existing concrete structure of the 1 and 9 subway was completed in less than 6 weeks. The reconstruction on the north end included sheeting, bracing, and dewatering of the section running from Barclay Street to Vesey Street near World Trade Center 7. Working from a 1915 design, contractors installed over 2 million pounds of steel bracing and formed and poured over 9,000 cubic yards of concrete for the new subway tunnel and station platforms in the rehabilitation of the Rector Street station. With an aggressive 9-month plan, the project was completed ahead of schedule. Insurance proceeds and federal disaster assistance should cover most of the property losses related to the tragedy. PRE-EVENT PLANNING FOR RECOVERY Emergency Plans That Included Recovery Were in Place After the 1993 incident at the World Trade Center, it was clear that the site was an ongoing target. Emergency plans that included recovery were created and kept up-to- date to address future incidents. Business contingency plans existed in all departments. Arrangements were established with other transportation operators such as NJ Transit and Amtrak, should PATH be unable to operate. MTA and other NYC transit systems developed updated evacuation and rerouting plans. Planning processes were in place and planning had already included some aspects of addressing recovery, but not for an event on the scale of the 9/11 attacks. Contingency plans existed in all departments to a greater or lesser extent. “Day in the life” experiences and previous incidents and exercises provided opportunities to learn how to quickly respond and recover from service interruption events. Key resources were available for recovery due to the pre-event planning such as highly specialized signal technology, transformers, and pumps. Equipment was available to maintain the system and to do damage assessment such as vibration checks. However, no one anticipated the level of destruction caused by the attacks of 9/11. Pre-Defined Organization Roles and Responsibilities Were Identified The PATH plan identified recovery roles and responsibilities by title. Individuals were aware of their roles, and even though overall responsibility was given to the director/general manager (GM), the GM depended on individual managers to perform their roles and keep the GM informed. Delegation of responsibility was key to the recovery effort, and communication was essential for it to work. Daily meetings were held in the aftermath of the incident. The ability to draw upon organizational resources was critical to the recovery after 9/11. The enormity of the event was beyond the scale of any plans that had been created. Key

B-10 A Pre-Event Recovery Planning Guide for Transportation senior personnel were lost along with critical infrastructure. Others had to quickly step up to replace those who were lost. The destruction of the World Trade Center also destroyed or prevented access to the MTA PATH crisis plans, documents, and drawings necessary for response and reconstruction. Knowing and utilizing all organizational resources available, including retirees volunteering for service, made a significant difference in the recovery effort. That difference ranged from obtaining physical supplies and facilities to identifying innovative solutions for asset recovery. Expedited Internal Procedures Were in Place What normally took months to complete had to be done in days; therefore, the existing organizational hierarchies and long planning cycles would not work. This was a lesson learned in the aftermath of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. Rapid recovery required delegating more authority down the line to get things accomplished. A temporary reprieve of established internal procedures was granted to speed up the recovery process. Related and/or Cascading Effects Were Anticipated Flooding of the transit tunnels from water main breaks was a known and anticipated aspect of the event in lower Manhattan. Pumping equipment and fans were available and quickly put into operation to minimize damage to the transportation system. However, fire suppression efforts at the site over the many weeks following 9/11 contributed significant additional volumes of water into the tunnels. In addition, the potential for the Hudson River to create extensive system flooding due to the collapse of the “bathtub” surrounding the WTC site was not anticipated. Concrete tunnel plugs had to be put in place quickly and then removed when the recovery projects were underway. Infrastructure Plans and Key Documents Were Collected in Advance PATH and MTA had compiled planning documents and drawings for critical infrastructure in the transportation systems. The destruction of the WTC destroyed or prevented access to some of the critical documents and drawings necessary for reconstruction. LESSONS FOR RECOVERY Understand the Impact of Response on Recovery The on-site crime investigation and debris removal at the site lasted for 8 months due to the forensic investigation and the hazardous materials in the debris. Infrastructure recovery efforts could not begin until the debris removal phase of the event was completed. In addition, debris removal equipment such as large cranes required that the streets and the tunnels below be shored up to support the additional weight. In one instance, NYC transit filled 220 feet of tunnel with concrete that then had to be carved away and removed when the transit recovery began. As previously noted, the concrete

Appendix B: NCHRP Project 20-59(33) Case Studies B-11 tunnel plugs put in place due to flooding had to be removed when the recovery projects were underway. Take a Phased Approach to Recovery The PATH service to lower Manhattan was provided through a series of temporary stations and station entrances as the permanent World Trade Center PATH station was being constructed. Innovative Use of Equipment When blasting and drilling through the rock for the tunnel was determined to be moving too slowly, the contractors decided instead to use "road headers," unique mining equipment resembling a tank, outfitted with a massive, rotating, grinding ball at the end of a long arm. The sequence of construction inside the tunnels was done differently, in a process developed in conjunction with the contractor. Normally, the track would be located first and everything else would be based on that. Because the contractor wanted to use rubber-tired equipment to bring in materials, there was a need to locate everything first and then lay the track last. To accommodate this atypical process, a high level of survey control was developed along with a “clearance jig” to make sure that once the track was placed, the trains wouldn't hit anything. Identify Options in Advance "We burned a lot of time getting the road headers up and running," concedes Jim Palmer, PE, lead technical advisor on the restoration of PATH service between the sites. "That was a real lesson we learned. Next time, I'd have my options laid out in advance." Use Simplified Designs to Expedite Recovery The Port Authority started by using simplified designs that allowed for ordering longer lead-time materials before the contractor was even hired. The lack of architectural detail in the temporary PATH stations allowed bidding on the necessary steel on a per-pound basis before the design was even finished, which shortened the time it usually takes to receive materials. In addition, the conduit carrying the utilities and cabling was left exposed, eliminating the design time needed to artfully bury it. Those strategies shaved 1 year off the construction schedule. To facilitate the quickest restoration of service possible, some customer amenities were not made available. All public access areas and track zones were open, but they were weather protected. There were no public toilets, shops, or eateries, but the terminal was fully ADA compliant and accessible.

B-12 A Pre-Event Recovery Planning Guide for Transportation Use Existing Plans and Footprints Where Possible In order to restore train service to the world Trade Center site as quickly as possible, a temporary PATH terminal was built at the same location as the destroyed facility. This enabled engineers to utilize previous alignments and minimize additional excavation and foundation work. The track and platform configuration of the temporary station followed the former station. Make Infrastructure Improvements Where Possible Bench walls, lighting, and communications were enhanced in PATH tunnels where possible. Because of time and spatial limitations, sensors, hardening, and other water- management capabilities were not installed as part of reconstruction and will have to be done in the future. A new traction power substation located adjacent to the former South Tower footprint was designed to support future construction of floor levels up to the street level. This "over build" scenario was intended to eliminate the need for building future support columns throughout the substation in the ongoing development of the World Trade Center site. Perform a Post-Recovery Evaluation Changes were made based on the post-event evaluation conducted after the event. For example, a separate Office of Emergency Management was established by the Port Authority of NY/NJ to develop additional planning capabilities for catastrophic events. Prior to 9/11, this planning was done within the police and individual Port Authority departments. PROCESSES AND TOOLS Lessons from Previous Incidents and Exercises “Day in the life” experiences and previous incidents and exercises provided opportunities to learn how to quickly respond and recover from service interruption events. Collaborative Approach for Design and Construction With resumption of PATH service to downtown Manhattan as its top priority, the Port Authority forged a unique partnership that allowed contractors to order materials and mobilize for construction even as engineers were completing design work. Lead technical designer Jim Palmer has noted that "when we brought the contractors on board, all we had were preliminary designs. We developed a contract packaging strategy by looking at how all this would be built and then arrived at design packages that would support that strategy."

Appendix B: NCHRP Project 20-59(33) Case Studies B-13 For example, they decided to use all rolled sections for the structural steel of the World Trade Center Station, because it would not require time-consuming fabrication. Framing plans were developed based on that and went out to bid without a complete design. The contractor also went out to bid on the electrical equipment for the electrified railroad without room layouts, although the schematic layout and the capacity of the system were known. As previously noted, the sequence of construction inside the tunnels was developed in conjunction with the contractor. Innovative Approaches for Contracting, Design, and Construction The Port Authority needed to compress the timetable for every aspect of the job, from budget authorization and contracting to design and construction. First, the Port Authority completed cost estimates very quickly to present a budget for approval. Budget authorization alone for a project this large can take a couple of years. The Port Authority completed the process in just 4 months. Hiring three contractors under a single net-cost, fixed-fee, construction contract (based on time and materials, plus a fixed fee for profit and overhead) also greatly simplified and accelerated the process, although it changed the way business was typically conducted. "Normally, a net-cost contract will be converted to a lump-sum contract after 10% to 15% of the work is done," explained Palmer. "We converted small parts of the contract, but very little, because there simply wasn't time.” They awarded a net-cost, fixed-fee, construction contract to a team of three contractors and worked with the contractors to design the project while construction was under way, eliminating the need for a lengthy design process. The strategy was so successful that the World Trade Center station was up and running 1 month early, and the rest of the project was completed on time. Innovation in Project Development, Oversight, and Environmental Management Due to the urgency of rebuilding these high-priority projects in lower Manhattan, the FTA Lower Manhattan Recovery Office (LMRO) was created to work with the project sponsors on innovative, streamlined, project delivery processes with consensus among federal and local partners. Some of these innovative approaches included the following: • Project Development − Using one grant for an entire project. − Developing an LMRO specific master agreement that eliminated different sets of requirements (i.e., FTA vs. FEMA) and two sets of paperwork.

B-14 A Pre-Event Recovery Planning Guide for Transportation − Creating an early partnering agreement between FTA and each project sponsor that established environmental actions and project scope, schedule and budget, and project oversight protocols. • Project Oversight − Creation of an oversight team with members drawn from FTA staff and contractors to focus on project management oversight (PMO), financial management oversight, procurement systems reviews, and environmental processes. − Development of a “manage to the risk” oversight approach by FTA to customize the level and type of oversight for each project. − Use of a contractor-developed risk assessment profile approach to measure adequacy of time and contingency for building each project. − Construction agreements between FTA and project sponsors addressing project scope, schedule, and budget that provide a streamlined approach to project management. • Environmental Management Oversight − Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with other federal agencies defining roles and response times. − Federal Interagency Review Team established to expedite agencies’ reviews and comments. − Agreement developed among project sponsors committing to a common Environmental Analysis Framework, Environmental Performance Commitments, and a coordinated cumulative effects analysis. − Coordinated approach among federal agencies to initiate the Section 106 review process under the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) for the World Trade Center Site. Solve and Prevent Problems with Communications One key to success in both preventing and solving problems was communication. Daily meetings were held within the transit organizations. Weekly meetings were held with the contractor, project managers, and, depending on the issue, the designers. Jim Palmer explained, "Normally, you have construction meetings with a smaller group of people, and you rely on documentation to relay the information. We defined everything on everybody's hot list to lay problems on the table. Then we went back to solve the problems; immediately, if there were emergencies." REFERENCES Interview conducted with Martha Gulick, Manager of System Safety and Environmental Management for the PATH Corporation. Jenkins, Brian Michael and Edwards-Winslow, Frances. Saving City Lifelines:

Appendix B: NCHRP Project 20-59(33) Case Studies B-15 Lessons Learned in the 9-11 Terrorist Attacks, Mineta Transportation Institution, September 2003. Steele, Bill. “In the wake of London bombings, Thomas O'Rourke contemplates dangers to underground infrastructure”. Cornell University News Service, July 2005. Tully Construction Company, PATH Station and Tunnel Reconstruction, Tully Company Website. http://www.tullyconstruction.com/projects/details/?c=29 Weisel, Lisa. NY Port Authority Rebuilds in Record Time After Sept. 11, Published in Tradeline, May 2006. Zimmerman, Rae, Public Infrastructure Service Flexibility for Response and Recovery in the Attacks at the World Trade Center, September 11, 2001, published in Beyond September 11th: An Account of Post-Disaster Research, Special Publication #39, National Hazards Center, University of Colorado, 2003.

B-16 A Pre-Event Recovery Planning Guide for Transportation LONDON TRANSIT BOMBING, LONDON, UK, 2005 EVENT AND RECOVERY SUMMARY Synopsis of Event At 8:50 a.m., during the morning rush of July 7, 2005, three bombs exploded within 50 seconds of each other on three different London Underground (tube) trains. Fifty-seven minutes later, at 9:47 a.m., a bomb detonated aboard a double-decker bus in Tavistock Square. The bomb attacks—often referred to as 7/7, killed at least 50 people and injured 700—were the deadliest in London since World War II and tested emergency responder training and tactics. • Eastbound Circle Line. The first bomb exploded on an eastbound train travelling between Liverpool Street and Aldgate. Train no. 204 had left King's Cross St. Pancras about 8 minutes earlier. At the time of the explosion, the third carriage of the train was approximately 100 yards (90 m) down the tunnel from Liverpool Street. The blast also damaged a parallel track—the Hammersmith & City Line from Liverpool Street to Aldgate East. • Westbound Circle Line. The second bomb exploded in the second carriage (no. 216) of a westbound Circle Line subsurface train that had just left Platform 4 at Edgeware Road headed for Paddington. The train had left King’s Cross St. Pancras about 8 minutes earlier. Several other trains were nearby at the time of the explosion—an eastbound Circle Line train arriving at Platform 3 at Edgeware Road from Paddington was passing next to the train and was damaged, as was a wall that later collapsed. Two other trains at Edgeware Road were an unidentified train on Platform 2 and a southbound Hammersmith & City Line train that had just arrived at Platform 1. • Piccadilly Line. The third bomb exploded on a southbound Piccadilly Line deep- level Underground train no. 113 as it travelled between King’s Cross St. Pancras and Russell Square. The bomb exploded about 1 minute after the train left King's Cross and had travelled about 500 yards (450 m). The explosion was in the rear of the first carriage of train no. 166; it caused severe damage to the rear of that carriage, as well as to the front of the second carriage. The surrounding tunnel also sustained damage. July 7, 2005, Event Timeline 8:50 a.m. 3 bombs explode in less than a minute on each of 3 London Underground trains. 9:19 a.m. Code Amber Alert issued; all train drivers directed to halt at platforms and evacuate passengers. 9:46 a.m. Red Code declared; entire Underground network shut down; trains returned to stations; all service suspended. 9:47 a.m. Bomb explodes on double-decker bus in Tavistock Square.

Appendix B: NCHRP Project 20-59(33) Case Studies B-17 Because the blasts occurred on trains that were between stations and the wounded were emerging from both stations, responders originally thought there had been six explosions at two different Underground stations. At 9:47 a.m., a bomb exploded aboard a double-decker bus in Tavistock Square. The bus had earlier passed through the King’s Cross area on its route from Hackney Wick to Marble Arch, had turned around, and was starting the reverse route. The bus left Marble Arch at 9:00 a.m. and arrived at Euston bus station at 9:35 a.m., where crowds of people evacuated from the Underground were boarding buses. The bus was not traveling its normal route at the time of the explosion; it was in Woburn Place because its usual route along Euston Road was closed as a result of the earlier bombing of the Piccadilly Line train between King’s Cross and Russell Square. The bus bomb exploded toward the rear of the vehicle’s top deck, ripping the roof off the top deck and totally destroying the back of the bus. The front of the bus remained intact. Witnesses reported seeing “half a bus flying through the air.” Impact of Event on Infrastructure The effects of the bombings on the infrastructure varied because of the differing characteristics of the tunnels. • The Circle Line is a cut and cover subsurface tunnel, about 21 ft (7 m) deep. Because the tunnel contains two parallel tracks, it is relatively wide. The two explosions on this line were probably able to vent their force into the tunnel, thus reducing their destructive force.

B-18 A Pre-Event Recovery Planning Guide for Transportation • Aldgate/Circle Line: Explosion in second carriage by first set of double doors. Edgeware Road/Circle Line: Explosion in second carriage by first set of double doors. The Piccadilly Line is a deep Tube tunnel, up to 100 ft (30 m) underground, with narrow (11 ft, 8¼ in. or 3.56 m) single-track tubes and just 6 in. (15 cm) clearances. This confined space reflected the blast force, concentrating its effect. Intense heat as high as 60ºC (140 ºF), dust, fumes, vermin, asbestos, and initial concerns that the tunnel might collapse delayed extraction of bodies along with the forensic operation. Russell Square/Piccadilly Line: Bomb exploded in first car.

Appendix B: NCHRP Project 20-59(33) Case Studies B-19 Restoration of Service For most of July 7, the complete closure of the underground system, including shutting down the Zone 1 bus networks and the evacuation of Russell Square, effectively crippled Central London's public transport system. Bus services restarted at 4:00 p.m. that day, and most service to mainline train stations shortly thereafter. Officials pressed tourist river vessels into service as a free alternative to the overcrowded trains and buses. Most of the Underground, apart from the affected stations, reopened the next morning, although some commuters chose to stay at home. King’s Cross station reopened later on 7/7, but only suburban rail services were able to use it, with Great North Eastern Railway (GNER) trains terminating at Peterborough (service was fully restored July 9). The King’s Cross St. Pancras station remained open to Metropolitan Line services only to facilitate the ongoing recovery and investigation effort for a week. Victoria Line services were restored on July 15 and Northern Line services on July 18. By July 25, there were still disruptions to the Piccadilly Line (which was not running in either direction between Arnos Grove and Hyde Park Corner), the Hammersmith & City Line (running shuttle service only between Hammersmith and Paddington), and the Circle Line (service suspended in its entirety). Most of the Underground network, Recovery Timeline July 7, 4:00 p.m. Bus service restored; most mainline trains reopen for service. Tourist river vessels provide free alternative to trains and buses. July 9. King’s Cross Station service fully restored. July 15. Victoria Line service restored. July 18. Northern Line service restored. August 2. Hammersmith & City Line resumes normal service. August 4. Piccadilly Line resumes normal service.

B-20 A Pre-Event Recovery Planning Guide for Transportation however, was running normally. Although service remained suspended on the Circle Line, other lines served all Circle Line stations. The Circle Line remained closed for several weeks, reopening a little less than a month after the attacks, on August 4. The Piccadilly Line resumed service August 4. Recovery of Critical Infrastructure Even though the incident teams had shifted from the Rescue Phase (led by fire services) into the Evidential Phase (led by the Police), recovery activity was being coordinated in the background. The major challenge to recovery was the need to seal the incident sites so investigators could collect evidence. Retaining evidence was a top priority for all parties. Some structural damage assessments were made, as necessary, to ensure the safety of the investigative team, but the required engineering response to address infrastructure damage could not occur until the police cleared each site. The London Underground Recovery Team was able to plan for structural surveys and determine specific equipment needed for the recovery. Permission was granted for equipment to be brought to the site, and plans were made to bring in equipment such as large cranes in a manner that did not interfere with the investigation. It was clear from structural damage on the Edgeware Road train that a crane would be necessary to remove the train from the scene. Permission was granted early to bring in the crane and crews began pouring the cement needed to reinforce the above ground supporting structure where the crane would be placed for that operation. From previous train crashes, Transport for London (TfL), operator of the London Underground (LU) knew how to access and mobilize the necessary specialized equipment and was able to have contracts in place quickly for the 7/7 recovery. PRE-EVENT PLANNING FOR RECOVERY Emergency Plans That Included Recovery Were in Place The London Underground had continuity, emergency, and recovery plans in place at the time of the incident and immediately put those plans into practice. As Andy Barr noted, “those plans worked.” Pre-event planning anticipated an intentional attack on the transit system, but at the time, planners may have placed more focus on a different type of attack (such as chemical).

Appendix B: NCHRP Project 20-59(33) Case Studies B-21 Pre-Defined Organization Roles and Responsibilities Were Identified The London Emergency Services Liaison Panel (LESLP), with representatives from the London Metropolitan Police Service, City of London Police, British Transport Police, London Fire Brigade, London Ambulance Service, and local London authorities, produced a Procedures Manual that documents a well-established process for incident response. The manual defines “major incident” broadly so that any emergency response agency can declare a major incident and thus increase the likelihood that multiple agencies will respond immediately. A key facet of the London bombing response was rapid recognition and declaration of a major incident. The Procedures Manual details a Gold/Silver/Bronze (Strategic/Tactical/Operational) incident management structure that describes the responsibilities of each agency during any major incident and defines the general roles that relevant personnel perform at the scene. An incident has a number of phases, from rescue through recovery and restoration of normality. At the Silver level, different agencies have primary responsibility for different phases. For example, during the rescue phase, the fire services handle primary lead; the asset owner has responsibility for the recovery phase. Consequently, relevant agencies are familiar with the roles and responsibilities of each level and who has primary responsibility during the various phases of an incident. In addition, all agencies have agreed that U.K. law enforcement serves as the coordination lead. Thus, there is no confusion about which agency is in charge during a major incident. Transport for London (TfL), operator of the London Underground, has a parallel in-place response structure that is integrated into the LESLP response structure. The London Underground (LU) represented the asset owner, or Infrastructure Companies (InfraCo). According to Andy Barr, Network Coordination Manager and London Underground Gold during 7/7, there was “an urgent need for London Underground to respond on the day

B-22 A Pre-Event Recovery Planning Guide for Transportation both as a system and in conjunction with the emergency services and other transport partners.” Because these procedures were in place at the time of the 2005 bombings, there was limited confusion about the roles and responsibilities of responding agencies. Training Exercises Had Taken Place Tim O’Toole, the former TfL Managing Director, is convinced that planning exercises conducted prior to the event created a shared knowledge across the various agencies as to who would do what, which permitted the transit network to return to operations relatively quickly. Others involved in the response to and recovery from the incident shared this opinion. O’Toole concluded, “Everyone knew the plan, everyone knew one another. That is why it worked so well.” Knowledge Was Gained from Previous Experiences Although the response to and recovery from incidents of the scale of 7/7 require massive amounts of resources that are not typically available for smaller incidents, there is knowledge gained that can be applied to both similar events and more catastrophic ones. A number of rail crashes in the U.K., especially from 2003 to 2004, provided knowledge, experience, and approaches that were incorporated into the response and recovery on 7/7. From the previous train crashes, the transit system understood what was needed for recovery large equipment, roads to access the site, repair of infrastructure and signaling equipment, and ensuring the safety of the recovery team. Although the logistics are specific to the location and circumstances of each event, plans can be created in advance for each key element. LESSONS FOR RECOVERY Understand Overlapping Phases of Response and Recovery A key to the London transit system’s rapid recovery was how quickly the recovery team was able to begin its work at the scene. After all survivors were led to safety (approximately 4 hours after the rescue teams arrived), planning for the recovery became part of the incident team’s consideration. The London Underground Recovery Team was given space to begin its project management activities, and access arrangements were made for the structural engineers to determine damage. Permission was granted to bring equipment needed to the site in a manner that did not interfere with the investigation. Unanticipated Challenges in Managing Multiple Recovery Sites Pre-event planning did not anticipate incidents at multiple locations. There were unanticipated challenges in managing the recovery at the three different sites even though

Appendix B: NCHRP Project 20-59(33) Case Studies B-23 a recovery management structure (Gold/Silver/Bronze or Strategic/Tactical/Operational) was in place. A Recovery Gold was appointed on a shift basis across all sites, and Recovery Silver controls were appointed at each site on a 24-hour basis. A Service Director was assigned the sole role of recovery, with day-to-day operations separated from the recovery role. Twice daily conference calls with all participants to monitor recovery progress established a communications and status system. This structure was effective in managing the three sites, but strained operation resources. Emergency Evacuation Process Caused Unexpected Problems in Reinstituting Service The emergency evacuation process implemented under the Service Alert caused unexpected problems in reinstituting service. Because drivers had been instructed to stop their trains at the nearest station and to evacuate the station, trains were scattered throughout the network. Issues arose in how to locate the drivers and get them to the stations to bring the trains back to the depot. As there was no service, traffic around the city was gridlocked. Officials made arrangements for assistance with non-affected transportation companies. PROCESSES AND TOOLS Pre-Event Recovery Strategy The London Underground had an established recovery strategy with pre-defined steps (listed in the sidebar). To implement that strategy, officials prepared a Recovery Plan with procedures and templates, which is frequently reviewed. The Recovery Plan’s two components—(1) Operational Assets and (2) Buildings/Infrastructure—are merged into one complete Business Recovery Integrated Approach, displayed below. Use a Series of Templates That Provide Recovery Options—a Series of Considerations—Instead of Decision Trees To implement the recovery strategy, officials have prepared a Recovery Plan with procedures and London Underground Recovery Strategy 1. Assess scene. 2. Estimate damage to rolling stock/infrastructure; develop project plans/repair timelines. 3. Communicate with customers, staff, and stakeholders. 4. Remove damaged rolling stock to a secure location. 5. Repair and test infrastructure damage. 6. Hand back assets and return to service.

B-24 A Pre-Event Recovery Planning Guide for Transportation templates, which is frequently reviewed. Templates are created for Operational Assets and Buildings/Infrastructure. Each template provides the pros and cons of actions/approaches for different scenarios. The templates provide the benefit of thinking through the consequences of actions and developing plans for use when an incident occurs. REFERENCES Interview with Assistant Chief Constable Paul Crowther, British Transport Police 5/11/2010. Barr, Andy. The Terrorist Attacks on London Underground on Thursday 7th July Presentation, 2005. CNN Transcript, Terror Hits London Transportation Systems, July 7, 2005. Galway, John. Recovering from a Major Incident, Rail Professional, Institution of Railway Operations, December 2007. Murray, Louise. Keeping London Moving. Geographical, May 2006.

Appendix B: NCHRP Project 20-59(33) Case Studies B-25 Ross, Peter. How Our Lives Changed, Interview with Andy Barr. Sunday Herald, July 2006. Steele, Bill. “In the wake of London bombings, Thomas O'Rourke contemplates dangers to underground infrastructure”. Cornell University News Service, July 2005. Recovery Guidance - Infrastructure Issues Transport, Cabinet Office UK Resilience.

B-26 A Pre-Event Recovery Planning Guide for Transportation HOWARD STREET TUNNEL FIRE, BALTIMORE, MARYLAND, 2001 EVENT AND RECOVERY SUMMARY Synopsis of Event At 3:08 p.m. on the afternoon of Wednesday, July 18, 2001, a portion of a 60-car CSXT freight train derailed in the Howard Street Tunnel, causing a major fire. A separation was found between the 45th and 46th cars, and cars 45 through 54 were derailed. Four of the 11 derailed cars were tank cars. One contained tripropylene, a flammable liquid; two contained hydrochloric acid; and another contained di(2-ethylhexyl) phthalate, which is a plasticizer and an environmentally hazardous substance. The derailed tank car containing tripropylene was punctured, causing the escaping tripropylene to ignite, which in turn ignited adjacent cars loaded with paper, pulpwood, and plywood. At 3:08 p.m., the train crew experienced an uncommanded (not applied by the crew) emergency air brake application and the lead locomotive stopped in the tunnel about 1,850 feet from the east portal. Per CSX standard and emergency operating procedures, the engineer and conductor attempted to radio the CSX dispatcher to provide notice that the train had stopped in the tunnel. Due to an apparent “dead zone” in the tunnel, with no radio contact, they were unable to reach the train dispatcher. At 3:13 p.m., the conductor used his cell phone to reach the Baltimore trainmaster at CSX and reported that the train had July 18, 2001, Event Timeline 3:08 p.m. 60-car CSXT freight train with hazardous materials derails in the Howard Street Tunnel. 3:13 p.m. Conductor uses cell phone to report incident to CSX after radio failure due to “dead zone” in tunnel. 3:26 p.m. Train crew returns to lead locomotive to move locomotives and train cars (not derailed) out of tunnel. 4:00 p.m. Baltimore 911 receives a call reporting smoke coming from a sewer near the Howard and Lombard Street intersection, nearly an hour after the incident. 4:00 p.m. CSX chief dispatcher telephones the CSX police communications center asking that emergency response personnel be dispatched to the tunnel. 4:04 p.m. Call to the Baltimore 911 operator, who ultimately notified the Baltimore City Fire Department. 4:20 p.m. Chief of Fire Department requests that all major roads (I-395, I-83, US-40) into Baltimore be closed. 4:30 p.m. Howard Street and all streets crossing over the Howard Street tunnel are closed. I-395 northbound and I-83 southbound are closed to traffic heading into the city. 5:00 p.m. U.S. Coast Guard closes Inner Harbor to boat traffic. 6:15 p.m. Water main break floods the tunnel with estimated 14 millions of gallons of water. MTA closes Metro’s State Center station due to smoke. 8:00–9:00 p.m. Roads and entrance/exit ramps on major thoroughfares into the City reopen. 11:59 p.m. 40-inch valve east of the water main break and other auxiliary valves were closed. Monday, July 23, 7:42 a.m. Incident commander declares scene officially under control.

Appendix B: NCHRP Project 20-59(33) Case Studies B-27 come to a stop in the tunnel. From there, the trainmaster contacted the CSX dispatcher in Jacksonville, Florida, to report that the train had stopped. When a train has experienced an uncommanded emergency stop, CSX procedures require that the train crew disembark and walk the train to find the problem. This procedure was cut short due to thick black smoke. At approximately 3:26 p.m., the train crew returned to the lead locomotive and recharged the air brake system in order to move the locomotives and the train cars that had not derailed (located in front of the first derailed car). They moved eastward out of the tunnel and stopped the train about 450 feet beyond the east tunnel portal (the Mt. Royal portal). The derailment occurred almost directly below the intersection of Howard and Lombard Streets. The location was 6,223 feet from the eastern entrance to the tunnel, near the University of Baltimore/Mt. Royal Light Rail Station of the Maryland Transit Administration Central Light Rail Line (CLR). The CLR runs along Howard Street between the University of Baltimore/Mt. Royal Station at the north end and Camden Yards Station at the south end. Subsequent to the fire, there was a break in a 40-inch water main almost directly above the derailment that flooded the tunnel with an estimated 14 millions of gallons of water. The fire and water main break impacted the Central Light Rail Line, a light rail track in downtown Baltimore, which runs directly over the Howard Street Tunnel and the water main. When the water main broke and the area around the break collapsed, much of the foundation support for this section of the light rail track was damaged. In addition, the main break created a barrier that cut the light rail line in half, isolating rolling stock on the southern segment. MTA established a temporary maintenance facility since the stock on the southern portion could not reach the maintenance facilities. Throughout the period, MTA was able to keep all light rail equipment operational.

B-28 A Pre-Event Recovery Planning Guide for Transportation On July 21, emergency personnel were able to remove three cars from the tunnel with their contents still burning, and emergency responders were able to contain and extinguish the fire over the next 2 days. Recovery of Critical Infrastructure The initial clean up from the tunnel fire took approximately 5 days. All cars were removed from the tunnel and inspected for damage, and all hazardous materials were off- loaded and removed. The tunnel was inspected for structural damage and reopened to rail traffic on July 23. Over the next 3-week period, the tunnel was periodically closed for maintenance, repair, and clean-up. Freight movement was delayed during these closures. The major transportation infrastructure impact from the tunnel fire was on the Central Light Rail Line. The light rail track in downtown Baltimore runs directly over the Howard Street Tunnel and the water main. When the water main broke and the area around the break collapsed, much of the foundation support for this section of the light rail track was damaged. The light rail track is embedded on a concrete slab, but much of the fill underneath the slab was washed away or collapsed. In order to gain access to the water main, the light rail track and the supporting concrete slab had to be cut. Once the water main had been repaired, the track itself had to be repaired and shored up, and the new concrete slab had to cure. MTA also had to determine if the area impacted by the water main break remained solid under the light rail track. MTA used ground-penetrating radar to determine whether there were substantial voids (holes or gaps) in the soil below the track bed. Once the slab of concrete with the embedded light rail was replaced, grout was injected to ensure that any small holes were filled. The event had an unexpected benefit for the MTA. As part of the repairs, MTA implemented a proposed fix for a previously identified problem. Vibration of the light rail tracks against the concrete slab rail bed had been loosening the fasteners that held the track to the slab. During the shut-down, a rubber boot was inserted between the rail and the slab. Completing repairs to the water main took 12 days. The reconstruction of the light rail bed and tracks took 53 days. Critical Infrastructure Cross-Impacts of Event Flooding collapsed several city streets, knocked out electricity to approximately 1,200 Baltimore Gas and Electric customers, and flooded nearby buildings. The Howard Street Tunnel housed an Internet pipe serving seven of the biggest U.S. Internet Information Service Providers (ISPs), which were subsequently identified as those ISPs experiencing backbone slowdowns. By its second day, the high-temperature fire melted a pipe containing fiber-optic lines passing through the tunnel, disrupting telecommunications traffic on a critical New York-to-Miami axis. The severed cable was used for voice and

Appendix B: NCHRP Project 20-59(33) Case Studies B-29 data transmission, causing backbone slowdowns for ISPs such as Metromedia Fiber Network, Inc.; WorldCom, Inc.; and PSINet, Inc. Reports were received all along the east coast about service disruptions and delays. Cell phones using MCI networks in suburban Maryland failed. New York-based Hearst Corporation lost its e-mail and the main access to its web pages. Slowdowns in communications were experienced in Atlanta, Seattle, and Los Angeles and even as far away as the American embassy in Lusaka, Zambia, which lost all contact with Washington, DC. LESSONS FOR RECOVERY Interagency Coordination and Communication Is Critical In general, the Baltimore Fire Department was well prepared to respond to emergencies within the city. They participated in trainings and drills and, in fact, had completed a full-scale drill, using an MTA-MD MARC Train in an Amtrak tunnel, approximately 6 weeks prior to the actual incident. They had also conducted drills in MTA-MD’s Metro tunnels in prior years. These drills had familiarized fire and emergency medical personnel with tunnel operations and MTA-MD personnel and fostered a positive relationship. However, the Baltimore Fire Department had never participated in exercise trainings or drills in the Howard Street Tunnel and had never done a preparedness drill with CSX involving hazardous materials before the Howard Street Tunnel incident. In the Baltimore CSX train derailment, the standard and emergency operating procedures for the train engineer required notifying CSX directly, upon which the CSX dispatcher would then contact the Baltimore Fire Department. Because of the communication difficulties inside the tunnel, which delayed the initial contact with the CSX office, and the routing through the CSX main office, the first call to 911 came from a security guard at a hotel above the incident site. It was not until 4:00 p.m., almost an hour after the incident occurred, that Baltimore 911 received a call reporting smoke coming from a sewer near the Howard and Lombard Street intersection. Baltimore Fire Department responders were dispatched and were able to trace the smoke to the Camden (west) tunnel portal. Also around 4:00 p.m., the CSX chief dispatcher telephoned the CSX police communications center to ask that the Baltimore City Fire Department be notified and emergency response personnel be dispatched to the tunnel. The time lapse stemming from the incident occurrence, the delay in notification to the CSX dispatcher due to the “dead zone,” the verification of the incident by the dispatcher, the call to CSX railroad police, and the 4:04 call to the Baltimore 911 operator, who ultimately notified the Baltimore City Fire Department, all contributed to critical delays in response. Fire department personnel responded to the site at the Mt. Royal portal at about 4:10 p.m., but they could not enter the tunnel because of the fire and smoke.

B-30 A Pre-Event Recovery Planning Guide for Transportation This delay had a profound impact on the spread of the fire, giving it time to smolder and expand to flammable cargo in the train cars behind the punctured tanker. Had there been immediate notification of the derailment, Fire Department personnel may have been able to contain the chemical spill, suppress the fire, and prevent the water main break, thus reducing the arduous tasks and costs of a multiple-day response to the incident. The number and type of agencies involved quickly adapted to the circumstances, providing support to each other, especially in the recovery phase. Limited Tunnel Access and Alternate Routes Because of the age of the tunnel, there were only two entrances at either end. The tunnel had not been modernized to improve access. Several studies have recommended that the freight route for the Eastern Seaboard of the United States be realigned so as not to pass through aging structures such as the Howard Street Tunnel. Speed and capacity are limited because of the age and design of the tunnel. Currently, there is no parallel routing for freight trains to follow if the tunnel is out of service. Rerouting causes delays and rail congestion. The lack of parallel routing is a significant oversight and deficiency of the freight rail network on the U.S. Eastern Seaboard. Incremental repairs to the existing tunnel, other than for purposes of safety and operational continuity, do not address the limitations of the structure. A study conducted by U.S. DOT in 2005 recommended that freight service be removed from the Howard Street Tunnel and that the structure be updated to provide double-track, high-clearance routes through Baltimore for freight. Lack of Critical Information due to Poor Configuration Management and Information Exchange Prior to the event, information about modifications and construction in or near the tunnel had not been reliably documented or exchanged among city officials, responders, and private industry. Information provided by the City of Baltimore indicated that a storm sewer was 19 feet below the surface near where a test drilling was proposed as part of the recovery effort. However, during the drilling project, the drill struck the storm sewer, which was only about 8 feet below the surface. Also, during the drilling project, it was discovered that a manhole had been moved without documentation. Configuration changes arising out of construction, repairs, inspections, and alterations to the infrastructure in and around the Howard Street Tunnel were unreliable or non- existent, and the information exchange between CSX and the City of Baltimore was inadequate to ensure proper response and recovery in the event of an emergency. CSX railroad structures, portions of the MTA-MD’s Central Light Rail, the Metro subway, and municipal and private utility lines and structures all coexist within a relatively compact area around the tunnel. Repairs and modifications to structures and utilities near critical infrastructure could have a significant effect on the tunnel’s structural integrity and on

Appendix B: NCHRP Project 20-59(33) Case Studies B-31 other nearby critical structures, including power substations and grids for the rail systems, water and gas lines, buildings, roadways, sidewalks, etc. Tunnel plans showing the exact location of the tunnel under Howard Street and its relationship to MTA assets (CLR tracks and Metro tunnels) were not found until days later; the plans existed only in hard copy at the MTA engineering office. Prepare for Hazardous Materials (Hazmat) Recovery The potential environmental impact was the responsibility of the Maryland Department of the Environment’s (MDE’s) Emergency Response Division (ERD). ERD obtained the bill of lading provided by the CSX crew and contacted members of the South Baltimore Industrial Mutual Aid Plan (SBIMAP). Established in 1982 and largely funded by industry, SBIMAP is a voluntary consortium of manufacturers, emergency response personnel, Baltimore City environmental and emergency management personnel, and MDE. The consortium is focused on industry in the South Baltimore industrial area, but its general purpose is to plan for and respond to incidents in which hazardous materials and potential environmental harm are involved. SBIMAP conducts periodic drills and works with emergency responders to train, practice, and refine response to hazardous releases. Member companies provided two chemists who quickly determined that there was no individual or combined danger from any of the chemicals involved in the derailment and subsequent fire. MDE advised Baltimore City Hazardous Materials (HazMat) Response Team of a potential hydrogen fluoride (HF) vapor hazard due to thermal degradation of fluorosilicic acid and identified specialized treatment needed for HF exposures. MDE also set up booms in the Inner Harbor to minimize contamination from chemicals seeping from the leaking rail cars. MDE furthermore initiated air and water quality monitoring in order to detect leaks or discharges. Based upon the results of this monitoring, a determination was made that evacuating the downtown area would not be necessary. However, shelter-in-place plans were put into action on the decision of the Incident Commander, and sirens were sounded throughout the downtown area to notify residents. Because of the pre-planning through SBIMAP for a hazardous materials release and its aftermath, the recovery phase in this area was facilitated. In fact, the issue was resolved before the fire was extinguished and other recovery efforts had yet to begin. Critical Infrastructure Interdependencies The loss of the communications pipe and the cables contained within the tunnel did not have a profound effect on recovery efforts in the Howard Street Tunnel incident. However, communications infrastructure loss of this type can have more widespread and lasting effects on recovery than one might anticipate.

B-32 A Pre-Event Recovery Planning Guide for Transportation Within cities, communications lines concentrate in physical locations called carrier “hotels,” otherwise known as telco or telecom hotels. They may be buildings, tunnels, viaducts, or other existing key structures. According to Kazys Varnelis (Spring 2005), the lasting economic effect (of the Baltimore tunnel fire), both locally and globally, might have been worse. Losing a major carrier hotel or a central switching station could result in the loss of all copper-wire and most cellular telephone service in a city, as well as the loss of 911 emergency services, Internet access, and most corporate networks. Given that many carrier hotels on the coasts are also key nodes in intercontinental telephone and data traffic, losing these structures could disrupt communications that we depend on worldwide. Water in Critical Tunnels Water in the Howard Street Tunnel was a common condition. It is not known how much of the water intrusion in the Howard Street Tunnel came from the July 2001 fire, the water main break, storm sewers, groundwater intrusion, runoff or any other source. Wet conditions and water intrusion are not unique to the Howard Street Tunnel. TCRP Synthesis 23: Inspection Policy and Procedures for Rail Transit Tunnels and Underground Structures states the following: The number one problem affecting tunnels and underground structures is groundwater intrusion and the subsequent damage caused by the presence of tunnel leaks. This groundwater intrusion is responsible for more problems affecting a tunnel’s concrete liners and steel reinforced concrete than all other tunnel structural problems combined. TCRP Synthesis 23 also concluded: There was a clear preponderance of water intrusion-related tunnel defects. This conclusion comes as no surprise to those familiar with rail tunnel conditions and maintenance priorities. Water leakage, infiltration, corrosion, spalling, de-laminations, potential cracking, and siltation all indicate the intrusion of water, usually associated with chloride or calcium carbonate (from the deterioration of concrete). Keeping water out of tunnels, and adequately draining the water that intrudes into tunnels are perhaps the two most substantial issues reported by responding rail transit system inspection managers, and the most intractable problems for transit tunnel inspectors and maintenance crews. Many rail tunnels have water intrusion of some kind, and some rail systems experience constant dampness in their tunnels. Groundwater intrusion and other seepage, the possibility of water main breaks, clogged drains, pump failure, and storm flow/flooding all make water a major source of threat and vulnerability for tunnels. These types of failures can be critical, resulting in derailments, collisions, and possible loss of life. Highway tunnels experience the same damage from wet conditions, and degradation to the roadway and tunnel integrity can occur. Hydrodemolition, or removal of concrete by high-pressure water is one outcome of any type of flood including water main breaks, storm surges from hurricanes, and flash flooding. The high frequency of water intrusion in tunnels and the damage that can occur when prolonged water intrusion is not addressed suggests that preventing/mitigating water intrusion be a high priority in designing, engineering, constructing, inspecting, and

Appendix B: NCHRP Project 20-59(33) Case Studies B-33 maintaining tunnels. When tunnels are in proximity to bodies of water and have the threat of breach and inundation, they should be considered high-risk installations. Even when no other alignment is possible, if the tunnel is a critical link, which most tunnels are, they must be inspected, maintained, and repaired on a more rigorous schedule than above-ground applications. Pumps should be reviewed and updates considered on a regular basis to reflect technological and mechanical improvements, with appropriate breakers to handle high-moisture situations, and reliable and robust back-up power should be in place for emergency operations. Another issue is earthen dams, which are often privately built and owned and are not always brought to the attention of local jurisdictions. If they are in proximity to transportation assets and are in danger of failure in flooding events such as storms of 1%/year, ½%/year or 0.1%/year magnitude, without pre-planning, they may inundate assets since their existence was not known or considered. PROCESSES AND TOOLS Utilize Pre-Existing Relationships Pre-planning consortiums, like SBIMAP, and establishing professional relationships in advance of an incident will greatly enhance recovery efforts. City management should continuously review and update plans, strategies, and standard operating procedure (SOP) tactics for response and recovery in tunnel incidents. All cities with a railroad industry should collaborate with the industry to be successful and comprehensive in response and recovery. Understand Resilience and Redundancy Ensure that critical infrastructure is analyzed to identify chokepoints and redundant systems (to the extent feasible) that can be used to compensate for a major transportation system disruption. Resilience of critical systems should be part of regional planning and redesign/rehabilitation of critical infrastructure. Rehabilitation of structures should include designing and building alternatives for transportation during the building and rehabilitation phases. The importance of resilience means looking at interdependencies beyond just one facility or agency. Contemplation of resilience when considering running hazardous freight through the Howard Street Tunnel (which historically had not always carried freight), would have raised issues, including the proximity of the water main. In addition, as planning progressed over time, the light rail system, the Metro, and the communications assets were also placed in proximity to the hazardous cargo running through the tunnel. Do Hazard and Risk Assessments These essential evaluations must be done on all critical infrastructure to properly pre-plan for recovery operations. These evaluations should use an all-hazards approach; develop

B-34 A Pre-Event Recovery Planning Guide for Transportation worst-case scenarios; and consider the impacts of loss and the time, money, and effort required to restore systems to operation at previous service levels. These assessments must be performed throughout the lifecycle of the critical infrastructure asset. In particular, they are needed whenever other assets are proposed in proximity to critical infrastructure, especially high-risk security assets such as military and intelligence installations, power and utilities, infrastructure for transportation and communications, and structures and locations where large numbers of people congregate for social, transit, or business purposes. Plan Effective Information Sharing Critical information is not critical until it is needed. This concept is simple, but information is not always available until well after recovery efforts have begun. Pre- planning for access to information, especially information that may not seem necessary for normal operation, will be critical. For instance, if an incident occurs in a tunnel adjacent to a building, it may be necessary to determine the floor plan and contents of privately owned property. This information may be critical to recovery, but it is probably not part of the emergency planning process for critical infrastructure access. Pre-Position Equipment if Possible Recovery efforts, especially debris removal, as in the case of the extrication of still burning rail cars from the Howard Street Tunnel with the cooperation of MTA and its specialized rail equipment, is one way to speed and ease recovery efforts, especially in the case of foreseen events. Even in unforeseen events, pre-planning using an all-hazards approach yields excellent strategies for dealing with events. Assuring that resources are inventoried and categorized, with information available to all agencies participating in recovery efforts, will facilitate pre-positioning for optimum recovery. Put Emergency Contracts in Place Prior to Event Effective recovery efforts require the pre-planning step of ensuring that emergency services contracts are in place for all-hazards events. In addition, access to a trust fund, such as the one used by the Maryland Department of Transportation for recovery efforts in the Howard Street event, will facilitate recovery efforts. REFERENCES CSX Tunnel Fire, United States Fire Administration, USFA-TR-140, July 2001. Varnelis, Kazys, Centripetal City, Cabinet, Issue 17 Spring 2005: http://www.cabinetmagazine.org/ issues/17/varnelis.php Transit Cooperative Research Program Synthesis No. 23: Inspection Policy and Procedures for Rail Transit Tunnels and Underground Structures, Transportation Research Board, 1997.

Appendix B: NCHRP Project 20-59(33) Case Studies B-35 2009 CALIFORNIA WILDFIRE, LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA EVENT AND RECOVERY SUMMARY Synopsis of Event On the afternoon of August 26, 2009, at approximately 3:30 p.m., the Station Fire commenced. The fire was officially declared arson the same day. Four days later, on August 30th, two firefighters were killed, resulting in a homicide investigation. Twenty-two people were injured, over 160,000 acres or 250 square miles were affected, and nearly 200 structures were destroyed in the Station Fire, making it the 10th largest fire in modern California history and the largest fire in the recorded history of Angeles National Forest. The fire ravaged two Caltrans District 7 highways, affecting 40 miles of Angeles Crest Highway (SR-2) and 7 miles of San Gabriel Canyon Road (SR-39). The fires in the Angeles National Forest continued to burn for almost 2 months and were officially contained on Friday, October 16, 2009. After containment, the initial priority was to clear two state highways, SR-2 and SR-30, in order for firefighters and other repair maintenance crews to gain access to fire-stricken areas. Impact of Event on Critical Infrastructure The fire damage to the highways and road systems included the destruction of thousands of wooden guardrail posts. Asphalt, berms, and drainage systems were damaged from the intense heat of the fire. Aluminum road signs were melted and vegetation was completely burned. Caltrans had to replace incinerated transportation support structures including 4 miles of guardrails, drainage pipes, mile-marker posts, and hundreds of signs and sections of pavement. Caltrans authorized $12.5 million for three emergency contracts to commence immediately by outside contractors. Station Fire Event Timeline August 26, 2009, approximately 3:30pm: The Station Fire commences on Angeles Crest Highway. The cause of the blaze is declared arson. Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department begins a criminal investigation. August 29–31, 2009: The fire expands to more than 80,000 acres within 3 days of starting, considered to be the most accelerated portion of expansion in the duration of the fire. August 30, 2009: Los Angeles County firefighters Arnold Quinones and Tedmund Hall are killed in their Fire Department vehicle, turning the criminal investigation into a homicide investigation. October 16, 2009: The Station Fire is officially declared contained, partially due to October rains.

B-36 A Pre-Event Recovery Planning Guide for Transportation Almost a year later, these highway structures were not yet open to the public due to effects from massive mud slides enabled by the fire during and after containment. Impact of Cascading Consequences The complete burn off, with extensive burning and destruction of vegetation in the forest area where the rocky terrain is steep and unstable, meant that massive rock and mudslides could occur without warning. With winter coming, the El Niño effect accompanied by heavy rains could worsen the situation. According to Caltrans Damage Restoration Coordinator, Bill Varley, “When the rains come, there could be massive debris flows. All it takes is one storm to start flushing everything on the surface downward. You get an avalanche of mud, water, ash, fragments of wood, rocks, everything.” Erosion control measures were investigated including a new method called hydromulch, a water and fiber mulch mixture that is sprayed onto exposed soil to control erosion and help stabilize vulnerable slopes near the road. Caltrans had received permission from the National Forestry Service to use hydromulching for roadway protection in selective areas. It worked well, but the National Forestry Service did not permit all surfaces to be sprayed. The National Forestry Service had jurisdiction where the Caltrans teams sought to spray. In the winter of 2010, Southern California experienced mudslides due to rains that were, according to the National Weather Service, the strongest to hit the region in 5 years. PRE-EVENT PLANNING FOR RECOVERY Emergency Processes Have Been Established in Advance The California Governor’s declaration of disaster can ease environmental requirements and other contracting requirements that can speed up the recovery process. Pre-Event Recovery Planning Is Part of Hazard Mitigation Effort and Coop Activities Recovery is integrated into other existing planning processes, such as hazard mitigation planning and COOP efforts. In addition, Caltrans has COOP engineers on staff who “understand infrastructure,” i.e., who have designed and built transportation infrastructure. Their expertise provides the perspective to address infrastructure issues in both hazard mitigation and recovery planning. Resources Are Identified and Pre-Positioned if Possible Resources should be identified from all relevant sources, including volunteer organizations. Coordination with agencies such as the Water Department and the Department of Forestry was critical to providing recovery resources. Placement of

Appendix B: NCHRP Project 20-59(33) Case Studies B-37 resources and identification of staging areas for resources were done in advance. In addition, debris removal plans were created and put in place prior to the event. Contractors Have Been Identified in Advance Recovery is expedited by having pre-identified and pre-qualified contractors. This allows emergency contracts to be implemented rapidly, even before funding is available. LESSONS FOR RECOVERY Lessons from Previous Incidents Were Put in Practice Knowledge gained from the San Diego County wildfires of 2007 and a post-fire mudslide near Independence, California, was used in pre-planning and preparedness for the 2009 Station Fire. Improvements were made in risk assessments and hazard mitigation practices; coordination amongst staff, contractors, and other agencies; and estimations of roadway closures. Coordination among Multiple Agencies Is Critical From a transportation perspective, critical coordination was necessary among multiple agencies including Caltrans, U.S. DOT, FHWA, the California Department of Forestry, the California Department of Fish and Game, and Los Angeles County First Responder Units. All entities worked well together in the early stages of recovery, but later it became clear that the organizations had different perspectives on the urgency and appropriate scope and pace of the recovery. These differences caused disagreements among organizations over how best to approach the recovery. Expect the Unexpected The threat of wildfires is a known hazard in California as are the risks associated with mudslides due to rains following wildfires. However, the combination of the severity of the 2009 Station Fire, which substantially impacted the terrain of the mountainous area it encompassed, and the anomalous storms that followed the fire, resulted in challenges for planning. Identify Stakeholders and Their Interests Being familiar with the needs of the multiple agencies and communities involved and understanding the dynamics between multijurisdictional entities can help address the conflicts and debates that can arise during an event. Establishing an interagency/intercounty working group before an event to coordinate planning and address implementation issues such as what procedures can be used and where—e.g., hydromulching—can improve the recovery process. Joint training exercises can be used to work through potential issues and plans before an event.

B-38 A Pre-Event Recovery Planning Guide for Transportation Plan for the Full Chain of Events Understanding the potential cascading effects of an event is critical to recovery. Planning for the full chain of events—e.g., potential mudslides occurring after wildfires—will improve the effectiveness of the recovery process. PROCESSES AND TOOLS Standardized Assessment Process Used Caltrans has established a Safety Assessment Program (SAP) to quickly produce damage assessments after an event. The program is based on the ATC-20 building assessment program developed for assessing damage after an earthquake. The program has been adapted to include highways and other key assets. Prioritization Process in Place Caltrans has adopted the National Highway System (NHS) classification system— strategic national highway network—as a key priority component in addition to the long- established Lifelines Identification and Asset Management system already in place. These three questions are typically answered: 1. Is it on the NHS? 2. What is the level of traffic? 3. Is there an alternate route? Multiagency Working Group Has Been Established A working group should be formed that is composed of key asset owners and stakeholders to coordinate incident planning and implementation. The group provides an opportunity to address conflicts over priorities and challenges related to jurisdiction. Having an existing forum can assist in resolving the debates about shared costs of recovery and responsibility for the cost of mitigation. GIS Mapping Tools Are Used Substantial GIS mapping is available to assist in recovery planning. Pre-event, it can help determine vulnerable areas and identify critical assets at risk. After an event, it can help identify and analyze damage to develop recovery plans. GIS maps provide an overall view of damage and recovery needs with location-specific information that includes severity of damage to buildings and infrastructure. After Katrina, FEMA produced high- resolution maps that showed the flood impacts from the storm.

Appendix B: NCHRP Project 20-59(33) Case Studies B-39 Recovery Included in Existing Plans The California State Emergency Plan includes a Recovery section that Caltrans helped to develop. The Caltrans Hazard Mitigation Plan includes all aspects of emergency management and recovery. REFERENCES Interviews with Dan Freeman, Deputy Director of Maintenance, and Damage Restoration Coordinator, Caltrans and Bill Varley, Emergency Management Coordinator, CalTrans. Interviews with Ed Toledo, Maintenance Area Superintendent for North Region 3, Caltrans and Donald Niles, Maintenance Supervisor, Caltrans and maintenance staff. Interview with Herby Lissade, Chief, Office of Emergency Management, Caltrans. Garcia, Armando. Caltrans District 11 San Diego County Wildfires Cost and Efforts for a Timely Recovery, Presented to Caltrans External Advisory Liaison (CEAL) Committee, May 6, 2008. Jarquin, Oscar. Disaster Response in Transportation Agencies, Presented at 21st Annual GIS-T Symposium Panel Discussion, March 18, 2008. Markham, Kelly. After Burn: Cleaning Up After the Fire. Published in InsideSeven, Caltrans Newsletter. April 2010. Newsweek Magazine, A Twitter Timeline of the California Wildfires, September 1, 2009. Available on Newsweek website, http://www.newsweek.com/2009/09/01/a-twitter-timeline-of-the-california-wildfires.html

B-40 A Pre-Event Recovery Planning Guide for Transportation MIDWEST FLOODING, 2008 EVENT AND RECOVERY SUMMARY Synopsis of Event In June 2008, much of the Midwestern United States received over 12 inches of rainfall as several storm systems sequentially impacted the region. The vast majority of the precipitation was channeled directly into lakes, rivers, and streams as runoff. Resulting stream flows reached historic highs across the Midwest, particularly in multiple areas of Iowa. Flooding lingered for weeks in many areas and broke historic records for flood levels. A presidential disaster declaration was made in Iowa on May 27, 2008, for severe storms and tornadoes. It was updated and amended after the June flooding, increasing from 4 counties to 85 counties throughout the state (as shown below). Impact of Event on Critical Infrastructure On the state roadway network, 24 state roads, 20 highways including Interstates 80 and 380, and more than 1,000 secondary roads were closed at various points during the course of the flooding. Damages accrued to public transportation infrastructure were approximately $53 million. May–June 2008 Event Timeline May 27, 2008: Presidential disaster is declared due to severe storms and tornadoes and increases from 4 counties to 85 counties. Iowa Governor Chet Culver declares a state disaster for 85 counties. June 2008: Iowa and the Midwest receive over 12 inches of rainfall via multiple storm systems.

Appendix B: NCHRP Project 20-59(33) Case Studies B-41 Recovery of Critical Infrastructure The Iowa DOT was the only agency in Iowa that had the staff and equipment needed for disaster response and recovery. Initial disaster recovery efforts completed by the Iowa DOT involved debris removal from roadways. During this period, Iowa DOT staff simultaneously initiated emergency repairs to federal-aid highways, as a part of the FHWA emergency relief program, to restore essential traffic, minimize the extent of damage, and protect the remaining facilities. The Iowa DOT submitted all FHWA emergency repair projects and funding requests within 60 days of the flooding event. After emergency repair projects were submitted, the Iowa DOT began the process of addressing permanent repair needs to federal-aid highways within the state. Permanent repairs are those repairs undertaken to restore the highway to its pre-disaster condition and must have prior FHWA approval and authorization unless done as part of the emergency repairs. The Iowa DOT not only addressed the needs on its own system of state and federal highways, but also oversaw the submittal of close to 300 projects from state, county, and city governments for locally owned or managed roadways. The initial disaster recovery efforts, which mostly involved debris removal, lasted an average of 4 weeks. The FHWA emergency repairs to Iowa DOT roads lasted 1 to 3 months. According to the Iowa DOT office, no major delays or unexpected obstacles were experienced in the recovery process PRE-EVENT PLANNING FOR RECOVERY Use of Integrated Planning Process The Iowa DOT takes an all-hazards approach to emergency management, which includes recovery as one of its four phases—preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery. Employee training, staff development, and developing FEMA resource management capabilities are considered comprehensive, allowing individuals to contribute to all disaster phases, rather than focusing on any one phase, i.e., solely recovery. Iowa has a State Recovery Plan that includes a Transportation Appendix that details the roles, responsibilities, and framework for post-disaster transportation recovery. Advance Coordination with the Iowa Homeland Security and Emergency Management Division (HSEMD) and the State Emergency Operating Center (SEOC) in Place Local management agencies request resources and assistance from the SEOC, which are then assigned to local state agencies after review. Iowa DOT is typically assigned debris- removal missions.

B-42 A Pre-Event Recovery Planning Guide for Transportation Iowa DOT also engages in executive-level decision-making in recovery efforts such as defining and committing resources to flood-damaged areas throughout the state (both personnel and equipment) and working with other state agencies to coordinate disaster response and recovery efforts. The Iowa DOT Bridges and Structures Office and the Office of Design were utilized to provide bridge and road plans, as well as expert advice on the conditions of structures (bridges, culverts, wing walls, etc.) impacted by the flooding. Established Relationships and Support Roles with Federal Agencies After significant disaster events, the Iowa DOT works closely with multiple federal agencies as a part of the recovery process for their transportation infrastructure. FEMA public assistance officers are critical in calculating damage amounts to infrastructure, which in turn fund the disaster recovery. These FEMA public assistance funds can be used to repair roads, bridges, and associated facilities, e.g., auxiliary structures, lighting, and signage. Members of the Iowa DOT serve as project officers for FEMA, with the responsibility of assisting public entities such as cities and counties in gathering information and completing worksheets essential to receiving FEMA recovery funding. The Iowa DOT also functions as the coordinator for the FHWA emergency relief program and takes on the responsibility for processing Detailed Damage Inspection Reports (DDIRs). DDIRs are forms used to document the cost estimates for emergency repairs to federal-aid highways after a significant disaster occurs. The DDIR is written to determine eligibility, scope, and preliminary cost estimates for the work, which the FHWA uses to support their request for emergency repair funding. The projects that were submitted to FHWA during the 2008 flooding disaster came from the Iowa DOT, Iowa counties and cities, the Iowa Department of Natural Resources (Iowa DNR), and railroad crossing systems within the state of Iowa. All of these projects were required to be submitted in the form of a DDIR. Critical Design and Infrastructure Records Have Been Compiled and Are Easily Accessed Many roadway and bridge design plans, shop drawings, and other infrastructure record documents are available electronically on a 24-hour basis, with plans to import older, paper bridge and road designs into the Iowa DOT’s electronic record management system (ERMS). LESSONS FOR RECOVERY Innovative State Funding Approaches Used Based on experiences from previous floods, a temporary state agency, the Rebuild Iowa Office (RIO), was created. RIO was engaged in community and regional recovery planning; disaster recovery case management coordination; communications and public outreach; and economic, environmental, housing, and infrastructure recovery.

Appendix B: NCHRP Project 20-59(33) Case Studies B-43 Recognizing the need to repair all of the damaged roads, bridges, and other transportation infrastructure within the state, plans were made to fund these repairs through grants from U.S. DOT, FEMA, and I-Jobs bonding funds. Iowa's Governor developed the I-Jobs initiative, a program focused on strengthening the state’s economy and rebuilding local infrastructure, following the 2008 storms. I-JOBS was a $875 million state infrastructure modernization program designed to support or retain jobs, rebuild communities impacted by the 2008 floods, and promote long-term economic growth. Of the total, $118.5 million was used for competitive disaster recovery grants and $46.5 million was used for targeted disaster rebuilding. Additional funding for infrastructure projects was made available through the Community Disaster Grant Program (CDGP), which was created in February 2009 by the Governor. The CDGP program is a $22 million disaster relief program that provides grants of $2,000 or more to cities and counties to projects that are not being otherwise funded (by federal or non-federal sources). Improve Coordination with State And Local Governments and Federal Agencies The Iowa DOT had in place electronic processes and tools to help streamline recovery efforts, but recognized the need to make changes to better align with federal agency requirements such as FHWA reporting requirements. The FHWA ER program requires that communities complete detailed damage inspection reports for (DDIRs) for reimbursement. The Iowa DOT is creating a software program that allows all community members to electronically document damages in the DDIR software. Once the damage data are entered, the DDIR program will automatically generate emails to different state offices that may be interested in taking on the project. This program will help automate the workflow by allowing state agencies to view damage reports almost as soon as they are entered by community members. Need for Additional Staffing and Training for Emergencies Iowa DOT realized a need for additional staffing and training at the State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) and at the Iowa DOT headquarters in Ames. The Iowa DOT is planning to provide additional training on the FHWA DDIR process and for Iowa DOT public assistance project officers. PROCESSES AND TOOLS Electronic Record Management System (ERMS) for Critical Documents With the large number of damaged roads, it was imperative for the Iowa DOT to effectively distribute critical information such as computer-aided design and drafting (CADD) files to personnel assisting with the recovery processes at the damaged sites. In order to accommodate the need for distributing pertinent information that could help decrease recovery time, the Iowa DOT has implemented the ERMS.

B-44 A Pre-Event Recovery Planning Guide for Transportation The ERMS electronically stores and organizes 1.2 million CADD records representing over 6 million pages of information. The decreased personnel productivity from the time-consuming tasks of paper handling and the inefficient process for storing, routing, and approving documents are removed from the recovery work flow process, allowing the Iowa DOT personnel to focus their resources on other tasks. The files stored in the ERMS are data encrypted and are open server/browser based—they do not require any proprietary workstation software. Records Management System (RMS) Used to Collected Reimbursement Information The Iowa DOT has implemented a record management system (RMS), which is an electronic tool that retains information regarding completed jobs, number of employees on a job, equipment usage, and expenses. This information is entered and stored through electronically submitted timesheets, expense reports, and equipment management reports. While the RMS is primarily used as a data-collection tool, it also allows the Iowa DOT to catch information such as materials, labor, and equipment for reimbursement of federal aid programs such as the FEMA public assistance (PA) program and the FHWA emergency repair and permanent repair programs. Once a day, Iowa DOT staff completes the RMS entries, and a summary is produced. These daily summaries are then reconciled into a pay period summary, which is sent directly to governmental agencies that are providing funding to the Iowa DOT. The Iowa DOT is currently in the process of updating the RMS in order to automate the reimbursement process from governmental agencies. By instantaneously sending payment reports to governmental agencies through the RMS, the Iowa DOT can ultimately reduce the recovery process time. Enhanced Use of GIS To implement enhanced use of GIS in conjunction with improved system tracking, the Iowa DOT’s Operations Support Center will provide a 24/7 capability to provide better and more current information. This enhanced information will be communicated with Iowa DOT partners. REFERENCES Mitigation Assessment Team Report – Midwest Floods of 2008 in Iowa and Wisconsin: Building Performance Observations, Recommendations, and Technical Guidance. FEMA P-765, October 2009. Flood Recovery and Reinvestment Plan, City of Cedar Rapids, Iowa, March 3, 2009. http://www.corridorrecovery.org/city/plan. A Summary of Emergency Relief Procedures for Federal-Aid Highways, IDOT Bureau of Local Roads/FHWA Illinois Division.

Appendix B: NCHRP Project 20-59(33) Case Studies B-45 http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/ildiv/handout.htm US Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration: Special Federal Aid Funding, Chapter II - Eligibility of Damage Repair Work. Updated 2011. http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/reports/erm/ermchap2.cfm FEMA Public Assistance Guide, June, 2007. http://www.fema.gov/government/grant/pa/pag07_2.shtm#Category%20C%20- %20Roads%20and%20Bridges

B-46 A Pre-Event Recovery Planning Guide for Transportation ASSET MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS In this case study, the research team explored the use of asset management systems (AMS) as tools for resource allocation and performance measurement for managers of transportation infrastructure and the application of AMS for purposes of emergency management and disaster recovery. Questions considered by the research team include the following: • What are transportation AMS? • How are AMS currently deployed by state DOTs? • Could AMS be leveraged as tools for pre-event recovery planning? WHAT ARE TRANSPORTATION ASSET MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS? The Midwest Regional University Transportation Center has one of the more concise and clear definitions of asset management: Simply bringing relevant data and analytic tools together with systematic implementation processes to ensure that the defined goals of the system are attained as efficiently as possible. AMS are data-driven systems used by capital asset owners to monitor the condition and use of their assets and to make quantitative, alternatives-based decisions about how to invest resources in the maintenance and expansion of those assets. The earliest transportation AMS were applied to pavement conditions on roadways. These systems began as manual processes for chronicling the construction media and repair history of a roadway to assist in scheduling repairs and resurfacing. As computers became more pervasive and powerful, the amount of input that could be tracked became more complex (including weather and use levels and their impact on various elements of the asset). Increased processing power made it possible to apply AMS to more complex assets like bridges and facilities. Over the past two decades, transportation asset owners facing aging infrastructure, restrictions on public resources, and demands for investment accountability, have increasingly turned to policy- and measurement-driven AMS to Timeline of the Modern Asset Management Program 1991 – Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA) required statewide transportation plans and addressed asset management and performance measures. 1994 – Executive Order 12983 required systematic benefit/cost analysis for federal infrastructure. 1994 – Government Accounting Standard Board (GASB) Concept Statement directed government agencies to establish and communicate goals and objectives and set measurable targets. 1998 – AASHTO adopted asset management as a strategic initiative and formed a task force to develop and implement a Strategic Plan for Transportation Asset Management. 1999 - GASB Statement 34 required more rigorous financial reporting from state and local governments. Also, recommended that capital assets be rigorously depreciated unless an asset management or maintenance and preservation plan is in place. 1999 – FHWA Office of Asset Management published the Asset Management Primer.

Appendix B: NCHRP Project 20-59(33) Case Studies B-47 maintain their assets, justify their resource requests, explore the economic trade-off of investment alternatives over time, and improve the experience of the end user. NCHRP Report 551 identified the core principles of a comprehensive system for assets management as follows: • Policy-driven—Resource allocation decisions are based on a well-defined set of policy goals and objectives. • Performance-based—Policy objectives are translated into system performance measures that are used for both day-to-day and strategic management. • Analysis of Options and Tradeoffs—Decisions on how to allocate funds within and across different types of investments (e.g., preventive maintenance versus rehabilitation, pavements versus bridges) are based on an analysis of how different allocations will impact achievement of relevant policy objectives. • Decisions Based on Quality Information—The merits of different options with respect to an agency’s policy goals are evaluated using credible and current data. • Monitoring Provides Clear Accountability and Feedback—Performance results are monitored and reported for both impacts and effectiveness. These principles represent an idealized comprehensive system. The reality is, although AMS are increasingly embraced by state DOTs and other asset owners, the degree of their implementation varies widely. HOW ARE ASSET MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS CURRENTLY DEPLOYED BY STATE DOTS? Most state DOTs now have some form of asset inventory and preservation programs to meet the federal funding and reporting guidelines, but due to funding, data, other resources, or political limitations, many of these programs are underdeveloped and not strategically deployed. Although most AMS are at least nominally driven by statewide, long-range planning processes and the performance measures identified by these processes, the level of commitment to utilizing AMS for decision making and performance evaluation varies considerably. A survey of state DOTs was conducted for this case study to further identify their structures and viability of AMS as emergency recovery tools. The table that follows provides a comparative overview of the AMS of the transportation agencies studied— Michigan DOT (MDOT), Montana DOT (MDT), Ohio DOT (ODOT), and Vermont Agency of Transportation (VTrans). These states were selected for this overview because of the relative maturity of their AMS. These states have their AMS integrated into their strategic planning process and either have a performance measurement process in place or in development—traits that provide a solid framework for testing the idea of leveraging AMS for pre-disaster planning and recovery.

Survey of Selected States with Asset Management Systems Michigan Montana Ohio Vermont AMS Program Transportation Management System (TMS). Integral decision support tool to feed a comprehensive project prioritization process and to provide a clear link showing how proposed projects and proposed use of funds support the State Long Range Plan and the Long Range Plans of TMAs, MPOs, and other agencies within Michigan. Performance Programming Process (P3). Ensures the best system-wide investment decisions are made given: (1) Overall direction from customers, (2) Availability of resources, and (3) System performance monitored over time. ODOT uses asset management to identify, evaluate and maintain its transportation assets in a steady-state manner. Annual condition assessments are reviewed and these trends are used to predict future asset conditions. The projected conditions are compared to adequacy thresholds to identify lane miles or assets that are deemed deficient. Performance measures are used to monitor the effectiveness of the asset management process and to adjust management strategies or resource levels. VTrans uses AMS and performance measures to implement and evaluate four key goals: safety, preservation, excellence, and planning. Managing Agency Michigan Department of Transportation (MDOT) Montana Department of Transportation (MDT) Ohio Department of Transportation (ODOT) Vermont Agency of Transportation (VTrans) Origin Act 51 of the State of Michigan Public Acts of 1951 (initially pavement management), revised July 25, 1997, and again by Public Act 199 of 2002. Identified as part of TRANPLAN 21 (1994) – State Planning Document. Developed through the long- range, strategic-planning process Sections 24 and 25 of Act no. 64 (2001) required VTrans to develop an asset management system, including a performance- driven and decision-making process for maintaining, upgrading, and operating transportation assets cost- effectively.

Michigan Montana Ohio Vermont Reason for Initiating Justification for funding, system preservation, and accountability. Improve pavement condition, prioritize funding allocation, improve customer experience, satisfaction, and accountability. Eliminate transportation system deficiencies statewide and then maintain over time, including accountability. Justification for funding, efficient allocation of resources, preservation of aging infrastructure. Funding Source Michigan’s House Bill No. 5396 provides for annual appropriations to support and implement a statewide asset management program. Part of the MDT budget. Part of the ODOT planning budget. Part of VTrans planning budget. Participating Asset Types Roads, Bridges, Park-and-Ride Lots, Vehicles, Rail Lines, Railroad Bridges, Railroad Crossings, Airports, Planes, and other Facilities and Assets. Pavement and Bridges. Pavement, Bridges, and Highway Maintenance. Pavement, Bridges, Maintenance, Vehicles and Equipment, and Aviation. VTrans is developing a Rail Policy Plan in which rail operators are required to evaluate tracks and beds per lease terms. Multi-Agency Coordination The Transportation Asset Management Committee includes agencies that own and manage roads and bridges. Some coordination with MPOs and local road owners. Some coordination with MPOs and local road owners. Some coordination with MPOs and local road owners. Evaluation System Pavement Surface and Evaluation Rating (PASER) Bridge Condition Forecasting System (BCFS). Ride Index – perceived quality (smoothness) of ride. National Bridge Inventory Condition Assessment. Organizational Performance Indicators (OPIs), integrated with Ellis Project tracking and funding application. dTIMS for pavement. PONTIS for bridges (working to fully utilize). MATS (Maintenance Activity Tracking System). Performance Measures and Evaluation Tools Yes Currently in development. Yes Yes - 33 strategic performance measures related to condition of underlying asset, or measure a service provided to users.

Michigan Montana Ohio Vermont Identify and Evaluate Project Alternatives Yes Yes Yes Yes System Integration TMS is a single management system with six subsystems: Bridge, Congestion, Intermodal, Pavement, Public Transportation, and Safety. This allows the TMS to include a common shared database, a common set of decision support tools and functionality, and the use of a robust and consistent user interface. Data collected, processed, and maintained at the working levels are stored using an enterprise database management system. No OPI is applied across assets Some Integrated into Master Planning Yes - AMS is a part of e- Michigan Transportation Policy Plan, State Long-Range Plan, agency business plans as well as program-specific strategies. Yes - P3 is a product of the master planning process and is an element of the STIP and TIP. Yes - AMS is an element of strategic and business planning as well as the STIP and TIP process. Yes – AMS is integrated into long- range strategic planning as well as STIP and TIP process.

Michigan Montana Ohio Vermont Linked to Resource Allocation and Decision Making Yes P3 “guides” the project nomination process and the P3 performance measures are considered during project selection. Yes, priority funding recommendations are made based on OPI performance measures and strategic goals. Yes Public Input and Reporting Internet Site, Newsletter, Michigan Transportation Facts & Figures, and STIP and TIP Process. Limited to the STIP and TIP process and long-range planning. Progress Reporting is under development. AMS is an element of the Governor’s Jobs and Progress Plan. Limited to STIP and TIP process and long-range planning. Does Managing Agency have an Emergency Planning or Incident Response Group? Yes Yes No No Is the AMS linked to Emergency Planning or Incident Response? No No No No

B-52 A Pre-Event Recovery Planning Guide for Transportation The results of the state DOT survey reflect the original assumptions that AMS are applied to varying degrees, are inconsistently integrated into DOT strategic planning, and are still in the expansion and development phases. On the other hand, these examples do show that the state DOTs surveyed collect and analyze a large amount of complex and potentially useful data. DOTs are expanding their AMS programs and integrating AMS analysis into their planning and investment policy and lifecycle management. The survey, although not exhaustive, did not identify formal integration between emergency management operations and the AMS process. Interviewees did identify some informal or personal connections between the groups responsible for maintaining the AMS and the emergency management entities. Within the Michigan DOT, for example, the administrator of the Safety and Security group has a strong personal relationship with the administrator of the AMS operations group. This is manifest in semi-regular conversations and occasional data or information requests from the Safety and Security group during emergency response or planning activities. Although there are no plans to formalize or deepen this relationship, interviewees acknowledged the potential benefits to improved and standardized coordination. COULD ASSET MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS BE USED FOR PRE-EVENT RECOVERY PLANNING? None of the AMS surveyed are currently connected to pre-disaster planning and recovery, but the logical link between the two does exist and has been indirectly identified and explored by previous TRB reports (see below). These prior findings begin to demonstrate the rationale for AMS-Emergency Management process integration. NCHRP Report 551: Performance Measures and Targets for Transportation Asset Management (2006) investigates the current state of practice for the integration of performance measurements in AMS. The report establishes categories of performance measurements, one of which is preservation. The applied definition of preservation measurement includes actions required to maintain the asset in a condition of good repair during emergency situations. Preservation is a founding principle of asset management and by prioritizing the preservation of infrastructure and a state of good repair, asset owners can reduce the chance that an incident will cripple or destroy infrastructure. The natural progression of system preservation is the identification and application of specific mitigation that would increase the likelihood that an asset would withstand natural and manmade events. NCHRP 525: Surface Transportation Security—Volume 15: Costing Asset Protection: An All Hazards Guide for Transportation Agencies (CAPTA) (2009) provides a guide for developing system-wide budget estimates for all hazards approach mitigation rooted in the National Incident Management System. It uses asset type and profiles to identify recommended countermeasures and accompanying costs. States that already employ comprehensive and fully integrated AMS will have already compiled the necessary information to execute the evaluation program. NCHRP Report 525: Surface Transportation Security—Volume 16: A Guide to Emergency Response Planning at State Transportation Agencies (2010) identifies the need for improving

Appendix B: NCHRP Project 20-59(33) Case Studies B-53 construction and maintenance methods to mitigate risk of failure during emergency events. AMS would be a natural tool for implementing this goal. The guidelines established by these reports begin to suggest the application of AMS primarily in the response phase of emergency management. AMS information provides a natural foundation for identifying and activating resources (vehicles, equipment, and materials) in an immediate response situation. Recovery phase application for AMS may be a bit less obvious, but could prove more effective in restoration of service in the long run. The inventories of key infrastructure, including roadway and rail segments, bridges and other structures, signage and traffic control devices, communication systems, buildings, and other fixed assets could provide rich and malleable data sets for recovery planners and policy makers to support accelerated recovery decision making. AMS could be applied directly to the following recovery activities: • Identifying and prioritizing critical infrastructure. • Developing an accurate snapshot of the “before” condition. • Facilitating the development of re-procurement guidelines and contracts. • Identifying potential resilience and lifecycle improvements that could be made to improve the asset during recovery. The logical next step to this line of thinking is the expansion of AMS to include planned investments, expansions, and reconstruction of the included assets. This extra layer of “improved” data could be then applied to ensure that recovery efforts consider providing improved service and/or resilience to the reconstructed or restored assets. CONCLUSIONS AMS have current and potential value in evaluating and improving asset resiliency. 1. Explicit integration of emergency response practices with the infrastructure planning and operation processes of AMS is a natural next step. AMS are already used to reduce the likelihood of asset failure by systematically and efficiently evaluating the asset elements and making lifecycle investments accordingly. 2. State DOT and emergency management agencies could develop standardized communication, data development, and planning processes to facilitate data and information sharing and integration. This could lead to information overlays that match identified hazards with assets that would likely be affected; the ability to incorporate hazard and threat information into AMS evaluation systems; and the prioritization of preservation and mitigation investments.

B-54 A Pre-Event Recovery Planning Guide for Transportation 3. AMS could be expanded to incorporate pre-disaster mitigation and recovery as performance measurements, providing an iterative and accountable system for improving the resiliency of transportation assets. REFERENCES USDOT, Asset Management Primer, December 1999. NCHRP Report 551: Performance Measures and Targets for Transportation Asset Management, Transportation Research Board of the National Academies, 2006. http://www.trb.org/Main/Blurbs/157275.aspx NCHRP 525: Surface Transportation Security—Volume 15: Costing Asset Protection: An All Hazards Guide For Transportation Agencies (CAPTA), Transportation Research Board of the National Academies, 2009. http://www.trb.org/Main/Blurbs/160337.aspx Domestic Scan Pilot Program: Best Practices in Transportation Asset Management, Transportation Research Board of the National Academies, 2007. http://onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/trbnet/acl/NCRHP2068_Domestic_Scan_TAM_Final_Repo rt.pdf NCHRP Report 525: Surface Transportation Security—Volume 16: A Guide to Emergency Response Planning at State Transportation Agencies, 2010. http://onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/nchrp/nchrp_rpt_525v16.pdf NCHRP Project 20-24(11) Asset Management Guide for Transportation, Transportation Research Board, 2002. http://downloads.transportation.org/AMGuide.pdf