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D-1 APPENDIX D: DECONTAMINATION TECHNIQUES An incident involving the dissemination of chemical, biological, or radiological (CBR) threat agents that affects the infrastructure of a transportation system will result in significant disruption of services and could have catastrophic economic and other impacts not only to the local region, but also potentially to the nation. CBR incidents involve unique challenges that will likely require significant operational adjustments by transportation agencies to ensure a rapid return to service and an acceptable remediation. Pre-event planning and preparedness were found to be essential to minimize the operational and financial impacts to transit services. The Response and Recovery Program in the Livermore Nonproliferation, Homeland, and International Security Directorate has been conducting research on the requirements for the decontamination of transportation facilities. The research has found that having a restoration plan vetted and facility personnel trained substantially reduces the overall time for a restoration operation. Absent an explosion or other obvious overt release, recognition that a CBR incident has occurred may take hours to days depending upon the specific threat agent, the circumstances of the release, and the response time of CBR monitoring equipment, if any is present. In particular, biological agents typically have latency periods of several days before exposed victims first develop diagnosable symptoms, and it may be even longer before a transit facility is identified as being contaminated. Chemical agents may produce recognizable symptoms within minutes to
D-2 A Pre-Event Recovery Planning Guide for Transportation hours. Although victims exposed to radiological agents may not produce symptoms for extended periods, some radiological agents are more readily detected with commonly available devices. Once a CBR incident is recognized, prompt actions need to be implemented to minimize further exposure (such as victim response and facility evacuation) and the spread of contamination (such as shutting down and by-passing impacted stations, shutting down ventilation systems, installing containment barriers, establishing perimeter security to deny unauthorized access, and isolating contaminated rolling stock). Rapid activation of an Incident Command System (ICS) with qualified local personnel will be critical to achieving a rapid return to service. Understanding the roles and responsibilities and the milestones for transitions of authority within the ICS will contribute to efficient incident recovery operations. ICS plans and processes should be formalized in pre-disaster phases, before an event occurs to support rapid and efficient mobilization. Speedy access to subject matter experts (CBR agents, sampling and analyses, risk assessment, and decontamination technicians and technologies) and qualified specialty contractors will expedite the recovery operations. CBR assistance from federal resources may not be immediately available, and local authorities should plan to utilize their own resources for response and recovery efforts. It is important to recognize that pre-incident planning efforts could significantly reduce the time needed for incident recovery. Such planning could decrease the amount of time needed to return to normal transit service from perhaps a year or more (time needed for recovery without any pre-incident planning) to possibly a few months. For multiple reasons, it is unlikely that recovery from a CBR incident will be achievable in less than several weeks to a few months, and transportation owners/operators should plan for extended by-pass services, related operational adjustments, and communications with the public. A generic biological restoration plan for major airports was developed as part of the Livermore research study. The plan includes templates for characterizing and removing the contamination and obtaining clearance to reopen the airport. It recommends actions for emergency responders, methods for sampling and analysis, and handling procedures for decontaminated waste. The restoration plan also evaluates the decontamination methods available, including liquid, gel, and gaseous reagents. Special emphasis is given to chlorine dioxide and vaporous hydrogen peroxide, the methods that were used to clean up anthrax-contaminated facilities in 2001. The plan pulls all of this work into a framework that decision makers can use in the event of bioterrorism. To help authorities determine how clean a facility must be before it can be reopened, the National Research Council (NRC) of the National Academies prepared a framework for evaluating decontamination efforts that was issued in 2005 as Reopening Public Facilities after a Biological Attack. The published framework recommends risk assessment actions, public health safeguards, sampling procedures, and decontamination standards. No universal standard was offered for determining when a building would be safe to re-enter because the type of pathogen and the amount disseminated affect cleanup operations. Instead, the framework includes questions about pathogen characteristicsâsuch as how far it has spread, whether it is transmissible between humans, and how long it will survive to pose a threat to help decision makers determine the appropriate response.
Appendix D: Decontamination Techniques D-3 Many activities can greatly reduce the time required to re-establish airport operations if those activities are conducted before an actual biological weapon agent (BWA) release. Recommended pre-planning actions are summarized here by topic. 1. Develop a concept of operations (CONOPS) for cleanup of a BWA release. The CONOPS should be specific to the airport, should show the structure of the organizations involved in cleanup, and should identify their specific roles and responsibilities. Formation of a technical working group (TWG), an environmental clearance committee (ECC), and selection of members are strongly recommended before an incident occurs. Issues pertaining to local, state, and federal jurisdictions should be addressed, and stakeholders should be identified. The steps in the CONOPS will depend on whether an Incident of National Significance (INS) has been declared and may be dictated by the type of BWA used. The CONOPS should include two potential response scenarios for biological agents, one for a federal (INS) and one for a nonfederal (nonINS) response. The CONOPS should also identify the pros and cons of a federal versus nonfederal response. The CONOPS can be maintained in a Data Supplement. Identify alternative, backup locations for the emergency operations center (EOC). 2. Ensure all facility information is readily accessible. Locate all architectural drawings of terminals, boarding areas, and other areas. Locate all mechanical drawings of ventilation systems, drainage systems, and associated mechanical rooms. All potential entrance and exit points for gases, particles, or liquids should be identified (such as sumps, drain pipes, vent shafts, and so forth). The information could be summarized in a Data Supplement for quick access and initial planning. It is essential that legible and intelligible facility information be immediately accessible to remediation personnel. Consider placing the information on a geographical information system (with hardcopy backup) that would be controlled and maintained by airport personnel. 3. Identify containment zones to prevent the spread of BWA and isolation zones to prevent the release of fumigant. Assess the facility layout and identify potential sampling, characterization, fumigation, and decontamination zones. Identify logical containment and isolation zones and stipulate the means by which the zones are to be established. Isolation can be established at connector halls between major terminal areas. Fire doors can assist in isolation. Life-safety zones are used for smoke control and are often serviced by dedicated air-handling units (AHUs). Because they are defined by the AHUs of the airport HVAC system, they constitute logical zones for characterization and remediation. Decontamination zones are defined primarily by physical structures such as fire doors or corridors that can be easily sealed in the event of a release. 4. Identify sampling and analytical resources. Determine who will collect samples, such as initial screening samples and subsequent characterization and clearance samples. Meet with the local laboratory response network (LRN) laboratory and discuss sample throughput, reporting of results, and surge capacity. If needed, line up additional LRN analytical laboratories that can be tapped in the event that many samples are to be collected. 5. Identify sampling zones and units. Identify logical sampling zones and sampling units for the airport. Decide how the airport can be logically subdivided to facilitate environmental sampling. Sampling zones may be similar to the containment and isolation zones, or they
D-4 A Pre-Event Recovery Planning Guide for Transportation may be defined at a finer scale. It is possible that sampling zones and units may be different, depending on the agent released. However, it should be possible to construct sampling zones and units that could be reviewed and modified as necessary in the case of an actual event. 6. Identify the most likely decontamination methods and experienced contractors to be used. Evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of available decontamination methods. Select the most appropriate methods to use for different BWA attack scenarios. In some cases, it may be possible to use or upgrade in-house decontamination equipment. Identify staging areas or warehouses for equipment and supplies. Decide on the types and amounts of decontamination supplies needed and whether to purchase them in advance (some materials may have a short shelf life). Select potential contractors to employ as members of the decontamination team. 7. Identify what to decontaminate in situ, remove for offsite treatment, or remove for disposal. In most cases, easily removed and replaced items should not be retained, whereas structural components will be decontaminated in place. The decontamination reagent used will affect the decision of what items may be left in place. Whereas treatment in place should reduce the costs of the source-reduction step, critical equipment and items should be identified for removal and treatment offsite. If existing decontamination methods are not compatible with certain equipment, then identify alternative, backup, or replacement equipment. 8. Determine initial disposition of contaminated materials and identify staging and storage areas for waste. Decontaminating materials in place will reduce the potential for spreading contamination, but it may also damage certain equipment or materials. Disposition choices should be evaluated in advance of an event. Estimate waste-storage requirements on the basis of quantities of materials that might require disposal and on the decontamination technologies of choice. Initiate discussions with local waste-disposal facilities, including municipal waste landfills; construction and demolition debris landfills; hazardous waste landfills; and hazardous, municipal, and medical waste incinerators, if available. Discuss waste-disposal issues with the state solid-waste-management authority. Discuss wastewater management issues (e.g., wastewater from chlorine dioxide scrubbers) with local wastewater treatment facilities. 9. Write a new, generic Health and Safety Plan (HASP). Write a new HASP, or re-evaluate an existing one, on the basis of information provided in this Plan. 10. Identify backup facilities to continue service. In the event that one or more facilities is contaminated with a BWA, identify areas and other infrastructure that might be used for the resumption of travel in some capacity. 11. Hold planning meetings at scheduled intervals. Airport personnel should meet with prospective unified command (UC) and TWG members, responders, and stakeholders to continue to develop cleanup-related documents, policies, and guidance. Plans will change over time as technologies advance and local, state, and federal policies evolve. 12. Conduct training exercises. Airports should identify the scope of training activities appropriate for responding to BWA scenarios. Activities can range from simple, internal notification drills to full-scale, mass-decontamination exercises that take place over one or more days. See Appendix A for checklists and other resources.
