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Current Hazardous Materials Transportation Research and Future Needs April 17, 2012 61 4. Future Research Needs The list of needed hazardous materials transportation-related research needs in Table 3 was compiled from interviews with research organizations. It includes any stated potential impediments to conducting the research or reasons why the organization does not plan to pursue it. Context and subject areas for the research needs are listed as well (these terms are discussed in Section 3). This list was augmented throughout the project as additional information was obtained.
Current Hazardous Materials Transportation Research and Future Needs April 17, 2012 62 Table 3. Research Needs Research Need Potential Impediments or Reasons for Not Pursuing [Organization Identifying Need] Context Area(s) ------------------------------ Subject Area(s) CARGO PACKAGING AND HANDLING 1. Human Factors in Hazardous Materials Air Cargo Handling - there is a need to further explore a number of areas, including (a) the interaction of people watching packages going by (looking for undeclared or otherwise problematic packages) and the speed of the process, (b) how moving the observation process to a more remote location (using technology) affects the accuracy and potential throughput and how safety systems account for the changes, (c) what are carriers really responsible for regarding undeclared hazardous materials packages, and (d) what are the training and language requirements, and (e) how do shipper permits and approvals affect carrier responsibility? Limited funding and staffing. [Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)] Safety Business ------------------------------ Operations 2. Undeclared packages related to returns involving small businesses and retailers (and the consumer). There are issues related to USPS air shipment of these packages as well. Limited funding and staffing. [Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)] Safety Business ------------------------------ Operations 3. Research into gaps in training and succession planning â there is an inability throughout the industry to hire experienced, trained workers, specifically in regard to senior management and trucking operators. With regard to management, the average age of managers is high and many are nearing retirement, but not many new qualified people are available for replacement. This is an industry-wide issue and beyond the scope of a single company. [DuPont] Business Safety ------------------------------ Operations 4. Studying the contributions of operator performance/human reliability to hazmat transportation risk beyond fatigue. There are a dozen or so factors that can be tied to human reliability and fatigue seems to have been singled out in the research thus far. This is an idea for future research that is not necessarily something Vanderbilt will not research in the future - no special major impediments [Vanderbilt University] Safety Security Regulatory/Enforcement ------------------------------ Risk Assessment Operations/Training
Current Hazardous Materials Transportation Research and Future Needs April 17, 2012 63 Research Need Potential Impediments or Reasons for Not Pursuing [Organization Identifying Need] Context Area(s) ------------------------------ Subject Area(s) EMERGENCY PLANNING AND RESPONSE 5. Hazmat Transportation Emergency Response Guidelines There is a need for comprehensive guidebook that covers all types of incidents and all probable types of hazardous materials releases, arranged in a hierarchical manner. Biological and infectious substances, as an example, could trigger significant response actions that, without proper guidance, may be too aggressive. The existing North American Emergency Response Guide (NAERG) provides a very good resource for first responders during the initial response phase of an incident but does not address actions to be taken by qualified responders; this document is intended primarily for qualified responders. Funding may be an impediment. [Standing Committee on Transportation of Hazardous Materials (AT040)] Safety ------------------------------ Emergency Response 6. How much training do emergency responders need? Funding availability is the primary reason that research of this type is not done. Finding the right approach for getting the research started is another reason. [Federal Railroad Administration (FRA)] Safety ------------------------------ Emergency Response 7. Further research into rural emergency response to follow on to their earlier work that looked at three different communities; (1) volunteer, and fire service-based, (2) law enforcement based, and (3) fully funded, paid, and fire service-based. There have been lots of changes since that work was done. Funding availability is the primary reason that research of this type is not done. Finding the right approach for getting the research started is another reason. [Federal Railroad Administration (FRA)] Safety ------------------------------ Emergency Response 8. Emergency response sustainability is a problem where long-term response "campaigns" can suffer when the mostly volunteer fire service personnel return to their regular jobs, including mutual aid and equipment issues. Funding availability is the primary reason that research of this type is not done. Finding the right approach for getting the research started is another reason. [Federal Railroad Administration (FRA)] Safety ------------------------------ Emergency Response
Current Hazardous Materials Transportation Research and Future Needs April 17, 2012 64 Research Need Potential Impediments or Reasons for Not Pursuing [Organization Identifying Need] Context Area(s) ------------------------------ Subject Area(s) 9. PARTICIPATION IN LOCAL PROCESSES â Local Emergency Planning Committees (LEPCs) often suffer from passive participation, turnover, and apathy. HMCFS are often conducted by LEPCs or their contractors. In either event participation, turnover, and apathy often provide considerable barriers to conducting, communicating, and implementing the outcomes associated with the HMCFS. How do organizations maintain proactive participation from stakeholders and decision makers for high-consequenceâlow-probability events such as hazardous materials accidents? Methods to maintain and encourage participation in local processes on an ongoing basis should be evaluated to see which provide consistent results under identified circumstances. Future research that created an inventory of methods, techniques, and activities used to attract and maintain voluntary participation in public service organizations would prove invaluable. Conversely, actions and behaviors that inadvertently create barriers to participation, encourage turnover, or increase apathy could be identified and detailed in terms of how they can be avoided. Each method could be classified with respect to the types of conditions under which they work best, anticipated results, and examples of use. Funding limitations; overlap with general focus of LEPCs, which is not limited to hazmat. [HM-01 Recommendations] Regulatory/Enforcement Safety Security ------------------------------ Emergency Response 10. TRACKING LEPC MEMBERS, EXECUTIVE COMMITTEES AND LEADERSHIPS - The U.S. EPA is faced with the difficulty of keeping track of LEPC members and leaders. Maintaining membership information, contact information, responsibilities for various roles and activities is an important part of effective hazardous materials planning and implementation. Maintaining this information on a LEPC-by-LEPC basis in conjunction with boundary maps would improve planning and response. Emergency planning and response are inherently limited by knowledge of the membership and leadershipâtheir contact information, knowledge, resources, skills, abilities and limitations. Future research that developed an internet-based self-updating national registry of LEPC members would allow more accurate records of LEPC leadership and members to be kept up to date. These records would allow LEPC members in various roles to network with members in similar roles in other locations. It could be used to address training needs associated with various roles on the LEPC, and generally better describe the roles and responsibilities of LEPC members. This self-updating directory could also be used for dissemination of key materials. Funding may be an issue here and the passivity, turnover, and apathy cited in another HM-01 recommendation may hamper efforts. [HM-01 Recommendations] Regulatory/Enforcement Safety Security ------------------------------ Emergency Response
Current Hazardous Materials Transportation Research and Future Needs April 17, 2012 65 Research Need Potential Impediments or Reasons for Not Pursuing [Organization Identifying Need] Context Area(s) ------------------------------ Subject Area(s) 11. INTEGRATING THE HMCFS INTO COMMUNITY COMPREHENSIVE EMERGENCY PLANS - Integrating the Hazardous Materials Commodity Flow Study (HMCFS) into comprehensive emergency planning is often left to the vagaries of future activities, which means the outcomes are often left either un-addressed or weakly integrated into the comprehensive plan. The data developed in the HMCFS are useful planning, preparedness, and response information. For example, know the volume of traffic flow along a route or route segment is critical in establishing alternative routes to allow emergency response operations should they be needed. Hence engaging response personnel in conducing the HMCFS, and integrating that information into the comprehensive emergency plan can provide integration that cannot be duplicated through training aloneâit goes beyond learning and knowing to understanding and acting on that knowledge. Integrating the HMCFS maps (e.g., of hotspots) with the comprehensive emergency planning maps may highlight areas where resources are needed. Research that examined this process of integration could inventory techniques, evaluate their utility, establish their limitations, and assess synergistic opportunities. Funding may be an impediment. [HM-01 Recommendations] Regulatory/Enforcement Safety Security ------------------------------ Emergency Response 12. Research into improving placarding with technological advances. There has been debate over whether or not to placard hazmat shipments because while placarding provides information for responders, it also serves as an advertisement to potential terrorists. It has generally been decided that placarding is better than not placarding, but is there a better, more secure way to handle it? For example, RFID signals may be used so that responders could pick up the signals when in proximity, but the placarding would not be so obvious to the general public. JHU APL does not have a specific focus on hazmat transportation. [John's Hopkins University Applied Physics Lab (JHU APL)] Safety Security Regulatory/Enforcement ------------------------------ Operations Packaging Emergency Response COMMODITY FLOW DATA 13. There is a need for federal as well as state/local governments to access all the existing data, including shipment and quantity information. The data are extremely valuable; models and risk assessments do not work without the data. The proprietary issues surrounding the data need to be overcome. [Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Chemical Security Analysis Center (CSAC)] Safety Security Data Availability ------------------------------ Risk Assessment
Current Hazardous Materials Transportation Research and Future Needs April 17, 2012 66 Research Need Potential Impediments or Reasons for Not Pursuing [Organization Identifying Need] Context Area(s) ------------------------------ Subject Area(s) 14. Consolidated commodity flow information for the entire state of California is needed. Currently commodity flow information is done piecemeal, on a local level, with no continuity across the state. Having a statewide commodity flow survey would help local and rural planners who often lack the resources to conduct commodity flow surveys themselves. This research would similarly benefit local emergency responders who could use it to better prioritize their use of resources and funding to be sure they have or have access to the necessary equipment for the hazards they face and that it is deployed in the right locations. Impediments to doing this research include high expense, gathering the data from private entities such as railroads with proprietary concerns, and that such initiatives often require legislation and/or funding streams to initiate. [California Office of Emergency Services] Safety Security Regulatory/Enforcement ------------------------------ Risk Assessment Emergency Response 15. TEMPORAL VARIABILITY OF HAZARDOUS MATERIAL TRANSPORT - The extent to which hazardous material flows vary by season, month, week, day-of-the week, and hour-of-the-day is not well documented. The funding mechanisms most often used by LEPCs to conduct HMCFS limit most empirical efforts to collection of primary data in Spring and Summer months; and most of that is limited to weekday and daylight hour observations. Hence, these data often fail to reflect the seasonal variations of use of hazardous materials in a community (e.g., agricultural communities). In addition, seasonal variations in road conditions (e.g., snow- covered roads, pot-holes), accident rates, and population distribution (e.g., tourism locations such as winter and summer resort areas) are equally under-represented. Future research that explores these current gaps in the data on the transport of hazardous materials would be well received. Funding limitations; the localization of the variability makes a national-level project more complex. [HM-01 Recommendations] Regulatory/Enforcement Safety Security ------------------------------ Risk Assessment 16. MULTILEVEL COMMUNICATION, DATA COLLECTION AND ARCHIVING - Effective communication among various levels of government is often reported as a barrier. Local participants are often frustrated with lack of information provided from higher levels, short deadlines for completion, and limited funding for implementation. Federal and state organizations often find local outcomes ineffectual, undocumented, and poorly archived. Resulting outcomes often disappear with changing personnel, either literally or through lack of transitional institutional behavior. What methods can be employed to overcome these issues? What are their primary advantages and disadvantages? Which mechanisms have been most effective under what circumstances? Committed funding source. [HM-01 Recommendations] Regulatory/Enforcement ------------------------------ Emergency Response Risk Assessment
Current Hazardous Materials Transportation Research and Future Needs April 17, 2012 67 Research Need Potential Impediments or Reasons for Not Pursuing [Organization Identifying Need] Context Area(s) ------------------------------ Subject Area(s) 17. Research into information flows regarding whereabouts of shipments. Better communication is needed among federal, state, and local agencies and carriers. Federal stakeholders often ship through a state without informing the state (one example is the movement of nuclear materials). A state is not often aware of what a shipper is sending through its territory, which can cause delayed response following an incident. One such example is the tunnel fire in Baltimore, where Maryland officials did not have information on hand regarding the shipment involved and found it hard to retrieve information from CSX headquarters in Florida. Sharing of this information in a secure and timely fashion is critical. JHU APL does not have a specific focus on hazmat transportation. [John's Hopkins University Applied Physics Lab (JHU APL)] Safety Security Regulatory/Enforcement ------------------------------ Operations Enforcement Routing Emergency Response HAZMAT RELEASE CONSEQUENCES 18. Information on the cost of fatalities and injuries. Liability issues are the main reason this research is not pursued. [Association of American Railroads (AAR)] Safety Regulatory/Enforcement Data Availability ------------------------------ Risk Assessment 19. Improved Methods for Categorizing Hazmat and their Associated Spill Impacts - Improved methods for estimating time-of-travel of spilled hazardous materials into riverine environments to aid in downstream contingency and mitigation plans. Such estimates would be useful for oil spills from transport pipelines at river crossings and from vessels on inland waterways. Funding may be an impediment. [Standing Committee on Transportation of Hazardous Materials (AT040)] Safety ------------------------------ Emergency Response Risk Assessment 20. Sabotage Consequence from Attack on Spent Nuclear Fuel Packages - The release of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) resulting from a terrorist attack on a transportation or storage cask poses a potential threat. As the most sensitive health effect pathway for SNF is through inhalation of respirable-sized particles, this research would focus on testing of real spent fuel to determine the ratio of particle size distribution of SNF to other brittle materials already tested. This ratio, the Spent Fuel Ratio (SFR), will provide a solid technical basis for analytically assessing consequences of other types of sabotage attacks and packaging configurations without having to perform further expensive testing. Funding and limited stakeholder group are impediments. [Standing Committee on Transportation of Hazardous Materials (AT040)] Security ------------------------------ Risk Assessment
Current Hazardous Materials Transportation Research and Future Needs April 17, 2012 68 Research Need Potential Impediments or Reasons for Not Pursuing [Organization Identifying Need] Context Area(s) ------------------------------ Subject Area(s) INTEGRATION OF SAFETY AND SECURITY 21. Integration of Safety and Security in Hazmat Risk Ranking - The objective of this project will be to produce a document that provides a framework for integrated security and safety risk assessment for the shipment of all hazardous materials by all modes of transport. This framework will guide policy makers and transportation service providers in developing appropriate and focused risk mitigations. In addition to funding, there is increasing consensus that safety and security need to be measured or assessed separately. [Standing Committee on Transportation of Hazardous Materials (AT040)] Safety Security ------------------------------ Risk Assessment 22. Assessment of Opportunities to Integrate and Supplement Safety and Security - Measures for Hazardous Materials Transportation - This project will identify areas in which regulated safety and security measures complement or conflict and instances in which current security requirements require attention beyond what is prescribed for safety performance. A determination will be made as to whether there should be any difference between response and remediation of traditional hazmat incidents and those resulting from terrorist attacks and a comprehensive approach to hazmat cargo transportation addressing both safety and security will be outlined. A second phase will produce national standards for state and local safety and security decisions and a model for reasonable state and local response and management plans. This is a suggested topic for research. Approval from the HMCRP Technical Oversight Panel is needed before any available funding will be provided. [Standing Committee on Transportation of Hazardous Materials (AT040)] Regulatory/Enforcement Safety Security ------------------------------ Operations/Training MATERIALS AND EQUIPMENT TESTING 23. Research into the standardization of hoses for the transfer of hazmat from hazmat industry users/producers to carrier containers (e.g., truck and rail tanks). Containers have been well-characterized, but hose failures have not. Some shippers, such as DuPont, have internal inspection, testing, maintenance, lifetime standards for hoses, but most carriers do not have standards nearly as stringent. Independent nature of carriers, expense of hoses combined with a lack of regulation [DuPont] Safety Regulatory ------------------------------ Risk Assessment Operations Packaging 24. More data from testing of types/quantities/locations of explosions. Small quantities have generally been untested (DOD focuses on large quantities for its purposes, but commercial users often use/store only small amounts). At IME, the main obstacle is manpower â they are a 7-person operation, and the IME constituent member companies do not have the money to put into explosives testing. [Institute of Makers of Explosives (IME)] Safety Data Availability ------------------------------ Risk Assessment 25. Research into the behavior of perforating guns (used to make oil/gas flow from a drilled well) when they detonate unexpectedly while packaged/stored. It is currently the norm to assume that all charges in a stored set of perforating guns would detonate if one charge detonates, which may not be the case. At IME, the main obstacle is manpower â they are a 7-person operation, and the IME constituent member companies do not have the money to put into explosives testing. [Institute of Makers of Explosives (IME)] Safety Data Availability ------------------------------ Risk Assessment
Current Hazardous Materials Transportation Research and Future Needs April 17, 2012 69 Research Need Potential Impediments or Reasons for Not Pursuing [Organization Identifying Need] Context Area(s) ------------------------------ Subject Area(s) 26. Need to address shortfalls in specific risk-based analysis of high-strength steel (e.g., x80, x100, x120 pipe) â series of investigations. These pipes are lighter (cheaper to transport) and higher-strength (higher flow and operating pressures), however, better controls and modeling are needed. Congressional budget limitations [Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) Office of Pipeline Safety] Safety Business ------------------------------ Operations Packaging Risk Assessment RISK ANALYSIS AND PERCEPTION 27. Criteria for regulators to use to make decisions could be better fleshed out so that when they do quantitative analysis (e.g., for explosives-related facility siting) they have guidelines or rules that prescribe what decision to make based on model output. At IME, the main obstacle is manpower â they are a 7-person operation, and the IME constituent member companies do not have the money to put into explosives testing. [Institute of Makers of Explosives (IME)] Regulatory/Enforcement ------------------------------ Risk Assessment 28. How & Why Public Risk Perceptions Change Over Time - This project would collect new survey data for an existing hazmat transportation program that has historical data on public risk perceptions prior to, and during the start of shipments. The new data would be compared to the large archive of existing public opinion research. The analysis would further our general knowledge how public risk perception evolves over time with increased experience; it would permit comparison of public knowledge of the transport program after ten years of nearly accident-free operation; and it would permit analysis of the relative role of familiarity, knowledge, and social factors in explaining changes in risk perceptions of hazardous materials transport. This is a suggested topic for research. Approval from the HMCRP Technical Oversight Panel is needed before any available funding will be provided. [Standing Committee on Transportation of Hazardous Materials (AT040)] Regulatory/Enforcement Public Perception ------------------------------ Risk Assessment Public Perception 29. Need to have a nationally accepted risk assessment model for hazardous materials. This would combine the chemical list and a rating system. Risk management rules would be associated with various hazardous materials or classes. This would involve both safety and security, but their focus would be a little more on security. Funding may be an impediment. [University of Kentucky] Safety Security ------------------------------ Risk Assessment 30. How do you do a proper risk assessment at distribution facilities (e.g., ethanol and transloading) where there are no clear lines of jurisdiction, but someone needs to step in to look at public safety. Funding availability is the primary reason that research of this type is not done. Finding the right approach for getting the research started is another reason. [Federal Railroad Administration (FRA)] Safety ------------------------------ Emergency Response
Current Hazardous Materials Transportation Research and Future Needs April 17, 2012 70 Research Need Potential Impediments or Reasons for Not Pursuing [Organization Identifying Need] Context Area(s) ------------------------------ Subject Area(s) 31. How can research be better used to drive public policy? Funding availability is the primary reason that research of this type is not done. Finding the right approach for getting the research started is another reason. [Federal Railroad Administration (FRA)] Safety ------------------------------ Public Policy 32. Most research to date has been reactive research and development; there has not been a detailed plan to identify areas requiring focus and a method for finding out what could not be accomplished. Funding is always an issue. [Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) Office of Hazardous Materials Safety] Safety Security ------------------------------ Risk Assessment 33. There is an important need for models that allow decision makers to look at how hazardous materials shipments move (from a top-level scale), both modal and intermodal. What is the chemistry and the impact of a release of the chemical? What is transported, how is it transported, and how does it get from point to point? The Chemical Security and Analysis Center uses, but does not develop, these types of models to make assessments. [Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Chemical Security Analysis Center (CSAC)] Safety Security ------------------------------ Risk Assessment 34. Event probability data could always be improved, particularly with regard to values for locations outside of the US/Canada â could be used to develop a factor for working in a certain location, for example (e.g., if youâre in Africa multiply the frequency by X amount). At IME, the main obstacle is manpower â they are a 7-person operation, and the IME constituent member companies do not have the money to put into explosives testing. [Institute of Makers of Explosives (IME)] Safety Data Availability ------------------------------ Risk Assessment 35. A need is to put together a defined process to select and implement hazardous materials research and development projects. The 2-3 year budget process stretches everything out. Five suggested steps would be to (1) review the project topic, (2) categorize under standardized types, (3) explore what has been done in the past on that topic (including data and risk assessments), (4) develop project description, and (5) review by internal organizational committee for approval and funding. Funding is always an issue. [Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) Office of Hazardous Materials Safety] Safety Security ------------------------------ Risk Assessment 36. VULNERABILITIES ASSOCIATED WITH DIFFERENT MODES OF HAZMAT TRANSPORT - The extent to which risk and vulnerability vary by mode of transport is an important area for further research to improve safety and security of hazardous materials transport. For example, pipeline and waterway accidents seem to occur less frequently than rail and roadway accidents. What can be learned by studying pipeline and waterway events that can reduce risk of hazardous materials events associated with other modes of transport? Can risk be reduced though reallocation among modes of transport? How should modes of transport be considered in light of the potential for terrorist attacks? Cross-modal comparisons can generate concerns from mode-specific stakeholders. [HM-01 Recommendations] Safety Security ------------------------------ Risk Assessment
Current Hazardous Materials Transportation Research and Future Needs April 17, 2012 71 Research Need Potential Impediments or Reasons for Not Pursuing [Organization Identifying Need] Context Area(s) ------------------------------ Subject Area(s) 37. VALIDATION OF EXISTING ACCIDENT DATA - The validation of existing data is a complex and important activity. Data derived from various institutional sources, which have functions tangentially related to the potential for hazardous materials accidents, often have years of accumulated errors. For example, one institution sorted the data to make the variables of interest more easily searched, but left other parts of the data unsorted that over time destroyed the link between the sorted and unsorted portions of the data. In other cases geo-spatial data are erroneous reported truck accidents in the middle of a local bay, where there are no bridges or tunnels. Such errors can be the result of dyslexic data entry, sloppy typing, or illegible hand-writing, but whatever the source, validating the data is an important first step in using existing data. Research that developed, and tested a series of techniques to search for, detect, and correct such errors would be an invaluable asset to the future secondary use of existing data. Successful implementation will require the participation of numerous agencies and data collection programs. [HM-01 Recommendations] Safety ------------------------------ Risk Assessment 38. Large need for cities and towns to do risk assessment research on how decades- old pipelines have been affected by land use (building, utility infrastructure, etc.) since they were buried. Changes to land use can affect the pipelineâs support base, cathodic protection, etc. and in most cases cities and towns, and even the pipeline company is unaware of safety risks. Public funding is the main issue â if private funding is required, it will not be done [National Pipeline Safety & Operations Research Center] Safety ------------------------------ Risk Assessment OTHER PERCEIVED AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 39. How can we better protect the nation's supply chain? Funding may be an impediment. May be too broadly defined. [University of Kentucky] Security ------------------------------ Risk Assessment Operations/Training Packaging
Current Hazardous Materials Transportation Research and Future Needs April 17, 2012 72 Research Need Potential Impediments or Reasons for Not Pursuing [Organization Identifying Need] Context Area(s) ------------------------------ Subject Area(s) 40. Pipelines are overseen by the DOT at the Federal level, but at the state and local levels, the responsibility for pipelines could be with any number of agencies. Furthermore, because pipelines are an issue of interstate commerce, state and local governments rarely direct significant focus on them. Research should be done into the best way to organize responsibility for pipelines at the state and local levels so that if something happens in a given jurisdiction, the responsible parties would be prepared and obvious to other stakeholders. For example, if a pipeline is clogged in Pennsylvania and causes a lapse in flow to Maryland, who is immediately in charge? This issue also has huge security ramifications, given the enormous pipeline network within the US. For example, if a gas pipeline from TX to ME is bombed in TN, who are the local and state officials responsible for coordinating the response? JHU APL does not have a specific focus on hazmat transportation. [John's Hopkins University Applied Physics Lab (JHU APL)] Safety Security Regulatory/Enforcement ------------------------------ Enforcement Emergency Response 41. Research into varying standards and their effects. International hazmat standards may be an issue and intrastate pipeline regulations (from state/local governments) may have different regulations than the federal government (could be more stringent); which creates operational issues for pipeline operators. Congressional budget limitations [Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) Office of Pipeline Safety] Regulatory/Enforcement Safety ------------------------------ Operations Routing
