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7 Characteristics of Technological Terrorism Scenarios and Impact Factors* Nikolai A. Makhutov, Vitaly P. Petrov, and Dmitry O. Reznikov, Russian Academy of Sciences Institute of Machine Sciences INTRODUCTION Technological terrorism is defined as actions directed against infrastructure elements critically important for national security or committed with the use of especially hazardous technologies, technical means, and materials. In consider- ing technological terrorism scenarios, the primary impact factors of such terrorist acts initiate secondary catastrophic processes with a significantly higher (tens and hundreds of times) level of secondary impact factors that affect the targets of the attack, their personnel, the public, and the environment. The scope and intensity of the impact factors of terrorist actions against a given system define the level of the terrorist threat to that system. The scenario for a terrorist attack entails a means of exerting the initiating effect on the system that is based on the use of appropriate technical devices, technologies, and materials and is characterized by the terroristsâ deliberate selec- tion of the place and time of the attack. The following characteristics must be taken into account in analyzing tech- nological terrorism scenarios and impact factors.1 â *Translated from the Russian by Kelly Robbins. 53
54 COUNTERING TERRORISM High level of dynamism: Terrorist attack scenarios and impact factors are more dynamic in nature than scenarios and impact factors for natural and tech- nogenic2 disasters to which the system is subject. Of course, emergency manage- ment and evacuation capabilities are relevant to both. A change in the spectrum and intensity of possible terrorism-related extreme effects on the system is sig- nificantly more powerful than a natural or technogenic threat. This is due to the terroristsâ capacity for constantly expanding their arsenal of mechanisms for initiating emergency situations using modern means of attack, reacting to changes in protection systems, and drawing lessons from mistakes made during previous attacks on the system or others like it. High level of uncertainty: In modeling terrorist scenarios and impact fac- tors, we encounter a higher level of uncertainty. In addition to the undefined fac- tors inherent in threats of a natural or technogenic nature, terrorist threats entail new factors of uncertainty resulting from the complexity of evaluating terroristsâ value system and behavioral logic as well as their organizational-technical poten- tial and the resources at their disposal. Capability of terrorists to choose attack scenarios deliberately: This re- fers to terroristsâ deliberate selection of attack scenarios (places, times, and types of actions), taking into account system vulnerability parameters and the damages expected if an attack is successfully carried out. That is, terrorists are capable of analyzing the vulnerability matrix and damage structure for various types of ac- tions against a system and selecting the attack scenario that maximizes the harm to society (taking secondary and cascade damages into account). Here, in addi- tion to probability analysis, it is also necessary to apply the tools of game theory, which makes it possible to take the intentional actions of terrorists into account. Characteristics of the perception of the terrorist threat: A significant part of the population is inclined to fear terrorist attacks to a greater degree than equivalent natural and technogenic phenomena as described in the equation R = HnÂ·VÂ·U where n < 1, the indicator for the degree characterizing the subjective perception of the consequences of terrorist acts. Complex nature of the terrorist threat: The presence of a terrorist organi- zation in a region may give rise to the possibility of a broad spectrum of attack scenarios, including the time, place, and character of the attack. Thus, to counter terrorist threats and terrorist mechanisms for initiating emergency situations to an even greater degree than for natural and technogenic risks, a complex systems approach is needed for ensuring security and developing an optimal strategy for counterterrorism force and resource deployment. Inasmuch as concentrating resources on protecting one system element (or protecting a target from one type of terrorist action) could prove useless because, after evaluating the situation, the terrorists could either redirect the attack against another element of the target or could switch to a different type of attack. In this case, counterterrorism efforts will not lead to reducing risk and increasing the targetâs level of protection. In addressing traditional tasks of ensuring security against natural and tech-
TECHNOLOGICAL TERRORISM SCENARIOS AND IMPACT FACTORS 55 nogenic disasters, the prevailing types of impact factors could be highlighted for the system being studied, such as threats from seismic activity, flooding, chemical contamination, and so forth. In protecting the system from these impact factors, it is possible to achieve the desired result. However, in protecting a given system from manifestations of terrorism, the spectrum of potential threats is significantly wider. Here, terrorists are capable of analyzing the level of protection of the sys- tem for various types of impact factors, identifying impact factors against which the target is least protected, and concentrating their efforts on carrying out an attack that will bring these very factors to bear. Furthermore, there are types of terrorist actions with no analogues in the structure of impact factors typical of natural and technogenic disasters: for ex- ample, cyberterrorism or electromagnetic actions aimed at knocking control systems out of commission. Global nature of terrorist threats: As a rule, the geographic distribution of sources of natural and technogenic threats is limited to regions where hazardous facilities are located or zones subject to natural hazards (river valleys for floods, seismic fault zones for earthquakes, tsunamis, and so forth). On the contrary, terrorist threats, especially those coming from international terrorist networks, are characterized by significantly more widespread distribution of the locations where a possible attack might occur. Presence of aftereffects in the flow of terrorist actions: In contrast to natural and technogenic disasters, which may often be viewed as chains of Poisson events, after a major terrorist act the condition of the system defined as âterrorist organizationâprotected objectâprotection systemâ is substantially changed. On the one hand, the terrorist organization achieves its goals to one or another degree and expends a significant part of its resources, while, on the other hand, law enforcement agencies intensify the protection regime. Therefore, after a major terrorist act the situation fundamentally changes and the likelihood of a subsequent attack is significantly altered as well (generally, it is reduced). Therefore, the sequence of terrorist attacks could be described with the help of a Markov chain model. For the purpose of this model, the activities of antiterrorist forces aimed at countering the terrorist threat are understood as under control. The Markov process model makes it possible to describe the dynamics of cycles of terrorist activity. Terroristsâ capacity for self-learning: Because terrorists are capable of analyzing the results of previous attacks and drawing conclusions from them, their experience in âsuccessfulâ and âunsuccessfulâ attacks can have a notice- able effect on the selection of a scenario for the next attack. (Attack scenarios that have proven their effectiveness in the past have a great likelihood of being repeated by terrorists in the future, while scenarios that ended unsuccessfully will most likely be less attractive to terrorists and consequently are less likely to be repeated.) Therefore, in assessing the chances that various attack scenarios will
56 COUNTERING TERRORISM be realized, statistical self-learning models are more effective than traditional frequency methods. Presence of two-way linkages between the terrorist threat and system vulnerability: One differentiating feature of a terrorist threat to a given system is the presence of two-way linkages between that threat and (1) vulnerability of the system to that threat and (2) the magnitude of expected damages if the threat is successfully realized. This characteristic of terrorist mechanisms must be examined in more detail, inasmuch as it opens up additional possibilities for reducing terrorism risks. The formula for assessing the risk of a traditional emergency situation initi- ated by a natural or technogenic disaster could be presented in simplified form as follows: Rc = PIV Ã P(NU/IV) Ã U(damage/IV & NU) Here PIV is the threat to the system, expressed as the probability of an ex- treme initiating action (the failure of a particular element, exceeding of allowable level for a hazard factor, extreme natural phenomenon, and so forth). P(NU/IV) is the vulnerability of the system to the given initiating action, ex- pressed as the conditional probability that damage will be inflicted if the initiating action occurs. U(damage/IV & NU) is the damage inflicted on the system if the initiating action occurs and causes damage. Thus, for traditional natural and technogenic disasters, vulnerability is deter- mined by a specific threat, but the consequences depend on both the type of threat and the vulnerability of the system to that type of threat. Here it should be noted that in this model there are no two-way linkages, such as the dependence of the threat on vulnerability (inasmuch as the probability of a spontaneously initiated action has no relation to system vulnerability to that action) or dependence of the threat on the consequences (for the same reason). Therefore, the system of linkages among the risk factors for the given sys- tem in an emergency of a natural or technogenic nature is as presented in Figure 7-1A. If the initiating action is a terrorist attack, the interactions among the various factors included in the risk assessment equation are more complex. Similar to the expression above, terrorism risk is presented as follows: RT = PA Ã P(NU/A) Ã U(damage/A & NU) PA is the terrorist threat to the given system, expressed as the probability that a terrorist attack of a particular type will be carried out. P(NU/A) is the vulnerability of the system to a terrorist attack of the given
TECHNOLOGICAL TERRORISM SCENARIOS AND IMPACT FACTORS 57 Threat, PIV Vulnerability, P(NU/IV) Consequences, U(damage/IV & NU) Risk of natural and technogenic disasters FIGURE 7-1Aâ System of linkages among risk factors for emergency situations of a natural or technogenic nature. Fig 7-1A.eps type, expressed as the conditional probability that damage will be inflicted if the attack is carried out. U(damage/A & NU) is the damage inflicted on the system if the terrorist attack is carried out and causes damage. If a terrorist action occurs, the presence of powerful two-way linkages among the risk factors should be noted (see Figure 7-1B).3 In particular, reducing the vulnerability of a given system makes it possible to reduce substantially the level of the terrorist threat it faces. MAIN TYPES OF SCENARIOS AND IMPACT FACTORS FOR TERRORIST ACTIONS Based on an analysis of the growing number and expanding spectrum of terrorist actions, we may conclude that scientific-technical progress presents terrorists with new opportunities for carrying out various types of terrorist acts. Successes in the development of advanced technologies and means of communi- cation, high rates of urbanization, and the concentration of potentially hazardous
58 COUNTERING TERRORISM Threat, PIV Vulnerability, P(NU/A) Consequences, U(damage/A & NU) Risk of terrorist actions FIGURE 7-1Bâ System of linkages among risk factors for emergency situations of a ter- rorist nature. Fig 7-1B.eps production facilities create favorable conditions for the appearance of new types of technological terrorism with especially dangerous consequences for the public and government institutions. On the other hand, scientific-technical progress also makes it possible to protect the public and objects in the technosphere from terrorist actions. It is technical means of protection that provide the possibility of preventing terrorist acts and minimizing their consequences; that is, they make it possible to protect critically important targets, personnel, the public, and the environment. The following section will cover the main types of scenarios for technologi- cal terrorism. Electromagnetic Terrorism Scenarios Modern critically important facilities (ground- and space-based communica- tions systems, telecommunications systems, computer networks, power plants, transport control systems, nuclear industry facilities, and so forth) are vulnerable to the impact of powerful electromagnetic irradiation and penetrating high-volt-
TECHNOLOGICAL TERRORISM SCENARIOS AND IMPACT FACTORS 59 age electrical pulses in electricity supply and grounding networks. This circum- stance has led in recent years to the appearance of a real danger that scenarios for terrorist attacks based on the application of electromagnetic effects may in fact be realized.4 Electromagnetic terrorism scenarios entail the intentional use of electro- magnetic effects against electrical and electronic systems to disrupt their normal operations. The foundations for the rise of the threat of electromagnetic terrorism were laid, on the one hand, by the sharp reduction in signal levels in electronic systems and, on the other hand, the sharp growth in achievements in creating pulse flow generators and, on their basis, electromagnetic wave emitters. The widespread introduction of electronic systems in all spheres of societal activity and the accessibility of devices used to create disruptions have given rise to the very real threat that electromagnetic terrorism scenarios may be implemented. Electromagnetic terrorism scenarios may be divided into four main groups: 1. Injection of electrical field pulses into the electricity supply networks serving electronic devices and information systems 2. Use of super-broadband emissions to affect electronic devices and con- trol systems 3. Creation of electromagnetic clouds to damage electric transmission lines 4. Use of electromagnetic emissions to detonate mines or other explosive devices placed for the purpose of sabotage Cyberterrorism Scenarios The development of computer networks and information systems based on packet commutation technology has created a new communications and informa- tion environment that is vulnerable to terrorist acts.5 Attacks by computer terror- ists could be aimed at specific elements of the information infrastructure itself, possibly by means of computer networks, or at other targets present in one way or another in this environment. The network infrastructure as such could be of enormous value to terrorists, inasmuch as it provides a cheap and effective means of interaction and communication and serves as a source from which information may be obtained. Thus, in addition to the multitude of positive aspects, the development of cyberspace significantly expands terroristsâ arsenal of tools and capabilities. The possibilities offered by global network technologies allow terrorists to work in practically any country against targets located in any other country. In modern industrially developed society, information technologies may be viewed by terrorists as both a target of attack and a means of attack. Not only telecommunications and information networks but also all other components of any vitally important (critical) infrastructure whose successful
60 COUNTERING TERRORISM functioning depends on computer control, data processing, and digital communi- cations could become targets for cyberattacks. The following are highlighted as main scenarios for computer terrorism: destroying network infrastructure on a corporate, national, or transnational scale by knocking their control systems or individual subsystems out of commission; obtaining access to confidential data; changing data affecting the outcome of pro- cesses in which terrorists have an interest; or an information-related action result- ing in individuals or groups behaving in accordance with terroristsâ wishes. Computer terrorism scenarios may be particularly effective if used in com- bination with physical actions against critically important targets. In such cases, a cyberattack is used as a factor intensifying the effect of the physical attack by countering the efforts of rapid-response services and communications and com- mand systems, providing false output data that cause leaders and personnel to take inadequate actions, or creating panic among the public. Thus, cyberattacks increase the danger from a physical attack and exacerbate its consequences by complicating response actions and implementation of damage reduction measures. Biological Terrorism Scenarios The impact factors of biological terrorism can cause massive disease out- breaks and panic among people, animals, and plants.6 These impact factors include microorganisms and some of their products (toxins), as well as certain types of insects, both plant pests and disease vectors. In means of application, bioterrorist acts differ from other types of terrorist acts in that they can be both overt, announced, demonstrative acts as well as covert acts masked as natural outbreaks. Here it should be noted that according to current information, a sig- nificant portion of cases of bioterrorism are covert or masked in nature. Therefore, the problem of differentiating natural and artificially created disease outbreaks remains very urgent. The effectiveness of biological terrorism scenarios is determined by the fol- lowing factors: â¢ The world is currently witnessing the rapid development of the biologi- cal sciences, biotechnology, medicine, and pharmacology. Increasing numbers of people are employed in these fields and have the necessary knowledge and quali- fications to develop and manufacture bioweapons. There is a growing number of laboratories and biological and pharmaceutical plants that have the necessary conditions for producing biological weapons. â¢ Manufacturing biological weapons is relatively simple and inexpensive. With the appropriate pathogenic virus or microorganism strain, a pathogen can be produced in rather large quantities without particular problems in any laboratory
TECHNOLOGICAL TERRORISM SCENARIOS AND IMPACT FACTORS 61 with the capacity to support work under sterile conditions. Such conditions are relatively easy to create even at home. â¢ The problem of the pathogenic bacterial or viral strain is that although it is one of the most complex problems bioterrorists face, it is also solvable. Bioter- rorists can obtain the pathogen illegally through a laboratory or production facil- ity where these microorganisms or viruses are studied or where related vaccines or diagnostic test kits are produced. Bioterrorists can then pass the pathogenic viral or microbial strain along to another terrorist group. â¢ Bioweapons are effective in very small doses. The ease of concealing bioweapons, the covert manner in which they can be used, the lack of external manifestations at the moment of release, and the relative ease with which they can be produced make it very unlikely that their use will be detected and prevented. â¢ Biological weapons make it possible to carry out both individual terrorist acts and massive strikes against people, animals, and plants. â¢ At present, there are practically no technologies for protecting against bioweapons or detecting and identifying a pathogenic microorganism or toxin before it begins to take effect. Therefore, a case of bioterrorism can be discovered only after the outbreak begins and is identified, which can take a fairly long time after large numbers of people, animals, or plants have already been infected. Thus, the relative ease of producing biological weapons, the practical invul- nerability of the perpetrators, and the possibility of damages on a huge scale make biological attack scenarios attractive to terrorists. Chemical Terrorism Scenarios Dangerous chemicals are found everywhere in modern industrial society and, consequently, may be accessible to terrorists.7 The following four attack scenarios related to chemical terrorism may be highlighted: 1. Dispersal of a military chemical substance for nonmilitary purposes 2. Sabotage at a chemical plant or storage facility (including rail tank cars) where there are toxic chemicals stored in gaseous, liquid, or solid form that can react with air or water to produce toxic gases or evaporate into the atmosphere 3. Contamination of natural water sources or drinking water reservoirs with toxic substances 4. Intentional use of chemical substances to kill individual people Terrorists may realize their intentions of acquiring chemical weapons in two ways: (1) by buying (stealing) them from existing national stockpiles or (2) by producing them at their own underground enterprises. Inasmuch as synthesizing military chemical substances requires overcoming complex technical barriers and entails great risk, it is more likely that terrorists will acquire highly toxic indus-
62 COUNTERING TERRORISM trial chemicals. Although such substances are hundreds of times less lethal than paralyzing nerve gas, they nevertheless can cause significant losses if used in a closed space or in the open air under favorable atmospheric conditions. Military chemical substances are poisonous, artificially created gases, liq- uids, or powders that upon entering the body through the lungs or skin cause disability or death among people and animals. Although many military chemical substances are liquids, they can be put into the form of an aerosol (fine mist of tiny droplets) and then evaporate into the atmosphere as a result of the detona- tion of a shell. Most chemical substances fall into one of five broad categories: (1) skin-blistering agents, (2) paralyzing nerve agents, (3) asphyxiating gases, (4) bleeding agents, and (5) disabling agents. Besides the various psychological effects that they produce, chemical weapons also differ from one another in their resistance to destruction, volatility, and evaporation rate. Unstable substances are dispersed in the air for several hours and mainly present a threat if they are inhaled, while persistent substances remain dangerous for a month if they are scattered on the soil, vegetation, or objects and, as a rule, represent a hazard if they make contact with skin. Chemical substances with skin-blistering effects, such as yperite (mustard gas) or lewisite, are liquids that cause chemical burns. Nerve-paralyzing substances like sarin and VX are the most powerful chemi- cal poisons known. They disrupt the human nervous system and kill their victims within a few minutes. Given the extreme danger associated with handling or stor- ing nerve-paralyzing agents, terrorists might attempt to develop a binary weapon that would be safer to produce, store, and transport. A binary system presumes the separate storage of two relatively nontoxic ingredients and their mixture im- mediately before use to create a lethal substance. Sarin, for example, could be produced in a binary system through the chemical reaction of isopropanol with methylphosphoryldifluoride (DF). However, synthesizing DF is complicated and difficult. Furthermore, terrorists would have to either mix the components manu- ally before use, which is an extremely dangerous operation, or try to develop a remote-controlled device to handle the mixing and dispersal, which in turn would require a high degree of technical skill. A very likely terrorist attack scenario would be a case of sabotage at an industrial enterprise that manufactures, processes, or stores highly toxic chemi- cals, leading to their emission or discharge with subsequent impacts on nearby populated areas. A dangerous chemical could be intentionally discharged by de- stroying a chemical container with the help of a conventional explosive device or by sabotaging the manufacturing process at the facility, leading to an emergency situation. Terrorists could also set off an improvised explosive device to blow a hole in a rail tank car being used to transport a dangerous chemical. Historical experience shows that most well-known chemical terrorism at- tacks were committed using household and industrial chemicals. Although these substances are less toxic than military poisonous substances, their consequences
TECHNOLOGICAL TERRORISM SCENARIOS AND IMPACT FACTORS 63 may be catastrophic. Therefore, in addition to countering attack scenarios using military poisonous substances, it is recommended that significant attention be devoted to attack scenarios involving sabotage at facilities producing, using, or transporting hazardous chemicals. Radiation Terrorism Scenarios Scenarios for terrorist acts using radiation sources may be divided into three groups: (1) detonation of a nuclear explosive device, (2) sabotage at nuclear fa- cilities, and (3) radiological terrorism.8 Detonation of a Nuclear Device Scenarios in this group relate to a more dangerous type of terrorism from the standpoint of the scope of the consequences. Such scenarios entail the theft of a nuclear explosive device from a storage arsenal or the creation of a homemade nuclear bomb using highly enriched uranium or plutonium. Realization of these scenarios is complicated by the circumstances that the key components necessary for manufacturing nuclear weapons systemsâthat is, fissible materials (pluto- nium or highly enriched uranium)âare difficult to obtain, and the capabilities and equipment needed to produce them also have their specific characteristics. However, although nuclear weapons systems are complex technical devices, it is impossible to rule out the possibility that a well-trained terrorist organization could be capable of manufacturing a primitive nuclear device with a yield up to the tens of kilotons. The most difficult part of manufacturing such a nuclear device is acquiring the necessary quantity (on the order of several kilograms) of highly enriched uranium or plutonium. Therefore, preventing nuclear weapons and weapons ma- terials from falling into the hands of terrorists is a top priority. Sabotage at Nuclear Facilities Scenarios in this nuclear terrorism category entail setting off an explosion at a facility such as a nuclear power plant, research reactor, spent fuel reprocessing plant, radioactive waste repository, or similar site. Numerous nuclear facilities present very attractive targets for terrorists. The potential destruction and damage that could be caused by a terrorist act at a nuclear reactor depend on the design characteristics of the given reactor and the protective measures in place, which in turn vary widely at the different types of facilities. According to data from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 438 nuclear reactors are operating in the world today.
64 COUNTERING TERRORISM Radiological Terrorism This type of terrorism involves detonating a conventional explosive device containing radioactive isotopes with the aim of subsequently dispersing them over a significant area. This category also includes attack scenarios in which radioac- tive substances are dissolved in water sources. This category of radiation terror- ism scenarios is not as powerful in impact as the first category, but is much more likely to be used by terrorists. So-called radiological dispersal devices could be manufactured by packing radioactive materials together with chemical explosives and then detonating the device. Scenarios for Terrorist Attacks Using Explosives Because the goal of any terrorist act is to create maximum resonance in society with minimal costs and minimal risk, the use of explosives for terrorist purposes has become widespread. Potential targets of terrorist attacks could in- clude critically important facilities of undoubted interest from the standpoint of inflicting damage and creating significant societal impact. 9 From the standpoint of the likelihood of technological terrorist attacks, such acts at enterprises using large volumes of flammable substances in their technological processes (gas stations, compressed gas facilities, oil refineries, chemical plants, and so forth) represent a serious potential danger. If explosives are detonated at enterprises using explosive or flammable substances, the fol- lowing attack scenario is possible: (a) release and dispersal of large volumes of flammable substances, (b) their mixture with air in the necessary proportions and formation of an explosive cloud, and (c) its subsequent explosion. The detonation of explosive clouds over a city could lead to significant destruction and fatalities. Facilities using poisonous substances must be considered as a separate category. Significant destruction at such sites is capable of releasing into the atmosphere a large volume of poisonous substances circulating in the facilityâs systems, which could contaminate large areas of the city. A separate target for potential techno- logical attacks by terrorists could be a cityâs natural gas system (gas distribution points, stations, pipelines, underground facilities, and even individual apartments with gas appliances). Explosive transformation is generally classified in one of two categoriesâdef- lagration and detonationâwhich are differentiated by the dynamics of the explosive load. The main impact factors from a detonation explosion are an atmospheric blast wave characterized by excess pressure and the force of the compression wave and a fireball created by extremely hot combustion products. The main impact factors from a deflagration explosion are (1) a compression wave char- acterized by maximal excess pressure, (2) dynamic pressure, (3) wind effects that can substantially exceed centrifugal load, (4) and a fireball of extremely hot combustion products.
TECHNOLOGICAL TERRORISM SCENARIOS AND IMPACT FACTORS 65 MODELING TERRORIST THREATS AND TERRORIST ATTACK SCENARIOS As noted previously, the distinguishing characteristics of technological ter- rorism scenarios and impact factors are shaped by the capacity of terrorists for deliberately choosing the means, place, and time for the attack. This choice is based on a rational assessment of (1) the vulnerability of the given target to vari- ous attack scenarios and (2) the magnitude of the damages expected if the various attack scenarios are carried out. The decisions made by the terrorists are based on the minimax principle, which consists of a striving to inflict maximum damage on society while expending the minimum resources and with minimal risk that the organization will be detected and eliminated (that is, a striving to ensure maxi- mum effectiveness for the attack). Here, terrorists are capable of reacting to the actions of antiterrorist forces, drawing lessons from the experience of previous attacks, and using them to correct their actions. Additional difficulties that must be faced in evaluating the likelihood that various terrorist attack scenarios will be carried out are associated with the value system of terrorists (that is, their useful- ness function) differing notably from the traditional value system. Their system of motivating principles often is not fully comprehensible even to specialists. Furthermore, the following characteristics are typical of the issues faced in evaluating terrorist attack threats (impact factors) and scenarios: â¢ High level of uncertainty due to lack of knowledge of terroristsâ inten- tions, intellectual potential, and organizational-technical resources, the goals they are pursuing, and the value system by which they are guided â¢ Fragmentary and (often) secret nature of data of various types obtained from various sources, such as statistical information, expert assessments, and operational information obtained from intelligence services â¢ Dynamic nature of terrorist risks The mathematical model being developed for evaluating various terrorist at- tack scenarios for a given target must meet the following requirements: â¢ The model must facilitate assessments and decision making for situa- tions involving a very high level of uncertainty. â¢ The model must be multidimensional; that is, it must consider a situation from the standpoint of both terrorists and antiterrorist forces. It must provide for a description of the dynamic interaction of these two sides, each of which is guided by its own strategy and is capable of reacting to its opponentâs actions. Further- more, the model must make it possible to take into account terroristsâ capacity for selecting the attack scenario that ensures maximum attack effectiveness. That is, it must include the two-way linkages between the vulnerability of the system to
66 COUNTERING TERRORISM the given attack scenario (and the expected damage) and the likelihood that this attack scenario will be selected by terrorists.10 â¢ The part of the model that characterizes terroristsâ situational analysis and decision making (part 1 of the model) must assess terroristsâ goals, value system, resources, and intellectual and organizational-technical potential; identify basic scenarios for terrorist attacks against a given target; and must assess the probability that various terrorist attack scenarios will be carried out based on their usefulness function, by which (in the opinion of antiterrorist analysts) terrorists must be guided. â¢ In addition to providing an assessment of vulnerability of the given target and the effectiveness of its protection systems, the blocks of the model that describe the situation from the antiterrorist standpoint must also use results obtained on the basis of analysis of the terrorist part of the model (particularly the likelihood of various attack scenarios being realized from the viewpoint of the terrorists) to determine the most effective measures for countering the terror- ist threat. In this regard, the possibility of interaction among the various forces countering the terrorist threat and of exchanges of information among them must be taken into account. â¢ The model must be dynamic; that is, it must make it possible to describe the change of parameters of the system (target), the external environment, and the spectrum and intensity of terrorist threats. Given these requirements, it makes sense to bring to bear the principles of game theory11 and Bayesian networks,12 which make it possible to (1) take into account the independent actions and rational behavioral strategies of terrorist and antiterrorist forces; (2) assess situations characterized by high levels of uncer- tainty; and (3) account for information obtained from various sources (including information received periodically on the status of particular variable models), thus making it possible to obtain detailed inductive assessments of the likely ac- curacy of the predictions of other variable models. Scientific methodological aspects and applied developments have become the focus of joint analysis within the framework of a program for countering techno- logical terrorism being carried out jointly by the Russian Academy of Sciences and the U.S. National Academy of Sciences13 and under the Science for Peace Program of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.14 Figure 7-2 presents a three-sided model that facilitates assessment of terrorist attack scenarios and counteractions by antiterrorist forces. The model consists of three graphs. Graph 1 is a diagram of influence describing the situation involved in making decisions to select an attack scenario from the standpoint of a terrorist organization. This diagram is compiled by analysts at the security service of a target facility, who, in their attempt to consider things from the terroristsâ position (playing the role of the enemy), strive to assign values for expected usefulness for the terrorists if various attack scenarios were to be carried out. The values arrived
1. Type 4. Adequacy of intellectual 3. Supply of attack resources channel 1. Attack 4. Adequacy of intellectual 3. Supply 2. Support 7. Operational 2. Support for Scenario resources Channel for international information about 6. Attack international terrorism attack planning 5. Adequacy of planning terrorism organizational-technical capability resources 8. Operational 15. Disruption 6. Attack information on attack 5. Adequacy of 10. Attack of supply channel planning capability organization 7. Strict organizational-technical implementation protection resources 9. Strict capability protection 14. Counter- 8. Attack 16. Security measures implementation 11. Functional protection protection 9. Functional capability 12. Condition protection of target after attack 10. Condition of target after attack 1. Attack 13. Usefulness Scenario to officials at target 2. Condition 11. Usefulness of target after to terrorists attack 4. Prevention of panic Graph 1 6. Mass media Graph 2 3. Counter- 7. Condition measures at 8. Condition of social local level of public infrastructure in affected zone 5. Removal of social Graph 3 infrastructure from affected zone 9. Usefulness to municipal authorities 67 FIGURE 7-2â Three-sided terrorism risk assessment model. Fig 7-2.eps landscape
68 COUNTERING TERRORISM at then make it possible to assess the probability of the various attack scenarios being realized. These probabilities are used in constructing graphs 2 and 3, which characterize the corresponding process of making decisions to select measures to counter the terrorist threat at the level of the security service of the given facil- ity (Graph 2) and at the level of the municipal authorities in the area where the facility is located (Graph 3). It should be kept in mind that facility officials and the municipal authorities can exchange information and coordinate their efforts; that is, they are allies in the game. The similarities and differences between the graphs show that they describe the same question but from different positions. For instance, the differences be- tween the graphs reflect the varying level of uncertainty regarding the condition of specific elements (the condition of the same elementâfor example, the resources of the terrorist organization could be known for certain by the terrorists but viewed by antiterrorist forces as a random value). Assessments of the probability links between task variables (that is, the tables of conditional probabilities for the three graphs) also differ accordingly. In addition, some task parameters may not be considered at all by one side but, at the same time, could be very important to the other. Fundamental differences are also noted in the usefulness elements of each graph, inasmuch as the usefulness functions for terrorists, facility officials, and the municipal authorities may take completely different factors into account. Terrorists, for example, may be oriented primarily toward infliction of the initial blow and on the expenditures necessary for carrying out the attack, while for facility officials the usefulness function must also include secondary damage and the cost of implementing various protective measures. The usefulness function for the municipal authorities must first take into account the damage inflicted on the public and the local infrastructure in areas near the target facility. NOTES 1. Frolov, K., and G. Baecher. 2006. Protection of the Civilian Infrastructure from Acts of Terrorism. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Springer, 252 pp. Pate-Cornell, E. 2002. Probabilistic modeling of terrorist threats: A systems analysis ap- proach to setting priorities among countermeasures. Military Operations Research 7(4):5-20. Woo, G. 2004. Quantitative terrorism risk assessment. Available online at www.rms.com/ NewsPress/Quantitative_Terrorism_Risk_Assessment.pdf. Accessed April 11, 2008. 2â Technogenic is used to refer to phenomena arising as a result of the development or deploy- . ment of technology. 3â Makhutov, N. A., and D. O. Reznikov. 2007. Use of Bayesian networks to assess terrorist . risks and select an optimal strategy for countering the terrorist threat. Problems of Security and Ex- treme Situations 5:43-63. Pate-Cornell. Probabilistic modeling of terrorist threats. 4â Fortov, V. E. 2004. Study of electromagnetic impacts in terrorist and antiterrorist actions. . Pp. 228-238 in Proceedings of a Scientific-Practical Conference. Moscow: Kombitell. 5â Barsukov, V. 2000. Protecting computer systems from powerful destructive effects. Jet Info . Information Bulletin 2(81):8-17. Available online at www.jetinfo.ru/2000 (in Russian).
TECHNOLOGICAL TERRORISM SCENARIOS AND IMPACT FACTORS 69 Vasenin, V. A., and A. V. Galatenko. 2002. Computer terrorism and Internet security prob- lems. Pp. 211-225 in High-Impact Terrorism: Proceedings of a Russian-American Workshop. Kirov, Russia: Vyatka. [Pp. 183-197 in the original English version by the same title, published in 2002, Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press.]. Branscomb, L. 2003. Cyberattacks as an amplifier in terrorist strategy. Pp. 93-96 in Ter- rorism: Reducing Vulnerabilities and Improving Responses: U.S.-Russian Workshop Proceedings. Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press. 6. Morenkov, O. S. 2002. Bioterrorism: A view from the side. Pp. 131-141 in High-Impact Terrorism: Proceedings of a Russian-American Workshop. Kirov, Russia: Vyatka. [Pp. 106-113 in the original English version by the same title, published in 2002, Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press.]. McGeorge, J. 2001. An analysis of 404 nonmilitary incidents involving either chemical or biological agents. P. 53 in Abstract Book of the World Congress on Chemical and Biological Terror- ism, Dubrovnik, Croatia, April 22-27, 2001. 7â Ibid. . 8â Aratyunyan, R. V., V. Belikov, et al. 1999. Models for the spread of radioactive contamina- . tion in the environment. RAS Power Engineering News 1:61-96. Hecker, S. 2002. Nuclear terrorism. Pp. 176-184 in High-Impact Terrorism: Proceedings of a Russian-American Workshop. Kirov, Russia: Vyatka. [Pp. 149-155 in the original English version by the same title, published in 2002, Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press.] 9â Komarov, A. A. 2004. Questions of protecting the urban infrastructure and the public from . explosive technological terrorism and catastrophic explosions. Pp. 79-89 in Proceedings of a Scien- tific-Practical Conference. Moscow: Kombitell. Simmons, R. 2002. Terrorism: Explosives threat. Pp. 199-211 in High-Impact Terrorism: Proceedings of a Russian-American Workshop. Kirov, Russia: Vyatka. [Pp. 171-179 in the original English version by the same title, published in 2002, Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press.] 10â The use of two-sided models describing the terrorist and antiterrorist sides of a conflict is . described in detail in Pate-Cornell, Probabilistic modeling of terrorist threats. 11â Hausken, K. 2002. Probabilistic risk analysis and game theory. Risk Analysis 22(1):17-27. . McCain, R. Game theory: An introductory sketch. Available online at william-king.www.drexel. edu/top/eco/game/nash.html. Sandler, T., and D. Arce. 2003. Terrorism and game theory. Simulation and Gaming 34(3). 12â Terekhov, S. A. 2003. Introduction to Bayesian networks. Scientific session of the Moscow . Engineering-Physics Institute, Fifth All-Russian Scientific Practical Conference, Moscow; Jensen, F. V. An Introduction to Bayesian Networks. 1996. New York: Springer-Verlag. 13â National Research Council Committee on Counterterrorism Challenges for Russia and the . United States. 2004. Terrorism: Reducing Vulnerabilities and Improving Responses: U.S.-Russian Workshop Proceedings. Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press. 14â Frolov and Baecher. Protection of the Civilian Infrastructure. . Additional background materials not specifically cited: Petrov, V. P., D. O. Reznikov, V. I. Kuksova, and Ye. F. Dubinin. 2007. Terrorist risk assessment and decision-making on the expediency of building a protection system against terrorist actions. Pp. 89-105 in Problems of Security and Emergency Situations, vol. 1. Tucker, J. 2002. Chemical terrorism: Assessing threats and responses. Pp. 141-165 in High-Impact Terrorism: Proceedings of a Russian-American Workshop. Kirov, Russia: Vyatka. [Pp. 117-133 in the original English version by the same title, published in 2002, Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press.] Frolov, K. V., and N. A. Makhutov. 2004. Technological terrorism and methods of countering terrorist threats. Pp. 228-238 in Proceedings of a Scientific-Practical Conference. Moscow: Kombitell.