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FOCUSING PRIVATE-SECTOR ACTION ON PUBLIC HAZARDS 193 original typesetting files. Page breaks are true to the original; line lengths, word breaks, heading styles, and other typesetting-specific formatting, however, cannot be About this PDF file: This new digital representation of the original work has been recomposed from XML files created from the original paper book, not from the retained, and some typographic errors may have been accidentally inserted. Please use the print version of this publication as the authoritative version for attribution. This requires identifying potentially responsible parties at sites newly nominated to the National Priorities List, selecting sites for demonstration of CSI's project management approach, and building relationships with regional federal offices and state and local governments. Clean Sites Inc. is a bold experiment in consensus-based environmental policymaking. This is evident every day in its offices, when people who previously worked for organizations like Du Pont, the National Audubon Society, the EPA, Exxon, and the Justice Department sit down in an atmosphere of creative problem solving and work together to move the hazardous waste cleanup process forward. Like many other nonprofit organizations, CSI faces challenges in both the scope and nature of its funding. Of the support currently received through grants from more than 125 industrial corporations, a major portion is contributed by chemical and petrochemical companies. CSI must broaden the base of its industrial fundingâboth to increase the number of sites at which the institution can become involved, and to draw upon a wider spectrum of industries. The organization also is seeking foundation grants to increase both the depth and independence of its financial support. In summary, although U.S. environmental policy is, in the words of the Conservation Foundation (1984), "suspended between progress and retrogression, between cooperation and polarization," CSI is an institution that can help the nation break this gridlock. Addressing the complex question of hazards equity is an important part of this mission. The ultimate value of the Clean Sites approach to cleanup of hazardous waste sites is perhaps best described by its chairman of the board, Russell Train, former EPA administrator and president of the World Wildlife Fund-U.S. Mr. Train noted at the news conference at which the creation of CSI was announced that the environmental problems facing the United States are less and less clear- cut. He observed that the debate "centers not on whether a problem needs to be dealt with, but on how to do it most efficiently and effectively." If you accept this premise, then the logical conclusion is that in the 1980s and beyond, the only realistic path toward continued environmental progress is one that is less adversarial and more cooperative. References Conservation Foundation. 1984. State of the Environment. Washington, D.C.: The Conservation Foundation. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 1984. Extent of the Hazardous Release Problem and Future Funding Needs: Final Report. Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response. Washington, D.C.
FOCUSING PRIVATE-SECTOR ACTION ON PUBLIC HAZARDS 194 original typesetting files. Page breaks are true to the original; line lengths, word breaks, heading styles, and other typesetting-specific formatting, however, cannot be About this PDF file: This new digital representation of the original work has been recomposed from XML files created from the original paper book, not from the retained, and some typographic errors may have been accidentally inserted. Please use the print version of this publication as the authoritative version for attribution. THE BHOPAL TRAGEDY PROLOGUE TO CHAPTER BY JOHN F. AHEARNE Karen B. Ekelman During the night between December 2 and 3, 1984, the worst industrial accident in history played itself out in Bhopal, India. An unlikely series of technological failures at the Union Carbide of India Limited plant combined with a southerly wind to expose 200,000 persons to a lethal cloud of methyl isocynate (MIC). The most widely accepted estimates suggest that there were between 2,500 and 4,000 fatalities, and that deaths were disproportionately concentrated among infants and children. The long-term health consequences for the 50,000 to 60,000 people who received substantial exposure to MIC are unknown. An estimated 1,600 animals died during the two days immediately following the accident, but the long-term effects of MIC exposure on vegetation, animal, and fish species are also unknown. The sequence of technical events that led to the release of MIC from the Union Carbide plant is now known, although the extent and cause of some events remain in dispute. The initiating event was the entry of water into a partly buried storage tank that contained 90,000 pounds of MIC. Although the Union Carbide study of the accident indicates that at least 120 gallons of water had to enter the storage tank to cause subsequent reactions, Indian authorities dispute this figure and argue that entry of a much smaller quantity of water could have served as the initiating event. An exothermic reaction between the MIC and the water rapidly raised the temperature in the tank. A concurrent exothermic reaction in which three molecules of MIC combine to form a single molecule was catalyzed by iron from the heat-induced corrosion of the tank walls. The pressure inside the storage tank rapidly increased because of carbon dioxide evolution and the increasing temperature of the tank contents; when the pressure reached 40 psig, the safety valve on MIC storage tank 610 opened. The safety valve remained open for approximately two hours, then reseated itself. During the time the valve was open, more than 50,000 pounds of MIC were discharged as vapor and liquid. During the discharge, the temperature of the MIC in the tank
FOCUSING PRIVATE-SECTOR ACTION ON PUBLIC HAZARDS 195 original typesetting files. Page breaks are true to the original; line lengths, word breaks, heading styles, and other typesetting-specific formatting, however, cannot be About this PDF file: This new digital representation of the original work has been recomposed from XML files created from the original paper book, not from the retained, and some typographic errors may have been accidentally inserted. Please use the print version of this publication as the authoritative version for attribution. was estimated to be greater than 200°C, and the pressure averaged 180 psig. Failures in several safety systems contributed to the accident. The MIC in the storage tank was at ambient temperature (15 to 20°C) because a refrigeration system for cooling the tank had been inoperative for nearly five months. If the refrigeration system had been operating, the stored MIC would have been at 0°C, and the exothermic reaction of water and MIC would have significantly slowed. The vent gas scrubber, a 5 1/2-foot- diameter tower 60 feet high that destroys MIC by passing it through circulating caustic soda, was shut down. When the scrubber was finally activited, the operator did not adequately augment the flow of soda, probably because the flow gauges were not working. A flare tower designed to burn various vent gases, including normal emissions from the three MIC storage tanks, was undergoing maintenance and was therefore out of service. The MIC vapor and liquid being discharged under high pressure from storage tank 610 could not be shunted to a spare tank that was supposed to be kept empty for such emergencies, because all three MIC storage tanks were full. A water curtain that might have inactivated the escaping MIC was not turned on until an hour after the start of the release, and was not adequate for the height of the escaping MIC vapor. Human errors also contributed to the accident. The entry of water into the MIC storage tank was almost certainly the result of operator error: one hypothesis is that a metal insert was not used to isolate the safety valve discharge pipe leading to the MIC storage tank when that pipe was washed with water during the evening of the accident; such inserts provide additional assurance that wash water will not leak through the valves into the storage tanks, and plant operating manuals require their use. A discrepancy in the control room pressure readings for storage tank 610 taken before and after a 10:45 p.m. shift change was not noticed. A supervisor may have delayed reporting an initial, small leak of MIC for approximately 20 minutes; it was in the first 5 minutes following this delay that the enormity of the accident became known. Analyses of the accident have of course focused on these proximal technological and human errors. It is unarguable that proper operating and maintenance procedures should be followed, that safety practices clearly written into the company's guidelines should be adhered to, that workers should be adequately trained to deal with both routine and emergency situations, that oversight of plant operating and maintenance procedures should be rigorous and redundant. But the accident at the Union Carbide plant in Bhopal, India, also
FOCUSING PRIVATE-SECTOR ACTION ON PUBLIC HAZARDS 196 original typesetting files. Page breaks are true to the original; line lengths, word breaks, heading styles, and other typesetting-specific formatting, however, cannot be About this PDF file: This new digital representation of the original work has been recomposed from XML files created from the original paper book, not from the retained, and some typographic errors may have been accidentally inserted. Please use the print version of this publication as the authoritative version for attribution. suggests other important lessons. Remedies for technological hazards will be found only partly in inherently safer technologies and enhanced technological competence. The transfer of technology, and particularly the international transfer of potentially hazardous technologies, should be accompanied by a recognition of the importance of the social and cultural environment into which the technology is being introduced. Local social and government institutions may significantly erode the effectiveness of even the most exemplary precautions. Certainly this occurred in Bhopal, where the siting of the Union Carbide plant did not adhere to local guidelines, where plant inspectors were overworked and were not trained to understand hazards that the plant might present, where emergency communication systems were inadequate, and where local conditions of poverty and crowding in Bhopal magnified the consequences of the accident. In his essay concerning lessons that were learned or that should have been learned from the Three Mile Island accident in 1979, John F. Ahearne suggests ways in which accidents involving technological hazards can be prevented or their consequences reduced. If these lessons had been learned, the disaster in Bhopal might have been avoided.
