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SUMMARY 15 dual-use capabilities in technology development for design, manufacture, and certification. The panel recommends that DOD and industry seek to strengthen coordinated planning for aircraft procurement so as to reduce, as far as practicable, the great cyclicality in production that disrupts the industry. Maintaining Momentum in R&D The bedrock of U.S. leadership in civil aircraft is technologyâits development and incorporation into new designs. That leadership need not be threatened provided that the U.S. maintains a vigorous program of research and development. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is the focal point of aeronautical R&D for both civil and military applications. The high cost of R&D and the massive facilities required for aeronautical R&D preclude any private enterprise from performing NASA's central role. It is apparent that the space programs dominate the NASA effortâ aeronautical R&D represents approximately 5 percent of NASA's total R&D budget. It is difficult to compare directly the effort of the United States with the aggregate of its competitors; however, they are approximately equal for generic R&D. In addition, however, in Europe and elsewhere specific competing products are also developed with public funds, and the technical performance of the equipment indicates that it rests on a solid base of technology. The panel questions the present priorities of NASA resource allocationsâgiven the economic and social importance of civil aviation and the altered competitive position of U.S. aircraft manufacturers. Technology validation represents another area of concern. NASA's charter permits work in basic research on new principles, configurations, and structures. The charter also permits the next phase, which involves technology validation with near full-scale systems under representative flight or other simulated operating conditions. Technology validation is expensive, time-consuming, and risky and must establish irrefutable proof in order to meet certification and legal liability standards. As a matter of practice, technology validation work receives limited support from NASA, and adequate funds are not available to do more at present. Thus, a serious gap exists in the total process of developing and applying new technology. The panel recommends reexamination of the research and technology development activity in support of civil aviation within NASA in the light of the changing competitive environment and the technological opportunities noted in this study.
