Below is the uncorrected machine-read text of this chapter, intended to provide our own search engines and external engines with highly rich, chapter-representative searchable text of each book. Because it is UNCORRECTED material, please consider the following text as a useful but insufficient proxy for the authoritative book pages.
COMPETITIVE ASSESSMENT OF TECHNOLOGY 135 leadership of the United States as a development partner need not be threatened provided that the United States maintains a vigorous program of basic research and technology development. Role of NASA The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is the focal agency for government support of aeronautical technology. The act creating NASA charged it with "preserving the role of the United States as a leader in aeronautical science and technology...."5 Its responsibilities covered both civil and military applications. NASA replaced the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA), established in 1915 to "guide and supervise the fledgling science of aeronautics in practical military and civil applications."6 NASA made significant diversions of "aeronautical capabilities and managerial attention to space activities,"7 because it had been created to guide the U.S. space program. Figure 5-13 shows the decline in manpower devoted to aeronautical technology after the creation of NASA. In view of the high cost of aeronautical R&D and the massive facilities required to conduct experimental programs, no other organizationâand certainly no private enterpriseâcan perform the central role in the development of new technology that NASA carries out. Figure 5-13 NACA/NASA Aeronautics Manpower History Source: NASA's Role in Aeronautics: A Workshop, Volume I Summary, p. 41, National Academy Press, Washington, DC, 1981.
COMPETITIVE ASSESSMENT OF TECHNOLOGY 136 There is little doubt that budget priorities reflect perceived political appeal and that space programs have been deemed to be more important than aeronautics. However, it is important for budget priorities also to reflect technological and economic opportunities and the altered competitive context that has been described in this study. Thus, the status of the international competition needs to be fully appreciated before making judgments on priorities. Examination of European and Japanese investments of public funds in R&D does not provide a clear picture of their activity. Their accounting and public reporting practices do not provide the information needed to separate the R&D funds related to generic work from funds allocated for the development and production of aircraft and engines. Thus, it is difficult to compare directly the funds of the United States devoted to R&D with those of other nations. It is likely, however, that expenditures by others for generic R&D are, in the aggregate, approximately equal to those in the United States. The technical accomplishments of the Concorde supersonic transport, Airbus A300, A310, RB-211 turbofan engine, RJ-500 turbofan engine, ATR 42 commuter transport, and helicopters suggest a sound preceding research and development program. The panel recommends reexamination of the research and technology development activity in support of civil aviation in NASA in the light of the changing competitive environment and the technical opportunities noted in this study. As can be seen in Table 5-3, aeronautical R&D represents approximately 5 percent of total R&D. Considering the importance of civil aircraft manufacture to economic health, societal good, and the balance of payments, there would seem to be reason to reexamine priorities and levels of expenditures. The NRC study, cited above, concluded that the problem did not result from the dual responsibility of NASA for space and for aviation. As has been noted, the need is to rethink the importance of advancing aeronautical technology to the American public and to national goals of economic strength and strategic security in the light of the changed competitive environment. Another development need also warrants attention. The present institutional mechanisms for developing and applying new technology do not address adequately the investment required for validating new technological advances for certification and for public acceptance. In the classical sequence of R&D new physical principles, configurations, structures, etc. are conceived and evaluated in the research and technology phase through analytical modeling, simulation, and flight research techniques as appropriate. For the technology to be ready for application its inherent risk factors must be fully understood by working with systems
COMPETITIVE ASSESSMENT OF TECHNOLOGY 137 that approximate full scale under representative flight or other simulated operating conditions. In this process (called validation) the component subsystem or system technology to be validated is generic, not specific to a design under developmentânot a prototype or actual product development. This validation stage provides the expanded knowledge necessary for enabling designers to incorporate the new advance into a specific product with a high degree of confidence in its performance and in the integrity and certificability of the product. TABLE 5-3 NASA Budget Authority, 1968â1983 (millions of dollars) Year Total R&D Aeronautical R&T 1968 4,589 3,912 NA 1969 3,995 3,314 NA 1970 3,749 2,993 96 1971 3,312 2,556 102 1972 3,308 2,523 109 1973 3,408 2,599 157 1974 3,040 2,194 168 1975 3,231 2,323 167 1976 3,552 2,678 175 1977 3,819 2,856 190 1978 4,064 3,012 228 1979 4,559 3,477 264 1980 5,243 4,088 308 1981 5,522 4,334 271 1982 6,020 4,772 265 1983 6,839 5,543 280 SOURCE: Aerospace Industries Association of America, Inc., Aerospace Facts and Figures, 1983/1984, pp. 74 and 76. There is no way that validation can be satisfactorily circumvented. It is the longest and most expensive part in the chain of advancing new technology. (It has also at this point where the momentum of the United States' R&D has become most vulnerable.) Industrial firms lack the resources to undertake expensive, long-term, and uncertain work of this nature; they have no public franchise that would legitimize their undertaking it; and no standards have been established to satisfy public opinion in an area where questions of safety are central. NASA has traditionally carried out the early phases of basic and applied research, while aircraft manufacturers have assumed responsibility for incorporating new technology into designs and obtaining certification. In the past the armed forces have played an important role in some validation, e.g., turbine engines, sweptback wings, and
COMPETITIVE ASSESSMENT OF TECHNOLOGY 138 supersonic flight, but the generic technology supported by DOD has been significantly curtailed over the past 15 years. The technology validation phase is within NASA's charter, but here also, it has received limited funding and support. The panel believes that the national implications of this gap in technology development have not been fully understood. The panel recommends reconsideration of NASA's activities and the resources available to support technology validation. An additional area in which NASA is not now active involves the flight, demonstration of long life, and basic process understanding of composites. Composites play a special role in future performance gains for aircraft. In addition to reductions in manufacturing cost that must be achieved by individual producers, their extended use will require significant advances in process automation, in nondestructive testing and inspection, in developing standard strength-of-materials data for use by designers, in evaluation of operational life and suitability, and in establishing design criteria for crash-worthiness. If these new materials are to be used in primary structures, it will be necessary to insure their integrity not only at installation but also during use. This means that progress in material processing and test techniques is as important as progress on composites themselves. An endeavor of this sort would clearly benefit from joint NASA-DOD-industry planning and participation. Consequently, an expanded role for NASA might also include accelerated service testing and work on evaluation technologies as part of the validation of new materials for use in primary structures. An expansion of NASA's activities into technology validation and evaluation of composite materials should include mechanisms to insure that areas selected for additional effort are relevant to the needs of industry and that the results will be of such a nature that they can be applied with confidence. One possible mechanism for ensuring relevance involves joint industry-government program definition. Another mechanism could be through augmentation of the present NASA aeronautics advisory committee structure. Similar committees have been effective in the past. The advisors included representatives from industry, universities, the airlines and from other involved government agencies, especially the DOD and FAA. The Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board of the National Research Council could make a contribution, as could the Aeronautics Committee of the NASA Advisory Council. The newly established OSTP Aeronautical Policy Review Committee can play a special role in such process because it reports to the President through the science advisor. The OSTP study of aeronautical R&D policy noted that both the Soviet Union and our commercial competitors actively col
