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INTERNATIONAL TRADE, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, NATIONAL SECURITY, AND 100 DIPLOMACY In the light of these complexities the panel recommends that mechanisms be developed that will insure an effective industrial input to the deliberations on coproduction and technology transfer and that due weight be given to the change in competitive status and relative technological position in U.S. industry in reaching decisions. If technology is to be controlled, it is important for the control to be effective, i.e., that there not be adequate alternatives available to the other side. It is also important to identify and give adequate weight to possible long-term adverse effects on the competitive position of U.S. industry. The cumulative effect of a deterioration in the competitive position of the U.S. aircraft industry has obvious strategic implications for the nation. SYNERGY BETWEEN NATIONAL SECURITY AND CIVIL AAVIATION Leadership in aviation in support of the strategic strength of the United States has been a prime element of U.S. policy since World War II. In many respects leadership in the air has replaced the concept of power on the seas as a symbol of national strength. The recent study by the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), noted in Chapter 1, in which both the National Security Council and DOD participated, reaffirmed the vital role of civil aviationâboth aircraft manufacturers and air transportâto the strategic posture of the United States. The relationships between civil and military aviation are important to the health of each. A healthy civil industry is vital for national security and for wartime surge readiness, including the potential of elements of the civil transport system as a military reserve fleet in an emergency. Consequently, policy decisions that adversely affect the civil side of aviation can also impair the security of the nation. Dual Use The 15,000-company supplier base is an important key, since these firms supply critical materials and parts to both the civil and military aircraft industry. Frequently, in the case of smaller second-or third-tier suppliers, the military and civil production outputs are sufficiently common that the same facilities and labor pools produce both. U.S. requirements for military production have diminished substantially in recent years, representing about 37 percent of aircraft output compared with 53 percent in the period 1968 to 1972, during the Vietnam war. They are now
INTERNATIONAL TRADE, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, NATIONAL SECURITY, AND 101 DIPLOMACY increasing again as a result of increased DOD expenditures. Thus, civil aircraft production provides a vital stabilizing influence on the industry in the presence of continuing military procurement uncertainties. Despite the differing requirements for civil and military aircraft, the technology base, much of the supplier base, and the skills and processes used are essentially common. They become mutually supportive in attaining diverse civil and military objectives. The technological synergies are very constructive. Military developments stress performance, while commercial aircraft developments emphasize lowered production costs, vehicle operating efficiency, and high availability with low maintenanceâattributes that are valuable to the military establishment. Historically, civil aeronautics development was triggered by military advancements, which the civil industry could refine or improve to gain the efficiency or technical objectives required in civil applicationâfor example, the swept-wing, fly-by-wire controls, and retractable landing gear. In more recent years, a reverse situation has become common, with the results of civil research or component design subsequently being used for military purposes, e.g., improved fuel efficiency, maintainability and reliability of jet engines, super- aluminum alloys, flight management systems, and composite structures. DOD has sponsored basic advances in propulsion technology in areas such as high-temperature materials, high pressure ratio compressors, combustion, etc. Although technology on supersonic engines and their integration into the inlet and exhaust systems of supersonic aircraft has little commercial relevance, other military engines for bombers, transports, patrol aircraft, and helicopters share common performance requirements with commercial aircraft. Both seek low fuel consumption, high thrust-weight ratio, long life, and high reliability. The need for high pressure ratio-high temperature engines is also common to both. Technology developed for commercial requirements also benefits military applications. Commercial engines gain service experience 10 to 15 times faster than military engines, even military transport engines. To stay competitive, commercial engines are under continuing pressure to improve fuel efficiency, reliability, and service lifeâall resulting in significant cost savings to the user. The benefits of these advances, with their large base of in-service verification, recycle back into military engines. For example, some of the improvements in the CF6 turbofan engine (derived from the TF39 used in DOD's large C5A cargo airplane), developed during commercial service, are being incorporated in later versions of the TF39. Thus, commercial experience provides the DOD with better engines for transport and mission support aircraft than would have been produced by military experience alone.
INTERNATIONAL TRADE, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, NATIONAL SECURITY, AND 102 DIPLOMACY The traditional role of DOD in propulsion development is changing. DOD is now supporting the launch of far fewer aircraft than was the case in previous decades. Equally important, for the last 15 years DOD has tended to define its interests more narrowly, to fund less generic research, and to insist on a specific, demonstrable relevance to present or proposed weapons systems for all DOD- sponsored R&D. For all but advanced supersonic aircraft or highly specialized mission requirements, DOD is largely prepared to buy off-the-shelf engine technology. Because of the huge investment ($1.5 to $2 billion) required and the long interval involved in the development of a new engine (four to six years), the future of U.S. technological leadership in propulsion will continue to rest to a large degree on defense sponsorship. Thus, an issue is evolving as to whether or how U.S. leadership in propulsion technology can be sustained in the face of this changing posture for DOD. There are, however, some military requirements that do not place important demands for specialized performance on suppliers. These aircraft, which provide support services, include general personnel and supply transport, navigation and command control trainers, and in-flight refuelers. The C140A (Jetstar), U-SF (Seminole), T-39A (Saberliner), E-3 (707), E-4 (747), C-9A (DC-9), and KC-10 (DC-10) are examples of civil aircraft that have evolved into dual-use aircraft with major cost avoidance to the nation. Recent examples are the Lear jet 35Aâ designated C-21A) and Beech Super King Airâdesignated B 200C for support functions.4 Our allies and international competitors provide explicitly for military support of commercial aircraft development. For example, the new British Aerospace AR146 commuter is being purchased by the Royal Air Force, and a version of the Bandeirante commuter is being purchased by the Brazilian Air Force. Obviously, it would be inappropriate for DOD to purchase civilian aircraft just to support the industry. However, at present no effective mechanisms exist even for joint consideration of military needs and civilian applications in planning development of civilian aircraft and in timing procurement. Generally, the military establishment has filled its support-aircraft requirements through existing civil production aircraft or called for new specialized developments when it saw a need. Planning military requirements for these support aircraft with a view to their integration with civilian developments could help U.S. manufacturers become more competitive by spreading the cost of design, development, and procurement among both military and civil users. It is important to note, however, that the common use of aircraft or even joint development of support aircraft, while
