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INTERNATIONAL TRADE, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, NATIONAL SECURITY, AND 99 DIPLOMACY floor" positions from which they can be dislodged only with great difficulty. This latter situation applies to manufacturers of parts and components as well as complete aircraft. The influence of U.S. control has been extended by getting other allied exporting nations to acknowledge U.S. sanctions with respect to reexport to third countries. This has placed the U.S. policy position on firmer international ground but given foreign exporters additional incentive to move toward the deletion of U.S.-supplied content in their aircraft products. It is important to recognize the realities of the present competitive world with respect to export controls, commerce, and technology. Denial of access to technology that already exists elsewhere or that can easily be developed by competitors does little to preserve U.S. security and damages the U.S. competitive trade position. It forces the acceleration of the development of in- country technology, thereby creating new competition. Achieving Balance in Controlling Technology Transfer In assessing the desirability of controls on the export of U.S. technologies and proprietary data in aircraft, it is important to recognize that technological advancement in aviation has always involved two-way flows. A U.S. policy that leads to excessive restrictions on technology exchanges with other nations can threaten to impede reverse flow and thus impair the aeronautics infrastructure of this country. This reverse flow will become more important as other countries' R&D creates new technology, e.g., eutectic alloys in France and ceramics in Japan. There are major cultural, political, and economic offsets that must also be considered with respect to a fundamental change in the nation's historic open- door policies, which capitalized extensively on European aircraft technology before World War II. It is equally important for the present status of U.S. technology vis-Ã -vis that available from others to be appraised realistically. For example, control of technology transfer for electronics and avionics has become very difficult. The commercialization of computer memories and data communication devices has diffused this technology all over the world. The United States does not hold technology leads in all areas, note, e.g., the powerful role of Japan in memories and data management. This discussion is not intended to lead to the conclusion that the panel is opposed to U.S. government control of technology transfer. Rather, the panel recognizes the complexity of the issues.
