National Academies Press: OpenBook
« Previous: 3 Domestic Chemical Supply Chain
Suggested Citation:"4 International Regulations." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2017. Reducing the Threat of Improvised Explosive Device Attacks by Restricting Access to Explosive Precursor Chemicals. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/24862.
×
Page 65
Suggested Citation:"4 International Regulations." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2017. Reducing the Threat of Improvised Explosive Device Attacks by Restricting Access to Explosive Precursor Chemicals. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/24862.
×
Page 66
Suggested Citation:"4 International Regulations." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2017. Reducing the Threat of Improvised Explosive Device Attacks by Restricting Access to Explosive Precursor Chemicals. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/24862.
×
Page 67
Suggested Citation:"4 International Regulations." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2017. Reducing the Threat of Improvised Explosive Device Attacks by Restricting Access to Explosive Precursor Chemicals. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/24862.
×
Page 68
Suggested Citation:"4 International Regulations." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2017. Reducing the Threat of Improvised Explosive Device Attacks by Restricting Access to Explosive Precursor Chemicals. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/24862.
×
Page 69
Suggested Citation:"4 International Regulations." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2017. Reducing the Threat of Improvised Explosive Device Attacks by Restricting Access to Explosive Precursor Chemicals. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/24862.
×
Page 70
Suggested Citation:"4 International Regulations." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2017. Reducing the Threat of Improvised Explosive Device Attacks by Restricting Access to Explosive Precursor Chemicals. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/24862.
×
Page 71
Suggested Citation:"4 International Regulations." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2017. Reducing the Threat of Improvised Explosive Device Attacks by Restricting Access to Explosive Precursor Chemicals. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/24862.
×
Page 72
Suggested Citation:"4 International Regulations." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2017. Reducing the Threat of Improvised Explosive Device Attacks by Restricting Access to Explosive Precursor Chemicals. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/24862.
×
Page 73
Suggested Citation:"4 International Regulations." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2017. Reducing the Threat of Improvised Explosive Device Attacks by Restricting Access to Explosive Precursor Chemicals. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/24862.
×
Page 74
Suggested Citation:"4 International Regulations." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2017. Reducing the Threat of Improvised Explosive Device Attacks by Restricting Access to Explosive Precursor Chemicals. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/24862.
×
Page 75
Suggested Citation:"4 International Regulations." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2017. Reducing the Threat of Improvised Explosive Device Attacks by Restricting Access to Explosive Precursor Chemicals. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/24862.
×
Page 76
Suggested Citation:"4 International Regulations." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2017. Reducing the Threat of Improvised Explosive Device Attacks by Restricting Access to Explosive Precursor Chemicals. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/24862.
×
Page 77
Suggested Citation:"4 International Regulations." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2017. Reducing the Threat of Improvised Explosive Device Attacks by Restricting Access to Explosive Precursor Chemicals. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/24862.
×
Page 78

Below is the uncorrected machine-read text of this chapter, intended to provide our own search engines and external engines with highly rich, chapter-representative searchable text of each book. Because it is UNCORRECTED material, please consider the following text as a useful but insufficient proxy for the authoritative book pages.

4 International Regulations Other countries have preceded the United States in developing policies to address concerns about access to precursor chemicals and their experience can help inform decisions about policy, including control strategies, in the United States. Table 4-1 compares the scope of regulations on precursor chemicals across the globe. Authorities generally agree on the types of chemicals that should be controlled, but differ in how they enact and implement policy. This chapter summarizes the policies of Australia, Canada, Singapore, the European Union (EU), and the United Kingdom. To supplement publicly available documentation on policy and programs, two members of the committee and committee staff visited the European Commission (EC) in Brussels, Belgium and the United Kingdom’s Home Office in London, England to learn firsthand about how they regulate precursor chemicals; the committee developed a list of questions that it sent in advance of these meetings to guide the discussions (see Appendix E). Information gathered from these meetings is described together in the EU section. All the countries were selected because of their collaborative relationships with the United States; however, each has taken different mandatory and voluntary approaches to restricting malicious actors’ access to precursor chemicals. The committee investigated the EU and United Kingdom’s programs because of the challenges faced implementing new regulations and voluntary measures across Europe using a common framework, but allowing different strategies in each of the EU MS. The committee examined Canada because of its proximity to the United States and the similarity of its approaches to counter-terrorism. Australia provides an example of a whole-of-government and industry approach that is implemented within a more decentralized, federal regulatory strategy. Finally, Singapore provides an example of a country that is developing a very proactive counter-terrorism program given repeated threats from various groups. PREPUBLICATION COPY: UNCORRECTED PROOFS 65

66 Restricting A R Access to Exp xplosive Prec cursor Chem micals TABLE 4-1 Compar rative chart of global reg o gulations on precursor ch hemicals NOTE: %s: percent composition in a solid mixture; %a: p c n m percent com mposition in a aqueous an solution; the letters in the second column cor n d rrespond to t prioritize groups fro Chapter 2; the ed om PGS: Proogramme Global Shield; the EU colu umn include s both Anne I and Ann II ex nex chemical 192 ls. PREPUBLIC P CATION CO OPY: UNCOR RRECTED P PROOFS

International Regulations 67 AUSTRALIA After the 2002 Bali bombings, which killed dozens of Australians; the conviction of five Sydney men in 2009 for a terrorism-related conspiracy; and a 2010 incident in which an HME exploded prematurely during transport, accidentally killing two men in Adelaide, the Australian government, along with state and territory governments, businesses, and industry, developed a voluntary National Code of Practice for Chemicals of Security Concern, which was enacted in July 2013.193-195 The Council of Australian Governments (COAG) identified ninety-six chemicals of concern and developed a voluntary code of practice for fifteen high priority precursor chemicals that can be used to make HMEs (see Table 4-1). The goals of this code are to protect against theft and diversion, promote precursor chemical awareness between business and law enforcement, and educate personnel on suspicious transactions. While there is no direct federal government involvement since it is a voluntary code, the government does provide guidelines for implementation of the code in several areas, including: • security risk management, which assesses the security risk of each business and assigns a security management point of contact who is responsible for investigating and reporting security incidents to the National Security Hotline; • security measures chosen to reduce the risk of terrorists acquiring chemicals from each business by providing background checks on potential employees, educating staff on suspicious behavior, maintaining inventory control records, and reporting thefts or diversions; and • supply chain security to verify the identity of all customers and promote transportation security of chemicals. Security sensitive ammonium nitrate (SSAN) is subject to state and territory regulations and is not subject to the national code.196-197 In June 2006, the COAG introduced a licensing regime for the use, manufacture, storage, transport, import, and export of SSAN, which comprises pure ammonium nitrate (AN), AN mixtures containing greater than 45% AN, and AN emulsions; SSAN does not include solutions or Class 1 explosives (explosive substances and articles, and pyrotechnics). The SSAN regulations form part of each Australian state’s explosives regulations. Transporters moving over 20 kg of SSAN or those storing more than 3 kg need an annual background check. They undergo inspections to ensure that they have secure, lockable storage; maintain detailed records of usage; and have a security plan. Unfortunately, it is not clear how successful this voluntary code alone has been on mitigating terrorist acquisition of precursor chemicals because of other counter-terrorism related laws that were passed around the same time, including a telecommunications act198 that allows companies to keep a limited amount of metadata for two years; an act against foreign fighters199 that allows Australia to arrest, monitor, investigate and prosecute as well as cancel passports for returning foreign fighters; and a counter-terrorism act200 that responds to operational priorities identified by law enforcement, intelligence and defense agencies. Australia has not had a major terrorist attack on its soil. The attack by Numan Haider on two police officers in September 2014 and the PREPUBLICATION COPY: UNCORRECTED PROOFS

68 Restricting Access to Explosive Precursor Chemicals siege at Martin Place in December 2014 have been the only successful terrorist attacks in Australia, and neither involved precursor chemicals.201 Additionally, focused counter-terrorism efforts conducted by intelligence and law enforcement agencies have resulted in the apprehension of terrorists plotting events in Australia.202-206 CANADA Natural Resources Canada’s Explosive Safety and Security Branch administers the Explosives Act and Explosives Regulations for the safe and secure handling of explosives.207 The Explosives Act: • requires anyone working with explosives to have a license, certificate, or permit issued by the Minister of Natural Resources; • makes exceptions to this requirement for some explosives and storage activities and for the use of certain low-hazard explosives, low-hazard pyrotechnic devices, sporting ammunition and consumer fireworks; and • covers fireworks, pyrotechnics, propellant powders, ammunition, rocket motors, and restricted components. Part 20 of the Explosives Regulations discusses the sale of and security plans for restricted components. The restricted components are the chemicals listed in Table 4-1 under the Canada heading. The sellers of restricted components must apply to sell the restricted component or to manufacture a product containing a restricted component. The application includes the applicant’s personal information, the restricted components to be sold, the address of each location where a restricted component will be stored or sold and the storage capacity, and the name and personal information for the contact person for each location where a restricted component will be stored or sold. If AN is to be sold, the applicant must also submit a security plan and notify purchasers and/or transporters of security requirements, in addition to producing annual inventory reports that are delivered to the Explosives Regulatory Division (ERD) Chief Inspector of Explosives. The purchaser of any restricted component must provide photo ID and state the intent of use. Since the implementation of this regulation, the ERD has seen an increase in products approved for sale in Canada, an increase in importation permits, and has increased its compliance monitoring activities. The ERD developed a rating system for assessing the number and types of deficiencies found during inspections. They noted a decrease in reported deficiencies as a result of their compliance monitoring and assessments.208 It is unclear whether the Explosives Act has had any impact on terrorism in Canada. Since 2009, Canada has charged 21 individuals with terrorism-related offenses that have been associated with bomb-making activities.209 PREPUBLICATION COPY: UNCORRECTED PROOFS

International Regulations 69 SINGAPORE Singapore has been targeted by terrorist groups, and remains at a relatively high security alert. It has partnered with other nations in counter-terrorism.210-212 It has also conducted major counter-terrorism related exercises in order to assess and refine its readiness for terrorist attacks.213 While there have not been terrorist attacks in Singapore, the country has developed proactive measures its borders to enhance and improve government agencies internal cooperation regarding precursor chemicals. In 2007, fifteen hazardous substances listed in the Environmental Pollution Control Act and Regulations were delisted, and instead listed in the Arms and Explosives Act.214-215 The majority of the hazardous substances appear on the prioritized list of precursor chemicals in this report (Table 4-1). The Arms and Explosives Act clearly details the concentrations at which a material would come under this regulation. Singapore implements a licensing program to import, export, possess, manufacture, deal in, or store any of the precursor chemicals. Possession is prohibited without a license. Application for a license can be made online or via phone. The license is precursor specific, and a licensee must undergo a background check and establish experience with and knowledge of how to handle the precursor chemical. All transactions must be recorded. EUROPEAN UNION The European Union (EU) passed Regulation 98/2013 on the use and sale of explosive precursors in September 2014.28 The policy action introduced a common regulatory framework across Europe regarding the “making available, introduction, possession and use, of certain substances or mixtures that could be used in the manufacture of home-made explosives.” The regulation restricts access to and use of seven restricted explosive precursors (listed in Annex I of the regulations) by members of the general public. EU member states (EU MS) may grant access to these substances to the public through a system of licenses and registration, but a ban is the default. In addition, the regulation introduces rules for retailers who place such substances on the market. Retailers must ensure the appropriate labeling of restricted precursor chemicals, and must also report any suspicious transactions involving either the restricted or other non-restricted substances that are considered items of concern (the latter listed in Annex II). Under the regulation, each of the EU MS designates a competent authority and implements the ban, licensing, or registration processes. The authority is required to set up its own national contact point(s) for the reporting of suspicious transactions. The European Commission (EC) is tasked with providing the list of measures and guidelines to facilitate implementation. The Standing Committee on Precursors The Standing Committee on Precursors (SCP) is an expert group composed of representatives of EU MS and of industry associations. It was established under the 2008 EU PREPUBLICATION COPY: UNCORRECTED PROOFS

70 Restricting Access to Explosive Precursor Chemicals Action Plan on Enhancing the Security of Explosives and is chaired by the EC.216,217 As depicted by the EC, the SCP provides a platform for EU MS and representatives of the operators in the supply chain to exchange information and share lessons learned on implementation.191 It also helps facilitate the implementation of Regulation 98/2013 with the goal of limiting the general public’s access to precursor chemicals and encouraging that suspicious transactions and significant disappearances and thefts throughout the supply chain be reported appropriately, while seeking minimal market disruption. To create awareness in support of these goals, the SCP has issued guidance materials to inform the EU MS’ authorities and retailers of their roles and responsibilities under the regulation (see Appendix F). Labeling, which is required, is another tool that can be used to raise awareness, but might not enhance security. For example, labeling might inadvertently alert bomb makers that a product can be used to make bombs. If the purpose of labeling is to provide retailers with information on targeted products so that they can meet their legal requirements, then retailers need to be able to get the information on products from manufacturers and/or suppliers; thus, notification in shipping materials, might be as useful as labels, without jeopardizing security. The questions of the intended target of labeling (i.e., the customer or the retailer) and the purpose of labeling have not been answered.218 Compliance Effectiveness Regulation 98/2013 defaults to a ban unless the EU MS tailor the regulation to meet their specific circumstances (i.e., licensing and/or registration). According to the EC’s January 2017report,191 most EU MS were in compliance; the report included the following highlights: • all EU MS identified one or more points of contact for suspicious transaction reporting and thefts; • twenty-three EU MS were in full compliance, and had set rules and penalties, disseminated the implementation guidelines and notified the EC of exceptions that would require licensing or registration; and • five EU MS were in partial compliance, having not developed rules or penalties. To promote compliance, the EC established regular bilateral discussions focused on implementation and potential regulation compliance issues with some EU MS.219 An updated list of measures is available via the EC, which details each member’s choice with regard to regulatory strategy (Figure 4-1).220 PREPUBLICATION COPY: UNCORRECTED PROOFS

International Regula ations 71 FIGURE 4-1. Implementation of Regulation 98/2013 by country. S: the country licenses or E n y : y registers a subset of the precursor list. t While some EU MS have opt for the default, a ban on public a M ted n access, other have chose rs en combinat tions of licen and reg nses gistration. Th is signif here ficant variati in the pro ion ocesses for requestin licenses, including the criteria on which the re ng i e equests are eevaluated for approval or r r refusal, and the lengt and type of validity. Some EU MS accept that the request for a license a th o S S t t should be granted un e nless there is a specific re eason to refu while ot use, thers refuse l licenses unle ess there is a specific reaason to grant them. Rates of licensing thus differ greatly from state to sta t s g r m ate, and there are no know instances of mutually recognized licenses. e wn s y d The EC also repo that som EU MS ha adopted additional m E orts me ave measures tha for examp at, ple, require reetailers to re egister with the authoritie and to per t es riodically de eclare all trannsactions, including imports; ex g xtend the sco of the regulation to c ope cover professsional users; determine condition for storage; foresee th exchange of relevant c ns he cross-border information with other EU r n MS; or establish a role for custom authoritie 191 Additio ms es. onally, most EU MS hav reportedly t ve y conducte awareness ed s-raising cam mpaigns that target the re etailers mark keting the pr recursor chemical Campaign aim to inc ls. ns crease awareeness about t obligatio to both res the on strict access and to report suspicious transactions. Some EU MS have acti t M ively engage online sup ed ppliers and marketpl laces. The United Kingdom’s Contr of Explosives Precur U rol rsors Regula ations 2014, w which applie to es 221 England, Scotland, an Wales (N , nd Northern Ireland is cover separatel red ly ), came into force on n PREPUBLIC P CATION CO OPY: UNCOR RRECTED P PROOFS

72 Restricting Access to Explosive Precursor Chemicals September 2, 2014, as a means to implement Regulation 98/2013, and provides a case study on a particular EU MS’s approach to implementation. The United Kingdom’s Home Office summarized the regulations as follows: • the public may obtain a three-year license to obtain and use the seven regulated precursor chemicals above their concentration thresholds, provided the applicants pass a background and medical check; • licenses may be issued subject to conditions, for example, storage, use, quantities, concentration, and reporting loss or thefts; • the supplier must verify the license and associated photographic identification of the purchaser and record the transaction details on the back of the license, and suppliers of Annex I substances must also ensure that such substances are labeled as restricted; and • any violation of the regulation is punishable with up to two years imprisonment or a fine or both, with the possibility of lesser penalties for lesser offenses, such as minor clerical omissions. As part of the regulatory process, the United Kingdom’s Home Office, in cooperation with the Ministry of Justice and Her Majesty’s Treasury, developed an impact assessment, much like a regulatory assessment in the United States (see Appendix G). The assessment considered the benefits, costs, and risks associated with doing nothing, or implementing a ban, licensing, or a registry in relation to three policy objectives: • prevent terrorists from using precursor chemicals to make explosives; • provide a mechanism for alerting authorities of illicit activities; and • minimize the burdens on industry and legitimate users. With that assessment, the United Kingdom chose to implement a licensing scheme, but not an accompanying registration program. Meetings with stakeholders suggested that an auxiliary registration program would create unnecessary confusion.222 Effectiveness The EC reports223 that Regulation 98/2013 has contributed to reducing the threat posed by precursor chemicals in Europe based on findings from meetings and consultations of the SCP and a study carried out by an independent expert consortium: • The amount of precursor chemicals available on the market has decreased. This is partly because many retailers are applying the restrictions or have opted to stop selling the chemicals and partly because, voluntarily, some manufacturers have stopped making them. The supply chain has not reported any significant disturbances or economic losses as a result of this. Also, in some EU MS that maintain licensing, PREPUBLICATION COPY: UNCORRECTED PROOFS

International Regulations 73 authorities have reported that the number of license applications is currently significantly lower than it was during the first year of application of the regulation. This suggests that members of the general public have successfully adopted alternative (non-sensitive) substances for continuing with their legitimate non- professional activities. • The capacity of law enforcement and designated authorities to investigate suspicious incidents involving precursor chemicals has increased. EU MS have reported an increase in the number of reported suspicious transactions, disappearances, and thefts due to greater awareness among retailers who handle precursor chemicals. In addition, some EU MS have, on an ad hoc basis, exchanged information on reports and refused licenses. Finally, the competent authorities in EU MS that maintain licensing regimes have a better understanding of which members of the general public are in possession of restricted substances and the purpose they intend to use them for. The EC has noted that it is not yet possible to assess the impact of the regulation on terrorist activities in more detail; however, they indicated in the meeting in Belgium that some EU MS have thwarted potential terrorist activities, suggesting that the application of the regulation has contributed to their efforts to prevent terrorist attacks involving HMEs.223 The EC also reported several challenges and costs, some of which are outlined below. Challenges and Initial Responses Preliminary evidence suggests that Regulation 98/2013 is contributing to security.191 For example, in the United Kingdom, successes in reporting dangerous activities are available via a government-sponsored podcast,224 and certain individuals who reportedly provided materials to terrorists have been identified.225 However, there are challenges and costs incurred in several area of implementation: • authorities have had difficulty reaching all suppliers to inform them of their duties; • authorities have had difficulty enforcing the restrictions and controls on internet sales, imports, and intra-EU movements, especially of small quantities; • retailers have had difficulty identifying products that fall under the scope of the regulation; • labeling, which is required, conveys risks of inadvertent disclosure; • businesses that operate across intra-EU borders face the challenge of compliance with multiple regulatory schemes; • economic operators have encountered difficulty determining whether the purchaser is a professional user or a member of the general public, because they do not have a process for establishing qualifications and verifying them (one unnamed country is PREPUBLICATION COPY: UNCORRECTED PROOFS

74 Restricting Access to Explosive Precursor Chemicals allegedly developing standardized industrial classification codes of those professions likely to need access); and • evolving security threats present a continuous challenge that requires regulatory adaptability. For a complete presentation of these challenges and some responses, see Box 4-1. GLOBAL SHIELD In an effort to mitigate the IED threat, the World Customs Organization, in conjunction with Interpol, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, and the US Immigration and Customs Enforcement, initiated a six month pilot Programme Global Shield (PGS) in November 2010.226The program was aimed at enhancing awareness and information sharing on the global movements of fourteen chemicals (see Table 4-1).227-228 The operations of the program included training and the establishment of national contact points with the responsibility of providing monthly shipping reports on these precursors. A centralized multilingual web-based communication channel was set up to report suspicious movements and act as a repository for project communications.229 The World Customs Organization endorsed the program as a long-term endeavor, with the overall objectives of the work to promote international cooperation to prevent precursor chemical diversion, interdict illegal shipments, and promote awareness among industry and other groups. . Between 2011 and 2014, PGS resulted in the seizure of 40 - 100 tons of precursor chemicals per year.230This increased dramatically in 2015 to about 544 tons of solid precursor chemicals, largely due to sustained seizures along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border by local agencies. The bulk of the amount (about 487 tons) consisted of AN and urea. In addition to precursor chemicals, PGS resulted in the seizure of detonators and completed HMEs and IEDs. PREPUBLICATION COPY: UNCORRECTED PROOFS

International Regulations 75 BOX 4-1 Challenges Arising from the Implementation of Regulation 98/2013 The EC reports a number of challenges relating to the implementation of Regulation 98/2013 and some initial responses. This box reproduces the relevant text of that report in its entirety.191 The main challenge for Member State competent authorities is the large number of operators affected by the restrictions and controls of the Regulation. Because many of the chemical substances and mixtures concerned by the Regulation are household products, the supply chain is significantly larger than that of other products subject to specific control provisions (e.g. drug precursors). Consequently, it has been challenging for competent authorities to reach all economic operators in the supply chain of explosives precursors to inform them of their duties. However, competent authorities have, in collaboration with the associations that represent the chemical industry and retail sector, conducted awareness-raising campaigns and engaged with a wide range of operators— from manufacturers to retailers, big companies to small independent stores, and internet sellers to marketplaces. Another challenge for Member State authorities is to enforce the restrictions and controls on internet sales, imports and intra-EU movements. Products having a large volume are often transported and sold in greater quantities (e.g. fertilizers), and are therefore relatively easier to identify and control. Conversely, other products are sold in small quantities and volumes, and are thus more difficult to intercept when they are shipped or transported into and across Europe. To address this problem, law enforcement and customs authorities are increasing their efforts to identify cases of illegal acquisition and possession by, for example, increasing inter-agency cooperation and exchanging information at EU level. A main challenge for economic operators, particularly those in the retail sector, has been to identify products that fall under the scope of the Regulation. Products containing restricted explosives precursors must be labelled accordingly. When that is not done early on in the supply chain, it is difficult for operators at retail level to properly verify that the label is affixed and that the restriction applies. In addition, the explosives precursors listed in Annex II of the Regulation that are not restricted do not have to be labelled. Economic operators, particularly those with high staff turnover, need to devote considerable time resources to identifying products of concern and training their staff appropriately. Economic operators that conduct business across intra-EU borders also face the challenge of having to adapt to the specific nature of the different regimes in each Member State. The Regulation allows Member State authorities to define key aspects of its application in their territory. Consequently, economic operators must be aware of the type of regime that applies in the specific Member State the product is destined for, and must register the sale, verify a license or ban the sale, accordingly. Some companies have robust due diligence internal procedures which facilitate compliance with complex regulatory frameworks. However, for companies without such procedures, often smaller companies, this is a time-consuming process. Finally, economic operators who sell to both members of the general public and other type of end-users have reported difficulty in assessing, with a reasonable degree of certainty, whether the person acquiring a restricted substance is acting for purposes connected with his trade, business or profession, or otherwise. Indeed, the Regulation does not specify criteria for evaluating what qualifies as professional or for checking professional credentials. These considerations are down to Member State authorities and, as a result, criteria may differ across different territories. A continuous challenge for the Commission is to keep abreast of the evolving security threat. In order to adapt the Regulation to the use of new chemical substances, or of new concentrations of the listed substances, the Commission relies on information and data from member states. In 2016, efforts channeled through the SCP have led to three threat substances being added to Annex II (see Annex II, Section 4). CONCLUSION The foregoing discussion of international policies and programs indicates differences and similarities among approaches, across venues and highlights the resulting challenges, some of which might pertain to a U.S. strategy and therefore merit further consideration in subsequent chapters of this report. While each country has taken different approaches toward regulation and PREPUBLICATION COPY: UNCORRECTED PROOFS

76 Restricting Access to Explosive Precursor Chemicals voluntary measures for eliminating broad access to precursor chemicals, the effectiveness of these programs is difficult to assess, let alone quantify. The avenues of terrorist attacks will not be equally likely given different laws and regulations between countries (e.g., the control of firearms in the United States versus the United Kingdom), and the threat environment in regards to physical locality; thus, for the purposes of controlling precursor chemicals, it is necessary to gather data on the international controls only as they relate to the goal of limiting access to the precursor chemicals, and not their ability to deal with terrorism as a whole. Market Level Policy in other countries tends to focus on retail-level, points-of-sale, whereas policy in the United States tends to focus on manufacturing, storage, and distribution. The EU defaults to a ban but allows flexibility for EU MS to implement licensing or registration for sales to the general public. Canada and Singapore have implemented similar licensing or registration measures for controlling access to precursor chemicals. By contrast, as described in Chapter 3, policy in the United States rarely addresses retail facilities or transactions, except in the case of agriculture. Preliminary evidence of the retail-level controls implemented in the EU indicates a decrease in the amount of precursor chemicals that are available on the market, and an increase in the reporting of suspicious transactions, but with some costs to commerce and legitimate users Responsible Entities Another difference between most of the countries described above and the United States is that precursor chemicals in the United States are not regulated by one responsible entity; this is similar to Australia, where authority is devolved throughout its federal system. In the United States, many federal and other agencies are involved to varying degrees along the supply chains, including DHS, DOT, EPA, and OSHA. Each maintains its own regulations and programs, intended to meet respective objectives for security, safety, the environment, and health. Because of this configuration, the committee found inconsistencies and possible gaps in coverage. For example, when CAN is stored in a facility, it is considered a hazardous material and falls under CFATS; however, when CAN is transferred to a wholesaler or distributor, DOT does not recognize CAN as a hazardous material and does not regulate it during transport. Harmonization The United States might face some of the same types of challenges that the EU has in its efforts to harmonize policy across EU MS. As the foregoing presentation of challenges and responses suggests, differences in implementation across member states might make it hard to enforce restrictions on internet sales, imports, and intra-EU trade, and might require costly adaptations. With open internal borders, the EU is only as secure as its most vulnerable point of purchase. If malicious actors cannot obtain a precursor chemical in one member state, they can try another. In the United States, differences between federal law, state law, and local ordinance, PREPUBLICATION COPY: UNCORRECTED PROOFS

International Regulations 77 and related concerns about the role of government, could present analogous challenges, depending on how policy unfolds going forward. In the 1998 Academies’ report, it was observed that “a criminal in the United States can easily purchase precursor chemicals in a state with few requirements and then use them anywhere in the United States.” Furthermore, malicious actors now have the option to purchase precursor chemicals online, another widely available means of interstate trade. EU regulations, PGS efforts, and HME collaborations between and among countries illustrate global cooperation in developing methods to minimize the broad access terrorists have to precursor chemicals. These efforts as well as country specific efforts will continue to increase compliance and awareness with current law enforcement security programs. While many countries conduct separate counter-terrorism response drills, cross border-drills can be conducted to understand the flow of information and resources and the change of custody. PREPUBLICATION COPY: UNCORRECTED PROOFS

Next: 5 Assessing Possible Control Strategies »
Reducing the Threat of Improvised Explosive Device Attacks by Restricting Access to Explosive Precursor Chemicals Get This Book
×
Buy Prepub | $64.00 Buy Paperback | $55.00
MyNAP members save 10% online.
Login or Register to save!
Download Free PDF

Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) are a type of unconventional explosive weapon that can be deployed in a variety of ways, and can cause loss of life, injury, and property damage in both military and civilian environments. Terrorists, violent extremists, and criminals often choose IEDs because the ingredients, components, and instructions required to make IEDs are highly accessible. In many cases, precursor chemicals enable this criminal use of IEDs because they are used in the manufacture of homemade explosives (HMEs), which are often used as a component of IEDs.

Many precursor chemicals are frequently used in industrial manufacturing and may be available as commercial products for personal use. Guides for making HMEs and instructions for constructing IEDs are widely available and can be easily found on the internet. Other countries restrict access to precursor chemicals in an effort to reduce the opportunity for HMEs to be used in IEDs. Although IED attacks have been less frequent in the United States than in other countries, IEDs remain a persistent domestic threat. Restricting access to precursor chemicals might contribute to reducing the threat of IED attacks and in turn prevent potentially devastating bombings, save lives, and reduce financial impacts.

Reducing the Threat of Improvised Explosive Device Attacks by Restricting Access to Explosive Precursor Chemicals prioritizes precursor chemicals that can be used to make HMEs and analyzes the movement of those chemicals through United States commercial supply chains and identifies potential vulnerabilities. This report examines current United States and international regulation of the chemicals, and compares the economic, security, and other tradeoffs among potential control strategies.

  1. ×

    Welcome to OpenBook!

    You're looking at OpenBook, NAP.edu's online reading room since 1999. Based on feedback from you, our users, we've made some improvements that make it easier than ever to read thousands of publications on our website.

    Do you want to take a quick tour of the OpenBook's features?

    No Thanks Take a Tour »
  2. ×

    Show this book's table of contents, where you can jump to any chapter by name.

    « Back Next »
  3. ×

    ...or use these buttons to go back to the previous chapter or skip to the next one.

    « Back Next »
  4. ×

    Jump up to the previous page or down to the next one. Also, you can type in a page number and press Enter to go directly to that page in the book.

    « Back Next »
  5. ×

    To search the entire text of this book, type in your search term here and press Enter.

    « Back Next »
  6. ×

    Share a link to this book page on your preferred social network or via email.

    « Back Next »
  7. ×

    View our suggested citation for this chapter.

    « Back Next »
  8. ×

    Ready to take your reading offline? Click here to buy this book in print or download it as a free PDF, if available.

    « Back Next »
Stay Connected!